Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Skydive Myrtle Beach, Inc. brought this lawsuit alleging Horry County, the Horry County Department of Airports, and several of their individually named employees improperly attempted to remove Skydive from the space it leased at Grand Strand Airport in North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. The circuit court dismissed Skydive's claims against the individually named employees pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, without allowing Skydive leave to amend its complaint. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Finding that the circuit court should have allowed Skydive an opportunity to amend its complaint pursuant to Rule 15(a), the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court to allow Skydive an opportunity to file its amended complaint. View "Skydive v. Horry" on Justia Law

Robert Osbey pled guilty to criminal charges without counsel. He later applied for post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground he did not waive his right to counsel. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the denial of his PCR claim because the record did not reflect a valid waiver of Osbey's right to counsel. In particular, the Court found the plea court did not ensure Osbey was aware of the dangers of self-representation. This case was remanded to the court of general sessions for a new trial. View "Osbey v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Sentry Select Insurance Company brought a legal malpractice lawsuit in federal district court against the lawyer it hired to defend an insured in an automobile accident case. The district court requested the South Carolina Supreme Court answer whether, under South Carolina law: (1) an insurer may maintain a direct malpractice action against counsel hired to represent its insured where the insurance company had a duty to defend; and (2) whether a legal malpractice claim be assigned to a third-party who is responsible for payment of legal fees and any judgment incurred as a result of the litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose. The Court responded in the affirmative to (1), reasserting an attorney would not be placed in conflict between his client's interests and the interests of the insurer. Thus, the insurer may recover only for the attorney's breach of his duty to his client, when the insurer proves the breach is the proximate cause of damages to the insurer. If the interests of the client are the slightest bit inconsistent with the insurer's interests, there can be no liability of the attorney to the insurer, because the attorney's duty to the client would not be permitted to be affected by the interests of the insurance company. Whether there is any inconsistency between the client's and the insurer's interests in the circumstances of an individual case is a question of law to be answered by the trial court. The Supreme Court declined to answer the second question posed. View "Sentry Select Insurance v. Maybank Law Firm" on Justia Law

In this case, Petitioner Daniel Herrera was convicted of "trafficking in" (meaning, possessing) between ten and 100 pounds of marijuana, which carried a substantial term of imprisonment. The penalty for possessing fewer than ten pounds of marijuana was less severe. Moreover, drug trafficking was classified as a violent and serious crime, affecting Herrera's parole eligibility. At trial, Herrera contended that he did not knowingly possess any marijuana. Moreover, Herrera disputed the weight of the marijuana, allegedly, ten pounds, 2.78 ounces, by challenging: (1) the qualifications of the State's marijuana expert, police officer Jared Hunnicutt; and (2) the accuracy of the purported weight of the marijuana. Ultimately, Herrera's challenges were unsuccessful, and following his conviction, the court of appeals affirmed the admission of Hunnicutt's testimony regarding the weight of the marijuana in a summary unpublished opinion. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, finding it was an abuse of discretion to permit Hunnicutt to testify to the weight of the marijuana. Accordingly, the matter was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Herrera" on Justia Law

Petitioner Sarah Cardwell appealed her convictions of two counts of unlawful conduct towards a child and two counts of first-degree sexual exploitation of a minor, arguing the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress a video file taken from her laptop computer. Computer technician David Marsh was repairing Petitioner's laptop when Chief Ron Douglas of the Johnsonville Police Department stopped by Marsh's home to deliver packages. While Marsh was taking the packages to his garage, Chief Douglas saw an image go across the computer screen of a naked, male child wearing a pink bra. At Chief Douglas's request, Marsh found the video from which the image had been taken, and the two men watched a minute of the video showing Petitioner's daughter, son, and then-boyfriend, Michael Cardwell, dancing naked. Petitioner could not be seen in the video; however, Marsh was able to identify Petitioner as the individual behind the camera directing the children's movements based on her voice. Upon Chief Douglas's instruction, Marsh copied the video to a disc. Chief Douglas instructed Marsh to secure the laptop, and contacted the Georgetown County Sheriff's Office ("GCSO") to take over the investigation. GCSO took possession of the disc and laptop and obtained a search warrant for these items; a grand jury would indict Petitioner on child pornography charges. Petitioner contended the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court's denial of her motion to suppress the video file seized from her laptop computer. "The fact that Marsh would not have seen the image without Chief Douglas's instruction is irrelevant because there was nothing unlawful about Chief Douglas bringing the still image to Marsh's attention since it was in Chief Douglas's plain view." The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed Cardwell's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Cardwell" on Justia Law

Daryl Snow appealed his commitment as a sexually violent predator under the Sexually Violent Predator Act. He argued his diagnosis of Other Specified Personality Disorder was legally insufficient to meet the constitutional and statutory requirements for commitment under the Act, and thus the trial court erred when it denied his motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV). The court of appeals affirmed his commitment in an unpublished opinion. Finding no reversible error, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals. The Supreme Court determined the diagnosis was legally sufficient to satisfy the second element of the Sexually Violent Predator Act definition, and also, the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate Snow's diagnosis made him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence and that he had serious difficulty controlling his behavior. View "In the Matter of Snow" on Justia Law

