Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Before the South Carolina Supreme Court in this appeal was the trial court's dismissal of respondent Jeanne Beverly's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Beverly brought claims against Grand Strand Regional Medical Center, LLC. Blue Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina (BCBS) was a mutual insurance company that provided health insurance coverage through Member Benefits Contracts to its Members. Beverly was a BCBS Member. In 2005, Grand Strand and BCBS entered into a contract labeled "Institutional Agreement." The Institutional Agreement contained a clause entitled, "No Third Party Beneficiaries," that provided in part, "This Agreement is not intended to, and shall not be construed to, make any person or entity a third party beneficiary." Grand Strand and BCBS were the only parties to the Institutional Agreement. Grand Strand made two promises to BCBS in the Institutional Agreement that Beverly contended created rights she and other BCBS Members could enforce. Beverly was injured in an automobile accident on September 6, 2012. The same day, she received health care services at a Grand Strand emergency room for injuries she sustained in the accident. Beverly alleges she provided Grand Strand proof of her status as a BCBS Member. Some time later, Beverly received a bill directly from Grand Strand for $8,000. Beverly alleges the $8,000 bill does not reflect the discount Grand Strand promised in the Institutional Agreement. Beverly filed this action on behalf of herself and a class of similarly situated BCBS Members who were denied the right to have their bills processed and discounted according to Grand Strand's promises in the Institutional Agreement. The primary question before the Supreme Court was whether the "no beneficiary" clause in the Institutional Agreement overrode an otherwise manifestly clear purpose of the contracting parties to provide a direct benefit to non-contracting parties. "Mindful that we are reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal order—not an order on the merits—we hold it does not." The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' opinion reversing the 12(b)(6) dismissal. The case was remanded to circuit court for discovery and trial. View "Beverly v. Grand Strand Regional Medical Center, LLC" on Justia Law

On the evening of May 21, 2014, Denise Garrison went to Target in Anderson, South Carolina with her eight-year-old daughter. Before entering the store, however, Denise retrieved her coupon book from her car, placed it on the hood, and proceeded to examine it. Looking up from the book, her daughter appeared with what looked like a hypodermic needle in her hand. Denise instinctively swatted the syringe out of her daughter's hand. However, in the swatting process, the syringe punctured the palm of her hand. Denise informed Target's store manager, who apologized for what happened. Denise believed the manager assured her that her medical bills would be paid, testifying that the manager said "bring us the bill." Despite Denise's belief that Target would cover her medical costs, Target refused to do so. The case proceeded to a jury trial, in which Target was found negligent, and awarded Denise $100,000 in compensatory damages and $4.51 million in punitive damages. The jury also awarded Clint $3,500 for lost wages and $5,000 for loss of consortium. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the court of appeals erred in: (1) affirming the trial court's denial of Target's motion for JNOV as to liability based on a theory of constructive notice; (2) holding the statutory cap on punitive damages was an affirmative defense; (3) instructing the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of punitive damages; and (4) refusing to award interest on punitive damages under Rule 68, SCRCP. The Supreme Court determined the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find Target had constructive notice of the syringe in its parking lot and failed to discover and remove it in the exercise of due care. In addition, Court held the statutory cap on punitive damages pursuant was not required to be pled by the defendant as an affirmative defense in order to apply. The court of appeals properly instructed the trial court to consider on remand the potential harm caused by Target's conduct in evaluating the constitutionality of the amount of the Garrisons' punitive damages award. Lastly, the Supreme Court held Denise was entitled to eight percent interest on the entirety of her damages award, including punitive damages, pursuant to Rule 68, SCRCP. View "Garrison v. Target Corporation" on Justia Law

Petitioner Reginald Swain (Grandfather) appealed the denial of a request to terminate a father's parental rights ("TPR") and to adopt the child. The family court determined Grandfather proved a statutory ground for TPR, but concluded TPR and adoption would not be in the child's best interests because the child was already in a stable custody situation with her grandparents, Father had seemingly reformed his ways while in prison, and the child might benefit in the future from having a relationship with him. The court of appeals affirmed, and the South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari. Grandfather contended the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's decision to deny TPR and adoption. Specifically, Grandfather contended both courts ignored the recommendation of the guardian ad litem, conflated the status of custody of a child with the permanency of TPR and adoption, and erroneously focused on the appearance of the new birth certificate, ignoring Mother's consent to the adoption. Conversely, Father argued both courts correctly found Grandfather failed to meet his burden of demonstrating TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. Exercising its de novo review, the South Carolina believed TPR and adoption were in Child's best interests. "Because the focus is on the child's best interests rather than the parents' interest when determining whether TPR and adoption is appropriate," the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, terminated Father's parental rights, and granted the adoption. View "Swain v. Bollinger" on Justia Law

