Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Terrance Edwards appealed a circuit court order that denied him post conviction relief. Petitioner was indicted for murder, robbery, and grand larceny. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner alleged that his attorney was ineffective for failing to interview a witness whose testimony could have exonerated him. Testimony by Petitioner's trial counsel revealed that it was a strategic decision not to interview the witness. The lower court determined that Petitioner failed to establish any resulting prejudice from his attorney's actions. Upon review of Petitioner's arguments, the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found probative evidence to support the lower court's conclusion. The Court dismissed petitioner's application for post conviction relief and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Edwards v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Najjar Byers unsuccessfully appealed the circuit court's denial of his motion to strike a witness' testimony at trial. On an evening in June 2005, a bingo hall was robbed at gunpoint. Police stopped a car after noticing its occupants were not wearing seat belts. Petitioner was a passenger in the car, along with three others. The driver gave police permission to search the car. Police found a cash register till, two handguns and two ski masks. The officer then received a bulletin from his radio that police were looking for a vehicle that matched the description of the car he had just pulled over. The officer took the car's occupants into custody. Petitioner was the only sober occupant at the time of the arrest. The key issue in this case was whether or not Petitioner was a passenger in the car at the time of the robbery. At trial, the State presented contradictory testimony from two of the other occupants. When defense counsel examined the other occupants, they testified they were either too drunk or too high to remember whether Petitioner was in the car. Petitioner moved to strike testimony by the occupants that he was in the car which was denied. Petitioner moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State's evidence that was also denied. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the trial and appellate courts erred in convicting him based on the evidence presented at trial. "With the greatest respect for the learned opinion of the court of appeals," the Supreme Court could "not understand the basis for its conclusion." The Court concluded, "another rational conclusion could have been reached by the jury." The Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Byers" on Justia Law

Appellant Don Phillips was the sole shareholder and officer in Crystal Lake Land Developers, Inc.(CLLD). In 1979, CLLD began developing Crystal Pines, and deeded all the roads in Crystal Pines to the Crystal Lake Road Company. In the mid 1980s, the Road Company operated as a simple homeowners association, but eventually changed its name to Crystal Pines Homeowners Association (HOA). CLLD attempted to execute a second deed to reflect the change of the Road Companyâs name to the HOA. The second deed stated that the HOA would be responsible for fixing the roads in Crystal Pines. In 1980, CLLD constructed a boat ramp that many of the homeowners used regularly. In 2004, CLLD gated and locked the boat ramp, and later conveyed title of the ramp to his son. The son then transferred title of the ramp to the Crystal Pines Yacht Club, which continued to keep the ramp locked from the residents. The HOA filed suit against Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club over who was responsible for maintaining Crystal Pinesâ roads, and for access to the boat ramp. The master-in-equity ruled in favor of the HOA, and Phillips, CLLD and the Yacht Club appealed. The Supreme Court found the deed in question unambiguous pertaining to who was responsible for fixing the roads. The Court found that CLLD and Phillips are not responsible for maintaining all of Crystal Pinesâ roads, only those roads they damage as a result of their development efforts. However, the Court found the mater did not err in finding that the HOA had established a prescriptive easement in its use of the boat ramp. The Court affirmed part and reversed part of the lower courtâs decision, and remanded the case for further proceedings on that which it reversed.

AnMed Health admitted liability to Respondent Elise Burke stemming from a trial held in 2005. Respondent was injured from a preoperative procedure, and the jury awarded her $250,000 in damages. AnMed appealed the verdict, arguing that the trial court made several mistakes in the proceedings, which ultimately entitled it to a new trial. Specifically, AnMed looked to the state's "thirteenth juror" doctrine which allowed a trial court to grant a new trial if it determined the jury verdict was "contrary to the fair preponderance of the evidence." The Supreme Court conceded that the thirteenth juror doctrine grants a trials court very broad discretion in determining whether a new trial is warranted, and the Court agreed that the jury verdict in this case was "generous." However, the Court found the trial judge's ruling to deny AnMed's motion for a new trial was within his discretion, and affirmed the lower court's decision.

