Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A circuit court found Appellant David Cannon in contempt of court for violating (1) an order mandating that Appellant give up all authority and cease all activities relating to the James Brown estate, the Brown trusts, and all Brown entities (which he violated by filing amended tax returns without authority); and (2) an order requiring Cannon to pay back money he had misappropriated from Brown's estate. The circuit court ordered Appellant to be incarcerated for six months for contempt. However, the circuit court stated Appellant could purge himself of the contempt "by the payment of the aforementioned [money, with a portion] to be applied towards the payment of attorneys' fees incurred by the various parties, and the payment of a fine." The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings; upholding all of the circuit court's findings regarding the contempt except for the amount awarded towards attorneys' fees and the imposition of the fine. The Court of Appeals found the circuit court abused its discretion as to attorneys' fees because it did not make the necessary factual findings to support the amount awarded, so it "reverse[d] and remand[ed] the issue of attorneys' fees to the circuit court for findings of fact as to the proper amount. On remand, the circuit court held a hearing for the sole purpose of making findings of fact regarding the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for reimbursing the parties for attorneys' time related to the issue of Appellant's contemptuous conduct, and held that Appellant should pay. Appellant appealed this order, arguing payment of fees was mooted by his serving his jail sentence. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant pay attorneys' fees. Further, the Court held that the issue of attorneys' fees was not mooted by Appellant serving his jail sentence. View "Ex parte: Cannon v. Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

Respondent Deborah Spence alleged that attorney Kenneth Wingate breached a fiduciary duty to her as a former client in its handling of her late husband's life insurance policy. Mr. Spence was a member of United States House of Representatives, and he held a life insurance policy.  Mr. Spence named Mrs. Spence and his four sons from a prior marriage as the beneficiaries of the policy, with all five to receive equal shares of the proceeds. Wingate undertook representation of Mrs. Spence with regards to the assets of her husband, her inheritance rights, and her rights in his estate.  Wingate advised Mrs. Spence that she was entitled to nothing from her husband's estate and that she was barred from receiving an elective share by a prenuptial agreement. Wingate advised Mrs. Spence to enter into an agreement with the four adult sons of Mr. Spence to create a trust to provide her with a lifetime income stream. The trust was to be created and funded from one-third of the value of Mr. Spence's probate estate. Mrs. Spence thereafter came to believe that the amount she received under the agreement negotiated by Wingate was much less than what she was entitled to under the will and its codicil or if she had opted for an elective share. Mrs. Spence thereafter brought a lawsuit to set aside the agreement creating the trust. The agreement was eventually set aside. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Wingate and found that, "[b]y statute, [Wingate] owed no duty or obligation to [Mrs. Spence] in connection with the congressional life insurance policy or the manner in which it was paid." The Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment to Wingate and remanded the matter for trial. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Wingate owed a fiduciary duty to Mrs. Spence: "[t]his duty included, among other obligations, the obligation not to act in a manner adverse to her interests in matters substantially related to the prior representation.  … we uphold the decision of the Court of Appeals to reverse the grant of summary judgment and remand this matter for trial.  To the extent the Court of Appeals indicated whether a duty was owed was a question of fact for the jury, the decision is modified to recognize that whether a fiduciary relationship exists between two classes of persons is a matter to be determined by a court." View "Spence v. Wingate" on Justia Law