Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioners Jennifer Pinckney, Howard Duvall, and Kay Patterson challenged the constitutionality of section 10-1-165 of the South Carolina Code (2011). Petitioners also sought an injunction prohibiting enforcement of section 10- 1-165. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition to hear the case in its original jurisdiction and found unconstitutional the procedural provision in subsection 10-1-165(B) purporting to restrict the General Assembly's legislative power by imposing a supermajority voting requirement to amend or repeal section 10-1-165. The Court found no constitutional violation in the substantive provisions in subsection 10-1-165(A) preventing the relocation, removal, renaming, or rededication of monuments, memorials, streets, bridges, parks, or other structures. The Court denied petitioners' request for an injunction. View "Pinckney v. Peeler" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a family court order terminating Mallory Sweigart's parental rights to her nine-year-old daughter. The court of appeals reversed, finding Mallory had not "wilfully failed to visit the child," the statutory ground for termination alleged in this case. Mallory Sweigart, the Child's biological mother, was twenty-five years old when the Child was born. Brittney Stasi was Mallory's sister, and Lukas Stasi was Brittney's husband. Mallory suffered from severe mental illness, diagnosed with borderline personality disorder and attempting suicide multiple times. The Child stayed with the Stasis in Fort Mill, South Carolina, from June 2014 until August 2014. Following another of Mallory's suicide attempts, in 2015 the Stasis filed an action in family court seeking custody of the Child. From December 2014 until September 2017, Mallory saw the Child only four times. When the Stasis first started taking care of the Child, Brittney and Mallory had a strong and loving relationship. Beginning in December 2014, however, their relationship began to deteriorate when Mallory claimed the Stasis coerced her into signing the custody agreement. In April 2016, represented by counsel for the first time, Mallory filed an action seeking to have custody of the Child returned to her. Mallory filed an affidavit in support of the claim and made extreme allegations against Brittney. The family court dismissed Mallory's action. In April 2017, the Stasis filed this action for termination of Mallory's parental rights and adoption of the Child. In November 2018, the family court terminated Mallory's parental rights and granted the adoption. In its order, the family court noted that in the twenty-nine months the Child lived with the Stasis before this proceeding was filed, Mallory visited the Child only four times, including two incidental visits while she was in town for hearings. The family court found by clear and convincing evidence Mallory willfully failed to visit the Child and termination of Mallory's parental rights was in the Child's best interests. The court of appeals found the Stasis "did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Mallory's] failure to visit was willful" and reversed the termination of Mallory's parental rights in an unpublished opinion. The South Carolina Supreme Court found by the required clear and convincing standard of proof that Mallory's failure to visit the Child was willful, and that termination of Mallory's parental rights is in the Child's best interest. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the family court's order terminating Mallory's parental rights and granting the Stasis' adoption of the Child. View "Stasi v. Sweigart" on Justia Law

Respondent Simran Singh (Mother) and Petitioner Gunjit Singh (Father) separated in January of 2012. They entered into a settlement agreement which resolved all issues arising from their marriage, including custody and visitation matters involving their two children, then aged eleven and two. Pursuant to that agreement, Mother received primary custody, and the parties consented to submit any future disputes regarding child support or visitation to a mutually agreed-upon arbitrator, specifically providing that his or her decision would "be binding and non-appealable." The family court approved the agreement and granted the parties a divorce in February of 2013. Approximately nine months later, Father filed an action in family court seeking modification of custody, visitation, and child support, alleging Mother had violated a provision of the agreement when she failed to return to South Carolina with the children after embarking on a cross-country tour as a motivational speaker. From January through August of 2014, four family court judges issued decisions— one dismissing Father’s complaint due to the parties' decision to arbitrate; a second issuing a consent order to arbitrate; and two approving amended agreements to arbitrate. The arbitrator issued a "partial" arbitration award finding a substantial and material change of circumstance affecting the welfare and custody of the minor children, and awarding Father temporary custody. A thirty-two-page final arbitration award was issued the next month, awarding custody to Father. A fifth family court judge issued an order in January 2015 confirming both the partial and final arbitration awards. Thereafter, Mother filed five separate Rule 60(b)(4), SCRCP, motions to vacate all the orders approving the parties' agreements to arbitrate. The court of appeals issued its unanimous decision in December of 2019, holding that the parties could not divest the family court of jurisdiction to determine issues relating to custody, visitation, and child support. One month prior, another panel of the court of appeals issued a decision in Kosciusko v. Parham, 836 S.E.2d 362 (Ct. App. 2019), holding the family court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to approve the binding arbitration of children's issues. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed as modified, the appellate court's order. View "Singh v. Singh" on Justia Law

