Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jerome Buckson and Tiffany Foggie lived together in Foggie's apartment until January 2006. At approximately three o'clock in the morning on Monday, January 30, 2006, Buckson entered the apartment through a kitchen window, and proceeded up the stairs to Foggie's bedroom. The door to the bedroom was closed and locked. Foggie and Buckson had been yelling to one another from the time he was outside, and Foggie told Buckson to leave. Instead, he forced the door open to find another man in the room. After a brief struggle, Foggie was shot. Buckson fled the apartment and called 911. He told the 911 operator the man shot at him, and that he heard other shots as he fled. He later learned Foggie was dead from a gunshot wound. The State charged Buckson with murder and first degree burglary. The jury found Buckson not guilty of murder. As to the burglary, the State presented evidence that Buckson no longer lived in the apartment on the night Foggie died, and Buckson's trial counsel presented evidence that he did. The jury found Buckson guilty of first degree burglary. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years in prison. The court of appeals affirmed. The post-conviction relief (PCR) court granted Buckson relief and ordered a new trial. The State appealed, arguing no probative evidence supported the findings of the PCR court. The court of appeals reversed the PCR court. The South Carolina Supreme Court, however, reversed the court of appeals. At his PCR trial, Buckson presented the testimony of five witnesses he claimed trial counsel should have called at the criminal trial. However, some of the testimony was new and was not presented to the jury. Based on this testimony, the PCR court found trial counsel's failure to call the PCR witnesses at the criminal trial was unreasonable. Counsel articulated specific reasons he did not call the witnesses. The State used the words "strategy" and "strategic decisions" in isolated places in its brief to the court of appeals, but the Supreme Court found those issues should have been raised in the Statement of Issues on Appeal. "While we seek to be flexible interpreting issue statements, ... no point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on appeal." In addition, the State's arguments in the body of the brief related to the sufficiency of the evidence, not strategy, and the State did not cite any legal authority on the issue of strategy. View "Buckson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This cross-appeal primarily concerned the amount of compensation owed to Petitioner-respondent Edward Sullivan as personal representative (PR) of Marion Kay's estate. Sullivan filed a petition to settle the estate and sought probate court approval for his commissions as PR together with fees and costs. In response, Respondents-petitioners Martha Brown and Mary Moses, cousins of the deceased and two of multiple beneficiaries under the will, challenged his compensation as excessive, and the probate court agreed, reducing Sullivan's commissions, disallowing certain fees and costs, and awarding attorney's fees to Brown and Moses. The circuit court affirmed, and both sides appealed. In a 2-1 opinion, the court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the probate court. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision to uphold the award of $51,300 in commissions for Sullivan's services as personal representative and the determination that Brown and Moses were responsible for their own attorney's fees. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' conclusion that Sullivan is not entitled to recover necessary expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred at the settlement hearing under section S.C. Code 62-3-720, and remanded this case back to the probate court for that determination. View "Kay v. Sullivan" on Justia Law

At issue before the South Carolina Supreme Court in this appeal was a question of whether Appellant Hilton Head Island-Bluffton Chamber of Commerce (Chamber) was subject to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) due to its receipt and expenditure of certain funds designated for promoting tourism ("accommodation tax funds"). The Chamber's receipt and expenditure of these funds was pursuant to, and governed by, the Accommodations Tax (A-Tax) statute and Proviso 39.2 of the Appropriation Act for Budget Year 2012–2013. Respondent DomainsNewMedia.com, LLC (Domains) filed a declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration and corresponding injunctive relief on the basis that the Chamber's receipt of these funds renders the Chamber a "public body" pursuant to FOIA, thus subjecting the Chamber to all of FOIA's requirements. The Chamber countered that FOIA did not apply, for the receipt, expenditure, and reporting requirements concerning these funds were governed by the more specific A-Tax statute and Proviso 39.2. The trial court held that the Chamber was a public body and, thus, was subject to FOIA's provisions. The Supreme Court, however, reversed, holding as a matter of discerning legislative intent, that the General Assembly did not intend the Chamber to be considered a public body for purposes of FOIA as a result of its receipt and expenditure of these specific funds. View "DomainsNewMedia.com v. Hilton Head Island-Bluffton Chamber of Commerce" on Justia Law

