Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gregg Pickrell was convicted of murdering Robert Lamont Demary. Pickrell and Demary were romantically involved but did not live together. Pickrell claimed that Demary routinely abused her and that she shot him in self-defense as he lunged toward her in her bedroom. The entry wound was in Demary's back, which Pickrell did not dispute.The Circuit Court of Kershaw County admitted testimony from SLED Agent Dawn Claycomb and Kershaw County Sheriff's Investigator Rick Bailey. Pickrell objected to both testimonies. The court of appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that any error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless and that Pickrell's objection to Investigator Bailey's testimony was not preserved for appellate review. The court also found Bailey's testimony admissible under Rule 701 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case on certiorari. The court agreed with the court of appeals that the error in admitting Agent Claycomb's testimony was harmless because the location of the shooting was not in dispute. However, the court disagreed with the court of appeals regarding Investigator Bailey's testimony, finding that Pickrell's objection was sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. The court held that Bailey's testimony did not meet the foundational requirements of Rule 701 and should have been excluded. Despite this, the court found the error harmless because Bailey's testimony was cumulative to that of Investigator Miles Taylor, who provided similar testimony without objection.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified, maintaining Pickrell's conviction. View "State v. Pickrell" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor. The trial court refused the State's request to instruct the jury that the testimony of an alleged victim of criminal sexual conduct need not be corroborated, as per section 16-3-657 of the South Carolina Code. However, the court allowed the State to cite and quote the statute during its closing argument, over the petitioner's objection. The victim testified that the petitioner sexually abused her from the age of four or five until she was nine, with no corroborating evidence presented.The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, holding that the issue of whether the State could argue section 16-3-657 was unpreserved for appellate review. The petitioner then sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his trial counsel failed to perfect his direct appeal. The post-conviction relief court granted a belated appeal, but the Court of Appeals again found the issues unpreserved and affirmed the conviction, also noting that the petitioner conceded the State could argue the statute during its closing argument.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and found that the petitioner's objections to the State arguing section 16-3-657 were preserved for appellate review. The court held that it is improper for a party to argue the statute to the jury, as it could unduly influence the jury to believe the victim's testimony without corroboration. The court noted that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the statute, combined with the State's argument and assurance that the trial court would correct any misstatement of the law, compounded the error. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Cone v. State" on Justia Law

Two children, E.G. and J.J., through their guardian ad litem, John D. Elliott, filed a lawsuit against the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) and others, alleging that the children were sexually molested by P.M., the adopted son of Annie Montgomery, while in Montgomery's foster care. The plaintiffs claimed that DSS and Montgomery were negligent in placing and accepting the children into the foster home, knowing or having reason to know of P.M.'s history of sexually abusive behavior. They sought discovery of DSS's adoption files to support their claims.The circuit court issued a protective order for certain DSS foster care files but did not rule on the adoption files. The plaintiffs then filed a motion in family court to unseal the adoption files, which was denied. The family court ruled that the plaintiffs had no legal interest in the records and had not shown good cause under section 63-9-780(C) of the South Carolina Code. The court of appeals affirmed this decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the confidentiality provision in section 63-9-780(C) does not insulate DSS adoption files from civil discovery if they meet the criteria under the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The court determined that if the files are discoverable under Rule 26(b), then good cause exists for their inspection. The court reversed the court of appeals' decision, emphasizing that protective orders can be used to maintain confidentiality while allowing necessary discovery. View "E.G. v. SCDSS" on Justia Law

Respondent Olandio R. Workman was convicted by a jury of domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature (DVHAN), kidnapping, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of twelve, fifteen, and five years, respectively. The case arose from an incident in August 2016, where Workman confined and beat his wife, Loretta Workman, for over forty-eight hours. The abuse included physical violence, threats with firearms, and preventing her from leaving the house or contacting anyone for help.The Court of Appeals reviewed the case and reversed Workman's DVHAN conviction, remanding for a new trial. The appellate court found that the trial court's jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of first-degree domestic violence (DV1) was erroneous. Specifically, the instruction failed to include the definition of "moderate bodily injury" and did not explain second-degree domestic violence (DV2), which is relevant to establishing DV1. The appellate court held that this omission was not harmless and warranted a new trial.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and agreed that the trial court's jury instruction was incomplete and erroneous. However, the Supreme Court held that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the evidence overwhelmingly supported Workman's conviction for DVHAN, as his actions demonstrated extreme indifference to human life and would reasonably cause fear of imminent great bodily injury or death. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's finding of error but reversed its decision on harmless error, reinstating Workman's DVHAN conviction. View "The State v. Workman" on Justia Law

