Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This action involves a dispute stemming from the removal of a drainage pipe running across neighboring properties. The pipe was part of an easement originally owned by the Seabrook Island Property Owners Association (SIPOA) and was intended to carry away stormwater from a road within the community, with a pipe running through the backyard portions of seven contiguous lots. Over the years, the pipe degraded and began draining standing water from the backyards of those seven lots. Nearly twenty years later, SIPOA installed a new drainage system for the road. At a property owner's request, SIPOA formally abandoned the easement, though the old, degraded pipe remained in place. Petitioners Paul and Susan McLaughlin later purchased one of the seven lots containing the old drainage pipe (Lot 22). After years of meetings and consultation with SIPOA and their neighbors, Petitioners removed the pipe and built a new house over the area in which the pipe was previously located. Respondents Richard and Eugenia Ralph owned the parcel next door to Petitioners (Lot 23). Following removal of the old pipe, Respondents claimed their backyard flooding became worse that it already was and sued Petitioners. A jury awarded Respondents $1,000 in "nominal" damages, and they appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial on damages alone. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court did not err in any respect, thus reversing the appellate court's decision. View "Ralph v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law

South Carolina Governor Henry McMaster issued an order suspending Mohsen Baddourah from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council after Baddourah was indicted for second-degree domestic violence. Baddourah initiated this declaratory judgment action seeking a determination that: (1) he was a member of the Legislative Branch and was, therefore, excepted from the Governor's suspension power under the South Carolina Constitution; and (2) second-degree domestic violence was not a crime involving moral turpitude, so it was not an act that was within the scope of the Governor's suspension power. The circuit court dismissed Baddourah's complaint on the ground the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and, alternatively, for failure to state a cause of action. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Baddourah's indictment charged a crime involving moral turpitude, and the Governor had the constitutional authority to issue the Executive Order suspending Baddourah from his position as a member of the Columbia City Council. Although Baddourah disputed whether the suspension was warranted, "where the Governor was constitutionally authorized to impose a suspension, the decision whether to do so is a matter committed to the Governor's discretion after considering all of the attendant circumstances." Consequently, the circuit court's order dismissing Baddourah's challenge to the suspension order is affirmed as modified. View "Baddourah v. Baddourah" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was a civil action to collect a debt under a contract that contained an arbitration provision. The defendants appealed the master in equity's order refusing to set aside the entry of their default. The court of appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis that an order refusing to set aside an entry of default was not immediately appealable. The defendants filed a petition for a writ of certiorari claiming the order was immediately appealable because it had the effect of precluding their motion to compel arbitration, and in fact, the order states, "Defendants' motion to stay and compel arbitration is denied as [the defendants are] in default." Finding no reversible error, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. View "Palmetto Construction Group, LLC v. Restoration Specialists, LLC" on Justia Law

Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide") relied on flight-from-law enforcement and felony step-down provisions in an automobile liability insurance policy to limit its coverage to the statutory mandatory minimum. Following a bench trial and after issuance of the South Carolina Supreme Court's opinion in Williams v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), 409 S.C. 586 (2014), the circuit court held the step-down provisions were void pursuant to Section 38-77-142(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015). The court of appeals reversed. Three individuals, Sharmin Walls, Randi Harper, and Christopher Timms, were passengers in a vehicle driven by Korey Mayfield that crashed in 2008 following a high-speed chase by law enforcement. Mayfield refused to pull over, and during the chase, the trooper's vehicle reached speeds of 109 miles per hour. All the passengers begged Mayfield to stop the car, but Mayfield refused. Eventually, the trooper received instructions to terminate the pursuit, which he did. Nevertheless, Mayfield continued speeding and lost control of the vehicle. Timms died in the single-car accident, and Walls, Harper, and Mayfield sustained serious injuries. After being charged with reckless homicide, Mayfield entered an Alford plea. At the time of the accident, Walls' automobile was insured through her Nationwide policy, which included bodily injury and property damage liability coverage with limits of $100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence. Walls also maintained uninsured motorist (UM) coverage for the same limits, but she did not have underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. In reliance on the aforementioned provisions, Nationwide paid only $50,000 in total to the injured passengers (the statutory minimum as provided by law) rather than the liability limits stated in the policy. Safe Auto, Mayfield's insurance company, also paid a total of $50,000 to the passengers. Nationwide brought this declaratory judgment action requesting the court declare that the passengers were not entitled to combined coverage of more than $50,000 for any claims arising from the accident. Walls answered, denying there was any evidence that the flight-from-law enforcement and felony provisions applied. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, holding that section 38-77-142(C) rendered Nationwide's attempt to limit the contracted-for liability insurance to the mandatory minimum void. View "Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Walls" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the enforceability of an arbitration agreement executed between Ashley River Plantation, an assisted-living facility, and Thayer Arredondo, the attorney-in-fact under two powers of attorney executed by Hubert Whaley, a facility resident. When Whaley was admitted into the facility, Arredondo held two valid powers of attorney, a General Durable Power of Attorney (GDPOA) and a Health Care Power of Attorney (HCPOA). Arredondo met with a facility representative and signed various documents in connection with Whaley's admission. During that meeting, the facility representative did not mention or present an arbitration agreement to Arredondo. Later that day, after Whaley was admitted, Arredondo met with a different facility representative who, according to Arredondo, told her she "needed to sign additional documents related to [her] father's admission to the facility." Included among those documents was the arbitration agreement, which Arredondo signed. The arbitration agreement contained a mutual waiver of the right to a trial by judge or jury, and required arbitration of all claims involving potential damages exceeding $25,000. The agreement barred either party from appealing the arbitrators' decision, prohibited an award of punitive damages, limited discovery, and provided Respondents the unilateral right to amend the agreement. Two years into his stay at the facility, Whaley was admitted to the hospital, where he died six years later. Arredondo, as Personal Representative of Whaley's estate, brought this action alleging claims for wrongful death and survival against Respondents. The complaint alleged that during his residency at the facility, Whaley suffered serious physical injuries and died as a result of Respondents' negligence and recklessness. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held the arbitration agreement was enforceable. The South Carolina Supreme Court held neither power of attorney gave Arredondo the authority to sign the arbitration agreement. Therefore, the court of appeals was reversed. View "Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC" on Justia Law

