Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1988, Respondents the Barnwell County Council passed an ordinance creating the Board of Trustees for the Barnwell County Hospital. The ordinance stated the Board was created "for the purposes of operating and maintaining adequate hospital facilities for the residents of Barnwell County[,]" and delineated the powers and duties of the Board. The ordinance also described the composition of the Board, set term limits, and provided members annual compensation. Over the years, the Council has passed various ordinances related to the Board. Appellants, former Board members, alleged that in 2009, during their time of service on the Board, the Council was developing a strategy in conjunction with Bamberg and Allendale Counties to close the respective county hospitals and create one hospital for all three counties. Appellants asserted the Council embarked upon various detrimental actions against the Hospital in connection with the strategy and maintain these actions financially crippled the Hospital. According to Appellants, when they resisted the Council's plan, which included the Hospital filing for bankruptcy, the Council voted to remove Appellants from the Board and appointed themselves as Board members. The Council, in their new, self-appointed status as Board members, placed the Hospital in bankruptcy. Appellants filed suit seeking a declaration that the Council violated the constitutional prohibition against dual office holding when it assumed positions as Board members. In response, the Council filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the claim presented a non-justiciable political question, and the dual office prohibition was not violated by what it termed a "vertical" duality. They cited no authority to support this unique theory. The circuit court granted the Council's motion to dismiss, finding the issue was a non-justiciable political question. Nevertheless, the circuit court addressed and rejected the dual office holding challenge. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in granting the motion to dismiss Appellants' declaratory judgment action, and reversed and remanded. View "Alexander v. Houston" on Justia Law

This matter began as a contested case in the administrative law court (ALC) brought by Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., (d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont)). The dispute arose out of Piedmont's contention that an urgent care center operated by a competitor, Carolinas Physicians Network, Inc. (CPN), was required to have a Certificate of Need (CON) or a Non-Applicability Determination (NAD) from the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). The ALC granted summary judgment to CHS and CPN on the basis the urgent care center was a licensed private physician's office and, thus, exempt from CON review as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding summary judgment was premature, and remanded to allow Piedmont the opportunity to conduct discovery. The Court of Appeals rejected DHEC's argument that the ALC did not have subject matter jurisdiction in this case because the agency had issued no staff decision subject to a contested case hearing. The Supreme Court granted DHEC's petition for a writ of certiorari as to the issue of jurisdiction and reversed. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in finding Piedmont has established the existence of a staff decision by DHEC that was properly the subject of a contested case hearing and in remanding the matter for discovery and further proceedings. View "Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court in this case centered on the interplay between the Subcontractors' and Suppliers' Payment Protection Act (SPPA), the Tort Claims Act (TCA), and the Court's opinion in "Sloan Construction Co. v. Southco Grassing, Inc. (Sloan I)," (659 S.E.2d 158 (2008)). When subcontractors Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. and Tindall Corporation (collectively Respondents) did not receive full payment from the general contractor Gilbert Group, LLC for their work on a public construction project for the City of Union, they filed suit, asserting the City failed to comply with the statutory bond requirements pertaining to contractors working with subcontractors on public projects found in the SPPA. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City. The court of appeals reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals decision, and affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Furthermore, the Court clarified "Sloan I" and held that a governmental entity may be liable to a subcontractor only for breach of contract for failing to comply with the SPPA bonding requirements. View "Shirley's Iron Works v. City of Union" on Justia Law

This case was one of two heard by the Court that presented the question of whether a pre-breath test videotape recording was required upon an arrest for driving under the influence (DUI) if the arrestee refused the breath test. At both trials, the trial court dismissed the DUI charges, finding that the arresting officers did not comply with section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) of the South Carolina Code by failing to videotape a twenty-minute pre-test waiting period. The same panel of the court of appeals affirmed defendant Ryan Hercheck's dismissal, but reversed defendant Justin Elwell's dismissal seven months later. Elwell appealed the reversal of the dismissal in his case, and the State appealed the dismissal of Hercheck's case. With respect to Elwell's case, the Supreme Court affirmed. The State argued that section 56-5-2953(A)(2)(d) does not require a law enforcement officer to videotape the entire twenty-minute pre-test waiting period once the arrestee refuses a breath test. Elwell argued that his case was simple, in that the videotape was produced, it was incomplete and therefore the statute was violated. Moreover, Elwell interpreted the statute's repeated reference to "conduct" to mean that the State was required to videotape all conduct, not just pre-test conduct, for the full twenty minutes. Here the Court disagreed and concluded that the court of appeals correctly and reasonably interpreted the applicable statute, concluding that only when the waiting period is required can the videotape recording also be required. On the other hand, if no test is administered, then the waiting period is rendered unnecessary, and so then is the videotape recording of that waiting period. View "South Carolina v. Elwell" on Justia Law