Edward Sloan and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation (collectively, Appellants) filed suit alleging Act 275 of 2016 violated article III, section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution (the One Subject Rule). Appellants claimed Act 275's title was insufficient and its provisions related to more than one subject, thus violating the Rule. The trial court dismissed the complaint on numerous grounds. The South Carolina Supreme Court did not address all of these issues on certiorari review, but elected to resolve the appeal on the merits. While it has not hesitated to strike down legislation that violates the One Subject Rule, the Supreme Court has also respected the separation of powers doctrine and upheld legislation where a close question is presented. The constitutional challenge to Act 275 did not present a close question—Act 275 manifestly complied with the One Subject Rule. The trial court's dismissal of the complaint was affirmed. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. SC House" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a certified question of South Carolina law from the federal district court, which stemmed from the construction of a home near Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. Mark Lawrence constructed his home using structural insulated panels manufactured by General Panel Corporation. Structural insulated panels (SIPs) are a structural alternative to traditional wood-frame construction. Lawrence claims faulty installation of the General Panel SIPs used in constructing his home allowed water intrusion, which in turn caused the panels to rot, damaging the structural integrity of his home. He brought a claim in federal district court alleging General Panel was liable for providing defective installation instructions to the subcontractor installing the SIPs. General Panel filed a motion for summary judgment, based on a South Carolina statute of repose: 15-3-640. The statute provided "No actions to recover damages based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe condition of an improvement to real property may be brought more than eight years after substantial completion of the improvement." General Panel's relief depended on the date of "substantial completion." The subcontractor completed the installation of the SIPs in Lawrence's home by March 2007. The home was not finished, however, until over a year later. Charleston County issued a certificate of occupancy on December 10, 2008. Lawrence filed his lawsuit against General Panel on December 8, 2016, more than eight years after installation of the SIPs, but less than eight years after the certificate of occupancy was issued. The federal district court asked whether South Carolina Act 27 of 2005 amended section 15-3- 640 (Supp. 2018) so that the date of "substantial completion of the improvement" is measured from the date of the certificate of occupancy (unless the parties establish a different date by written agreement), thereby superseding the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Ocean Winds Corp. of Johns Island v. Lane, 556 S.E.2d 377 (2001). The Supreme Court responded in the negative: the 2005 amendments did not supersede Ocean Winds. View "Lawrence v. General Panel Corp." on Justia Law

The merits of this appeal centered on three parcels of land, serving as links in a chain necessary to satisfy contiguity requirements of annexation. The first link, the Ten-Foot Strip, was a ten-foot wide, 1.25 mile-long parcel of land in the National Forest, which was managed by the United States Forest Service. The second link was property owned by the Mt. Nebo AME Church (Church Tract), and the third link was approximately 360 acres of unimproved real estate surrounded by the National Forest on three sides (Nebo Tract). In the fall of 2003, the Town of Awendaw sought to annex the Ten-Foot Strip, which required a petition signed by the Forest Service. The Town's representatives sent the Forest Service four letters from November 2003 through February 2004 in an effort to obtain its approval. The sole question before the South Carolina Supreme Court was whether Petitioners Lynne Vicary, Kent Prause, and the South Carolina Coastal Conservation League possessed standing to contest the Town’s annexation of land within the Francis Marion National Forest (Ten-Foot Strip). Because the Town allegedly acted nefariously in using a decade-old letter as a petition for annexation, the circuit court found Petitioners had standing and reached the merits. The court of appeals reversed, finding Petitioners lacked standing. The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding Petitioners had standing to challenge the annexation of the Ten-Foot Strip. View "Vicary v. Town of Awendaw" on Justia Law

McCormick County voters elected Clarke Anderson Stearns as their Sheriff in the November 8, 2016, general election. After the election, Appellants brought this action alleging "Stearns does not possess the necessary qualifications to be Sheriff of McCormick County." Based on that claim, Appellants "specifically request[ed]" the circuit court issue an order "enjoining the Defendant Stearns from serving as Sheriff of McCormick County." Before the circuit court action was filed, however, the losing candidate in the general election, J.R. Jones, filed a Title 7 election protest with the McCormick County Board of Canvassers. Jones filed the challenge on November 16, 2016. The county board held a hearing on November 21. By a vote of 3-to-3, the county board took no action on Jones's protest. Jones did not appeal the county board's decision. Jones then filed this action in circuit court on December 7, 2016, joined as plaintiff by the South Carolina Democratic Party and the McCormick County Democratic Party. This appeal presented two issues for the South Carolina Supreme Court's resolution: (1) whether a challenge to an elected official's legal qualifications to serve in the office to which he has just been elected must be brought pursuant to the administrative provisions of Title 7 of the South Carolina Code, or whether such a challenge may be brought in circuit court; and (2) whether the "certified law enforcement officer" requirement to serve as sheriff, found in subsection 23-11- 110(A)(5) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2018), required the certification to come from South Carolina authorities, as opposed to authorities in another state. The Supreme Court determined the plaintiffs in this case were permitted to bring the action in circuit court, but the necessary certification to serve as sheriff need not come from South Carolina authorities. The Court affirmed the result of the circuit court's decision, which did not remove the elected McCormick County Sheriff from office. View "Jones v. South Carolina Republican Party" on Justia Law