Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rocky Linkhorn was arrested and charged with Criminal Sexual Conduct with a Minor in the First Degree, Lewd Act on a Minor, and Disseminating Obscene Material to a Minor. After finding Linkhorn was incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to become fit in the foreseeable future, the circuit court ordered the solicitor to initiate judicial admission proceedings with the probate court to have Linkhorn involuntarily committed to the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs ("DDSN"). Before the probate court determined whether Linkhorn was intellectually disabled, the solicitor filed a motion for a rule to show cause at the circuit court, requesting DDSN be ruled into court "to show just cause for services being denied to [Linkhorn] as previously ordered." The circuit court granted the solicitor's motion and ordered DDSN to, inter alia, take custody of Linkhorn and house him in a secure facility until the probate court determines whether Linkhorn is intellectually disabled. Additionally, the court prohibited DDSN from refusing involuntary commitment of individuals similarly situated to Linkhorn. DDSN appealed. The Supreme Court found the statutes concerning the involuntary commitment of individuals to DDSN were “clear and unambiguous: [. . .] only individuals who developed an ‘intellectual disability’ during the developmental period or a ‘related disability’ before the age of twenty-two can be involuntarily committed to DDSN.” The Court concluded the circuit court erred in applying the broad definition of "person with intellectual disability" found in the applicable statutes to Linkhorn. Because this issue was dispositive of the appeal, the Court declined to address DDSN's remaining arguments, and reversed the circuit court’s decision. View "Ex parte So. Carolina Dept. of Disabilities & Spec. Needs v. Linkhorn" on Justia Law

In 2003, petitioner Roosevelt Simmons acquired title to two parcels of land, "Tract 498" and "Tract 135." Both parcels were undeveloped, wooded, and located along Kitford Road on Johns Island. The parcels were separated by an abandoned railroad right-of-way and were previously part of a larger tract owned by two of Simmons' predecessors-in-title, Edward Heyward and E.C. Brown. In 1956, Heyward granted an easement to Berkeley Electric to construct and maintain transmission lines over Tract 498 and Tract 135. In 1972, Brown granted an easement to Berkeley Electric to construct and maintain distribution lines over Tract 498. In 1977, Charleston County issued an encroachment permit authorizing St. John's Water to install a water main along Kitford Road pursuant to an accompanying map that illustrated the water main's approved location. In 2005, Simmons discovered a water meter under bushes on Tract 135. Simmons subsequently contacted St. John's Water, which informed Simmons that it would not move the water main because it believed it had an easement giving it the right to use the property. St. John's Water based its belief on the encroachment permit and its understanding that the water main had been in its current location for more than twenty years. Pursuant to a request by Simmons, St. John's Water "blue-flagged" the property. The blue flags showed the water main crossing both Tract 135 and Tract 498. In 2008, Simmons commenced this action against Berkeley Electric and St. John's Water alleging trespass and unjust enrichment. Specifically, Simmons alleged Berkeley Electric and St. John's Water trespassed on his property by constructing, placing, and maintaining unauthorized power and water lines. In doing so, Simmons claimed Berkeley Electric and St. John's Water had been "furnished with a non-gratuitous and valuable benefit without paying for its reasonable value." Simmons also sought a declaration that neither utility company had property interests or rights to his property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the master's grant of summary judgment in favor of Berkeley Electric, finding Berkeley Electric did not exceed the scope of the express easements. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed judgment in favor of Berkeley Electric, but reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals' decision that upheld the master's grant of summary judgment in favor of St. John's Water. The case was remanded for additional proceedings. View "Simmons v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner Nathalie Davaut appealed the denial of her claim for workers' compensation benefits for injuries she sustained attempting to leave her workplace. To reach her car, which was in a university lot provided for faculty and student parking, Petitioner was required to cross Hubbard Drive (the Street), which bisected University of South Carolina Lancaster's (USCL) campus. While crossing the Street, Petitioner was struck by a vehicle and injured. It was undisputed that the Street and the crosswalks that spanned it are not owned or controlled by the University of South Carolina (USC); rather, they were maintained and controlled by the City of Lancaster. However, it was also undisputed that both the library (where Petitioner had been working) and the parking lot (where Petitioner was headed) belonged to USC. Petitioner sought workers' compensation benefits from her employer and its insurer, State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents). Respondents, relying on the going and coming rule, denied Petitioner's injuries were compensable, on the basis Petitioner was injured away from USC's property. Petitioner claimed that because she was injured while traveling from one portion of USC's property to another, the Panel erred in denying her relief. The court of appeals disagreed and upheld the Workers' Compensation Commission's denial of coverage. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that when an employee crosses from one portion of her employer's property to another over a reasonably necessary and direct route, the employee remains in the course of her employment for purposes of workers' compensation. View "Davaut v. Univ. of So. Carolina" on Justia Law

