Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified two questions of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. John Wickersham, Jr. was seriously injured in an automobile accident. After months of severe pain from the injuries he received in the accident, he committed suicide. His widow filed lawsuits for wrongful death, survival, and loss of consortium against Ford Motor Company in state circuit court. She alleged that defects in the airbag system in Mr. Wickersham's Ford Escape enhanced his injuries, increasing the severity of his pain, which in turn proximately caused his suicide. She included causes of action for negligence, strict liability, and breach of warranty. Ford removed the cases to the federal district court, then moved for summary judgment in the wrongful death suit, arguing Mrs. Wickersham had no wrongful death claim under South Carolina law because Mr. Wickersham's suicide was an intervening act that could not be proximately caused by a defective airbag. The district court denied Ford's motion, ruling Mrs. Wickersham could prevail on the wrongful death claim if she proved the enhanced injuries Mr. Wickersham sustained in the accident as a result of the defective airbag caused severe pain that led to an "uncontrollable impulse" to commit suicide. Ford renewed the motion during and after trial, but the district court denied both motions. In returning a verdict for Mrs. Wickersham, the jury found the airbag was defective and proximately caused Mr. Wickersham's enhanced injuries and suicide. However, the jury also found Mr. Wickersham's actions in being out of position enhanced his injuries, and found his share of the fault was thirty percent. The district court entered judgment for Mrs. Wickersham, but denied Ford's request to reduce the damages based on Mr. Wickersham's fault. Ford filed motions to alter or amend the judgment, for judgment as a matter of law, and for a new trial, all of which the district court denied. Responding to the two questions certified by the federal appellate court, the South Carolina Supreme Court held traditional principles of proximate cause governed whether a personal representative has a valid claim for wrongful death from suicide, and whether a person's own actions that enhance his injuries, as opposed to those that cause the accident itself, should be compared to the tortious conduct of a defendant in determining liability. View "Wickersham v. Ford Motor Co" on Justia Law

by
At issue in this appeal was candidate Glenn Odom’s contest of a McBee Town Council election. The McBee Municipal Election Commission ruled on the contest, and Odom appealed the Commission's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court ruled in favor of Odom, and the Commission and candidate Shilon Green (collectively, Appellants) appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court. During the election, several people attempting to vote were challenged as nonresidents of McBee. At the heart of this appeal were votes cast by four of the challenged voters. The Commission heard testimony from Odom and the four challenged voters and heard arguments from counsel. The four challenged voters testified they were McBee residents at all appropriate times and further testified they voted for Odom. In its written decision, the Commission found the four voters were eligible to vote in the election. The Commission wrote: "Because adding the four votes to the total for Glenn Odom would have changed the outcome of the election, the Municipal Election Commission hereby invalidates the September 5, 2018 election and orders a new election as is required under S.C. Code Ann. 5-15-130." Odom appealed the Commission's decision to the circuit court, arguing the Commission erred in ordering a new election instead of simply counting the four votes and declaring he was a prevailing candidate. The circuit court granted Odom's motion for reconsideration and held the Commission erred in invalidating the election and ordering a new election. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision to remand the proceedings to the Commission. The Supreme Court modified, however, the circuit court's order in two ways: (1) section 5-15-130, standing alone, required the four votes to be counted; (2) to the extent that the circuit court's decision could be read to order the Commission to declare Odom a prevailing candidate without the four votes first being counted, the Court held the four votes had to first be counted before the results of the election can be determined. The matter was remanded to the Commission and the Court ordered it to unseal the four provisional votes and apply those votes to the vote totals of the candidate(s) for whom the votes were cast, with the results of the election to then be declared accordingly. View "Odom v. Town of McBee Election Comm" on Justia Law

by
In 2013, a bus driven by Defendant Asia Partman struck Respondent Andrew Neumayer while he was a pedestrian in Cayce, South Carolina. EMS transported Neumayer to Lexington Medical Center where he was diagnosed with a ruptured spleen, broken left ribs, left humerus fracture, left pneumothorax, and a punctured lung. After eight days in the hospital and medical costs of approximately $122,000, Neumayer was released. Partman worked for Defendant Primary Colors Child Care Center, and in November of 2013, Neumayer filed a lawsuit against both defendants, alleging negligence against Partman and Primary Colors. The defendants did not answer or respond in any fashion, and after a default judgment was entered, the court held a damages hearing, where it awarded Neumayer $622,500. Over eighteen months after the entry of default, Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. (Philadelphia), Primary Colors' insurance carrier, received notice that its insured was involved in a lawsuit that culminated in a default judgment. While the record was unclear as to why it took eighteen months to notify Philadelphia, it ultimately received notice when Neumayer's counsel faxed documents seeking to collect $622,500. Philadelphia declined to pay that amount, instead asserting its indemnification obligation was limited to $25,000 because South Carolina jurisprudence required an insurer to pay only the minimum limits when it was substantially prejudiced by its insured's failure to provide notice of a lawsuit. Further, Philadelphia contended the failure to receive notice of the underlying lawsuit prevented an opportunity to investigate and defend. Neumayer filed this declaratory judgment action asking the court to require Philadelphia to pay the judgment in full. At issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court was whether notice clauses in automobile insurance policies were rendered meaningless by Section 38-77-142(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015) . The trial court found the clause in this policy void and accordingly required the insurance company to pay the full default judgment entered against its insured. The insurer appealed. The Supreme Court determined the circuit court erred in ruling that section 38-77-142(C) invalidated the standard notice clause contained in this insurance policy. “An insurer may continue to invoke notice clauses to deny coverage above the statutory limits, providing the insurer can prove that it was substantially prejudiced by its insured's failure to comply with the provision.” View "Neumayer v. Philadelphia Indemnity" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner Anthony Martin was convicted of armed robbery and criminal conspiracy in Aiken County, South Carolina. Petitioner alleged in his PCR application that his trial attorneys were ineffective for failing to elicit testimony from Petitioner's mother regarding the specific timeline of Petitioner's purported alibi: Petitioner contended he was in Atlanta, Georgia, at the time of the robbery in South Carolina. Relief was denied because Petitioner failed to present his mother's testimony at the PCR hearing regarding the alibi defense. Ordinarily, the absence of a purported alibi witness's testimony is fatal, but in this case, counsel admitted they were aware of the specific timeline furnished by the mother, yet failed to introduce it. That testimony, if presented and believed, would have made it impossible for Petitioner to be in Aiken County at the time of the robbery. The South Carolina Supreme Court therefore granted post-conviction relief and remanded for a new trial. View "Martin v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

by
A jury found Kenneth Campbell met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP) under South Carolina's SVP Act, S.C. Code Ann. sections 44-48-10 to -170 (2018). Campbell appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. On petition of certiorari, Campbell contended the court of appeals erred in affirming his civil commitment because the State inappropriately impeached the credibility of Campbell's expert witness by introducing evidence of a recent arrest warrant for an unrelated sex offender whom the expert had opined was unlikely to reoffend. The South Carolina Supreme Court found the admission of testimony about a mere arrest warrant of an unrelated individual in a collateral matter unduly prejudiced Campbell and, therefore, reversed and remanded for a new commitment proceeding. View "In the Matter of the Care & Treatment of Campbell" on Justia Law

by
Petitioners Dr. John Roberts and the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Johnson v. Roberts, 812 S.E.2d 207 (Ct. App. 2018). Respondent Clair Johnson filed a medical malpractice action alleging Roberts and MUSC negligently treated Johnson with electroconvulsive therapy. Roberts and MUSC moved for summary judgment, contending the six-year statute of repose barred her claims, and the circuit court agreed, holding the repose period began on the first date of treatment. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed, relying on its decision in Marshall v. Dodds, 789 S.E.2d 88 (Ct. App. 2016), to hold that there was evidence to support Johnson's claim that Roberts and MUSC acted negligently within six years of filing her lawsuit. The South Carolina Supreme Court recently affirmed as modified the court of appeals' Marshall decision, holding the statute of repose began to run after each occurrence. In this case, Roberts and MUSC contended the court of appeals erred in finding Johnson's claims preserved for review and in holding the statute of repose began after each occurrence. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed. View "Johnson v. Roberts" on Justia Law

by
Jalann Williams was convicted for murder, shooting and killing his victim with an unlawfully-possessed pistol defendant intentionally brought to an illegal drug transaction. Williams argued the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury with the law of self-defense. The South Carolina Supreme Court found defendant was at fault in bringing on the violence. View "South Carolina v. Williams" on Justia Law

by
The State of South Carolina petitioned for certiorari review of the Court of Appeals' decision in South Carolina v. Andrews, 818 S.E.2d 227 (Ct. App. 2018). After a fatal shooting at Respondent's home, Respondent was indicted for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Respondent moved to dismiss the charges pursuant to the Protection of Persons and Property Act on the ground he shot the victim in self-defense. However, another eyewitness testified the victim was attempting to peacefully leave Respondent's home and that Respondent followed the victim out of the home, shooting him on the porch. Additional forensic evidence was presented at the hearing, but it did not conclusively support either version of events. Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's denial of immunity, but reversed Respondent's convictions based on a separate evidentiary issue. To the extent the Court of Appeals relied upon the portion of South Carolina v. Curry, 752 S.E.2d 263 (2013). relating to the directed verdict procedural posture in affirming the circuit court's denial of immunity in this case, the South Carolina Supreme Court vacated that portion of the Court of Appeals' opinion and affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Andrews" on Justia Law

by
Petitioner Gerald Williams was convicted of three counts of attempted murder related to his alleged shooting into an occupied mobile home where he knew his intended victim was present, but did not realize two other individuals were also present. Under the common law, transferred intent “makes a whole crime out of two halves by joining the intent to harm one victim with the actual harm caused to another.” Normally, transferred intent applies to general-intent crimes. However, attempted murder is a specific-intent crime in South Carolina, and the South Carolina Supreme Court had not yet addressed whether transferred intent could supply the requisite mens rea for such a crime. Because this case was tried without objection as a general-intent crime, the Supreme Court found the doctrine of transferred intent applied in this instance. The Court declined to address the applicability of transferred intent to a specific-intent crime such as attempted murder and vacate the portion of the court of appeals' opinion dealing with this issue. The Court found in light of the facts of this case, there was no error in failing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree (AB-1st). The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals as modified. View "South Carolina v. Williams" on Justia Law

by
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The underlying case was an insurance bad faith action against an insurance company for its failure to defend its insured in a construction defect action. The insured settled the construction defect action and brought a bad faith tort action. When the insurer asserted it acted in good faith in denying coverage, the insured sought to discover the reasons why the insurer denied coverage. According to the insurer, the discovery requests included communications protected by the attorney-client relationship. The federal district court reviewed the parties' respective positions, determined the insured had established a prima facie case of bad faith, and ordered the questioned documents to be submitted to the court for an in camera inspection. The insurer then sought a writ of mandamus from the Fourth Circuit to vacate the district court's order regarding the discovery dispute. In turn, the Fourth Circuit asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether state law supported the application of the "at issue" exception to attorney-client privilege such that a party may waive the privilege by denying liability in its answer. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the parties, especially the insured, contended the certified question did not accurately represent the correct posture of the case. In fact, the insured conceded the narrow question presented required an answer in the negative. The Supreme Court agreed, finding “little authority for the untenable proposition that the mere denial of liability in a pleading constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege.” The Court elected to analyze the issue narrowly in the limited context of a bad faith action against an insurer, and felt constrained to answer the certified question as follows: "No, denying liability and/or asserting good faith in the answer does not, standing alone, place the privileged communications 'at issue' in the case." View "Mt. Hawley Insurance Company v. Contravest Construction" on Justia Law