Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A group of retired firefighters from the City of Columbia claimed that the City had promised them free lifetime health insurance. This promise was allegedly made through verbal statements, newsletters, and retirement letters. The dispute arose when the City Council required all active and retired employees under 65 to contribute to their health insurance premiums, and later extended this requirement to Medicare supplemental coverage for retirees over 65. The firefighters argued that the City should be held to its promise under the doctrine of promissory estoppel.Initially, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the City, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, allowing the promissory estoppel claim to proceed. After a nonjury trial, Judge Sprouse ruled in favor of the City, and the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, stating that the firefighters had not proven an unambiguous promise or reasonable reliance on such a promise.The Supreme Court of South Carolina reviewed the case and affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision but modified the reasoning. The Supreme Court found that the firefighters did not prove the City made a clear promise of free lifetime health insurance. Additionally, the Court emphasized that the City Council, not individual employees, had the authority to make such promises. The Court also clarified that promissory estoppel claims need only be proven by the greater weight of the evidence, not by clear and convincing evidence, except in cases involving specific performance of land transfers. The Court concluded that the firefighters had no right to rely on statements made by City employees who lacked the authority to bind the City. View "Cruz v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Adam Rowell was convicted of two felony driving under the influence charges. After the trial, Rowell discovered that Juror 164, who served on his jury, had failed to disclose during voir dire that he had been recently arrested for several charges, including possession with intent to distribute marijuana. Rowell included this information in his motion for a new trial. Juror 164 was not present at the hearing for the new trial motion, and although the State consented to a second hearing to examine Juror 164, the circuit court denied the motion without holding the additional hearing.The circuit court found that Juror 164's failure to disclose his arrest was unintentional, attributing it to the structure of the voir dire questions, which could have confused the average juror. The court of appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that there was no need for further examination of Juror 164 since the concealment was deemed unintentional.The South Carolina Supreme Court reviewed the case and decided to abandon the distinction between intentional and unintentional concealment. The court held that the focus should be on whether the juror's nondisclosure suggests bias and whether this bias caused prejudice to the moving party. The court ruled that a new trial may be ordered only when prejudice is proven by showing that the concealed information reveals a potential for bias and would have influenced the use of a peremptory strike or a challenge for cause.The Supreme Court vacated the lower court's decision and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine if Juror 164's nondisclosure suggested bias and if it prejudiced Rowell's defense. The circuit court is instructed to assess whether the withheld information would have been material to Rowell's use of peremptory strikes or supported a challenge for cause. View "The State v. Rowell" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Gabrielle Davis-Kocsis, who was convicted of murder, two counts of kidnapping, first-degree burglary, and criminal conspiracy, all stemming from a dispute between drug dealers. Davis-Kocsis had offered methamphetamine as a reward for information about Mark Connor, who had stolen cash and a motorcycle from her. After learning of Connor's location, Davis-Kocsis and her accomplices broke into the house, sprayed bear mace, and held the occupants at gunpoint. During the confrontation, one of Davis-Kocsis's accomplices shot and killed Connor.The case was initially tried in a lower court where Davis-Kocsis was found guilty on all charges. She appealed the decision, arguing that the South Carolina Code prohibits sentencing a defendant for both kidnapping and murder when the victims are different. She also contested the trial court's decision to admit a 911 call recording as evidence, claiming it was more prejudicial than probative.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that a defendant could be sentenced for both murder and kidnapping when the victims are different, overruling Davis-Kocsis's interpretation of the South Carolina Code. The court also found no error in the trial court's decision to admit the 911 call recording, stating that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The court dismissed Davis-Kocsis's other arguments regarding the recording as they were not raised at the trial court level and were therefore unpreserved for appellate review. View "The State v. Gabrielle Oliva Lashane Davis-Kocsis" on Justia Law

In February 2015, Samuel Paulino was injured while working as a custodian at Diversified Coatings, Inc. Despite undergoing surgery and various treatments, Paulino continued to experience persistent pain and limited mobility. His doctors assigned him impairment ratings of 12% to his lumbar spine and 13% to his whole person. Paulino argued that he was permanently and totally disabled under South Carolina law, which presumes total and permanent disability where there is a 50% or more loss of use of the back.The South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Paulino total and permanent disability benefits, finding that he had sustained a 50% or greater loss of use to his back. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this decision, stating that there was no medical evidence in the record to support the Commission's findings.The South Carolina Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals, stating that the lower court had misapplied the "substantial evidence" standard for reviewing decisions of the Commission. The Supreme Court noted that the Commission's decision was not solely based on medical evidence, but also considered Paulino's testimony about his pain and limitations, as well as the results of his functional capacity evaluation. The Supreme Court held that the Commission's award was supported by substantial evidence and should have been affirmed. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Commission's award. View "Paulino v. Diversified Coatings, Inc." on Justia Law