South Carolina Attorney General Alan Wilson sought a declaration by the South Carolina Supreme Court concerning the use of facemasks in the public schools of South Carolina during the coronavirus pandemic. The Court construed Proviso 117.190 of the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act relating to public institutions of higher learning, and determined from the language in that proviso that the University of South Carolina was not precluded from issuing a universal mask mandate that applied equally to vaccinated and unvaccinated students and faculty alike. This case involved a different proviso from the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act: Proviso 1.108, relating to public schools serving students grades kindergarten through 12 (K-12). Proviso 1.108 manifestly set forth the intent of the legislature to prohibit mask mandates funded by the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act in K-12 public schools. The Attorney General contended the City of Columbia passed ordinances in direct opposition to Proviso 1.108, mandating masks in all K-12 public schools in the City of Columbia. "While allowing school districts flexibility to encourage one policy or the other, the state legislature has elected to leave the ultimate decision to parents. Conversely, the City of Columbia has attempted to mandate masks for all school children by following guidance from the Centers for Disease Control, which has the effect of disallowing parents a say in the matter." The Supreme Court upheld Proviso 1.108 and declared void the challenged ordinances of the City of Columbia insofar as they purported to impose a mask mandate in K-12 public schools. View "Wilson v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Public Service Commission (PSC) was a quasi-judicial body established by the South Carolina General Assembly, to which the legislature delegated "power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate the rates and service of every public utility in this State and to fix just and reasonable standards, classifications, regulations, practices, and measurements of service to be furnished, imposed, or observed, and followed by every public utility in this State." Part of this power includes the authority "to create incentives for utilities to improve their business practices." The PSC's order on appeal here was primarily focused on providing incentives to the utility to improve its business practices. Appellant, Blue Granite Water Co. (Blue Granite), was a utility that provided water and sewer services. Blue Granite was formerly known as Carolina Water Service (CWS). CWS changed its name to Blue Granite as part of a rebranding campaign, in part because the utility had earned an unfavorable reputation throughout the state. In rejecting Blue Granite's request for an approximate 50% rate increase, and in an effort to incentivize Blue Granite to improve its business practices, the PSC set a lower return on equity (ROE) than requested and allowed only certain portions of Blue Granite's requested costs, citing to the utility's known, poor reputation and service problems. On appeal, Blue Granite contended the PSC's attempts to incentivize the utility actually unfairly punished the company in violation of law. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part. As to the issues involving the ROE, storm costs, and bond, the Court found the PSC's decision was not unfairly punitive, not arbitrary or capricious, and not clearly erroneous. However, as to the Greenville office expenses, the Court found the PSC's decision to completely deny yearly rental expenses was arbitrary and capricious. The Court therefore remanded this case back to the PSC for additional proceedings. View "In re Application of Blue Granite" on Justia Law