Pickens County, South Carolina sought a contested case hearing in the administrative law court (ALC) to challenge a landfill permit modification issued to MRR Pickens, LLC (MRR) by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC). The ALC dismissed the County's challenge, finding the County failed to timely request DHEC to conduct a final review of the decision to issue the permit modification. The court of appeals reversed and remanded to the ALC for further proceedings. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in part, vacated in part, and remanded to the ALC for further proceedings. The Court affirmed the court of appeals' rejection of MRR and DHEC's argument that the County's actual notice of the Permit Modification in December 2015 and January 2016 triggered the fifteen-day limitations period set forth in subsection S.C. Code Ann. sec. 44-1-60(E)(2). Because the ALC found the County's request for final review untimely under subsection 44-1-60(E)(2), the ALC did not rule upon the issue of whether DHEC properly classified the Permit Modification as a minor modification. The court of appeals correctly reversed the ALC on this point when it held the ALC should have determined whether DHEC properly classified the Permit Modification before ruling upon the statutory timeliness of the County's challenge. The ALC expressly refused to make any findings as to whether the County was entitled to notice and as to whether the Permit Modification was major or minor. While the Supreme Court held the ALC erred in not deciding whether the modification was major or minor, it was not for the court of appeals to make these findings of fact; therefore, the Court vacated this portion of the court of appeals' opinion. The Supreme Court also vacated other portions of the opinion that could be construed to make factual findings. The ALC must determine on remand whether DHEC properly classified the Permit Modification as a minor modification. Only after resolving that question can the ALC determine whether the County's request for a contested case hearing was untimely under subsection 44-1-60(E)(2). View "Pickens County v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Arguing that a drug raid of his home violated the Fourth Amendment, Petitioner Kelvin Jones appealed his convictions for trafficking cocaine and possession with intent to distribute cocaine within the proximity of a school. Jones's pretrial motion to suppress was denied and he was convicted following a jury trial. The court of appeals affirmed on the basis the issue was not preserved for appellate review. The South Carolina Supreme Court held Jones's argument as to the search warrant was preserved but failed on the merits. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in result the court of appeals' opinion and took this opportunity presented by this case to clarify issue preservation rules with respect to pre-trial rulings of constitutional dimension. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from a construction defect lawsuit involving waterfront townhomes on Lake Keowee in Oconee County, South Carolina. After a two-week trial, Petitioners-Respondents Stoneledge at Lake Keowee Owners' Association, Inc. (the HOA) received plaintiff's verdicts against several defendants, including Respondents-Petitioners Marick Home Builders, LLC and Rick Thoennes. Marick Home Builders, Thoennes, and other defendants appealed, and in a pair of published opinions, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted several writs of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decisions. Here, the Court reviewed "Stoneledge I" and addressed the trial court's: (1) jury charge; (2) denial of Marick's directed verdict motions; (3) finding of amalgamation; and (4) calculation of damages. The Supreme Court affirmrf the court of appeals as to the jury charge and as to the trial court's denial of Marick's motions. The Court reversed the court of appeals as to amalgamation. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals as to the amount of the judgment in favor of the HOA and remanded to the circuit court for final calculation and entry of judgment. View "Stoneledge at Lake Keowee v. IMK Development Co., LLC" on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals filed by Greenville County, South Carolina, the issue central to the cases involved a zoning dispute between the County and Greenville Bistro, LLC, d/b/a Bucks Racks & Ribs. Greenville Bistro filed suit against the County to enjoin the County from enforcing an ordinance to deny Greenville Bistro's desired method of operating Bucks Racks & Ribs. Citing other ordinances, the County counterclaimed and moved to enjoin Greenville Bistro from operating Bucks as a sexually oriented business. Both appeals concerned the legality of Greenville Bistro operating Bucks as a restaurant with the added feature of scantily clad exotic dancers. The circuit court granted Greenville Bistro's motion for a temporary injunction, and the County appealed. While the County's appeal was pending, another circuit court denied the County's motion for temporary injunctive relief, ruling that in light of the County's appeal it did not have jurisdiction to consider the County's motion. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed both rulings, dissolved the injunction granted to Greenville Bistro, and held the County was entitled to injunctive relief. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Greenville Bistro, LLC. v. Greenville County" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted three certified questions from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In this case, Curt Hall sued UBS Financial Services Inc. (UBS) (his former employer) and Mary Reid, a former co-worker, seeking to hold them liable for damages he allegedly incurred when he was fired by UBS. Hall's claims against UBS included one for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and Hall's claims against Reid included one for tortious interference with contractual relations. The certified questions concerned the nature of Hall's at-will employment and the viability of Hall's causes of action in the employment at-will context. Hall did not concede he was an at-will employee. The Supreme Court held: (1) terminable at-will employment relationships are contractual in nature as a matter of law; (2a) the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may arise in the context of terminable-at-will employment relationships; (2b) an employer's termination of an at-will employee does not constitute a breach of the relationship such that it may give rise to a claim by the former employee against the employer for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; (3) potential liability extends to third parties who are not fellow employees of the terminated employee. The Court issued a caveat to its responses to the district court's questions: it answered all questions under the assumption that no exception to the doctrine of at-will employment applies "our answers to these questions do not alter the established rule that, as long as an exception does not apply, an employer may terminate an at-will employee for any reason without incurring liability." View "Hall v. UBS Financial Services Inc." on Justia Law

The issue presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court in this case involved two consolidated cross-appeals from the Public Service Commission's (PSC) determinations regarding ratemaking applications filed by Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC (DEC) and Duke Energy Progress, LLC (DEP) (collectively, Duke). Each Duke entity owned one coal-fired power plant in South Carolina and seven coal-fired power plants in North Carolina, for a total of sixteen affected plants. In their ratemaking applications, the two Duke entities sought recovery for expenses related to their plants in both states, with those costs shared proportionately between their North and South Carolina customers. The PSC allowed in part and disallowed in part the requested expenses. On appeal, Duke contended the PSC erred in disallowing: (1) environmental compliance costs associated with North Carolina law; (2) litigation costs incurred by Duke in defending itself from various lawsuits; and (3) carrying costs on specified deferred accounts. In the cross-appeal, the South Carolina Energy Users Committee (SCEUC) contended the PSC erred in allowing DEC recovery of costs associated with a now-abandoned nuclear project in Cherokee County because of the South Carolina General Assembly's repeal of the Base Load Review Act (BLRA). After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the PSC's decisions in full because its decisions were supported by substantial evidence in the record, were not arbitrary or capricious, and were not controlled by an error of law. View "Duke Energy Carolinas v. SC Office of Regulatory Staff" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted petitioners' request for a declaration with respect to Provisos 1.108 and 1.103 of the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act1 were invalid. Proviso 1.108 (enacted June 22, 2021,) was directed to the South Carolina Department of Education for South Carolina's kindergarten through 12th grade (K-12) public schools, and banned face mask mandates at any of its education facilities. Proviso 1.103 permitted school districts to offer a virtual education program for up to five percent of its student population based on the most recent 135 day ADM [(average daily membership)]count without impacting any state funding. For every student participating in the virtual program above the five percent threshold, the school district would not receive 47.22% of the State per pupil funding provided to that district as reported in the latest Revenue and Fiscal Affairs revenue per pupil report pursuant to Proviso 1.3. Although the School District did not require its students to wear masks in its education facilities, it claimed Proviso 1.108 conflicted with local laws regarding mask requirements in schools and placed the School District in an untenable position. In addition, Petitioners claimed the School District reached the five percent cap for virtual enrollment and did not wish to risk losing state funds by exceeding the cap in Proviso 1.103. The School District asked for guidance on its options and obligations regarding face masks and virtual education. Petitioners contended: (1) Provisos 1.108 and 1.103 violate the one-subject rule of article III, section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution; (2) the plain language of Proviso 1.108 permitted the School District to implement and enforce mask mandates in its education facilities if the School District did so with funds not appropriated or authorized in the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act; (3) Provisos 1.108 and 1.103 improperly invade the authority of local school boards; and (4) Provisos 1.108 and 1.103 denied equal protection to students and violated their constitutional right to free public education. The Supreme Court held the provisos were constitutional, and rejected the remaining challenges to the validity of the provisos. View "Richland County School District 2 v. Lucas" on Justia Law