Respondent Russell Earley was convicted of criminal solicitation of a minor and sentenced to eight years in prison. Respondent's criminal charge arose from an encounter with a fourteen-year-old male (Victim) outside a public restroom at Walmart in Sumter in November 2008. On the evening of the incident, the Victim visited Walmart with his grandmother, who had promised to buy him some headphones. The Victim and his grandmother went in separate directions when they entered the store—the Victim headed for the electronics department while his grandmother went to pick up a few grocery items. After separating from his grandmother, the Victim stopped to use the restroom before shopping for headphones; as he entered the restroom, he noticed Respondent following him. The Victim stated he felt uncomfortable because Respondent stood in the restroom watching the Victim use the urinal. The Victim testified Respondent thereafter followed him out of the restroom, pointed to the Victim's genitals, and offered the Victim oral sex, which the Victim declined in no uncertain terms. The Victim immediately reported the incident to Walmart security, and multiple witnesses testified the Victim was visibly upset after the incident. There were no witnesses to the incident itself, and nothing was captured on Walmart surveillance video. The theory of Respondent's defense was that the Victim fabricated the whole story and the motivation for doing so was that Respondent had caught the Victim trying to shoplift CDs. The issue in this PCR matter involved a line of questioning during the State's cross-examination of Respondent. Specifically, the State had evidence that Respondent posted the message "See ya" on the Victim's Facebook wall the week before trial, despite having been ordered after his arrest not to have any contact with the Victim. The State's theory was that by posting such a message, Respondent was attempting to intimidate or threaten the Victim on the eve of trial. Defense counsel did not object or otherwise alert the trial court that the State had failed to disclose the "See ya" Facebook posting prior to trial. After withdrawing his direct appeal, Respondent filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application, generally alleging that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review of the trial court record, the PCR court granted Respondent relief. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Respondent's conviction and sentence. "Because the trial court would not have been compelled to declare a mistrial, we find the PCR court committed an error of law in finding the outcome of Respondent's trial would have been different had trial counsel moved for a mistrial based on the State's failure to disclose the Facebook posting. Absent a showing of prejudice as required by Strickland, it was error to grant relief." View "Earley v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Thomas Hilton suffered an admittedly compensable injury as the result of an insect or spider bite. The present dispute centered on whether he required further medical treatment to reach maximum medical improvement (MMI). The single commissioner agreed with Hilton on the merits, finding he had not reached MMI, and further that any misrepresentations he had made during the life of his claim were a result of a serious cognitive deficit from a previous brain injury. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an order of the Court of Appeals dismissing Hilton's appeal of an admittedly interlocutory order of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission's Appellate Panel (the Commission). Hilton argued the Commission's interlocutory order vacating and remanding the Workers' Compensation Commission's single commissioner's order was immediately appealable pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(A) (Supp. 2015). The Supreme Court agreed, under these unusual facts, that review of the final agency decision would not provide Hilton with an adequate remedy, and he was therefore entitled to an immediate appeal. Determining whether review of the final agency decision would give Hilton an adequate remedy required the Court to reach the underlying merits of the Commission's order, and since it concluded that the order could not stand, the Court of Appeals' order was vacated and the case remanded back to the Commission. View "Hilton v. Flakeboard America Limited" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alexander Hunsberger was sentenced to thirty-three years' incarceration for his part in the murder of Samuel Sturrup. Hunsberger argued on appeal that the trial judge erred in denying his speedy trial motion. Sturrup allegedly stole money from Steven Barnes, the purported head of a robbery and prostitution ring in Georgia. In an effort to force Sturrup to divulge where the stolen money was located, Barnes allegedly beat, and caused others to beat, Sturrup at a location in Augusta, Georgia. Sturrup was then placed in the trunk of a vehicle and brought from Georgia to South Carolina by petitioner and his brother Julio. Hunsberger was arrested in South Carolina and in March 2002, he was indicted for the murder of Sturrup. In June 2002, Hunsberger's request for bail was denied and his renewed request was denied in April 2004. In November 2004, Hunsberger moved for an order requiring the State to try him during the next two terms of court, or if no trial were held, that he be released on bail, citing S.C. Code Ann. Sec. 17-23-90 (2014) and the state and federal constitutional guarantees of due process and speedy trial. While this motion was denied in December 2004, the circuit court judge found the delay "clearly bordering on the excessive" and admonished the State to either try Hunsberger or release him to Georgia which had placed a hold on him. Following notification that the State would not go forward with trial, in January 2005 the circuit court judge granted bail but ordered Hunsberger held unless Georgia released its hold. Petitioner was subsequently extradited to Georgia, and in September 2006, he was convicted there of kidnapping with bodily injury of Sturrup, and sentenced to life imprisonment. In early 2011, Alex was extradited to South Carolina. In January 2012, the State called Hunsberger's case for trial and he moved for dismissal of his charges, claiming his state and federal rights to a speedy trial had been violated. The motion was denied, as was his renewed request made at mid-trial. Hunsberger argued that his right to a speedy trial under both the United States and South Carolina Constitutions was violated, and therefore, his murder charge should be dismissed. The South Carolina Supreme Court analyzed the issue under the Sixth Amendment, and agreed. The Court of Appeals' decision was reversed. View "South Carolina v. Hunsberger" on Justia Law

