Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles Dent was convicted and sentenced on one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor and two counts of disseminating obscene material to a minor. Dent appealed, and a divided court of appeals' panel reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding the trial court erred in failing to give the requested circumstantial evidence charge the South Carolina Supreme Court articulated in State v. Logan, 747 S.E.2d 444 (2013). Because this ruling was dispositive, the court of appeals did not reach Dent's other assignments of error. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari and then reversed: while the Court agreed with the court of appeals' finding of error in the trial court's failure to charge circumstantial evidence pursuant to Logan, the error was harmless. The Court reversed and remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Dent's remaining issues on appeal. View "South Carolina v. Dent" on Justia Law

A jury found Petitioner Carmie Nelson ("Carmie") guilty of murdering her roommate, and the trial court sentenced her to life imprisonment. Carmie appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in admitting gruesome autopsy photos in contravention of Rule 403, SCRE. The court of appeals, finding no error, affirmed in an unpublished opinion. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Carmie's petition for a writ of certiorari, and reversed: “the photos admitted here surpassed ‘the outer limits of what our law permits a jury to consider.’” View "South Carolina v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the District of South Carolina certified a question of law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Plaintiff John Doe was a convicted sex offender who moved from South Carolina to Georgia in 2015. He filed suit in South Carolina in federal court against the Chief of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) Mark Keel, contending in part that because he no longer resided in South Carolina, SLED should be prohibited from continuing to publish his name and information on the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry. The question certified to the Supreme Court involved whether South Carolina’s Sex Offender Registry Act (SORA) permitted the publication of out-of-state offenders on the state’s public sex offender registry. The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative. View "John Doe v. Keel" on Justia Law

Petitioners Rick Hendrick Dodge Chrysler Jeep Ram (Rick Hendrick Dodge) and Isiah White argued an arbitrator had to decide whether they could enforce an arbitration provision in a contract even after that contract had been assigned to a third party. The court of appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the circuit court's determinations that: (1) the circuit court was the proper forum for deciding the gateway question of whether the dispute is arbitrable; and (2) Petitioners could not compel arbitration because Rick Hendrick Dodge assigned the contract to a third party. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the doctrine announced in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967) required the arbitrator to decide whether the assignment extinguished Petitioners' right to compel arbitration. Therefore, the Court reversed the court of appeals' decision and vacated the circuit court's discovery order. View "Sanders v. Savannah Highway Automotive Company" on Justia Law

Respondent John Perry, Jr. was convicted by jury of the attempted murder of a police officer. During deliberations, the jury requested a recharge on intent. Over the defense's objection, the trial court instructed, "When the intent to do an act that violates the law exists motive becomes immaterial." The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding the statement improperly instructed the jury on general intent for the crime of attempted murder. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed that the trial court erred in giving the jury this recharge, the Supreme Court believed the error was harmless. Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Perry" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner Tappia Green's convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. During an in camera hearing, the parties offered competing evidence as to whether Green was given his Miranda warnings, with law enforcement officers claiming they did not Mirandize Green at the time of his arrest and Green asserting they did. The trial court found the State's evidence more credible, determining Green was not Mirandized and, therefore, a violation of Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610(1976) did not occur. As a result, the trial court denied Green's motion for a mistrial. Nevertheless, the State did not further pursue Green's post-arrest silence. The court of appeals affirmed, focusing on the novel question of whether the State or the defendant had the burden of proof in a Doyle hearing and, ultimately, concluding the defendant had the burden to prove Miranda warnings were given and a Doyle violation occurred. The South Carolina Supreme Court took the opportunity of this case to clarify the proper procedure when a potential Doyle violation arises. "Care must be taken when the State seeks to impeach a defendant with his post-arrest silence." As the proponent of such impeachment evidence, the Court held the State bears the burden of proving the evidence is admissible and will not violate the defendant's right to due process as articulated in Doyle and its progeny. "In its role as the gatekeeper of admissibility, the trial court must evaluate the evidence and determine whether the State has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was not given his Miranda warnings." Here, the Court found the trial court properly fulfilled its role and issued a detailed ruling supported by a number of facts in evidence. The Court therefore held the trial court did not commit error in denying Green's motion for a mistrial. The decision of the court of appeals was affirmed as modified and vacated in part. View "South Carolina v. Green" on Justia Law

