Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant James Miller appealed the circuit court's order committing him to the custody of the Department of Mental Health under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), asserting that the State failed to try the case within sixty days of the probable cause hearing as mandated by the SVPA. In September 2001, Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under the age of sixteen years and criminal domestic violence. In May 2005, prior to his scheduled release date of December 1, 2005, the Department of Corrections referred Miller's case to the multidisciplinary team to assess whether Miller constituted a "Sexually Violent Predator" (SVP) as defined by the SVPA. Having determined that Miller satisfied the statutory definition of an SVP, the multidisciplinary team referred the case to the prosecutor's review committee. While the State assembled its case for committing Miller, it asked for several continuances. In January 2006, Miller filed a motion to dismiss the commitment hearing, arguing that the State's petition "should be dismissed with prejudice due to the State's failure to pursue the prosecution of this matter in a reasonably timely manner." Specifically, counsel claimed that the "case should have been tried on or before January 4, 2006 because [Miller's] continued incarceration beyond December 1, 2005 [was] certainly prejudicial." In opposition, the State claimed it had "good cause" for a continuance as the forensic psychiatrist, who conducted all of the state's SVP evaluations, was unable to complete the evaluation within the sixty-day time period. The circuit court conducted a hearing the same day the motion to dismiss was filed; however, the court did not rule on the motion but instead took it under advisement. The court issued an order denying Miller's motion to dismiss in July. Although the court expressed its displeasure with the State's routine delay in initiating the SVP process, it found the State's interest in proceeding with the SVP trial outweighed the prejudice to Miller. Additionally, the court found there was no substantial prejudice to Miller. The Court of Appeals affirmed Miller's civil commitment. Although the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's decision, the Court used this case as an opportunity to clarify certain procedural aspects of the SVPA. Specifically, Court considered the appropriate remedy when the State fails to timely conduct a civil commitment trial within the time provisions mandated by the SVPA. The Court held that if an inmate is granted a dismissal the proceedings should be dismissed without prejudice to the State. If the motion to dismiss is granted, the inmate may be released from custody while the State re-files its petition to the circuit court provided that the inmate has completed his sentence as determined by the Department of Corrections. View "In the Matter of James Miller" on Justia Law

In 2007, Appellant-Attorney James Brown was appointed to represent Alfonzo Howard. Mr. Howard was charged with multiple crimes, including first degree criminal sexual conduct, two counts of kidnapping, two counts of armed robbery and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime. From the beginning, Appellant complained about the appointment, first to the circuit's chief administrative judge, and then to the trial judge. The charges against Howard proceeded to trial.  During the trial, Appellant's belligerent unwillingness to comply with the court's order continued. The trial court, "displaying remarkable patience," only threatened Appellant with contempt and instructed Appellant to proceed.  Appellant then invoked his right to counsel.  The trial against Howard was briefly continued to allow Appellant's attorney to appear.  After consulting with his attorney, Appellant finally decided to continue with representation of the indigent defendant. The trial judge awarded costs for investigative work and expert fees, which was substantially in excess of the statutory cap of $500. However, the court denied Appellant's motion to award attorney's fees in excess of the $3,500 statutory amount. The sole basis for denying Appellant an award of fees in excess of the statutory cap was his unprofessional conduct.  During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court accepted an amicus curiae brief on behalf of the South Carolina Bar concerning the potential constitutional implications arising from the court appointment of attorneys to represent indigent clients.  The Supreme Court elected to address this matter of significant public interest.  The Court held that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is implicated when an attorney is appointed by the court to represent an indigent litigant.  In such circumstances, the attorney's services constitute property entitling the attorney to just compensation. However in this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion for denying Appellant fees in excess of the statutory cap for his behavior at trial. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision. View "Brown v. Howard" on Justia Law

This appeal was the culmination of the Town of James Island's (Town) third attempt to incorporate into its own municipal body. The two previous attempts were invalidated by the Supreme Court. In this case, the Court found that the Town's incorporation petition was again insufficient. In reversing a lower court's approval of the Town's petition, the Court took the opportunity to guide Petitioners with a legally sufficient framework for the Town and other unincorporated areas to successfully petition for incorporation in the future. View "Cabiness v. Town of James Island" on Justia Law

