Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jimmy and Laura Bailey mortgaged their home in October 2009 to Quicken Loans (first mortgage). A week later, the Baileys entered into an equity line of credit a month later with ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union (the LOC) to the maximum principal amount. The ArrowPointe LOC was secured by a mortgage; ArrowPointe had record notice of the first mortgage. Shortly after taking out the second mortgage, the Baileys refinanced the first mortgage with Quicken in a greater amount than the previous first mortgage. The Baileys executed a “Title Company Client Acknowledgement” at the closing of the refinanced mortgage, which stated the only outstanding lien on the subject property was the first mortgage. There was no clear explanation in the record as to whether Quicken obtained a title examination to ascertain whether there were any outstanding additional liens; Quicken did not ask ArrowPointe to sign a subordination agreement, and ArrowPointe was unaware of the refinance. The Baileys used money from the refinance to pay the first mortgage. Quicken released the first mortgage and recorded the refinance. The Baileys ultimately defaulted on the LOC, and ArrowPointe filed an action to declare its lien had priority over the refinance. US Bank, assignee to the Quicken refinance, argued it was entitled to priority under the replacement mortgage doctrine. ArrowPointe argued it was entitled to priority because Quicken had record notice of its LOC at the time of refinancing. A referee concluded South Carolina did not recognize the replacement mortgage doctrine, and because there was no subordination agreement, ArrowPointe had priority under the race-notice statute. The referee ordered foreclosure and sale of the subject property. Finding no reversible error in the referee’s order, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. View "ArrowPointe Federal Credit Union v. Bailey" on Justia Law

Respondent Maunwell Ervin was granted post-conviction relief (PCR) for being twice tried for multiple offenses stemming from a search if his rented residence. Ervin was charged on firearms and drug trafficking charges; the first trial ended in an acquittal of the firearm charge, and a mistrial on the trafficking charge. The second trial resulted in another mistrial on the trafficking charge. Ervin and the State reached a plea agreement by reducing the charge to a lesser offense and imposing the minimum sentence. Ervin then applied for PCR on the negotiated plea. The PCR court granted relief on Ervin’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, premised on counsel’s failure to raise a double jeopardy objection based on the rule established in Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110(2009). The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the PCR court misapplied Yeager, thereby erring in granting PCR relief. Accordingly, relief was reversed and the negotiated guilty plea and sentence were reinstated. View "Ervin v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2021, the South Carolina General Assembly passed the Fetal Heartbeat and Protection from Abortion Act ("the Act"), which prohibited an abortion after around six weeks gestation. This was before many women—excluding those who were trying to become pregnant and were therefore closely monitoring their menstrual cycles—even know they were pregnant. The Supreme Court held that the decision to terminate a pregnancy rested upon the "utmost personal and private considerations imaginable," and implicates a woman's right to privacy. "While this right is not absolute, and must be balanced against the State's interest in protecting unborn life, this Act, which severely limits—and in many instances completely forecloses—abortion, is an unreasonable restriction upon a woman's right to privacy and is therefore unconstitutional." View "Planned Parenthood South Atlantic, et al. v. South Carolina, et al." on Justia Law

Barry Clarke brought this action for specific performance of a right of first refusal. Clarke owned a strip club at 2015 Pittsburgh Avenue in Charleston, South Carolina. Group Investment Company, Inc., whose shareholders were John Robinson and Robin Robinson, owned a strip club across the street at 2028 Pittsburgh Avenue (the Subject Property). The Subject Property included buildings, a parking lot, and other land. In 1999, Clarke and Group Investment entered into a recorded lease that allowed Clarke to use half of the parking spaces located on the Subject Property. In 2007, Group Investment conveyed the Subject Property to RRJR, LLC for the stated consideration of $5.00. John Robinson and Robin Robinson were members of RRJR. Clarke testified he "probably" knew Group Investment transferred the Subject Property to RRJR, but Clarke claimed he did not seek to exercise the Right at that time because Group Investment and RRJR were "the same people." In 2013, RRJR conveyed the Subject Property to Fine Housing for $150,000.00. Fine Housing's closing attorney did not take note of the Lease or the Right prior to the closing, but Fine Housing conceded it had record notice of both the Lease and the Right. Neither Fine Housing nor RRJR notified Clarke of the sale of the Subject Property. Clarke learned of the sale in March 2014, and in May 2015, Clarke initiated this action for specific performance against Fine Housing and RRJR. RRJR did not answer and was in default. After a bench trial, the trial court ruled the Right was enforceable as to the entire Subject Property and ordered Fine Housing to convey title to the Subject Property to Clarke upon his payment of $350,000.00. The court of appeals reversed, holding the Right was an unreasonable restraint on alienation and was therefore unenforceable. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the Right did not identify the property it encumbered, contain price provisions, or contain procedures governing the exercise of the Right. Therefore, the Court concluded the Right was an unreasonable restraint on alienation, and affirmed the court of appeals' holding that the Right was unenforceable. View "Clarke v. Fine Housing, Inc." on Justia Law