Petitioner Anthony Jones pleaded guilty to first-degree burglary and armed robbery, crimes he committed at the ages of sixteen and seventeen, respectively. Pursuant to subsection 63-19-20(1), South Carolina's definitional statute of chapter nineteen in the Juvenile Justice Code, the circuit court had jurisdiction over Jones's charges, rather than the family court. The circuit court judge sentenced Jones to ten years in prison for armed robbery and fifteen years for first-degree burglary, with the sentences to run concurrently. Jones did not file a direct appeal. Instead, he filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR") on several grounds, including a challenge to the constitutionality of subsection 63-19-20(1). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed the application, finding the constitutional challenge was not a cognizable PCR claim and, even if it were, the statute was constitutional. The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded Jones properly brought this challenge in his PCR application and subsection 63-19-20(1) was constitutional. However, in keeping with prior decisions regarding sentencing juveniles, the Court held circuit court judges had to consider the mitigating factors of youth as identified in Aiken v. Byars when sentencing. "Consideration of these factors can be done at sentencing; therefore, a separate Aiken hearing is not required." Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Jones v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit certified a question of South Carolina Supreme Court to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Metal Recycling Services, LLC, hired an independent contractor - Norris Trucking, LLC - to transport scrap metal. A truck driver employed by Norris Trucking hit the car Lucinda Ruh was driving and injured her. Ruh sued Metal Recycling Services and its parent company, Nucor Corporation, in state court. The defendants removed the case to the federal district court, which granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding Ruh did not allege an employer-employee relationship between the defendants and Norris Trucking or its driver, nor did she otherwise allege any basis on which the defendants could be liable for the negligence of their independent contractor. The district court delayed entry of judgment to allow Ruh to seek leave to amend her complaint. Ruh then moved to amend her complaint to add a claim that Metal Recycling Services itself was negligent in selecting Norris Trucking to transport the scrap metal. The district court denied the motion to amend and dismissed the complaint. The federal appellate court asked the South Carolina Supreme Court whether an employer could be subject to liability for harm caused by the negligent selection of an independent contractor. The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative: an independent contractor relationship may be subject to liability for physical harm proximately caused by the principal's own negligence in selecting the independent contractor. View "Ruh v. Metal Recycling Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioner Richard Passio Jr. was convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to thirty years' imprisonment. Passio appealed, arguing the trial court erred in: (1) denying his motion for a directed verdict; and (2) admitting a screenshot of his Facebook page. Finding no error by the trial court on either issue, the court of appeals affirmed. Having carefully examined Passio's challenges, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals in upholding the trial court's denial of Passio's motion for a directed verdict. The Supreme Court concluded, however, that the admission of Passio's Facebook page was error, albeit harmless. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified. View "South Carolina v. Passio" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jon Smart and his co-defendant, Stephen Hutto, were in custody at a Department of Juvenile Justice detention facility near Rimini in Clarendon County in August 1999 when they brutally murdered a citizen volunteer who graciously allowed the boys to work on his family farm under his supervision as a part of their rehabilitation. Smart and Hutto then stole the man's truck and drove it on a violent crime spree. After Horry County Police officers stopped them for a traffic violation and discovered the truck was stolen, Smart and Hutto led officers on a thirty-mile high-speed chase during which Smart fired shots at pursuing law enforcement vehicles. Smart was sixteen years old. Smart pled guilty in 2001 to murder, armed robbery, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and escape. The plea court sentenced him to life in prison for the murder. The issue his appeal presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on whether a juvenile sentenced to life in prison, bore any burden of proof or persuasion when seeking resentencing under Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014). The Supreme Court held there was no such burden—on either party—and the resentencing court did not impose such a burden. View "South Carolina v. Smart" on Justia Law