Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2004, petitioner was adjudicated delinquent on charges of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and disturbing the schools,1 and committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) for an indeterminate period not to exceed his twenty-first birthday. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished decision by the Court of Appeals which held that trial court did not err in permitting a witness to give an opinion. The Court agreed with petitioner and found that the lay witness was improperly allowed to offer expert opinion testimony and that this error was not harmless. The Court therefore reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "In the Matter of Thomas S." on Justia Law

In October 2009, Appellant Serria Dawson was observed making false refunds to an accomplice while working as a cashier at Walmart. Appellant later confessed to making false refunds on multiple occasions, and with the assistance of two accomplices, defrauding Walmart of approximately $5,000. Appellant pled guilty to breach of trust with fraudulent intent (valued at more than $1,000 but less than $5,000). She was sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act to a term not to exceed six years, suspended upon five years' probation and payment of restitution. Appellant appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying her motion to be sentenced under the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act of 2010, which became effective after Appellant committed the crime but before she was sentenced. Prior to the sentencing hearing, Appellant filed a motion to be sentenced pursuant to the Act, which lowered the penalties for breach of trust. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion. Finding no error in the circuit court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Dawson" on Justia Law

Appellants Thomas and Vera Gladden appealed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to Respondent Palmetto Home Inspection Services, alleging the limit of liability provision in a home inspection contract was unenforceable as violative of public policy and as unconscionable under the facts of this case. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that contractual limitation of a home inspector's liability did not violate South Carolina public policy as expressed by the General Assembly and, as a matter of law, was not so oppressive that no reasonable person would make it and no fair and honest person would accept it. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's order granting summary judgment to the inspector. View "Gladden v. Palmetto Home Inspections" on Justia Law

Appellants owned property in North Myrtle Beach bounded by water on the west and north. In early 2007, they applied to the Department of Health and Environmental Control ("DHEC") for a critical area permit to construct a replacement bulkhead. DHEC issued a Critical Area Permit to Appellants. The permit included a special condition: "Provided the proposed bulkhead is placed in the same location as the existing bulkhead." In response to a complaint, a DHEC Enforcement and Compliance Project manager inspected Appellants' property and observed the replacement bulkhead was partially constructed in a different location along the northern property line and that fill dirt had been placed in the area between the house and new bulkhead. DHEC issued Appellants various written warnings, including a Cease and Desist Directive and a Notice of Violation and Admission Letter. However, follow-up inspections revealed Appellants continued to alter the critical area and construct the replacement bulkhead in a different, unauthorized location. Accordingly, DHEC sent Appellants a Notice of Intent to Revoke the permit. Thereafter, (in 2010) DHEC issued a separate administrative enforcement order assessing against Appellants a civil penalty of $54,0002 and requiring Appellants to restore the impacted portion of the critical area to its previous condition. However, rather than requesting a contested case before the ALC, Appellants filed an action in circuit court seeking judicial review of the Enforcement Order de novo and requesting a final order "overturning [DHEC's] [Enforcement Order] and decision dated [. . .] 2010, with prejudice[.]" The circuit court granted DHEC's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court found section 48-39-180 did not confer jurisdiction on the circuit court to review administrative enforcement orders issued by DHEC. Rather, the circuit court held such orders were administrative in nature and governed by the APA. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed dismissal of the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Berry v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Sarah W. (Mother) is the biological mother of a minor boy and a minor girl. In 2007, Mother and the children's father, Vaughn S. (Father; parents collectively, defendants), and the children resided in a home without heat, electricity, or running water. Mother arranged for her brother and sister-in-law, Thomas W. and Brittney W., to take primary responsibility for the children. The South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) requested that the family court issue an ex parte order granting DSS emergency protective custody of Boy. DSS alleged it had probable cause to believe that Boy faced imminent and substantial danger to his health or physical safety. The family court agreed, basing its determination on the fact that Defendants were "unable to provided[sic] even marginally suitable housing" for Boy, and finding that Thomas W. and Brittney W. "apparently abused a sibling" of Boy. The family court awarded emergency protective custody to DSS. The family court held a probable cause hearing and found sufficient probable cause to issue the ex parte order. The family court also found that Thomas W. and Brittney W. were no longer willing to maintain custody of Girl, and the court ordered DSS to take emergency protective custody of Girl. Ultimately DSS moved to terminate Mother's rights to both children; the appellate court disagreed with the trial court and reversed. Upon further review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court properly terminated Mother's parental rights, and reversed the appellate court. View "SCDSS v. Sarah W." on Justia Law

A jury convicted defendant Brad Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Upon review of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), the Supreme Court found that defendant did not present evidence that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the second prong of prejudice in analyzing Defendant's entitlement to PCR. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of defendant's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Barnes was convicted of throwing urine on a jailor and received a fifteen-year sentence consecutive to the sentence he was then serving. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's decision to have a twice deadlocked jury continue to deliberate in petitioner's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the trial court's decision violated the mandate of S.C. Code Ann. 14-7-1330 (1976) and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court reversed lower courts and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Brown challenged his conviction for grand larceny of two motor vehicles. On appeal, he argued: (1) whether the amendment to section 16-13-30 of the South Carolina Code should be applied retroactively to Appellant's case; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the amendment to the applicable statute in this case, 16-13-30, should not be applied retroactively: "Appellant's argument regarding the absence of a savings clause is merely an attempt to confuse the issues. . . Appellant clearly incurred liability for grand larceny at the time he committed the crime." Furthermore, the Court found that the stolen vehicles met the statutory monetary threshold for grand larceny. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether former foster parents had standing to petition to adopt a child placed for adoption by the Department of Social Services (DSS) with a different family. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the former foster parents possessed neither statutory or constitutional standing, and therefore vacated the order that granted the parents' petition, and remanded custody of the child to DSS for adoptive placement. "[R]ecognizing that children develop rapidly, and that stability and attachment are important components in their growth and development, [the Court directed] DSS to consider [the] child's present best interests in placing her for adoption." View "Youngblood v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Crisp, Jr. worked for Employer SouthCo, Inc., seeding grass and performing odd construction jobs. In 2004, Petitioner and other workers were installing silt fencing to combat ground erosion. Petitioner held a pole while another worker operated the Bobcat. As Petitioner bent down to reach for a pole, the bucket of the Bobcat fell on Petitioner, covering him. Petitioner suffered injuries to his head and hands. At the emergency room, Petitioner was treated for abrasions and bruises to the back of the head and neck and a complex fracture in his right hand. There was no mention of a brain injury in Petitioner's hospital records. Nearly two years after his injury, Petitioner's doctor opined that Petitioner sustained physical brain injury as a result of his 2004 injury. Petitioner's eventual workers' compensation claim for the brain injury was denied, and he petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's decision to reverse a circuit court's finding that he sustained a compensable brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further consideration of whether Petitioner sustained physical brain damage as contemplated under the Workers' Compensation Act which would entitle him to benefits for life. View "Crisp v. SouthCo." on Justia Law