Gregory and Kerry Brown appealed the circuit court's confirmation of an arbitration award that was granted to their former general contractor C-Sculptures. C-Sculptures built the Browns' house. The Browns claimed C-Sculptures was precluded from enforcing a contract between them because the contractor's license limited the contractor to work totaling $100,000. C-Sculptures' final invoice totaled over $800,000, and when the Browns refused to pay, the contractor placed a lien on their property for the unpaid amount. The arbitrator awarded C-Sculptures the money it was owed, and the Browns appealed the arbitrator's award to the circuit court, arguing that the statutory limit on the contractor's license limited payment to $100,000. On review, the Supreme Court found that the arbitrator followed the statutory scheme to make his determination in favor of the contractor. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the lower court's confirmation of the arbitrator's award.

George Grumbos (Husband) contested the family court's decision to impute certain income to him when it granted his wife Demetra Grumbos' temporary and permanent alimony. In its final order, the family court found both parties were underemployed, and both were able to work. Based on his past W2s, the court imputed $4,500 per month to the Husband, which was more than he was actually earning at the time. In assessing the parties' debts, the court considered three promissory notes the Husband executed, loaning his brothers and parents over $100,000. Based on these findings, the court awarded the Wife $630 per month as alimony. The Husband challenged the court's calculation of the Wife's alimony award. The Supreme Court found that the family court properly weighed the testimony and evidence, and accurately assessed the Husband's income. However, in its holding, the Court found that the family court erroneously made the Husband pay the Wife's attorney's fees. The Court affirmed the alimony award, but reversed the award of attorney fees and remanded the case for further proceedings.

"The Hamlets" is a subdivision within Crowfield Plantation. Covenants for the subdivision were drafted and recorded in 1991. The covenants created an Architectural Review Board that would enforce the terms of the covenants of the subdivision. Respondents John and Pamela Matsell live in the Hamlets, and their lot abuts a golf course. Their next door neighbors built a fence that covers the majority of the backyard that can be seen from the street that fronts the property, in violation of the covenants. In 2007, the Matsells filed a complaint with the Architectural Review Board to have the Board order the neighbors to remove the fence. When the Board did not comply, the Matsells filed their complaint with the circuit court. The Board argued that it had discretion in interpreting and enforcing the subdivision covenants. The trial court read the "clear language" of the covenants, and found the fence was in violation. The court granted the Matsells summary judgment, and the Board appealed. The Supreme Court found the language of the covenants was plain and unambiguous, and did not allow for a fence that could be seen from the street. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision granting the Matsells summary judgment.

Defendant James Miller appealed an order of the circuit court that tolled his probation while he was civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. In 1998, Defendant pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a minor, and other domestic violence charges. The trial court sentenced Defendant to 15 years: ten years' in prison and five years' probation for the lewd act charge. The circuit court found that Defendant would benefit from supervision, and tolled Defendant's probation until his release from commitment. Defendant appealed. The Supreme Court found that under the circumstances, tolling Defendant's probation was consistent with the spirit of rehabilitation and protection of the public. The Court affirmed the trial court's decision.

American Media Services, LLC (AMS) appealed an arbitration award that was decided in favor of former employee, Respondent Mark Steinmetz. Steinmetz claimed AMS breached his employment agreement, and the parties agreed to settle the dispute through arbitration. The arbitrator found in favor of Steinmetz. AMS filed a motion to have the award reconsidered by the circuit court, but the court entered judgment in accordance with the arbitrator's findings. The Supreme Court found in submitting its appeal, AMS did not appeal the order of the circuit court, it appealed the order of the arbitrator. Accordingly, the Court did not have jurisdiction over AMS' claim and dismissed it.

The Supreme Court reversed the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) and Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision against Appellant Peter Brown. Appellant is a Medicaid recipient who is disabled and mentally retarded. Appellant qualified for a program that allowed him to move from an intermediate care facility and into a supervised living facility for people with mental disabilities. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services waived the statutory requirement that individuals with mental disabilities live in an institution to have Medicaid pay for the associated expenses in the supervised living arrangement. In 2005, the center informed Appellant that it would terminate Appellant's 12-hour weekly one-on-one service that had allowed him to remain at the center and out of the institution. Appellant appealed to the DHHS; the hearing officer found that the one-on-one service was not eligible for Medicaid under the waiver because Appellant could not prove the service was necessary to keep him out of the institution. Appellant appealed to the ALC, and the ALC affirmed the DHHS hearing officer's decision. The Supreme Court, in review of the case found that the hearing officer did not have jurisdiction to hear Appellant's appeal, and found the ALC applied an incorrect legal standard. Accordingly, the Court vacated the ALC's order and remanded the case back to DHHS for an additional hearing.