Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Kenneth Hilton appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming the PCR court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to represent himself at his PCR trial. Hilton pled guilty to kidnapping and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. When asked at the PCR trial about the quality of the State's evidence, plea counsel explained, "We had the actual recording of what went on, and when you listen to it, there is no defense to these charges." The plea court sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. He did not appeal. Hilton filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State requested a hearing, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. Hilton then moved to "dismiss" his appointed attorney. A few weeks later, after learning his motion was set for a hearing, Hilton filed another motion, again seeking "dismissal of PCR Court Appointed Attorney." At the hearing on Hilton's motion, the PCR court informed him of his right to counsel but did not warn him of the dangers of proceeding without an attorney. After the hearing, the PCR court entered an order granting the motion to relieve counsel. Almost a year later, Hilton appeared without an attorney before a second PCR court for trial. The PCR court began by inquiring into Hilton's waiver of his right to counsel. Both sides presented testimony. As a part of its presentation, the State informed the PCR court of Hilton's seven prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct. The PCR court took the case under advisement, and later issued a written order denying relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court found Hilton declined to have the PCR court explain "the kinds of things that an attorney might do to be of service. ... the record here is clear Hilton was already aware of several of the specific advantages of having an attorney." Finding a valid waiver of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. View "Hilton v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Kenneth Hilton appealed the denial of post-conviction relief (PCR), claiming the PCR court did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel before allowing him to represent himself at his PCR trial. Hilton pled guilty to kidnapping and assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct in the second degree. When asked at the PCR trial about the quality of the State's evidence, plea counsel explained, "We had the actual recording of what went on, and when you listen to it, there is no defense to these charges." The plea court sentenced him to forty-five years in prison. He did not appeal. Hilton filed a PCR application alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The State requested a hearing, and the court appointed counsel to represent him. Hilton then moved to "dismiss" his appointed attorney. A few weeks later, after learning his motion was set for a hearing, Hilton filed another motion, again seeking "dismissal of PCR Court Appointed Attorney." At the hearing on Hilton's motion, the PCR court informed him of his right to counsel but did not warn him of the dangers of proceeding without an attorney. After the hearing, the PCR court entered an order granting the motion to relieve counsel. Almost a year later, Hilton appeared without an attorney before a second PCR court for trial. The PCR court began by inquiring into Hilton's waiver of his right to counsel. Both sides presented testimony. As a part of its presentation, the State informed the PCR court of Hilton's seven prior convictions for criminal sexual conduct. The PCR court took the case under advisement, and later issued a written order denying relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court found Hilton declined to have the PCR court explain "the kinds of things that an attorney might do to be of service. ... the record here is clear Hilton was already aware of several of the specific advantages of having an attorney." Finding a valid waiver of his right to counsel, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of relief. View "Hilton v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the novel issue of whether an email that provides written notice of entry of an order or judgment triggers the time for serving a notice of appeal for purposes of Rule 203(b)(1) of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules ("SCACR"). On December 15, 2014, the master filed an order denying Fallon Properties South Carolina, LLC, Timothy R. Fallon, and Susan C. Fallon's ("Petitioners") petition for an order of appraisal. That same day, the master's administrative assistant emailed a signed and stamped copy of the order and Form 4 to both Petitioners and Wells Fargo Bank ("Respondent"). The email provided: "Please see attached copy of signed and clocked Form 4 and Order. I have also mailed a copy to all listed on the Form 4." Three days later, Petitioners received a copy of both documents in the mail. Believing the time to appeal commenced on the day they received the copy of the order and Form 4 in the mail, Petitioners served their notice of appeal on January 15, 2015, which was thirty-one days after they received the email and twenty-eight days after they received the documents in the mail. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the email triggered the time to appeal; therefore, Petitioners' notice of appeal was untimely served. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondent and dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court held that such an email, if sent from the court, an attorney of record, or a party, triggers the time to serve a notice of appeal. Because the email giving rise to this appeal was from a master-in-equity's administrative assistant and provided written notice of the entry of an order, the email triggered the time to appeal. Since the notice of appeal was not served until thirty-one days after the parties received the email, the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the service of the notice of appeal was untimely. However, given the novelty of the issue, the frequency in which the issue is likely to arise, and the inconsistent case law interpreting Rule 203, SCACR, fairness dictated the Court's ruling on this issue was applied prospectively. View "Wells Fargo Bank v. Fallon Properties" on Justia Law

Johnny Eades sought treatment from numerous healthcare providers, including Petitioners Palmetto Primary Care Physicians, LLC and Trident Emergency Physicians, LLC, for a blockage and aneurysm of the left iliac artery in July and August of 2009. Three years later, Mr. Eades and his wife filed a Notice of Intent to File Suit (NOI) to bring a medical malpractice action in Charleston County, South Carolina. Two days after filing the NOI, the Eades filed answers to interrogatories listing Dr. Paul Skudder as an expert witness, along with an affidavit from Skudder pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). This case required the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide whether an expert witness affidavit submitted prior to the commencement of a medical malpractice action complied with section 15-36-100(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). The trial court found the affidavit insufficient based on the expert's practice area and dismissed the NOI. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute permitted the production of an affidavit from an expert who did not practice in the same area of medicine as the allegedly negligent doctor. View "Eades v. Palmetto Cardiovascular" on Justia Law

