Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent, magistrate judge of Greenwood County Walter Martin, and the South Carolina Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Judicial Disciplinary Enforcement (RJDE) contained in Rule 502 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, Respondent admitted misconduct, consented to any sanction ranging from a confidential admonition up to a six-month definite suspension, and agreed to attend anger management counseling and pay costs. This discipline stemmed from two incidents in 2021 in which Respondent used profanity toward plaintiff's counsel at a jury trial, and for complaining "in a loud and agitated manner" toward a scheduling clerk for failing to provide him timely notice of a jury trial. The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted the Agreement and issued a public reprimand. View "In the Matter of Walter Rutledge Martin of the Greenwood County Magistrate's Court" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Sullivan Management, LLC operated restaurants in South Carolina and filed suit to recover for business interruption losses during COVID-19 under a commercial property insurance policy issued by Fireman's Fund and Allianz Global Risks US Insurance Company (Fireman's). Specifically, the questions was whether the presence of COVID-19 in or near Sullivan's properties, and/or related governmental orders, which allegedly hinder or destroy the fitness, habitability or functionality of property, constituted "direct physical loss or damage" or did "direct physical loss or damage" require some permanent dispossession of the property or physical alteration to the property. The Supreme Court held that the presence of COVID-19 and the corresponding government orders prohibiting indoor dining did not fall within the policy’s trigger language of “direct physical loss or damage.” View "Sullivan Mgmt v. Fireman's Fund" on Justia Law

Wife Olivia Seels Smalls died during the pendency of her divorce from Husband Joe Truman Smalls. The couple accumulated significant assets, including the marital home; eighteen rental properties; and multiple retirement, checking, savings, and investment accounts. Both parties worked during the marriage and contributed to the acquisition of the marital assets. The parties separated in July 2014 when Wife left the marital home. On October 10, 2014, Wife filed the underlying action seeking an order that would, among other things: (1) allow her to live separate and apart from Husband pendente lite and permanently; (2) restrain Husband from harassing her or cancelling her health insurance; (3) permit her to enter the marital home to retrieve her personal belongings; (4) provide separate support and maintenance and/or alimony pendente lite and permanently; and (5) equitably apportion the marital property. Wife alleged she was in poor health and had been subjected to an extended pattern of abusive behavior from Husband, which escalated after she underwent surgery for lung cancer in 2013. Wife also alleged Husband committed adultery at various times during their marriage. Husband filed an answer denying the allegations and asserting counterclaims. He likewise sought a divorce and equitable apportionment of the marital assets. The parties engaged in mediation, but Wife suffered a recurrence of cancer and they never formally entered into a signed agreement resolving their dispute. The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether the family court properly retained jurisdiction to rule on the apportionment of the marital property of the parties when the Wife died. The Court ruled the appellate court did not err in determining the family court properly retained jurisdiction to rule. View "Seels v. Smalls" on Justia Law

The Callawassie Island Members Club, Inc. ("the Club"), brought separate actions against three couples—the Martins, the Freys, and the Quinns—following a dispute over membership dues. The circuit court granted the Club's motion for summary judgment. The court of appeals consolidated the parties' appeals and affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari review filed by Michael Frey, who challenged the award of summary judgment. Frey contended material questions of fact existed as to whether the Club improperly billed him for continuing membership dues, particularly where his membership was suspended over a decade ago and membership was undisputedly optional when he joined. To this the Court concurred, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Callawasie Island Members Club v. Frey" on Justia Law

Joseph Bowers was involved in a shootout in which multiple people fired their guns. Four people were shot, and two of them died. A jury convicted Bowers of voluntary manslaughter, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed the convictions because the trial court should not have charged the doctrine of mutual combat to the jury. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to address a narrow point: the State's contention the erroneous jury charge did not prejudice Bowers as to the ABHAN conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Bowers" on Justia Law

Central to this case was a dispute between two daughters and a stepdaughter of the testatrix, Jacquelin Stevenson, who died in 2007. She was survived by six children: four from her marriage to Thomas Stevenson, a son by a former marriage, and a stepdaughter. The testatrix's two sons by Stevenson, Thomas and Daniel, stole millions from the estate while co-trustees from 1996 to 2006, thereby forfeiting any rights they had to take under their mother's will and leaving Jacquelin and Kathleen as the personal representatives. The theft by Thomas and Daniel left the estate with insufficient monies remaining to fund specific bequests of $400,000 each to the two stepchildren of the marriage. Further, the bequest of a Lake Summit property to the two sons failed, sending it to the residuary, and because no amendment by codicil preceded the testatrix's demise, after acquired properties passed through the residuary as well. The residuary clause provided that "[a]ll the rest, residue and remainder of my property and estate . . . I give, devise and bequeath to Kathleen S. Turner, Jacquelin S. Bennett, Thomas C. Stevenson, III, Daniel R. Stevenson, James Kelly King, and Genevieve S. Felder in equal shares." The probate court, the circuit court, and the court of appeals all interpreted this to mean in equal ownership interests rather than equal monetary values. Just as the language of the residuary clause was relevant to the resolution of this dispute, so was section 10 of the will, which set forth the powers of the personal representatives and expressly stated the testatrix's intention to give broad discretion and flexibility to her personal representatives. The probate judge, the circuit court, and the court of appeals all determined the broad powers did not govern distributions of the residual estate. Also, the court of appeals affirmed the probate court's finding that the personal representatives' conduct constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the court of appeals erred and reversed. View "Bennett v. Estate of James Kelly King" on Justia Law

