Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, Decedent Robert L. Gilmore executed his Will, which was filed with the probate court upon his death in August of 2010. He bequeathed his entire estate to Respondents Francis D. Daniels and Patricia C. Daniels, who are unrelated to Decedent. Appellant Jennifer Turner was born on November 8, 1972. It is undisputed that Appellant and Decedent did not know each other, but she later learned that Decedent was her biological father. Appellant filed a claim of inheritance with the probate court based on section 62-2-302(b) of the South Carolina Code. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether Appellant qualified as a pretermitted child. Because the presumed facts of this case fell outside the clear language of section 62-2-302(b), the Supreme Court concluded that the probate court, and the circuit court on review, correctly dismissed Appellant's claim. View "Turner v. Daniels" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case was a court of appeals' finding that Wachovia Bank, N.A. committed the unauthorized practice of law in closing a home equity loan in 2001. In 2001, Michael Coffey obtained a home equity line of credit from the Bank, using a Hilton Head Island home as collateral. While the mortgage documents the Bank prepared contained language that Michael owned the home, he was not on the title to the home. It belonged to his wife Ann alone. Ann did not sign the line of credit papers. The money was used to purchase a sailboat, the title of which placed in the name of A&M Partners, a company both Michael and Ann jointly owned. Michael made payments on the boat from a personal checking account. He died in 2005, and Ann continued to make payments from the same personal checking account until she decided to sell the boat through a broker. The Broker checked the status of the Bank's loan. It informed Ann that there was no lien or mortgage on the boat. Believing that the boat was then paid for, she sold the boat in 2006 and stopped making payments. Six months later, the Bank filed a foreclosure action against Michael's estate. Ann moved to dismiss, and the trial court granted her motion for summary judgment, citing the Bank's failure to perform due diligence to see that Michael did not own the property the Bank used as collateral for the loan. Finding that the Bank never held a valid mortgage, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant summary judgment. View "Wachovia Bank v. Coffey" on Justia Law

In 1999 and 2001, Respondent John Hollman went to Appellants TLC Laser Eye Centers, LLC and the TLC Laser Center (the Centers) for a series of eye surgeries. In the several years following the surgeries, respondent's vision deteriorated. He sued the Centers' doctors and the Centers themselves alleging medical malpractice. Respondent's wife sued for loss of consortium. Respondents requested a patient database the Centers maintained through the discovery process. The Centers resisted, but was eventually ordered to produce the database under a protective order. While this case was still pending, respondents joined a class action against appellants. Before the database was produced, the parties entered into a settlement agreement in which they settled all their personal state and federal claims. The Centers were subsequently dismissed from the litigation. Respondents' claims against the doctors continued. As a result of the settlement, respondents withdrew as lead plaintiffs in the class action, and a new plaintiff took their place. The class action plaintiff requested the database. Appellants filed a notice of motion and motion for rule to show cause, motion to modify the protective order, and motion for sanctions in the class action although they were no longer parties in that action. The class action court issued an order denying the motion. Appellants moved for reconsideration. Respondents then settled their individual claims against the remaining state court defendants. Appellants moved the court to order respondents' counsel to prepare an order denying appellants' Rule 59(e) motion or, in the alternative, that the court prepare such an order. The trial court held a hearing on the motion denied it in part and granted it in part. It denied appellants' motion for reconsideration, finding it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over appellants' request as a result of the dismissal of the case. Notwithstanding this finding, it also held that settlement and dismissal of the case operated as a final adjudication, barring further litigation of pre-settlement violations of the protective order. It held appellants waived their right to a written order denying the Rule 59(e) motion by failing to respond to respondents' counsel's letter advising of the impending dismissal of the case without an order on appellants' Rule 59(e) motion. With respect to the protective order, the court held it retained jurisdiction to hear appellants' request for return of the database and granted their motion for its return. Upon direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the issue was the denial of a motion for entry of a ruling on a motion for reconsideration and the motion for rule to show cause, for sanctions, and for modification of a protective order. The Court concluded that the trial court erred when it held it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order ruling on appellants' motion for reconsideration after the action had been dismissed when a protective order governed disclosure of certain materials discovered in that action. View "TLC Laser Eye Centers v. Woolfson" on Justia Law