Petitioner Richard Creswick, a professor at the University of South Carolina (the University), sought a declaration in the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction that Proviso 117.190 of the 2021-2022 Appropriations Act did not prohibit a universal mask mandate at the University, and asked the Court for expedited consideration of this matter. Because this matter involved a question of significant public interest that had to be decided before classes resumed, the Supreme Court accepted review of this matter and expedited its consideration. Dispensing with further briefing (finding oral argument would not be helpful), the Court declared Proviso 117.190 did not prohibit a universal mask mandate. View "Creswick v. University of South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant William Lewis, the former Sheriff of Greenville County, asked the South Carolina Supreme Court to hold the 1829 statute under which he was convicted for misconduct in office relating to a sexual affair with an employee, void for vagueness. Specifically, he argued Section 8-1-80 of the South Carolina Code (2019), was unconstitutional because it proscribed "official misconduct, corruption, fraud, or oppression" without defining those terms, and he claimed he was entitled to a directed verdict. Lewis was elected sheriff of Greenville County in the 2016 general election. Lewis hired Savannah Nabors, aged twenty-two, with whom he had previously worked at a local law firm, to be his administrative coordinator. Nabors had no law enforcement experience. She was paid a salary and given numerous benefits, including a new 2017 Ford Explorer equipped with a special "police package," an assigned parking place close to Lewis, a cell phone, an iPad, and a computer. Lewis first had sex with Nabors in 2017 when she accompanied him on a business trip out of state. Nabors testified that Lewis acted appropriately at times but on other occasions, he continued to pursue a relationship with her. Nabors indicated she preferred her relationship with Lewis to be nonsexual; Lewis responded that was "fine" but there would have to be changes, including her not accompanying him to meetings and other places for work. Nabors tendered her resignation in April 2017. By August 2017, Nabors detailed the out-of-state trip in a personal blog and accused Lewis (not specifically by name), of improprieties. Thereafter, she filed a civil lawsuit. Lewis held a press conference in October 2017 and admitted to the affair, but denied allegations of assault, rape, or stalking, maintaining the encounter was consensual. Following a SLED investigation, Lewis was indicted in April 2018 for common law misconduct in office and obstruction of justice. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the applicable statute constitutional, and that the trial court did not err in refusing to quash the indictment against Lewis. View "South Carolina v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Hystron Fibers, Inc. hired Daniel Construction Company in 1965 to build a polyester fiber plant in Spartanburg, South Carolina. When the plant began operating in 1967, Hystron retained Daniel to provide all maintenance and repair workers at the plant. Hystron soon became Hoechst Fibers, Inc. Pursuant to a series of written contracts, Hoechst paid Daniel an annual fee and reimbursed Daniel for certain costs. The contracts required Daniel to purchase workers' compensation insurance for the workers and required Hoechst to reimburse Daniel for the workers' compensation insurance premiums. Dennis Seay was employed by Daniel. Seay worked various maintenance and repair positions at the Hoechst plant from 1971 until 1980. The manufacture of polyester fibers required the piping of very hot liquid polyester through asbestos-insulated pipes. He eventually developed lung problems, which were later diagnosed as mesothelioma, a cancer caused by inhaling asbestos fibers. Seay and his wife filed this lawsuit against CNA Holdings (Hoechst's corporate successor) claiming Hoechst acted negligently in using asbestos and in failing to warn of its dangers. After Seay died from mesothelioma, his daughter, Angie Keene, took over the lawsuit as personal representative of his estate. Throughout the litigation, CNA Holdings argued Seay was a statutory employee and the Workers' Compensation Law provided the exclusive remedy for his claims. The circuit court disagreed and denied CNA Holdings' motion for summary judgment. A jury awarded Seay's estate $14 million in actual damages and $2 million in punitive damages. The trial court denied CNA Holdings' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, again finding Seay was not a statutory employee. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the circuit court and the court of appeals correctly determined the injured worker in this case was not the statutory employee of the defendant. View "Keene v, CNA Holdings, LLC" on Justia Law

After sustaining injuries in a vehicle driven by her son, Kevin Simms, Petitioner Belinda Pickens sought UM coverage through her policy with Respondent United Services Automobile Association (USAA). At the time of the accident, Pickens's policy covered five vehicles, including the 1997 Chevrolet involved in the accident. The policy included liability, personal injury protection (PIP), UM, and underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. Pickens also executed a named driver exclusion. Pickens's declarations page also contained a provision that stated, "***COVERAGES EXCLUDED WHEN ANY VEHICLE OPERATED BY KEVIN SIMMS***." USAA denied Pickens's claim and initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting she was not entitled to UM coverage because Simms, the excluded driver, was operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. Pickens sued USAA and lost. The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether Section 38-77-340 of the South Carolina Code (2015) permitted a named driver exclusion that precluded uninsured motorist (UM) coverage to a passenger injured in an accident involving an unknown driver. The Court held that it did. "As the circuit court noted, no liability coverage would have been afforded to a third party had Simms been at fault, and thus, it would violate public policy to allow Pickens to recover UM when she was the person who executed the exclusion yet knowingly allowed Simms to drive her vehicle." View "United Services Automobile Association v. Pickens" on Justia Law

Lucille Ray sued the City of Rock Hill, South Carolina (the City) for inverse condemnation, claiming her property was taken as a result of stormwater flowing through pipes under City streets and into a terra cotta pipe that ran underneath and behind her property. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, and the court of appeals reversed, holding a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the City engaged in an affirmative, positive, aggressive act sufficient to support Ray's claim. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals (as modified), and remanded the case back to the circuit court for a determination on the merits as to whether the City's reconnection of its three stormwater pipes to the catch basin and the resumed flow of water through the Pipe constituted an affirmative, positive, aggressive act causing damage to the Property over and above any damage that had occurred before the three pipes were severed and reconnected. "Given the posture of this case and the above discussion, Ray cannot recover for any damage to the Property caused by the flow of water though the Pipe before the City reconnected its three pipes to the catch basin in November 2012." View "Ray v. City of Rock Hill" on Justia Law