Respondent optometrist Steven Hobbs sublet space leased by Cole Vision Corporation (Cole Vision) from Sears Roebuck and Company (Sears) for his optometry practice. The sublease agreement between Hobbs and Cole Vision contained indemnity provisions whereby Hobbs agreed to defend Cole Vision and Sears against any and all liabilities arising from events occurring in Hobbs' business location or as a result of Hobbs' activities at the business. The agreement also purportedly required Cole Vision to retain copies of Hobbs' patient records. Pursuant to the agreement, Hobbs obtained professional liability insurance with NCMIC Insurance Company (NCMIC). Mary and John Lewis (the Lewises) sued Hobbs, Cole Vision, and Sears based on Hobbs' alleged malpractice in failing to properly diagnose and treat Mary Lewis. Cole Vision and Sears brought this action for declaratory relief after Hobbs and NCMIC refused to defend them in the malpractice suit. Although the Lewises' case was pending when Cole Vision brought this declaratory judgment action, it eventually settled. Cole Vision and Sears also sought judgment against Hobbs and NCMIC for defense costs and settlement amounts of the malpractice action brought by the Lewises. In response to the complaint, Hobbs filed a defense and counterclaim for negligent spoliation of evidence against Cole Vision and Sears stemming from the loss of Mary Lewis's patient profile sheet. Hobbs contended that Cole Vision lost the profile sheet, which was a key piece of evidence needed to defend the malpractice claim. According to Hobbs, he incurred costs and attorney fees as a result of his inability to adequately defend against the Lewises' claim for malpractice. Cole Vision filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that South Carolina does not recognize a cause of action for spoliation of evidence. The circuit court agreed and granted the motion to dismiss. Hobbs appealed the circuit court's order and the court of appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that Hobbs pled facts sufficient to constitute a general negligence cause of action. The court of appeals did not determine whether South Carolina recognizes a cause of action for negligent spoliation, instead reversing the circuit court based on its characterization of Hobbs' claim as a general negligence claim. Upon review of the record of the courts below, the Supreme Court found that Hobbs' claim that Cole Vision breached a contractual duty to maintain the document at issue remained a viable defense in his action for indemnification. The Court declined to recognize the tort of negligent spoliation of evidence and accordingly found that the circuit court properly dismissed it as a counterclaim. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cole Vision v. Hobbs" on Justia Law

Following the resolution of his partition action in probate court, Petitioner James Judy (James) filed a "waste" suit in circuit court against his brother, Respondent Ronnie Judy (Ronnie), for the destruction of a pond located on a tract of real property involved in the partition. A jury found in favor of James and awarded him damages. Ronnie appealed the jury's verdict, arguing the circuit court erred in declining to dismiss the suit against him on the basis of laches, collateral estoppel, or res judicata. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss Ronnie's suit on the basis of collateral estoppel and laches. However, the court reversed the circuit court's refusal to dismiss the suit on the basis of res judicata. The Supreme Court granted James's petition to review the appellate court's decision as to whether res judicata operated to preclude the waste lawsuit. James contended the prior probate court action was conducted for the limited purpose of partitioning the real property of the Estate. Because the subject matter of his waste claim was not identical to the partition action, James asserted that the requisite elements of res judicata were not satisfied. The Supreme Court found that because the tort duties that were breached and the evidence was the same in both the probate and waste proceedings, there was "identity of subject matter" for the purposes of res judicata. Yet in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, James attempted to "split" his cause of action for waste by pursuing and procuring another remedy in circuit court for an identical claim. Given the probate court could have fully adjudicated the waste cause of action, James was precluded from initiating a second lawsuit in the circuit court as this cause of action could have been raised in the former suit. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court's decision effectively dismissing James' appeal. View "Judy v. Judy" on Justia Law

Appellants the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), Office of Ocean and Coastal Resource Management (OCRM), and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League appealed a final order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) that granted Respondent Jerry Risher's "critical area permit" application to construct a bridge over a portion of wetlands contained within his property on Fripp Island. Respondent owns less than a half-acre, half of which is "upland high ground" or build-able property. The remainder of the property partially surrounds the build-able portion and is composed of wetlands. One year prior to Respondent's purchase of the lot, his predecessor in title applied to the DHEC and was approved for a critical area permit to construct a vehicular bridge across the non-build-able wetland portion of the lot to connect with the nearest vehicular road. In 2006, Respondent began to construct a bridge similar to the one previously submitted and approved by his predecessor in title. To that end, Respondent submitted a permit application to OCRM. OCRM took the matter under advisement but ultimately denied Respondent's application based on its finding that the upland build-able portion of the lot qualified as a coastal island which was too small to allow bridge access. After exhausting DHEC's review options, Respondent filed a request for review by the ALC. A hearing was held, and the ALC issued an order reversing DHEC's denial of Respondent's permit request. DHEC appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that there was insufficient evidence before the ALC to reverse its decision. Upon review of the briefs submitted and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found substantial evidence sufficient to support the ALC's decision. The Court affirmed the ALC's decision in support of Respondent. View "Risher v. South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control " on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a class action lawsuit brought by Appellants John Doe #53, John Doe #66, John Doe #66A, John Doe #67, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Rachel Roe. The plaintiffs in the underlying class action consisted of two classes: one for victims of childhood sexual abuse by agents of the Diocese and one for the spouses and parents of victims. A settlement in the class action was approved by the trial judge over Appellants' objections. Appellants moved to alter or amend the order approving the settlement. While Appellants' motion to alter or amend was pending, they reached a separate settlement agreement with the Diocese and class counsel. This agreement provided that the Diocese would pay Appellants $1.375 million to their settle claims, in exchange for Appellants' agreement to opt out of the class action, execute releases, and withdraw all pending motions and objections with prejudice. Appellants presented several issues for the Supreme Court's review, including some relating to the trial court's approval of the settlement agreements. Upon consideration of the arguments presented by the class, the Supreme Court found that due to the executed settlement agreement, there were no issues for further consideration. The Court dismissed the appeal as moot. View "Doe v. Bishop of Charleston" on Justia Law