Jaron Gibbs was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in (1) allowing Detective Michael Arflin to present lay testimony about single and double action revolvers and (2) allowing the State to reference Arflin's testimony in its closing argument. The court of appeals affirmed Gibbs's convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that because the court of appeals held Arflin's personal knowledge rendered the lay testimony proper, it did not squarely address whether the trial court erred in finding this subject matter was not outside the ordinary knowledge of most jurors. In any event, the Court determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the testimony did not have to be given by an expert. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals as modified and hedld the trial court did not err in admitting Arflin's lay testimony. Likewise, the Court found the solicitor's closing was "certainly proper" when viewed as a reply to Gibbs's theory of the case. "Under the invited reply doctrine, conduct that would be improper otherwise may be appropriate if made in response to statements or arguments made by the defense." The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' analysis and held the trial court did not err with respect to the solicitor's closing argument. View "South Carolina v. Gibbs" on Justia Law

Respondent Myra Windham was seriously injured while driving a rental car that was considered a temporary substitute vehicle under her State Farm policy. In this declaratory judgment action instituted by Petitioner State Farm, the issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's determination was whether Windham could stack her underinsured motorist ("UIM") coverage pursuant to section 38-77-160 of the South Carolina Code. The circuit court agreed with State Farm that stacking was prohibited, and the court of appeals reversed. Because both parties offered reasonable interpretations of the policy language, the Supreme Court found an ambiguity existed, which it construed against the drafter. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the court of appeals that Windham could stack, and affirmed as modified. View "State Farm v. Windham" on Justia Law

Angela Brewer was convicted of homicide by child abuse after her thirteen-month-old grandson died from drinking lemonade mixed with oxycodone. Brewer contended the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's admission of an interrogation video when she was under the influence of medication. She also raised an issue relating to the scope of the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause when the State sought to introduce the contents of a toxicology report from an out-of-state laboratory through a pathologist who did not perform the actual testing. The trial court concluded the toxicology report was not testimonial in nature, thereby removing it from the confines of the Sixth Amendment, and the court of appeals affirmed. While the South Carolina Supreme Court saw no error in admitting the interrogation video, it reversed Brewer's conviction and sentence based on a Confrontation Clause violation: "the Confrontation Clause mandates that an individual who actually performed the forensic testing be subject to cross- examination." View "South Carolina v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Victim, who was fifteen at the time of trial, alleged she was sexually assaulted on multiple occasions by respondent Charles Rampey, her stepfather, when she was eleven and twelve years old. Victim testified that sometime around her birthday in June of 2013, Rampey called Victim into a room and forced her to touch his penis. On another occasion, Victim testified that Rampey had her perform oral sex on him. This escalated to multiple instances of sexual intercourse, according to Victim. In this criminal sexual conduct case with a minor, the trial judge gave an Allen charge to the jury after approximately two hours and twenty minutes of deliberations. About an hour and fifteen minutes later, the jury returned with a not guilty verdict as to criminal sexual conduct with a minor (CSC) in the second degree and a guilty verdict as to CSC third degree. Rampey, appealed, asserting the Allen charge was unconstitutionally coercive. The court of appeals reversed the conviction in an unpublished opinion, primarily citing to South Carolina v. Taylor, 829 S.E.2d 723 (Ct. App. 2019). Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. "The trial court's overemphasis of the resources expended and the need for a verdict, combined with the absence of the critical cautionary language despite being requested by defense counsel, renders the charge unconstitutional and warrants a new trial. Moreover, the post-verdict polling of the jurors by the trial court did not cure this error." View "South Carolina v. Rampey" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Frasier was convicted of trafficking cocaine in excess of 100 grams after police discovered cocaine during a traffic stop for an inoperable brake light. The questions this appeal presented for the the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether police had reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic encounter and whether Frasier consented to the search. The trial court concluded the officer had reasonable suspicion and Frasier consented, and the court of appeals affirmed. In deciding these two issues, the Supreme Court clarified the scope of its standard of review in the Fourth Amendment context. Ultimately, the Court reversed the court of appeals because law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion to prolong the traffic stop, and Frasier did not consent to the search. View "South Carolina v. Frasier" on Justia Law

Petitioner John McCarty was charged with murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Petitioner maintained he acted in defense of another and moved for immunity from criminal prosecution pursuant to the South Carolina Protection of Persons and Property Act ("Act"). After a pretrial hearing, the circuit court denied the motion, and Petitioner was subsequently tried and convicted as charged. On appeal, Petitioner challenged the circuit court's ruling as to immunity, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's arguments that: (1) the court of appeals erred in failing to hold the circuit court abdicated its role as the fact-finder by ruling a jury, not the court, must decide whether the individual Petitioner was defending was without fault in bringing on the difficulty; and (2) the Supreme Court should conclude Petitioner was entitled to immunity. The Supreme Court agreed with Petitioner as to the first issue, but held the issue of immunity should be decided in the first instance by the circuit court. As a result, the Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the matter to the circuit court to make the necessary findings. View "South Carolina v. McCarty" on Justia Law