Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Russell Johnson was indicted on charges of kidnapping and criminal domestic violence in the first degree. The events leading to the indictment began in Marion County and progressed over the course of approximately thirteen hours into Dillon and Marlboro Counties, then back to Marion County. The trial court admitted evidence of Johnson's alleged acts of domestic violence in Dillon and Marlboro Counties and denied Johnson's request for a limiting instruction. Johnson was acquitted of kidnapping but was convicted of criminal domestic violence. The court of appeals reversed Johnson's conviction, holding the trial court erred in failing to issue a limiting instruction. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that though Johnson preserved the issue of a limiting instruction, he was not entitled to one. Therefore, it reversed the court of appeals and reinstated Johnson's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Mary Ann German was convicted of felony driving under the influence ("DUI") resulting in death and sentenced to eleven years' incarceration. Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress evidence of her blood alcohol content ("BAC") obtained through a warrantless blood draw, which was taken pursuant to section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code while she was hospitalized after an automobile accident. Finding that section 56-5-2946 was constitutional as applied and unchanged by the holdings of Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013) and Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438 (2016), the trial court denied the motion to suppress. The court concluded that law enforcement had probable cause to suspect Appellant of felony DUI and properly obtained the blood draw pursuant to section 56-5-2946. Appellant appealed her conviction based on the denial of her motion, and the court of appeals requested certification pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. The South Carolina Supreme Court agreed to consider whether the warrantless blood draw based on section 56-5-2946 violated Appellant's Fourth Amendment rights or her rights under the South Carolina Constitution and, in effect, whether section 56-5-2946 was constitutional. The Court concluded section 56-5-2946 was facially constitutional but unconstitutional as applied in Appellant's case. However, the Court found the trial court did not err in denying Appellant's motion to suppress because law enforcement acted in good faith based on existing precedent at the time of the blood draw. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. German" on Justia Law

Respondent Braden's Folly, LLC owned two small, contiguous, developed coastal properties on the northeast end of Folly Beach, South Carolina. The City of Folly Beach amended an ordinance to require certain contiguous properties under common ownership to be merged into a single, larger property. The ordinance did not impact the existing uses of Braden's Folly's contiguous lots. Nevertheless, Braden's Folly challenged the merger ordinance, claiming it had planned to sell one of the developed properties, and that the merger ordinance interfered with its investment-backed expectation under the test announced in Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). Folly Beach denied the claim of an unconstitutional regulatory taking. Pursuant to cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court agreed with Braden's Folly, finding the merger ordinance effected an as-applied taking of Braden's Folly's beachfront property. Folly Beach appealed the judgment in favor of Braden's Folly. Underlying the South Carolina Supreme Court's application of the Penn Central factors was the "distinct fragility" of Folly Beach's coastline, which was subject to such extreme erosion that the General Assembly exempted Folly Beach from parts of the South Carolina Beachfront Management Act. This exemption gave the city the authority to act in the State's stead in protecting the beach there. One of Braden's Folly's properties was contributing to worsening erosion rates on Folly Beach and, along with similarly situated properties, was threatening the existence of the entire beach in that area of the state. The Court concluded Braden's Folly had not suffered a taking under the Penn Central test. Therefore, the judgment was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of Folly Beach. View "Braden's Folly, LLC v. City of Folly Beach" on Justia Law

Petitioner Quincy Allen, a formerly death-sentenced inmate housed at Broad River Correctional Institution, appealed to the Administrative Law Court (ALC) the denial by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) of his grievance concerning visitation with persons not known to him prior to his incarceration. Following the ALC's dismissal of Petitioner's appeal, Petitioner appealed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the order of the ALC. Petitioner now sought certiorari review by the South Carolina Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the petition, dispensed with briefing, and affirmed the decision of the court of appeals as modified. The Court determined the court of appeals incorrectly analyzed the issue as one of "subject matter jurisdiction" when it affirmed the ALC's decision. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding that the denial of Petitioner's visitation with persons not known to him prior to incarceration did not implicate a state-created liberty interest, and the Supreme Court agreed with the result of the court of appeals' decision to affirm the dismissal of Petitioner's appeal by the ALC. View "Allen v. SCDC" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Garland Denson (the decedent) was killed in an automobile accident allegedly caused by a drunk driver. The complaint alleged the at-fault driver was overserved at Royal Lanes, a bar insured by Defendant National Casualty Company (National Casualty) under a general liability policy with no liquor liability endorsement. During probate of the decedent's estate, his personal representative, Plaintiff Anthony Denson (Denson), discovered Royal Lanes did not have the required liquor liability insurance. Specifically, Denson learned National Casualty previously provided liquor liability coverage to Royal Lanes, but at the time of the accident, the business had failed to renew the liquor liability coverage, leaving only a general liability policy. Liquor liability coverage was statutorily mandated for certain establishments that sell alcoholic beverages, and the failure to maintain this coverage constituted a violation of South Carolina law. The federal court asked whether a person could bring a dram-shop negligence action against a business whose insurer failed to notify the state Department of Revenue of the business’ lapse in liquor liability coverage, and the business did not have coverage at the time of the accident. The Supreme Court responded in the negative: S.C. Code Ann. section 61-2-145(C) did not create a private right of action in favor of an injured party against the business's insurer. View "Denson v. National Casualty" on Justia Law