Dr. Earl Bostick Sr. and Josie Bostick married in 1970, and Dr. Bostick developed two successful dental practices in South Carolina. In 2009, he sold one practice and continued with the other until the couple separated in 2017, after which he sold the remaining practice for $569,000. The sales contract indicated that $424,140 of this amount was for goodwill and a non-compete agreement. The couple agreed to an equal division of the marital estate but disputed whether the goodwill was personal (nonmarital) or enterprise (marital) property.The Family Court granted the divorce and ruled that the goodwill in Dr. Bostick's practice was personal, thus not subject to division. The court based its decision on the evidence that the goodwill was tied to Dr. Bostick's personal reputation and professional skills. Josie Bostick appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the Family Court's decision, determining that the goodwill should be considered enterprise goodwill and thus marital property.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, reinstating the Family Court's ruling. The Supreme Court found that the goodwill was indeed personal, as it was closely tied to Dr. Bostick's reputation, community involvement, and professional skills. The Court emphasized that Josie Bostick did not present evidence to prove the goodwill was enterprise in nature. The presence of a non-compete agreement further supported the conclusion that the goodwill was personal. Consequently, the value of the goodwill was excluded from the marital estate, and the Family Court's judgment was reinstated. View "Bostick v. Bostick" on Justia Law

Richard Kenneth Galloway was convicted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend's daughter between 1988 and 1990. The victim, who was in elementary and middle school at the time, reported the abuse to the police in 2016. At trial, she testified about multiple incidents of sexual abuse by Galloway. The jury convicted Galloway on two charges: one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor and one count of lewd act upon a child. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of thirty years and ten years, respectively. Galloway appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed his convictions.Galloway's appeal to the South Carolina Supreme Court focused on two main issues: the exclusion of expert testimony on "false memories" and the admission of testimony about his violence toward the victim's mother. The trial court had excluded the expert testimony because the expert had not evaluated the victim and could not reliably apply his theories to her specific case. The court of appeals upheld this exclusion, finding that the testimony would not assist the jury and was speculative.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. It held that the trial court did not err in excluding the expert testimony on false memories, as it was not reliably applied to the victim and would not assist the jury. The court also found no reversible error in admitting testimony about Galloway's violence toward the victim's mother, as it was relevant to explaining the victim's delayed disclosure of the abuse and did not unfairly prejudice the jury against Galloway. The court dismissed the writ of certiorari on a third issue regarding the contents of a letter Galloway wrote, finding no reason to disagree with the court of appeals' analysis. View "The State v. Galloway" on Justia Law

Gena Cain Davis, a correctional officer, filed a workers' compensation claim in July 2016, alleging injuries from a slip-and-fall accident. She later requested a hearing, which she withdrew, leading to the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) suspending her temporary disability compensation and filing a request to stop payments. Davis filed another hearing request, which was also withdrawn. The single commissioner allowed the withdrawal without prejudice and dismissed SCDC's stop-payment request.The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's Appellate Panel upheld the dismissal of the stop-payment request but reversed the withdrawal without prejudice, claiming the single commissioner lacked jurisdiction. The court of appeals vacated the Appellate Panel's decision, stating the single commissioner's ruling was interlocutory and not immediately reviewable, and remanded the case to the Commission.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision as modified. The Supreme Court held that the single commissioner's order was interlocutory and not an "award" subject to immediate review by the Appellate Panel under section 42-17-50. The court clarified that the single commissioner had jurisdiction to rule on the issue of prejudice and reinstated the single commissioner's ruling. The case was remanded to the Commission for further proceedings, urging an expeditious resolution of the claim's merits. View "Davis v. SCDC" on Justia Law

