Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Liberty Life Insurance Company denied insurance proceeds to Stephen Ney's beneficiary after toxicology reports reflected the presence of methamphetamine in Ney's blood when he was killed in a car accident. Respondent Hutchinson, Ney's daughter and beneficiary, sued Appellant for insurance benefits, arguing that the policy exclusion for injury resulting from an insured being "under the influence of any narcotic" did not apply to Ney's claim, because methamphetamine isn't a narcotic. The circuit court granted Respondent summary judgment on the ground that methamphetamine is not a narcotic within the definition of the policy. In this appeal, Appellant argues that the circuit curt erred in granting summary judgment when the plain and ordinary meaning of the term "narcotic" is understood by laypersons, and that he operative language of the policy, "under the influence of any narcotic" was taken verbatim from the state insurance code. On review of the case, the Supreme Court found Appellant's argument persuasive, and reversed and remanded the case to the lower court for further consideration.

Appellants Hanson Brick America, Inc and Zurich North America appeal the circuit court's order reversing the appellate panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Respondent Lawson's knee problems were not causally related to his back injury sustained on the job, and the awarding Respondent temporary total disability benefits. Respondent, a fork lift operator, was injured while moving a bag of motor. Diagnosed with degenerative disk disease, Respondent underwent surgery and had bones fused and screws inserted in his spine. Following surgery, Respondent still suffered from back pain; several months later, he developed pain in both knees that affected his ability to walk. Respondent filed a Form 50 with the Commission to report his injuries, and seeking temporary total disability benefits. Appellants challenged Respondent's claim. The Commission's hearing officer ruled that Respondent was entitled to receive temporary total disability benefits, but that the pains in his knees were not a compensible injury. Prior to the Commission's final order, Respondent sought to have newly discovered evidence admitted for the Commission's consideration; Appellants objected, but the commissioner determined that Respondent, in addition to benefits for his back injury, should also receive compensation for his knee pain. On review of the records, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's determination that Lawson was entitled to temporary total disability benefits and further evaluation of his knees, and remand the case back to the appellate panel for reconsideration of all evidence.

Defendant-Appellant Lawrence Burgess appeals his conviction for possession of crack cocaine with the intent to distribute. In his appeal, Defendant questioned the validity of a multijurisdictional narcotics enforcement agreement, the admissibility of an arresting officer's employment records, and the circumstances under which a trial judge must charge "mere presence." Defendant was arrested outside the town limits of Batesburg-Leesville by a Batesburg-Leesville officer. The officer was acting within a multijurisdictional drug enforcement unit agreement (NET agreement) signed by the Batesville-Leesville Police Department. The agreement covered all of Lexington County, which included the area outside the Batesville-Leesville town limits. Defendant alleged the officer did not have the authority to arrest him. The trial judge found the NET agreement valid, and that the officer had authority to make the arrest. Defendant then sought to have the arresting officer's employment records admitted into evidence to attempt to portray him as an "overzealous narcotics officer." The trial judge sustained the state's objection to the records' admission. Defendant also argued that none of the witnesses could testify that Defendant actually possessed the crack cocaine which was found on the ground at his arrest. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider whether Defendant had actual possession, but offered no definition of "mere presence." On review of the case, the Supreme Court found no reversible errors in the lower court's decision, and affirmed Defendant's conviction.

Appellant-Defendant Tyquan Jared Amir Jones was charged as a juvenile with murder, armed robbery and unlawful possession of a pistol. The family court waived jurisdiction and ordered Defendant be treated as an adult. Defendant plead to a lesser charge pursuant to a plea agreement. On appeal, Defendant argued the family court erred in waiving jurisdiction because it did not properly apply state law in its order, and that statements he made to police should not have been used against him because his mother was not present when he signed the waiver of rights form. The Supreme Court found that the family court properly considered all of the Kent factors in deciding to waive jurisdiction. The Court also found that Defendant never argued the statement was involuntary at trial. Finding no reversible errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision.