Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dr. Earl Bostick Sr. and Josie Bostick married in 1970, and Dr. Bostick developed two successful dental practices in South Carolina. In 2009, he sold one practice and continued with the other until the couple separated in 2017, after which he sold the remaining practice for $569,000. The sales contract indicated that $424,140 of this amount was for goodwill and a non-compete agreement. The couple agreed to an equal division of the marital estate but disputed whether the goodwill was personal (nonmarital) or enterprise (marital) property.The Family Court granted the divorce and ruled that the goodwill in Dr. Bostick's practice was personal, thus not subject to division. The court based its decision on the evidence that the goodwill was tied to Dr. Bostick's personal reputation and professional skills. Josie Bostick appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court's decision, determining that the goodwill should be considered enterprise goodwill and thus marital property.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Family Court's ruling. The Supreme Court found that the goodwill was indeed personal, as it was closely tied to Dr. Bostick's reputation, community involvement, and professional skills. The Court emphasized that Josie Bostick did not present evidence to prove the goodwill was enterprise in nature. The presence of a non-compete agreement further supported the conclusion that the goodwill was personal. Consequently, the value of the goodwill was excluded from the marital estate, and the Family Court's judgment was reinstated. View "Bostick v. Bostick" on Justia Law

Richard Kenneth Galloway was convicted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend's daughter between 1988 and 1990. The victim, who was in elementary and middle school at the time, reported the abuse to the police in 2016. At trial, she testified about multiple incidents of sexual abuse by Galloway. The jury convicted Galloway on two charges: one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and one count of lewd act upon a child. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of thirty years and ten years, respectively. Galloway appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions.Galloway's appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court focused on two main issues: the exclusion of expert testimony on "false memories" and the admission of testimony about his violence toward the victim's mother. The trial court had excluded the expert testimony because the expert had not evaluated the victim and could not reliably apply his theories to her specific case. The court of appeals upheld this exclusion, finding that the testimony would not assist the jury and was speculative.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the trial court did not err in excluding the expert testimony on false memories, as it was not reliably applied to the victim and would not assist the jury. The court also found no reversible error in admitting testimony about Galloway's violence toward the victim's mother, as it was relevant to explaining the victim's delayed disclosure of the abuse and did not unfairly prejudice the jury against Galloway. The court dismissed the writ of certiorari on a third issue regarding the contents of a letter Galloway wrote, finding no reason to disagree with the court of appeals' analysis. View "The State v. Galloway" on Justia Law

Gena Cain Davis, a correctional officer, filed a workers' compensation claim in July 2016, alleging injuries from a slip-and-fall accident. She later requested a hearing, which she withdrew, leading to the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) suspending her temporary disability compensation and filing a request to stop payments. Davis filed another hearing request, which was also withdrawn. The single commissioner allowed the withdrawal without prejudice and dismissed SCDC's stop-payment request.The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's Appellate Panel upheld the dismissal of the stop-payment request but reversed the withdrawal without prejudice, claiming the single commissioner lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals vacated the Appellate Panel's decision, stating the single commissioner's ruling was interlocutory and not immediately reviewable, and remanded the case to the Commission.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified. The Supreme Court held that the single commissioner's order was interlocutory and not an "award" subject to immediate review by the Appellate Panel under section 42-17-50. The court clarified that the single commissioner had jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prejudice and reinstated the single commissioner's ruling. The case was remanded to the Commission for further proceedings, urging an expeditious resolution of the claim's merits. View "Davis v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Four condemned inmates challenged the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that provides three methods of execution: electrocution, lethal injection, and firing squad. They argued that the statute violates the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment.The Richland County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the inmates, declaring the statute unconstitutional. The court found that electrocution and firing squad methods violate the state constitution's prohibition on cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. It also found the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution unconstitutionally vague and an improper delegation of authority. The court further ruled that the retroactive application of the amended statute violated ex post facto prohibitions.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the statute does not violate the South Carolina Constitution. It found that electrocution is not unconstitutionally cruel, corporal, or unusual, noting that the inmates did not meet their burden of proving that electrocution causes unnecessary and excessive pain. The court also held that lethal injection, as conceded by the inmates, is constitutional if properly administered. Regarding the firing squad, the court found it to be a relatively quick and painless method of execution, thus not cruel or unusual.The court also addressed the inmates' claims about the statute's vagueness and improper delegation of authority, finding that the term "available" is not unconstitutionally vague and that the statute does not unlawfully delegate authority to the Director of the Department of Corrections. The court emphasized that the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution is a constitutional innovation aimed at making the death penalty less inhumane. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional in its entirety. View "Owens v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Covil Corporation, through its receiver, sued Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Company for breaching their insurance contract by not contributing to a settlement in an asbestos case. David Rollins had sued Covil and others, alleging negligent asbestos exposure caused his mesothelioma. Penn National insured Covil during part of the exposure period. Covil settled the case and sought $50,000 from Penn National, which the insurer refused to pay.The circuit court granted summary judgment for Covil, requiring Penn National to indemnify Covil for the settlement. The court rejected Penn National's arguments about untimely notice, premature summary judgment, and policy exclusions. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision with modifications. The court held that the notice-prejudice rule did not apply because the underlying plaintiff, Rollins, had already been fully compensated. The court also found that Covil's untimely notice was not a material breach of the insurance contract, as Covil's interests were adequately protected by other insurers' counsel. Additionally, the court ruled that Penn National did not waive its right to timely notice by attending mediation.The court further held that the policy's "Products Hazard" and "Completed Operations Hazard" exclusions did not apply. The Products Hazard exclusion was inapplicable because Covil's liability was based on installation, not supplying asbestos. The Completed Operations Hazard exclusion did not apply because Rollins's exposure occurred before Covil's work was completed. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Covil. View "Covil Corporation v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In December 2014, the petitioner and his son met Charles Brown to sell a motorcycle. The transaction failed, and the petitioner and his son allegedly robbed and killed Brown. Both were indicted for murder and armed robbery and proceeded to a joint jury trial. The jury was instructed to consider each charge separately for each defendant. After deliberations, the jury convicted the petitioner's son of armed robbery but acquitted him of murder. The jury then reported being deadlocked on the petitioner's charges, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.After the jury was dismissed, a bailiff found documents indicating the jury had reached a guilty verdict for the petitioner's armed robbery charge. The trial court recalled the jury, which confirmed it had reached a verdict on the armed robbery charge before being discharged. The jury was polled individually, and all jurors affirmed the guilty verdict. The trial court then entered the guilty verdict and sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment without parole.The petitioner appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in recalling the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on procedural grounds. The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to recall the jury. The Supreme Court emphasized that the jury was recalled shortly after discharge, remained on the courthouse premises, and was not subjected to outside influences. The recall served only to confirm the verdict reached before discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence for armed robbery. View "The State v. Mills" on Justia Law