Orthofix, Inc. and KCI USA, Inc., both Delaware corporations with principal places of business outside South Carolina, sold durable medical equipment (DME) in South Carolina and remitted the 6% sales tax without protest. However, they later requested refunds for the sales tax paid during certain periods, arguing that they should qualify for a sales tax exemption for DME paid for by Medicaid or Medicare funds. This exemption, however, was only available to sellers whose principal place of business was in South Carolina. The South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) denied the refund claims, stating that the companies did not meet the statutory requirements for the exemption.The companies appealed the decisions within the DOR, arguing that the exemption's limitation to in-state businesses violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The DOR issued determinations finding that the companies were not entitled to a refund of sales tax paid for DME. The companies then filed actions in the circuit court challenging the constitutionality of the exemption under the dormant Commerce Clause. The circuit court granted summary judgment to each company, finding the exemption's discrimination against interstate commerce unconstitutional and severing the "principal place of business in South Carolina" requirement from the remainder of the exemption.The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision as modified. The court agreed that the exemption unconstitutionally discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and that the ordered refunds were appropriate. However, the court found that the companies had not satisfied their burden of proof to show the legislature would have passed the remainder of the exemption absent the unconstitutional language. Therefore, the court declined to sever only the offending language and instead declared the entire exemption void going forward. The court invited the legislature to reenact the exemption, excluding the unconstitutional limitation on a seller's principal place of business. View "Orthofix v. South Carolina Department of Revenue" on Justia Law

Eric English was convicted of first-degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, his biological daughter. The victim, who was six or seven years old at the time of the abuse, tested positive for gonorrhea. English and Jamie Stroman, the victim's mother's boyfriend, also underwent STD testing. English tested positive for gonorrhea, while Stroman tested negative. The trial court admitted the STD test reports as evidence under the business records exception to the rule against hearsay, despite English's objections.The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, arguing that the test reports were admissible under the business records exception and were not testimonial under the United States Supreme Court's holding in Davis v. Washington. English appealed, arguing that the test reports were inadmissible without the testimony of the individuals who performed the tests, citing State v. James.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the lower courts' decisions in part and vacated in part. The court overruled James, stating that it had been abrogated by subsequent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. The court held that the STD test reports were nontestimonial and did not implicate English's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Therefore, the trial court did not err in admitting the reports without requiring the testimony of the individuals who authored the reports. However, the court vacated the court of appeals' holding that the requirements of Rule 803(6) were satisfied, as English did not argue that the reports did not meet these requirements. View "The State v. English" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Travis Hines, who was indicted for the distribution of heroin after selling the drug to a confidential informant. Hines initially had a public defender, then hired a private attorney, Christopher Wellborn. The State offered Hines a plea deal of ten years, which was later withdrawn and replaced with an eighteen-year offer. Wellborn requested the video of the drug buy, which the State refused to provide unless Hines rejected the plea offer and proceeded to trial. After viewing the video, Wellborn advised Hines to accept a fifteen-year plea deal. However, Hines discharged Wellborn and began negotiating directly with the State. He eventually pleaded guilty in exchange for a fourteen-year sentence, representing himself in the process.The lower courts dismissed Hines' post-conviction relief (PCR) petition, where he sought to set aside his guilty plea on the grounds that he was not adequately warned about the dangers of self-representation and that the State violated discovery rules by refusing to let him watch the video. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal, ruling that the warnings Hines received about self-representation satisfied the Sixth Amendment and that there was no discovery violation.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the lower courts' decisions. The court held that Hines had competently and intelligently waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court found that Hines, a twenty-nine-year-old college student with previous experience in the criminal justice system, understood the nuances of having legal representation. The court also noted that Hines had been advised by Wellborn to plead guilty, and the nature of the charges and the scope of the punishments he faced were clear to him. The court concluded that Hines had not met his burden of proving his waiver was involuntary. View "Hines v. State" on Justia Law

