Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Craig Busse appealed his conviction for second-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, claiming the deputy solicitor improperly vouched for the victim's credibility in a statement he made during closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the deputy solicitor's statement was technically in error and the trial court should have sustained Busse's objection. However, the statement did not amount to vouching. Therefore, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Busse" on Justia Law

This case involved promises made and broken to homeowners by a developer and its affiliated entities. A jury returned verdicts on several causes of action in favor of the homeowners, and the developer appealed. The court of appeals initially upheld the jury's verdict for $1.75 million on the homeowners' breach of fiduciary claim and a verdict for $10,000 on a breach of contract claim by an individual homeowner. Thereafter, upon petitions for rehearing, the court of appeals completely reversed course, dismissing all of the homeowners' claims as a matter of law and reversing and remanding the breach of contract claim by the individual homeowner. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed in part and reversed in part, thus reinstating the jury's verdicts. The Court: (1) reversed the court of appeals' ruling on the statute of limitations because the issue as to when Homeowners had adequate notice to begin the limitations clock was properly presented to the jury and resolved by it; (2) found any procedural issues related to the derivative claims either (a) moot as the HOA was realigned as a plaintiff and the trial court explicitly found it adopted its own claims against the Developers, or (b) demand was saved by futility due to the Developer's continuing veto power; (3) held that Developers breached the fiduciary duties owed to Homeowners; (4) reversed the court of appeals' decision that Developers could not be amalgamated, as there was more than enough evidence of bad faith, abuse, fraud, wrongdoing, or injustice resulting from the blurring of the entities' legal distinctions; and (5) affirmed the court of appeals that the recreational easement was invalid. View "Walbeck, et al. v. The I'On Company" on Justia Law

The Town of McBee Municipal Election Commission overturned the results of the town's September 2020 mayoral and town council elections after finding Sydney Baker violated a previous version of section 7-15-330 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2021)2 by requesting applications to vote by absentee ballot on behalf of other voters. The circuit court found there was no evidence to support the election commission's decision and reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "Odom v. McBee Municipal Election Commission" on Justia Law

Four prisoners filed a declaratory judgment action challenging two of the execution methods set forth in South Carolina's death penalty statute: electrocution and firing squad. The prisoners contend the methods violate the South Carolina Constitution's article I, section 15 prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. The circuit court concluded electrocution and the firing squad were unconstitutional under state law, and the parties filed cross-appeals with the South Carolina Supreme Court. The primary appeal concerned the merits of the ruling, and the prisoners' cross-appeal challenged the partial denial of their pretrial discovery request for information on the availability of a third statutory method of execution, lethal injection. At this time, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's discovery ruling (which was the subject of the cross-appeal), and remanded the discovery issue to the circuit court for further proceedings to be completed in accordance with time limits set forth in this opinion. The Supreme Court held the remainder of the appeal in abeyance pending the circuit court's resolution of the discovery issue. View "Owens, et al. v. Stirling, et al." on Justia Law

The South Carolina workers' compensation commission dismissed an appeal to its appellate panel because the attorney filing the appeal missed a deadline for his brief. The commission refused to reinstate the appeal even after the attorney explained he made an innocent calendaring mistake, and then the commission refused to reconsider its decision. In all three instances, the commission gave no explanation of its decision; it simply issued a form order with blanks checked indicating the commission's action. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the commission offered no explanation for its decision, it did not act within its discretion in refusing to reinstate the appeal. "The failure to accurately calendar a filing deadline will not constitute good cause for reinstating an appeal in every instance. We have reviewed the record in this case, however, and we find Proffitt demonstrated good cause." The commission's decision refusing to reinstate the appeal was reversed and the case remanded to the appellate panel for consideration of the appeal on the merits. View "Morris v. BB&T Corporation" on Justia Law

Respondent Stephany Connelly was a passenger in a vehicle driven by co-worker Freya Trezona during the course and scope of their employment when Trezona negligently caused the accident, injuring Connelly. Because workers’ compensation benefits did not fully redress Connelly’s injuries, she made a claim for bodily injury and uninsured motorist (UM) benefits with her own insurance carrier and with Trezona’s carrier. Both companies denied the claim, contending Connelly’s sole remedy lay with the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. Connelly filed suit seeking a declaration that both policies provided coverage. The parties agreed the dispute turned on the interpretation of the phrase “legally entitled to recover” found in the UM statute. The trial court ruled in favor of Connelly, and the court of appeals concurred the phrase was legally ambiguous. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the phrase unambiguous: the amount a plaintiff is “legally entitled to recover” under a UM provision of an insurance policy is the amount for which the plaintiff has secured a judgment against the at-fault defendant. Because the Act prevents Connelly from ever becoming “legally entitled to recover” from Trezona under the facts of this case, the Court reversed the trial court. View "Connelly v. Main Street America Group" on Justia Law

