Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Robert Moore was convicted by jury and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment for the attempted murder of Travis Hall. Hall was shot in the head and left for dead in a vehicle in a Taco Bell parking lot following a drug deal gone wrong. In the immediate aftermath of the shooting, law enforcement officers found three cell phones, including one later identified as Petitioner's in the area of the driver's floorboard after emergency medical personnel removed Hall from the vehicle. Without obtaining a warrant, the officers removed the cell phones' subscriber identity module (SIM) cards to determine ownership. The officers then obtained a warrant to search the contents of Petitioner's phone. Petitioner's subsequent motion to suppress all evidence acquired from the phone was denied, as the trial court found Petitioner had abandoned his phone. A divided court of appeals' panel affirmed Petitioner's conviction on the basis of inevitable discovery. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Moore" on Justia Law

Petitioners, consisting of several citizens groups and neighborhood associations, sought a contested case hearing in the administrative law court (ALC) to challenge the propriety of state environmental authorizations issued by the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) for a project relocating and expanding the passenger cruise facility at the Union Pier Terminal (the Terminal) in downtown Charleston. Petitioners contended they had standing to seek this hearing as "affected persons" under section 44-1- 60(G) of the South Carolina Code (2018). The ALC concluded Petitioners did not have standing and granted summary judgment to Respondents. The ALC terminated discovery and also sanctioned Petitioners for requesting a remand to the DHEC Board. The court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, concluded Petitioners did have standing, and thus reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the matter to the ALC for a contested case hearing. View "Preservation Society v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

This case concerned accreting land along the South Carolina coast that owned by the Town of Sullivan. Petitioners Nathan and Ettaleah Bluestein and Theodore and Karen Albenesius (collectively, Petitioners) bought property in the Town that abutted the accreting land. Petitioners' properties were once considered oceanfront lots only a short distance from the beach, but due to accretion, the properties were now a substantial distance away. The accreting land was subject to a 1991 deed, which set forth certain rights and responsibilities respecting the condition of the property and the Town's duties concerning upkeep of the land. Petitioners were third party beneficiaries of the 1991 deed. Petitioners argued the 1991 deed mandated the Town keep the vegetation on the land in the same condition as existed in 1991, particularly as to the height of shrubs and vegetation. Conversely, the Town contended the 1991 deed granted it unfettered discretion to allow unchecked growth of the vegetation on the accreting land. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined all parties cherrypicked language from the 1991 deed to support their respective interpretations of the deed. But contrary to the holding of the court of appeals and the trial court's findings, the Supreme Court held the deed was “far from unambiguous;” because the 1991 deed is ambiguous in terms of the Town's maintenance responsibilities, the court of appeals erred in affirming the entry of summary judgment for the Town. As a result, the matter was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Bluestein v. Town of Sullivans Island" on Justia Law

Eric Spears was indicted for trafficking crack cocaine between ten and twenty-eight grams. Spears moved to suppress the evidence of the drugs seized from his person on the ground he was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied the motion to suppress, and Spears was convicted as charged. The trial court sentenced Spears to thirty years in prison. A divided court of appeals reversed Spears' conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision, and reversed, thus upholding Spears' conviction. The Supreme Court found evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Spears engaged in a consensual encounter with law enforcement and that Spears' subsequent actions created a reasonable suspicion that he may have been armed and dangerous - justifying law enforcement's Terry frisk that led to the discovery of the offending crack cocaine in Spears' pants. View "South Carolina v. Spears" on Justia Law

Respondents, individually and as members of a putative class, brought a declaratory judgment action against the South Carolina Department of Revenue seeking refunds of amounts garnished from their wages by the Department to satisfy delinquent debts they allegedly owed to other governmental entities. The sole issue on appeal centered on the circuit court's grant of Respondents' motion to strike one defense from the Department's answer to Respondents' second amended complaint: that South Carolina Revenue Procedures Act (RPA) subsection 12-60-80(C) prohibited this action from proceeding as a class action against the Department. The Department appealed the circuit court's order to the court of appeals, and the Supreme Court certified the Department's appeal pursuant to Rule 204(b) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and held this case could not proceed as a class action against the Department. View "Aiken v. So. Carolina Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