This case involves a dispute over a real estate development project in Beaufort County, South Carolina. The developer, Road, LLC, purchased a 229-acre peninsula with plans to develop it. However, the project was contingent on resolving two disputes concerning the only access road to the peninsula. The first dispute involved neighboring landowners who claimed ownership of a parcel of land the access road crossed. The second dispute involved Beaufort County's denial of the developer's request for a zoning variance to relocate and improve the access road. The developer, the neighboring landowners, and Beaufort County settled both disputes in a written "Settlement Agreement." However, the developer eventually defaulted on its loan and the lender took title to the peninsula. After the developer's options to repurchase the peninsula expired, Beaufort County purchased the peninsula to prevent its development. Road, LLC argued that Beaufort County breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Settlement Agreement by purchasing the peninsula, thereby extinguishing any opportunity Road might later gain to sell the parcel to another developer.The trial court initially ruled in favor of Road, LLC, but later granted Beaufort County's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, arguing that there was no breach of the Settlement Agreement and that Road presented no evidence to support the jury's $5 million award. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision on the grounds that there was no evidence Beaufort County was the proximate cause of Road's damages and that the evidence showed Road did not suffer $5 million in damages because the property was still worth $5 million after the County purchased the peninsula.The Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the court of appeals' decision in result. The court held that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot create new contractual duties not expressly stated or fairly implied in the contract itself. The court found that the Settlement Agreement did not prohibit Beaufort County from purchasing the peninsula once the developer's option expired. Therefore, the court concluded that Beaufort County could not have breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the Settlement Agreement. View "Road, LLC and Pinckney Point, LLC v. Beaufort County" on Justia Law

In July 2018, Thomas Jones was observing a traffic stop conducted by two deputies outside his home. Jones interacted with the deputies, asking questions about the stop. The deputies responded by arresting Jones, using a taser in the process. Jones was convicted under a Greenville County ordinance for interfering with a county law enforcement officer. He was sentenced to thirty days in jail and a $1,000 fine, which was suspended upon ten days in jail over weekends and a $500 fine. Jones appealed his conviction, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to him and that the ordinance itself was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution.Jones's case was transferred to the Supreme Court of South Carolina due to the constitutional challenges he raised. The State conceded that the ordinance was improperly applied to Jones under the specific facts of the case and asked the court to reverse his conviction and sentence. The State also requested that the court not address Jones's broader challenges to the ordinance.The Supreme Court of South Carolina agreed with the State's position. The court noted that it generally declines to rule on constitutional issues unless necessary and that facial challenges to statutes are disfavored. The court found that Jones's actions of observing and asking questions were constitutionally protected conduct and could not support a conviction under the ordinance. The court was deeply disturbed by the deputies' behavior in this case but declined to go further than necessary in its ruling. The court reversed Jones's conviction on the narrow grounds that the ordinance was unconstitutionally applied to him and reserved judgment on the broader challenges to the ordinance for another case. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

Patrick Clemons, a convicted felon, was found guilty of possessing a firearm. He had two prior convictions for Criminal Domestic Violence of a High and Aggravated Nature (CDVHAN) and one for Assault and Battery Second Degree (AB2d) in South Carolina. Due to these prior convictions, Clemons was classified as an armed career criminal under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), leading to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years. Clemons appealed his enhanced sentence, arguing that both CDVHAN and AB2d could be committed through reckless or negligent conduct, and therefore, neither should qualify as a predicate offense for enhanced sentencing under the ACCA's "elements clause."Clemons' appeal reached the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which certified two questions to the South Carolina Supreme Court. The questions sought to clarify the mental state required to commit AB2d and CDVHAN in South Carolina. The South Carolina Supreme Court rephrased the questions to ask whether a defendant could be convicted of these offenses with a mens rea of recklessness as defined by the Model Penal Code.The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the answer to both questions was "yes." The court explained that the South Carolina Legislature had chosen to criminalize multiple types of conduct under the statutes for AB2d and CDVHAN. Therefore, there was not a single mens rea required for a conviction under either statute. Instead, the required mens rea depended on the actus reus of the crime being prosecuted. The court concluded that under some circumstances, a person could be convicted of AB2d and CDVHAN with a mens rea of recklessness. View "United States of America v. Clemons" on Justia Law