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order requiring that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her life pursuant to sections 23-3-540(C) and (H) of the South Carolina Code of Laws (Supp. 2011). When she was twenty-six years old, Appellant was indicted for lewd act on a minor in violation of Section 16-15-140 of the South Carolina Code (2006) as a result of her sexual relationship with a fourteen-year-old female. Appellant pled guilty and was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of three years and five years' probation. Upon her release, Appellant was notified verbally and in writing that pursuant to section 23-3-540(C) she would be placed on satellite monitoring if she were to violate the terms of her probation. Shortly thereafter, Appellant violated her probation. She did not contest any of these violations, though she did offer testimony in mitigation. At her probation revocation hearing, Appellant objected to the constitutionality of mandatory lifetime monitoring. In support of her arguments, Appellant presented expert testimony that she posed a low risk of reoffending and that one's risk of reoffending cannot be determined solely by the offense committed. The State offered no evidence, relying instead on the mandatory, nondiscretionary requirement of the statute. The circuit court found Appellant to be in willful violation of her probation and that she had notice of the potential for satellite monitoring. The court denied Appellant's constitutional challenges and found it was statutorily mandated to impose satellite monitoring without making any findings as to her likelihood of reoffending. The court also revoked Appellant's probation for two years, but it ordered that her probation be terminated upon release. This appeal followed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Appellant asserted that she had a fundamental right to be "let alone." The Supreme Court disagreed, and affirmed the circuit court. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc., employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. At the hearing, Petitioner testified to substantial head pain, loss of cognitive ability, and other brain-function-related symptoms, including inability to read without severe headache, loss of his mathematical abilities, inability to balance while standing or to walk without a cane, hand tremors, anxiety, and more. Petitioner argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed. Because "physical brain damage" as contemplated in S.C. Code Ann. 42-9-10 required "severe and permanent physical brain damage as a result of a compensable injury" and the Workers' Compensation Commission's finding that Petitioner did not suffer such brain damage was supported by substantial evidence in the record, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

Petitioner Brian Menezes served as the chief financial officer and interim chief executive officer of Safety Components International, Incorporated (SCI), from 1999 until 2006. SCI was a publicly traded Delaware company with its headquarters and principal place of business located in Greenville, South Carolina. In June 2006, SCI terminated Petitioner. Petitioner sued SCI, alleging, among other things, breach of contract and violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act. A short time after his termination, Petitioner exercised his stock options and became an SCI shareholder. The SCI board of directors entered into merger negotiations with the former International Textile Group (FITG). WL Ross & Company, LLC (Respondents), controlled both SCI and FITG. The SCI Board publicly announced the terms of the merger on August 30, 2006, with the filing of a Form 8-K with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On September 1, 2006, the SCI Board filed a Joint Proxy Statement/Prospectus (Form S-4) with the SEC. It was clear from the Form S-4, that due to Respondent's ownership role in SCI and FITG, the planned procedures at the 2006 Annual Meeting were a formality. Petitioner argued that Respondents breached their fiduciary duty to SCI's shareholders by approving merger terms which were unfair to SCI shareholders, failing to conduct due diligence regarding the financial condition of FITG, and failing to protect SCI's minority shareholders. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the court of appeals erred in its analysis of when a claim for breach of fiduciary duty accrued under Delaware law. The Supreme Court disagreed: "The court of appeals performed a knowledgeable and perceptive analysis of the instant case. However, our review of Delaware law leads us to a different conclusion regarding the efficacy of Petitioner's claim. Thus, we affirm the court of appeals' decision in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion." View "Menezes v. WL Ross & Company" on Justia Law

Defendant Myron Samuels was romantically involved with two women, Patricia Speaks and Carla Daniels, among others, but told each woman he was involved with her alone. Eventually, Speaks and Daniels learned of the other's relationship with Samuels. Daniels traveled to Speaks' home in Columbia, suspecting Samuels was there and wanting to confront him. Samuels was there, and after Daniels entered the home, she and Speaks began to discuss their situation. Speaks informed Daniels that Samuels was romantically involved with two additional women and that she had copied their telephone numbers from his phone. They then decided to call the other women in Samuels' presence, presumably to tell the others of "the health dangers inherent in Samuels' duplicity." While Daniels was speaking to one of the other women on the phone, she felt something touch her forehead. She looked up to see Samuels holding the barrel of Speaks' pistol against her forehead. Speaks began screaming, and Samuels then turned to her and threatened her with the gun. Samuels then fled from the home, and when Speaks ran after him to retrieve her pistol, Samuels hit her, knocking her to the ground. The women then called the police. Samuels was indicted for one count of assault with intent to kill. He challenged his conviction and sentence on the grounds the indictment was duplicitous. Because of the distinct risks created by duplicitous indictments, the Supreme Court held that an indictment is defective and entitles a defendant to relief if it is duplicitous, providing it results in prejudice to the defendant. Although the Court agreed the indictment was duplicitous, the Court found that Samuels was not prejudiced and accordingly affirmed his conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Samuels" on Justia Law

The Town of Hollywood filed suit against William Floyd, Troy Readen, and Edward McCracken (collectively, the developers) seeking a declaration that the developers could not subdivide their property without approval from the Town's Planning Commission and an injunction prohibiting subdivision of the property until such approval was obtained. The developers filed counterclaims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging equal protection and due process violations as well as various state law claims. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on its claims for equitable and declaratory relief, and also granted the Town's motion for a directed verdict on the developers' state law claims. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Town on the developers' due process claim, but awarded the developers $450,000 in actual damages on their equal protection claim. Both parties appealed. The Town argued that the circuit court erred in denying its motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on the developers' equal protection claim, and in granting the developers' motion for attorney's fees and costs. The developers argued the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Town on its claims for equitable and declaratory relief. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court concluded that the circuit court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the Town on its claims for declaratory and injunctive relief., but erred in denying the Town's motions for a directed verdict and JNOV because the developers failed to show the Planning Commission treated them differently than other similarly situated developers in the subdivision application process. View "Town of Hollywood v. Floyd" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the denial of petitioner Clarence Gibbs's second application for post-conviction relief (PCR). After being convicted by a jury of kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and unsuccessfully pursuing a direct appeal, Petitioner sought PCR on two grounds: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to contemporaneously object to the introduction of a lineup, a show-up, and in-court identifications; and (2) trial counsel was ineffective in failing to request a jury instruction on the law of alibi as part of the defense strategy. Finding that the trial court record did not support petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gibbs v. South Carolina" on Justia Law