Appellant Timothy Jones, Jr. admitted to killing his five young children and was indicted for five counts of murder. He was convicted by jury and sentenced to death. In a direct appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court, Jones raised eight issues centering on three points: juror qualification, requested voir dire and a related jury instruction, and evidentiary rulings made during the guilt and sentencing phases. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the juror qualification, voir dire, and jury instruction rulings. The Court held the trial court erred in certain evidentiary rulings; however, the Court found the errors were harmless and affirmed Jones's conviction and death sentence. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 2018, Appellant Nationwide Affinity Insurance Company of America (Nationwide) issued a personal automobile insurance policy to Shameika Clark, Respondent Andrew Green's mother. The policy included $25,000 in UIM property damage coverage for Clark and her family members. The general definition section broadly defined "property damage" as "physical injury to, destruction of[,] or loss of use of tangible property." The UIM endorsement, however, more narrowly defined "property damage" as "injury to or destruction of 'your covered auto.'" In October 2018, Green was hit by a vehicle while walking home from school. Green pursued a claim against Nationwide for UIM bodily injury, but Nationwide refused to pay because the accident did not result in “damage to a “covered auto.” Nationwide filed this declaratory judgment action and requested a declaration that Green was not entitled to UIM property damage. The circuit court reformed Nationwide’s policy rider issued to Clark, finding that under South Carolina case law, insurers could not limit that coverage to vehicles defined in policy as “covered autos.” The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s judgment. View "Nationwide v. Green" on Justia Law

The federal district court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. In 2019, USAA issued a personal automobile policy to Megan Jenkins. The policy defined "your covered auto" as any vehicle shown on the policy's declaration, any newly acquired vehicle, and any trailer owned by the insured. While riding her bicycle, Jenkins was struck and killed by an underinsured motorist. Defendant Vincent Rafferty—Jenkins' personal representative—made a claim under Jenkins' policy for UIM property damage arising from damage to the bicycle. USAA Casualty Insurance Company (USAA) denied the claim and commenced this action in federal court, asserting Jenkins' bicycle did not fall within the definition of "your covered auto." Whether USAA prevailed depended upon whether automobile insurers were required to offer UIM property damage coverage at all. If insurers were not required to offer UIM property damage coverage, they were free to restrict such coverage to an insured's "covered auto." The federal court asked the Supreme Court whether, under South Carolina Law, an auto insurer could validly limit underinsured motorist property damage coverage to property damage to vehicles defined in the policy as a “covered auto.” In their briefs and during oral argument, the parties did not directly address the question as framed by the district court. Instead, the parties briefed and argued the broader question of whether an automobile insurer's offer of underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage had to include property damage coverage. Because the answer to the broader question yielded the answer to the certified question, the Supreme Court addressed the parties’ question. USAA rightly conceded that if the Supreme Court held an insurer was required to offer UIM property damage coverage, the Court had to answer the certified question "no." The Court indeed held insurers were required to offer UIM property damage coverage, and therefore answered the certified question "no." View "USAA Casualty v. Rafferty" on Justia Law

At Stewart Middleton's trial for third-degree criminal sexual conduct, the State introduced a police detective's testimony that Middleton was evasive in response to her attempts to get Middleton to come in for an interview. The trial court admitted this testimony over Middleton's relevance objection. The jury found Middleton guilty and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in finding the testimony relevant because the State did not establish a nexus between Middleton's conduct and a consciousness of his guilt. The conviction was reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

Craig Busse appealed his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, claiming the deputy solicitor improperly vouched for the victim's credibility in a statement he made during closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the deputy solicitor's statement was technically in error and the trial court should have sustained Busse's objection. However, the statement did not amount to vouching. Therefore, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Busse" on Justia Law