Voters in Calhoun County, South Carolina, approved a referendum in the November 2018 general election imposing a one percent sales and use tax ("a penny tax") to fund a list of fifteen projects. Nearly five months later, Appellants filed suit, contending four of the projects were not authorized pursuant to section S.C. Code Ann. sections 4-10-300 to -390 (2019). The County responded that the statute of limitations had expired, and alternatively, the projects fell within the scope of the Act. The circuit court found the thirty-day limitations period barred the action and did not address the merits. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed, holding the statute of limitations had run. View "South Carolina Public Interest Foundation v. Calhoun County Council" on Justia Law

Appellant James Harrison, a former state legislator, was convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment in a public corruption probe. The case was prosecuted by David Pascoe, Solicitor of the First Judicial Circuit, who was serving as the acting Attorney General. As recognized in prior case law, Solicitor Pascoe's authority to pursue the corruption probe was bestowed on him by South Carolina's then-current Attorney General, Alan Wilson. Appellant contended Solicitor Pascoe's authority did not grant the solicitor the power to investigate or prosecute Appellant. Conversely, Solicitor Pascoe dismissed any suggestion that his authority was limited, contending he had the authority to prosecute public corruption wherever the investigation led. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined Solicitor Pascoe had the authority to prosecute Appellant for perjury, but did not have the authority to prosecute Appellant for misconduct in office. Consequently, the Court affirmed Appellant's conviction and eighteen-month sentence for perjury, but reversed the statutory and common law misconduct in office charges, and remanded to the presiding judge of the State Grand Jury for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Harrison" on Justia Law

Jose Reyes Reyes was convicted by a jury of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Reyes's petition for a writ of certiorari to address two questions: (1) whether the trial court improperly ruled in the jury's presence that the child victim (Minor) was competent to testify; and (2) whether the solicitor improperly bolstered Minor's credibility by phrasing questions to Minor in the first person. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' judgment. View "South Carolina v. Reyes" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. John Harley Wickersham Jr. was seriously injured in an automobile accident. After months of severe pain from the injuries he received in the accident, he committed suicide. His widow filed lawsuits for wrongful death, survival, and loss of consortium against Ford Motor Company in state circuit court. She alleged that defects in the airbag system in Mr. Wickersham's Ford Escape enhanced his injuries, increasing the severity of his pain, which in turn proximately caused his suicide. She included causes of action for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Ford removed the cases to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. Ford then filed a motion for summary judgment in the wrongful death suit, arguing Mrs. Wickersham has no wrongful death claim under South Carolina law because Mr. Wickersham's suicide was an intervening act that could not be proximately caused by a defective airbag. The district court denied Ford's motion. 194 F. Supp. 3d at 448. The court ruled Mrs. Wickersham could prevail on the wrongful death claim if she proved the enhanced injuries Mr. Wickersham sustained in the accident as a result of the defective airbag caused severe pain that led to an "uncontrollable impulse" to commit suicide. Ford renewed the motion during and after trial, but the district court denied both motions. A jury ultimately returned a verdict in favor of Mrs. Wickersham on all claims. Ford appealed, and the Fourth Circuit asked: (1) whether South Carolina recognized an "uncontrollable impulse" exception to the general rule that suicide breaks the causal chain for wrongful death claims; and (2) did comparative negligence in causing enhanced injuries apply in a crashworthiness case when the plaintiff alleges claims of strict liability and breach of warranty and is seeking damages related only to the plaintiff's enhanced injuries? The Supreme Court responded that (1) South Carolina did not recognize a general rule that suicide was an intervening act which breaks the chain of causation and categorically precludes recovery in wrongful death actions. "Rather, our courts have applied traditional principles of proximate cause to individual factual situations when considering whether a personal representative has a valid claim for wrongful death from suicide." With respect to the federal court's second question, the Supreme Court held a plaintiff's actions that do not cause an accident but are nevertheless a contributing cause to the enhancement of his injuries, are not necessarily a legally remote cause. "Mr. Wickersham's non-tortious actions that were not misuse are not relevant to Ford's liability for enhancement of his injuries in terms of the defense of comparative negligence or fault." View "Wickersham v. Ford Motor Company" on Justia Law

The issue presented in this declaratory action before the South Carolina Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction was a challenge to the constitutionality of Governor Henry McMaster's allocation of $32 million in federal emergency education funding for the creation of the Safe Access to Flexible Education ("SAFE") Grants Program. Petitioners contended the program violated South Carolina's constitutional mandate prohibiting public funding of private schools. The Supreme Court held the Governor's decision constituted the use of public funds for the direct benefit of private educational institutions within the meaning of, and prohibited by, Article XI, Section 4 of the South Carolina Constitution. "Even in the midst of a pandemic, our State Constitution remains a constant, and the current circumstances cannot dictate our decision. Rather, no matter the circumstances, the Court has a responsibility to uphold the Constitution." View "Adams v. McMaster" on Justia Law