Appellant Thalma Barton appealed an Administrative Law Court's order that affirmed the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services' (DPPPS) decision to deny her parole. Although two-thirds of the members of the Parole Board voted in favor, the Board ultimately denied parole, citing the seriousness of Appellant's offense. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Administrative Law Court erred in interpreting the two-thirds provision requiring Appellant to obtain five Parole Board votes instead of four, and that retroactive application of that provision constituted an ex post facto violation. Because Appellant received the necessary number of votes, she should have been granted parole. The Court therefore reversed the Administrative Law Court's decision. View "Barton v. SCDPPP" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the failure to complete a mediation conference in a timely manner does not divest a trial court of jurisdiction, and dismissal is not mandated. South Carolina Code 15-79-125 requires a pre-suit mediation process for medical malpractice claims, and that the conference be completed within a 120-day period, which may be extended. The issue before the Court centered on whether the failure to complete the mediation conference in a timely manner divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction and required dismissal. The contrary decision of the trial court was reversed and the case remanded for the pre-suit mediation process to be completed. View "Ross v. Waccamaw Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Lawton Limehouse, Sr. ("Father") and Lawton Limehouse, Jr. ("Son") each sued attorney Paul Hulsey, and his law practice (collectively, "Hulsey") for defamation arising out of statements Hulsey made about L&L Services, LLC ("L&L"), a staffing agency they owned. Local newspapers published articles concerning housing raids performed on homes rented by L&L and fines assessed for overcrowding, inadequate heating and plumbing, and running illegal boarding houses. Hulsey filed a class action lawsuit in federal court on behalf of former employees of L&L, alleging violations of the RICO Act and other state and federal laws. One article quoted Hulsey as stating that L&L engaged in a "classic racketeering scheme . . . just like Tony Soprano." Neither Father nor Son was mentioned by name in the article. The case was moved to federal court based on the RICO claim; the federal court remanded the case back to the state court on the ground it lacked federal question jurisdiction over the issues presented. After the remand, the state court clerk of court entered a default against Hulsey. Following a damages hearing, a jury awarded Father $2.39 million in actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages. While the appeal in Father's case was pending, a damages hearing was held for Son's case. A jury awarded Son $1 million in actual damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages. Hulsey appealed both judgments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the state court proceedings were void as the lack of a certified remand order precluded the state court from resuming jurisdiction over the cases. The cases were remanded back to the circuit court to start over from the procedural point at which the state court received a certified remand order from the federal court. View "Limehouse v. Hulsey" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression centering on the foreclosure on a member of a limited liability company's (LLC) interest under the South Carolina Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. Kriti Ripley, LLC and Emerald Investments, LLC formed Ashley River Properties II, LLC for the purpose of developing a parcel of property. Emerald made in-kind contributions for its share in Ashley River II, and Kriti contributed cash. Immediately, Emerald and its sole member, Stuart Longman, diverted and misappropriated those funds. Upon learning of Emerald and Longman's wrongdoing, Kriti and Ashley River II obtained a judgment against Emerald and Longman, and Emerald was stripped of its voting rights in and management of Ashley River II. Since then, Emerald and Longman refused to pay any amount towards the judgment and instead have engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation. Kriti and Ashley River II obtained a charging order against Emerald's interest and later moved to foreclose on that interest. The circuit court denied the motion for foreclosure. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to foreclose, finding that it failed to consider the likelihood of satisfaction of the judgment through distributions. The Court remanded the case for foreclosure and the sale of Emerald's interest in Ashley River II. View "Kriti Ripley, LLC v. Emerald Investments" on Justia Law

Employee-claimant Cathy Bone filed a workman's compensation claim for a work-related injury. The employer, U.S. Food Service, and its carrier Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America disputed the claim. The single commissioner and an Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission issued orders denying the claim. Under the procedure then in place, Bone appealed to the circuit court, which concluded the injury was compensable and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The employer appealed the circuit court's order, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis the order was not a "final judgment" and thus not immediately appealable because further proceedings were ordered before the administrative agency. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The high court subsequently granted a petition for rehearing filed by the employer, and it additionally granted the following two motions: (1) Bone's motion to argue against precedent, and (2) the motion of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association to accept its Amicus Curiae Brief in support of Petitioners. After considering the record in this matter, as well as the briefs and arguments, the Court adhered to its original decision to affirm. View "Bone v. U.S. Food Service" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Taylor appealed the post-conviction relief court's denial of relief on the grounds that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel though his plea counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of a guilty plea. He also argued that counsel failed to fully investigate one of the charges prior to his plea. Finding that Petitioner did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2001, Petitioner James Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under sixteen, and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature. He was sentenced for the lewd act to fifteen years in prison, suspended upon ten years of service and five years' probation. Petitioner was also to undergo counseling and have no contact with children while on probation. Probation began in 2005; however Petitioner was not immediately released, but referred for review as to whether he should be deemed a sexually violent predator (SVP) and subjected to civil commitment. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the question of whether Petitioner's probation for a criminal offense should have been tolled during his civil commitment as a SVP. The lower courts affirmed the tolling, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Miller" on Justia Law