In the course of a gun battle between mutual combatants, a bullet fired at Petitioner Aaron Young Jr. (Young Jr.) missed its intended mark and killed an unintended victim. Young Jr. and his father Aaron Young Sr. (Young Sr.) willingly engaged a rival, Tyrone Robinson, in a residential neighborhood. The battle ended when Robinson shot and killed an unintended victim, an eight-year-old child who was playing in the area. The State charged all three combatants with the murder of the victim. Robinson's murder charge stemmed from a straightforward application of the doctrine of transferred intent. The Youngs' murder charges stemmed from an application of the doctrine of mutual combat. The South Carolina Supreme Court held mutual combat could properly serve as the basis for a murder charge for the death of a non-combatant under the "hand of one is the hand of all" theory of accomplice liability. The Court therefore found the law sanctioned holding Young Jr. responsible for the actions of Robinson in causing the victim's death, and affirmed Young Jr.'s murder conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Young" on Justia Law

Appellant Terry McCall was convicted of felony DUI. On appeal, he argued the warrantless collection of his blood and urine at the direction of law enforcement pursuant to Section 56-5-2946 of the South Carolina Code (2018) violated the Fourth Amendment. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed because exigent circumstances existed to support the admission of his blood and urine test results. View "South Carolina v. McCall" on Justia Law

Kenneth and Angela Hensley filed suit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services on behalf of their adopted minor child BLH and a class of approximately 4000 similarly situated adopted children. The central allegation of the lawsuit was that DSS breached an Adoption Subsidy Agreement with the parents of each member of the class by reducing each parent's adoption subsidy by $20 a month, beginning in 2002. The circuit court issued an order finding the Hensleys satisfied the requirements of Rule 23(a) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, and certifying the proposed class. The court of appeals reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the circuit court's order was not immediately appealable, and vacated the court of appeals' opinion and dismissed the appeal. View "Hensley v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

For years, the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (DPPPS) improperly denied inmates parole based on an incorrect interpretation of the statute setting forth the number of votes required by the parole board. Because DPPPS had a policy of destroying records of parole hearings, it was difficult to determine which inmates were wrongly denied parole. Nevertheless, in 2013, following the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Barton v. South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole & Pardon Services, 745 S.E.2d 110 (2013), DPPPS undertook a process to attempt to identify which inmates were improperly denied parole. Petitioner David Rose was one of the inmates who claimed he was improperly denied parole; in Rose's situation, the parole hearing occurred in 2001. The evidence manifestly established Rose received the requisite number of votes in favor of parole in 2001, but remained in jail. Rose persistently sought relief through the years, often in circuit court, where DPPPS contended that Rose had to pursue relief through the administrative process rather than through the judicial process. At the agency level, DPPPS denied relief to Rose because the agency records did not establish the actual vote count from the 2001 hearing, but DPPPS had destroyed the very records it claimed were necessary for Rose to prevail. Following DPPPS's final agency decision, the administrative law court (ALC) granted Rose relief, finding the only evidence as to the parole board's 2001 vote demonstrated Rose was entitled to parole. The court of appeals reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding the ALC's decision was supported by substantial evidence. View "Rose v. SC Department of Probation, Parole and Pardon Services" on Justia Law

John Henry Dial Jr. was charged in magistrates court with three counts of assault and battery in the third degree arising from an incident in which two adults and one minor were sprayed with pepper spray. Dial appeared in court several times before trial, each time without counsel. He pled not guilty and requested a jury trial. The record on appeal did not include transcripts of Dial's pre-trial appearances. The magistrate averred he advised Dial on three separate occasions before trial of his right to be represented by an attorney. Each time, Dial requested to represent himself. The return was silent as to whether the magistrate advised Dial of the dangers of representing himself. Dial testified in his defense and denied spraying any of the victims with pepper spray. The jury returned a verdict of guilty on two counts of assault and battery in the third degree but found Dial not guilty on the count for spraying the minor. The magistrates court sentenced Dial to sixty days in jail. Dial retained counsel to appeal his conviction to the circuit court. He argued, among other things, "[Dial] was not represented by counsel and did not waive his right to counsel." At the hearing in the circuit court, Dial's counsel stated, "There is no evidence in the return or in the transcript that the trial judge properly warned [Dial] under Faretta v. California of the dangers of proceeding pro se." The circuit court affirmed Dial's conviction. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the record idid not reflect whether the magistrates court obtained a valid waiver of the right to counsel before proceeding to the trial of this unrepresented defendant. Therefore, the Supreme Court remanded to the circuit court for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. View "South Carolina v. Dial" on Justia Law