In 2018, Montrelle Campbell was convicted of one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder. The case involved a shooting at an apartment in Charleston, where Campbell allegedly fired fourteen rifle rounds, resulting in one death and two injuries. The key issues on appeal were the trial court's instruction on malice inferred from the use of a deadly weapon, the requirement of expressed malice for attempted murder, and the accomplice liability instruction.The Court of Appeals reversed Campbell's convictions, citing errors in the trial court's instructions. It held that the instruction on inferred malice from a deadly weapon was erroneous and not harmless, that expressed malice was required for attempted murder under State v. King, and that the accomplice liability instruction was improper. The court remanded the case for a new trial.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals. It held that the erroneous instruction on inferred malice was harmless due to overwhelming evidence of malice. The court clarified that attempted murder can be proven by either expressed or implied malice. Additionally, it found sufficient circumstantial evidence to support the accomplice liability instruction, noting that the evidence allowed the jury to reasonably conclude that Campbell and another individual were acting together during the shooting. The Supreme Court's decision reinstated Campbell's convictions. View "The State v. Campbell" on Justia Law

Phillip Wayne Lowery was convicted of second offense driving under the influence (DUI). He admitted to being under the influence but contested that the only evidence of him driving came from statements he made to a patrol trooper, which he argued were inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona. Additionally, Lowery argued that the charge should be dismissed because field sobriety tests and Miranda warnings from another trooper's dash camera video were not shown to the jury.The Circuit Court in Greenville County admitted Lowery's statements and denied his motion for a directed verdict. The court found that the State had substantially complied with the statutory requirements for videotaping field sobriety tests and Miranda warnings. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, agreeing with Lowery that his statements were inadmissible and remanded for a new trial. However, it held that dismissal of the charge was not required despite the video deficiencies.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case. It reversed the Court of Appeals' decision regarding the admissibility of Lowery's statements, holding that even if the initial statements were inadmissible, subsequent volunteered statements were admissible and created a jury issue on whether Lowery was driving. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that the absence of the sobriety tests and Miranda warnings on the video did not warrant dismissal of the charge. The Supreme Court reinstated Lowery's conviction, emphasizing that the statute does not require the State to offer any portion of the incident site video into evidence. View "The State v. Lowery" on Justia Law

A group of retired firefighters from the City of Columbia claimed that the City had promised them free lifetime health insurance. This promise was allegedly made through verbal statements, newsletters, and retirement letters. The dispute arose when the City Council required all active and retired employees under 65 to contribute to their health insurance premiums, and later extended this requirement to Medicare supplemental coverage for retirees over 65. The firefighters argued that the City should be held to its promise under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.Initially, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, allowing the promissory estoppel claim to proceed. After a nonjury trial, Judge Sprouse ruled in favor of the City, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, stating that the firefighters had not proven an unambiguous promise or reasonable reliance on such a promise.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court found that the firefighters did not prove the City made a clear promise of free lifetime health insurance. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the City Council, not individual employees, had the authority to make such promises. The Court also clarified that promissory estoppel claims need only be proven by the greater weight of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence, except in cases involving specific performance of land transfers. The Court concluded that the firefighters had no right to rely on statements made by City employees who lacked the authority to bind the City. View "Cruz v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Adam Rowell was convicted of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164, who served on his jury, had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Juror 164 was not present at the hearing for the new trial motion, and although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the additional hearing.The circuit court found that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional, attributing it to the structure of the voir dire questions, which could have confused the average juror. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that there was no need for further examination of Juror 164 since the concealment was deemed unintentional.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided to abandon the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment. The court held that the focus should be on whether the juror's nondisclosure suggests bias and whether this bias caused prejudice to the moving party. The court ruled that a new trial may be ordered only when prejudice is proven by showing that the concealed information reveals a potential for bias and would have influenced the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Juror 164's nondisclosure suggested bias and if it prejudiced Rowell's defense. The circuit court is instructed to assess whether the withheld information would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or supported a challenge for cause. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law