Jimmy and Laura Bailey mortgaged their home in October 2009 to Quicken Loans (first mortgage). A week later, the Baileys entered into an equity line of credit a month later with ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union (the LOC) to the maximum principal amount. The ArrowPointe LOC was secured by a mortgage; ArrowPointe had record notice of the first mortgage. Shortly after taking out the second mortgage, the Baileys refinanced the first mortgage with Quicken in a greater amount than the previous first mortgage. The Baileys executed a “Title Company Client Acknowledgement” at the closing of the refinanced mortgage, which stated the only outstanding lien on the subject property was the first mortgage. There was no clear explanation in the record as to whether Quicken obtained a title examination to ascertain whether there were any outstanding additional liens; Quicken did not ask ArrowPointe to sign a subordination agreement, and ArrowPointe was unaware of the refinance. The Baileys used money from the refinance to pay the first mortgage. Quicken released the first mortgage and recorded the refinance. The Baileys ultimately defaulted on the LOC, and ArrowPointe filed an action to declare its lien had priority over the refinance. US Bank, assignee to the Quicken refinance, argued it was entitled to priority under the replacement mortgage doctrine. ArrowPointe argued it was entitled to priority because Quicken had record notice of its LOC at the time of refinancing. A referee concluded South Carolina did not recognize the replacement mortgage doctrine, and because there was no subordination agreement, ArrowPointe had priority under the race-notice statute. The referee ordered foreclosure and sale of the subject property. Finding no reversible error in the referee’s order, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. View "ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Respondent Maunwell Ervin was granted post-conviction relief (PCR) for being twice tried for multiple offenses stemming from a search if his rented residence. Ervin was charged on firearms and drug trafficking charges; the first trial ended in an acquittal of the firearm charge, and a mistrial on the trafficking charge. The second trial resulted in another mistrial on the trafficking charge. Ervin and the State reached a plea agreement by reducing the charge to a lesser offense and imposing the minimum sentence. Ervin then applied for PCR on the negotiated plea. The PCR court granted relief on Ervin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, premised on counsel’s failure to raise a double jeopardy objection based on the rule established in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110(2009). The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the PCR court misapplied Yeager, thereby erring in granting PCR relief. Accordingly, relief was reversed and the negotiated guilty plea and sentence were reinstated. View "Ervin v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2021, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act ("the Act"), which prohibited an abortion after around six weeks gestation. This was before many women—excluding those who were trying to become pregnant and were therefore closely monitoring their menstrual cycles—even know they were pregnant. The Supreme Court held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy rested upon the "utmost personal and private considerations imaginable," and implicates a woman's right to privacy. "While this right is not absolute, and must be balanced against the State's interest in protecting unborn life, this Act, which severely limits—and in many instances completely forecloses—abortion, is an unreasonable restriction upon a woman's right to privacy and is therefore unconstitutional." View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, et al. v. South Carolina, et al." on Justia Law

Barry Clarke brought this action for specific performance of a right of first refusal. Clarke owned a strip club at 2015 Pittsburgh Avenue in Charleston, South Carolina. Group Investment Company, Inc., whose shareholders were John Robinson and Robin Robinson, owned a strip club across the street at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue (the Subject Property). The Subject Property included buildings, a parking lot, and other land. In 1999, Clarke and Group Investment entered into a recorded lease that allowed Clarke to use half of the parking spaces located on the Subject Property. In 2007, Group Investment conveyed the Subject Property to RRJR, LLC for the stated consideration of $5.00. John Robinson and Robin Robinson were members of RRJR. Clarke testified he "probably" knew Group Investment transferred the Subject Property to RRJR, but Clarke claimed he did not seek to exercise the Right at that time because Group Investment and RRJR were "the same people." In 2013, RRJR conveyed the Subject Property to Fine Housing for $150,000.00. Fine Housing's closing attorney did not take note of the Lease or the Right prior to the closing, but Fine Housing conceded it had record notice of both the Lease and the Right. Neither Fine Housing nor RRJR notified Clarke of the sale of the Subject Property. Clarke learned of the sale in March 2014, and in May 2015, Clarke initiated this action for specific performance against Fine Housing and RRJR. RRJR did not answer and was in default. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled the Right was enforceable as to the entire Subject Property and ordered Fine Housing to convey title to the Subject Property to Clarke upon his payment of $350,000.00. The court of appeals reversed, holding the Right was an unreasonable restraint on alienation and was therefore unenforceable. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Right did not identify the property it encumbered, contain price provisions, or contain procedures governing the exercise of the Right. Therefore, the Court concluded the Right was an unreasonable restraint on alienation, and affirmed the court of appeals' holding that the Right was unenforceable. View "Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc." on Justia Law