Johnny Eades sought treatment from numerous healthcare providers, including Petitioners Palmetto Primary Care Physicians, LLC and Trident Emergency Physicians, LLC, for a blockage and aneurysm of the left iliac artery in July and August of 2009. Three years later, Mr. Eades and his wife filed a Notice of Intent to File Suit (NOI) to bring a medical malpractice action in Charleston County, South Carolina. Two days after filing the NOI, the Eades filed answers to interrogatories listing Dr. Paul Skudder as an expert witness, along with an affidavit from Skudder pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). This case required the South Carolina Supreme Court to decide whether an expert witness affidavit submitted prior to the commencement of a medical malpractice action complied with section 15-36-100(A) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2016). The trial court found the affidavit insufficient based on the expert's practice area and dismissed the NOI. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the statute permitted the production of an affidavit from an expert who did not practice in the same area of medicine as the allegedly negligent doctor. View "Eades v. Palmetto Cardiovascular" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for Jacklyn Donevant in her wrongful termination action against the Town of Surfside Beach, finding her cause of action fit within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Donevant was fired because she carried out her mandatory responsibility under the law to enforce the provisions of the South Carolina building code. Donevant discovered unpermitted construction work she determined to be in violation of the building code, and she issued a stop work order. She was fired a few days later. The Town appealed, contending the court of appeals misinterpreted the "public policy exception." The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the Town misinterpreted the public policy exception: "Donevant was enforcing the building code and therefore enforcing a clear mandate of public policy when she issued the stop-work order. ... Under the circumstances of this case, firing Donevant for carrying out her mandatory responsibility to enforce the building code violates public policy." View "Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach" on Justia Law

The court of appeals affirmed a jury verdict for Jacklyn Donevant in her wrongful termination action against the Town of Surfside Beach, finding her cause of action fit within the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Donevant was fired because she carried out her mandatory responsibility under the law to enforce the provisions of the South Carolina building code. Donevant discovered unpermitted construction work she determined to be in violation of the building code, and she issued a stop work order. She was fired a few days later. The Town appealed, contending the court of appeals misinterpreted the "public policy exception." The South Carolina Supreme Court determined the Town misinterpreted the public policy exception: "Donevant was enforcing the building code and therefore enforcing a clear mandate of public policy when she issued the stop-work order. ... Under the circumstances of this case, firing Donevant for carrying out her mandatory responsibility to enforce the building code violates public policy." View "Donevant v. Town of Surfside Beach" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case appeal presented a post-conviction relief (PCR) matter in which Petitioner Gregg Taylor, a Jamaican citizen, pled guilty to a drug offense. Petitioner resided in South Carolina for years with his wife and two children, all three of whom were United States citizens. In plea negotiations, Petitioner's primary concern was whether he would be subject to deportation. Plea counsel viewed Petitioner's grave concern with the prospect of deportation as a "collateral" issue, yet provided general assurances to Petitioner that he would not be deported. As a result, Petitioner pled guilty. The drug offense resulted in Petitioner's deportation, and this PCR application followed. The PCR court denied relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari and reversed: "By focusing on Petitioner's decision-making, it is uncontested that he 'would have rejected any plea leading to deportation.' Because Petitioner's counsel provided deficient representation, we may not avoid a finding of prejudice on the basis of the likelihood of a guilty verdict . . . we are constrained to 'conclude [Petitioner] has demonstrated a 'reasonable probability that, but for [his] counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court clarified the proper scope of a circuit judge's inquiry under Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), when a criminal defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives his right to counsel and requests to proceed pro se. Lamont Samuel was indicted for the murder of his cousin, Taneris Hamilton. On the day his case was called to trial, Samuel indicated he was dissatisfied with defense counsel and made a Faretta motion to waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Rather than concluding the Faretta colloquy, the circuit judge continued to caution Samuel against representing himself, stating she did not believe he was sufficiently familiar with the law, procedure, or rules of evidence to adequately represent himself. Despite the judge's warnings and in light of the potential penalties he faced, Samuel voluntarily reaffirmed his desire to dispense with the assistance of counsel and proceed pro se. The circuit judge summoned the attorney Samuel alleged he had been coached by in order to proceed pro se, to question the attorney on his relationship with Samuel. The attorney's testimony conflicted with Samuel's asserted "coaching." The circuit judge interpreted Samuel's and the attorney's conflicting testimony to mean Samuel was lying to her and attempting to manipulate the proceedings. Samuel proceeded to trial with his counsel and was found guilty and sentenced to fifty years imprisonment. He appealed his conviction, asserting the circuit judge erred in denying his right to self-representation, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, finding Samuel made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary request to proceed pro se as required by Faretta, and he should have been given the opportunity to represent himself. View "South Carolina v. Samuel" on Justia Law