Appellant Stephanie Irene Greene appeals her convictions and sentences for homicide by child abuse, involuntary manslaughter, and unlawful conduct toward a child for the death of her infant daughter, Alexis. Appellant was Alexis's mother; she was Alexis's caretaker during her brief life. Alexis died from morphine poisoning when she was forty-six days old. Appellant, a former nurse, was addicted to many drugs. The State contended that Appellant's morphine addiction (as well as dependence on other drugs) caused Alexis's drug poisoning through breastfeeding. The jury convicted Appellant on all charges. Appellant was sentenced to prison for twenty years for homicide by child abuse, five years concurrent for involuntary manslaughter, and five years concurrent for unlawful conduct toward a child. The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the homicide by child abuse and unlawful conduct toward a child convictions and sentences, but vacated the involuntary manslaughter conviction and sentence. With respect to the involuntary manslaughter charge, the Court found nothing in South Carolina's homicide statutes or law that reflected a legislative intent to deviate from the overwhelmingly prevailing view that the homicide of one person by one defendant is limited to one homicide punishment - one homicide, one homicide punishment. View "South Carolina v. Greene" on Justia Law

Petitioner Darryl Frierson pled guilty to assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature, criminal conspiracy, kidnapping, and armed robbery for his role in masterminding a $9.8 million heist from an armored truck. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of thirty-five years in prison. He applied for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting he would not have pled guilty but instead would have proceeded to trial had his plea counsel adequately informed him of the possibility to suppress evidence gathered from law enforcement's warrantless placement of a mobile tracking device on his vehicle. The PCR court denied relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the appellate court erred in its application of the standard of review, but corretly deferred to the OCR court's findings. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed as modified and took the opportunity to clarify the correct standard to determine prejudice when a defendant seeks PCR after pleading guilty. View "Frierson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Overland, Inc., filed this lawsuit against Lara Nance, Bank of America, SunTrust Banks, and other defendants seeking damages arising out of Nance's embezzlement of $1,282,000 from the Land Rover dealership Overland operated in the city of Greenville. Nance pled guilty in federal court to wire fraud for stealing the money and was sentenced to 46 months in prison. Overland's theory of liability against Bank of America and SunTrust was that allowing Nance to deposit forged checks into fraudulent accounts she created breached duties the banks owed to Overland. The banks made motions for summary judgment on the ground they owed no duty to Overland, who was not a customer of either bank. The circuit court granted the motions for summary judgment, stating, "Overland [was] unable to demonstrate that [the banks] owed it any duty . . . ." The circuit court denied Overland's Rule 59(e) motion. Overland filed a notice of appeal, which the court of appeals dismissed in an unpublished opinion. Though the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment, the Supreme Court emphasized that a trial court does not have the power to alter or amend a final order if more than ten days passes and no Rule 59(e) motion has been served, nor does a trial court have any power to grant the moving party an extension of time in which to file a Rule 59(e) motion. The failure to serve a Rule 59(e) motion within ten days of receipt of notice of entry of the order converts the order into a final judgment, and the aggrieved party's only recourse is to file a notice of intent to appeal. View "Overland v. Nance" on Justia Law

Jonathan Miller appealed his conviction for possession of crack cocaine. He argued the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence seized during an inventory search of his vehicle after he was arrested for driving with a suspended license. The issue on appeal for the South Carolina Supreme Court’s review was whether it was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, for the officers acting pursuant to their department policy to seize, search, and then tow the vehicle Miller was driving when he was arrested on private property away from his residence and the owner of the vehicle was not present. The Supreme Court found no conflict between the Columbia Police Department policy and any other state statutes regarding the authority to tow vehicles from private property; the inventory search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, and the trial court was correct to deny Miller’s motion to suppress. View "South Carolina v. Miller" on Justia Law