Four condemned inmates challenged the constitutionality of a South Carolina statute that provides three methods of execution: electrocution, lethal injection, and firing squad. They argued that the statute violates the South Carolina Constitution's prohibition against cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment.The Richland County Circuit Court ruled in favor of the inmates, declaring the statute unconstitutional. The court found that electrocution and firing squad methods violate the state constitution's prohibition on cruel, corporal, or unusual punishment. It also found the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution unconstitutionally vague and an improper delegation of authority. The court further ruled that the retroactive application of the amended statute violated ex post facto prohibitions.The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed the lower court's decision. The court held that the statute does not violate the South Carolina Constitution. It found that electrocution is not unconstitutionally cruel, corporal, or unusual, noting that the inmates did not meet their burden of proving that electrocution causes unnecessary and excessive pain. The court also held that lethal injection, as conceded by the inmates, is constitutional if properly administered. Regarding the firing squad, the court found it to be a relatively quick and painless method of execution, thus not cruel or unusual.The court also addressed the inmates' claims about the statute's vagueness and improper delegation of authority, finding that the term "available" is not unconstitutionally vague and that the statute does not unlawfully delegate authority to the Director of the Department of Corrections. The court emphasized that the statute's provision allowing inmates to choose their method of execution is a constitutional innovation aimed at making the death penalty less inhumane. The court concluded that the statute is constitutional in its entirety. View "Owens v. Stirling" on Justia Law

Covil Corporation, through its receiver, sued Pennsylvania National Mutual Insurance Company for breaching their insurance contract by not contributing to a settlement in an asbestos case. David Rollins had sued Covil and others, alleging negligent asbestos exposure caused his mesothelioma. Penn National insured Covil during part of the exposure period. Covil settled the case and sought $50,000 from Penn National, which the insurer refused to pay.The circuit court granted summary judgment for Covil, requiring Penn National to indemnify Covil for the settlement. The court rejected Penn National's arguments about untimely notice, premature summary judgment, and policy exclusions. The court of appeals affirmed the decision.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and affirmed the court of appeals' decision with modifications. The court held that the notice-prejudice rule did not apply because the underlying plaintiff, Rollins, had already been fully compensated. The court also found that Covil's untimely notice was not a material breach of the insurance contract, as Covil's interests were adequately protected by other insurers' counsel. Additionally, the court ruled that Penn National did not waive its right to timely notice by attending mediation.The court further held that the policy's "Products Hazard" and "Completed Operations Hazard" exclusions did not apply. The Products Hazard exclusion was inapplicable because Covil's liability was based on installation, not supplying asbestos. The Completed Operations Hazard exclusion did not apply because Rollins's exposure occurred before Covil's work was completed. Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's summary judgment in favor of Covil. View "Covil Corporation v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

In December 2014, the petitioner and his son met Charles Brown to sell a motorcycle. The transaction failed, and the petitioner and his son allegedly robbed and killed Brown. Both were indicted for murder and armed robbery and proceeded to a joint jury trial. The jury was instructed to consider each charge separately for each defendant. After deliberations, the jury convicted the petitioner's son of armed robbery but acquitted him of murder. The jury then reported being deadlocked on the petitioner's charges, leading the trial court to declare a mistrial and discharge the jury.After the jury was dismissed, a bailiff found documents indicating the jury had reached a guilty verdict for the petitioner's armed robbery charge. The trial court recalled the jury, which confirmed it had reached a verdict on the armed robbery charge before being discharged. The jury was polled individually, and all jurors affirmed the guilty verdict. The trial court then entered the guilty verdict and sentenced the petitioner to life imprisonment without parole.The petitioner appealed to the South Carolina Court of Appeals, arguing the trial court erred in recalling the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on procedural grounds. The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to recall the jury. The Supreme Court emphasized that the jury was recalled shortly after discharge, remained on the courthouse premises, and was not subjected to outside influences. The recall served only to confirm the verdict reached before discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the petitioner's conviction and sentence for armed robbery. View "The State v. Mills" on Justia Law