A church entity became the legal or beneficial owner of certain real and personal property after The Protestant Episcopal Church in the Diocese of South Carolina (Disassociated Diocese) and thirty-six individual Episcopal Parishes (Parishes) disassociated from The Episcopal Church in the United States of America (National Church). The dispute presented two broad questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court: (1) who owned the real estate long-owned and occupied by the individual Parishes; and (2) who was the beneficiary of a statutorily-created trust controlled by the Trustees of The Protestant Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Trustees). The National Church and the Episcopal Church in South Carolina (Associated Diocese) contended the South Carolina Supreme Court made a final decision as to who owned all the disputed property when the Court heard the case in 2015 and each Justice sitting on the Court in 2015 issued a separate opinion in 2017. The Parishes disagreed the Court made a final decision as to the real property occupied by twenty-nine Parishes, and contended the Court left much to be decided by the circuit court as to these Parishes. The Disassociated Diocese and the Trustees agreed the Supreme Court made a final decision as to real and personal property the Trustees formerly held in trust for the Lower Diocese—the second question—but they disagree what that decision was. To the second question presented, the Supreme Court agreed with the National Church and the Associated Diocese that the 2017 Court decided the real and personal property held in trust by the Trustees was held for the benefit of the Associated Diocese. As to the first question, the Supreme Court determined the 2017 Court did not make a final decision as to the real property owned by the twenty-nine Parishes. As to some Parishes, the Court held the circuit court correctly ruled the individual Parish retained ownership of its property. As to other Parishes, those Parishes created an irrevocable trust in favor of the National Church and its diocese, now the Associated Diocese. As to the Parishes that created a trust, the Court directed that appropriate documentation be filed in the public record indicating the National Church and the Associated Diocese now owned that real estate. From its decision here, there will be no remand. "The case is over." View "The Protestant Episcopal Church v. The Episcopal Church" on Justia Law

Justin Jamal Warner was convicted by jury of murder, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Warner's petition for a writ of certiorari to address: (1) whether the trial court was correct to deny Warner's motion to suppress cell-site location information (CSLI) seized from his cell phone service provider; and (2) whether an out-of-court viewing by Warner's probation officer of a crime-scene video and the officer's identification of Warner as the man in the video required a hearing under Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972). The Supreme Court found the trial court correctly ruled the identification made from the video did not require a Biggers hearing. As to the CSLI, the Court held the warrant the trial court found invalid because the warrant sought information stored in another state was not - at least for that reason - invalid. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals as to the Biggers issue and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings as to Warner's motion to suppress CSLI. View "South Carolina v. Warner" on Justia Law

PCS Nitrogen sought insurance coverage for liability arising from contamination of a fertilizer manufacturing site in Charleston, South Carolina, claiming its right to coverage stemmed from an assignment of insurance benefits executed by Columbia Nitrogen Corporation in 1986. Respondents, the insurance carriers who issued the policies at issue, claimed they owed no coverage because Columbia Nitrogen Corporation executed the assignment without their consent. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted PCS's petition for a writ of certiorari, finding Columbia Nitrogen Corporation executed a valid post-loss assignment of insurance rights in 1986. "PCS cannot be denied coverage on the basis that Respondents did not consent to the assignment." The case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "PCS Nitrogen, Inc. v Continental Casualty Company, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from the armed robbery and shooting death of a convenience store clerk, James Mahoney, at Nikki's Speedy Mart in Spartanburg County, South Carolina, in the early morning hours of September 16, 1999. Richard Moore petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge the proportionality of the death sentence that was imposed for his murder conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Moore's motion to argue against the precedent of South Carolina v. Copeland, 300 S.E.2d 63 (1982). After review of the record and applicable law and consideration of the parties' arguments, the Supreme Court clarified Copeland and noted the Court was not statutorily required to restrict its proportionality review of "similar cases" to a comparison of only cases in which a sentence of death was imposed. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that Moore did not establish he was entitled to habeas relief. View "Moore v. Stirling" on Justia Law