Petitioners Edward and Tammy Dalsing (Foster Parents) sought to adopt a young girl (Child). Foster Parents' private action for termination of parental rights (TPR) and adoption was consolidated with the South Carolina Department of Social Services' removal action against Erica Smith (Mother) and Andrew Myers (Father). At the final hearing, the family court: (1) adopted the permanent plan of TPR and adoption; (2) terminated Mother's parental rights; (3) found Father was not a person whose consent was required for Child's adoption, but as a further sustaining ground, terminated Father's parental rights; and (4) granted Foster Parents' petition for adoption. Father appealed, and the court of appeals vacated in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the family court for a new permanency planning hearing. The court of appeals ruled the family court erred in terminating Father's parental rights, finding Foster Parents failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence a statutory ground for TPR existed. The court of appeals found the record did not contain clear and convincing evidence to show that Father abandoned Child, willfully failed to visit Child, or willfully failed to support Child. The court of appeals remanded the matter to the family court for a new permanency planning hearing. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. “Although the court of appeals' list of actions taken by Father may appear sufficient to find clear and convincing evidence did not support this statutory ground for TPR, a close analysis of the record reveals otherwise. Several of the actions listed separately by the court of appeals were not actually separate and distinct actions, but rather occurred within a month's time of one another, and approximately one year after Child's birth.” The Court found the trial court record contained clear and convincing evidence that Father abandoned Child. The Court therefore reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the family court's grant of adoption to Foster Parents. View "So. Carolina Dept. Social Svcs v. Smith" on Justia Law

Samuel Brown Jr. filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking appellate review of an order granting summary judgment to the State in his application for post-conviction relief (PCR). Brown pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute marijuana (PWID) on May 20, 2014, and the court sentenced him to three years in prison. At the time of his plea, Brown was already serving a ten-year sentence for trafficking in cocaine. The PWID sentence began on June 25, 2013, due to credit for time served, and was imposed concurrent to the ten-year sentence. Brown did not appeal. Brown filed an application for PCR on November 20, 2014. No hearing was held until September 16, 2016. By then, Brown had completed his PWID sentence, although he remained incarcerated on the ten-year sentence. At the PCR hearing, the State made a motion for summary judgment, arguing Brown's claim was moot because he had already completed his PWID sentence. The PCR court granted the State's motion for summary judgment, and dismissed the PCR application. The South Carolina Supreme Court determined dismissing the PCR application was made in error. The case was reversed and remanded for a hearing on the merits. View "Brown v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hospital Authority, d/b/a Carolinas Medical Center-Fort Mill sought a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Amisub of South Carolina, Inc. v. South Carolina Department of Health & Environmental Control, Op. No. 2017-UP-013 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Jan. 11, 2017). In 2005, four hospitals, Petitioner, Respondent Amisub, Presbyterian Healthcare System, and Hospital Partners of America, applied for a certificate of need (CON) to construct and operate an acute-care hospital in Fort Mill. In May 2006, the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) determined the acute-care hospital was necessary, and granted a CON to Amisub, but denied a CON to Petitioner and the others. DHEC's decision to award the CON to Amisub was based in part on its interpretation of the language of the South Carolina Health Plan that only existing health care providers in York County were eligible for additional hospital beds. Petitioner filed a contested case at the ALC, contending DHEC had erroneously interpreted the language of the Health Plan. Alternatively, Petitioner argued that if DHEC's interpretation was correct, the Health Plan violated the dormant Commerce Clause because it improperly restricted interstate commerce. The ALC found DHEC's interpretation of the Health Plan was not correct, reversed, and remanded to DHEC. The ALC's determination made it unnecessary for the ALC to reach the alternative dormant Commerce Clause claim. On remand, DHEC granted a CON to Petitioner, but denied a CON to the others. Amisub filed a second contested case at the ALC, which again reversed, this time ordering a CON be granted to Amisub and denied to Petitioner. The court of appeals affirmed, finding "the record does not show [Petitioner] presented to the ALC any argument that [Amisub]'s positions on adverse impact and outmigration, if adopted by the ALC, would violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. [Petitioner] waited until filing its Rule 59(e) motion to present this argument, which is too late." If Petitioner had reason to believe this issue was actually being litigated before the ALC in the second contested case, and yet remained silent, the South Carolina Supreme Court would have agreed with the court of appeals. However, the dormant Commerce Clause issues arising out of the language of the Health Plan were resolved in Petitioner's favor in the first contested case. Thus, Petitioner could not reasonably have foreseen the ALC would craft its order in a fashion to revive those issues. Therefore, Petitioner had no reason to raise the dormant Commerce Clause challenge in the second contested case until the ALC issued its order. “No party should be penalized for not addressing an issue as to which it had previously prevailed, and which it did not reasonably contemplate would yet be the basis of the court's ruling.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' finding that the dormant Commerce Clause issue was not preserved for appellate review, and remanded the case to the court of appeals for a ruling on the merits of the issue. View "Amisub v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law