The Town of Rockville is listed in the National Register of Historic Places. Appellant Marc Merrill owns a historic home in Rockville. The property abuts a marsh. Appellant obtained a permit from the state Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) to construct a dock and walkway on property he owned in Respondent Town of Rockville (Rockville). He then sought approval to construct the dock from the Rockville Design Review Board DRB which, pursuant to a newly adopted municipal ordinance, had to approve the construction of any dock or walkway already permitted by OCRM. The DRB declined to approve construction, and Appellant unsuccessfully appealed to circuit court. Although appellants raised numerous issues on appeal, the Supreme Court addressed only whether the evidence presented to the DRB was sufficient to support its conclusion that Appellant's proposed dock and walkway would impede a scenic rural view. Upon consideration of the DRB's review of Appellant's dock proposal, the Court found that there was simply nothing in the record to support the DRB's finding. Accordingly, the Court reversed both the DRB's and circuit court's decisions in this case, and remanded it for further proceedings. View "Rockville Haven v. Town of Rockville" on Justia Law

Appellant Friends of the Hunley, Inc., (Friends) is a non-profit corporation dedicated to the recovery and conservation of the H.L. Hunley Confederate submarine. In 2001, Petitioner Edward Sloan submitted a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request to Friends seeking a list of documents pertaining to Friends' corporate structure and legal relationship with the Hunley Commission, a state agency. Friends denied that it was subject to FOIA and declined to produce the documents. In 2001, Mr. Sloan filed a complaint seeking production of the documents based on Friends' status either as a public body under FOIA or as an alter ego of the Hunley Commission. Approximately one month later, Friends fully complied with Mr. Sloan's document request, but stated that it was not tendering the documents "due to any concession that [Friends] is subject to the Freedom of Information Act," but "in the spirit of cooperation." Following a series of cross-motions, the trial court granted Friends' motion for summary judgment, finding Mr. Sloan lacked standing to maintain the action and that there was no controversy since Friends had produced the very documents sought in the complaint. Following a Supreme Court decision in the case, Mr. Sloan moved in the trial court for an award of attorney's fees under FOIA. In 2009, the trial court granted Mr. Sloan's motion and awarded attorney's fees to include those incurred from the beginning of the litigation up to the granting of the motion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Friends challenged the FOIA-based attorney's fee award to Sloan. Specifically, Friends argued Sloan was not a prevailing party and, in any event, was not entitled to relief beyond the date the requested documents were produced. Upon consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that Mr. Sloan was the "prevailing party" and the trial court properly awarded him attorney's fees. However, in view of the law of this case in from the earlier decision, the Court found that the trial court erred in awarding fees beyond the time that Friends provided the requested information to Mr. Sloan. The Court partly affirmed, and partly reversed the lower court decisions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Sloan v. Friends of the Hunley" on Justia Law

Appellants Larry and Jeannie Boiter were injured when the motorcycle they were riding collided with a car driven by Nancy Kochenower at an intersection. The red light signal bulb for the road Ms. Kochenower was traveling on had burned out earlier that day. The Boiters suffered significant injuries. They settled with Ms. Kochenhower for her policy limits and sued Respondents the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT) and the South Carolina Department of Public Safety (SCDPS), alleging negligence in their failure to prevent the accident. At trial, a jury found in favor of the Boiters and awarded them a total of $1.875 million. Respondents filed motions for "judgment notwithstanding the verdict," for a new trial, and to reduce the amount of the verdict pursuant to the state's Tort Claims Act. In response, the Boiters filed a motion to challenge the constitutionality of the two-tier cap in the Tort Claims Act. In the alternative, the Boiters argued that Respondents' negligence constituted two separate occurrences of negligence under the Act (one for each Appellant), and as such, were entitled to separate damages awards. The circuit court denied all parties' motions, and found that there was only one occurrence of negligence. The court reduced the damages to $600,000. Upon careful consideration of the arguments and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court affirmed part and reversed part of the trial court's order. The Court found that the two-tier statutory cap on damages is constitutional, but that more than one occurrence of negligence occurred at the time of the accident. The Court remanded the case for reconsideration of the damages award. View "Boiter v. South Carolina Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law