This case was one in a string of longstanding disagreements regarding how the practice of physical therapy should be regulated in South Carolina. The South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy (the Board) sided with members of the profession who wanted to prevent physical therapists (PTs) from providing treatment as direct employees of physicians. The Board had long sought to require PTs to provide their services directly to patients or through a practice group of PTs. However, other licensed healthcare professionals in South Carolina, such as occupational therapists, speech pathologists, and nurse practitioners may be employed by physicians. Thus, the PTs stood alone in South Carolina. Physicians' offices could not provide PT services by employing licensed PTs, and PTs could not provide services while employed by a physician or physicians' practice group. Appellants Kristin Joseph, a PT, and two orthopedic surgeons, Doctors Thomas Joseph and William McCarthy appealed a circuit court's order dismissing their claims challenging a 2011 position statement from the Board, which opined that within a group practice, if a PT or physical therapist assistant (PTA) provided services to a patient at the request of another PT or PTA employed within the same practice, the act did not constitute a "referral" under section 40-45-110(A)(1) of the South Carolina Code, as construed in "Sloan v. South Carolina Board of Physical Therapy Examiners," (636 S.E.2d 598 (2006)). After review, the Supreme Court overruled its decision in "Sloan," and reversed the circuit court's order in this case. View "Joseph v. SC Dept of Labor, Licensing & Regulation" on Justia Law

Respondent Theodore Manning was charged with murder following the death of his girlfriend, Mikki McPhatter. The victim died after being shot in the back of the head in Respondent's home. It was undisputed that the victim was unarmed. Another of Respondent's girlfriends, Kendra Goodman, led police to the victim's abandoned and burned vehicle, where her charred skeletal remains were discovered in the trunk. Respondent claimed self-defense. At a pre-trial hearing, Respondent's counsel relied upon Respondent's statement to police, introduced as an exhibit by the State, to support his immunity claim. In the statement, Respondent maintained he had taken a gun away from the victim during an argument, but ultimately "pulled the trigger to show her to stop playing." After considering Respondent's statement to police and hearing arguments from counsel for both sides, the trial court denied Respondent's pretrial motion for immunity. The matter then proceeded to a jury trial, where respondent was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and sentenced to thirty years in prison. Respondent appealed, and the court of appeals found, inter alia, that the trial court was required to grant Respondent a full evidentiary hearing prior to determining whether the immunity provision applied, and therefore the court of appeals remanded the case for a full hearing. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to decide whether the appellate court's judgment was made in error. After review, the Supreme Court concluded respondent received the pre-trial determination he was entitled to under South Carolina law, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in making that ruling without first conducting a full testimonial evidentiary hearing. As such, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals. View "South Carolina v. Manning" on Justia Law

Jimmy Johnson fled from police after being stopped for having an expired vehicle license. Armed, Johnson went to a Carolina Convenience Store in Spartanburg, where he took Saroj Patel hostage. The City's police department negotiated with Johnson in an effort to encourage Johnson to surrender. After the negotiations were unsuccessful, the police department cut off the power to the store and sent tear gas and pepper spray into the building's ventilation system in another attempt to induce surrender. After a twelve-hour standoff, the police decided to breach the building with a bulldozer, which resulted in severe physical damage to the property. Given the condition of the store, the City asked Carolina Convenience to tear it down for code violations. After Carolina Convenience refused, the City demolished the building. Carolina Convenience then brought claims for inverse condemnation and negligence against the City for damages to the store. The circuit court granted the City's summary judgment motion as to the inverse condemnation claim, but denied it as to the negligence claim. The jury returned a verdict in the City's favor as to the negligence claim. The store appealed only the inverse condemnation ruling, but the court of appeals affirmed, finding the circuit court properly granted summary judgment as to the inverse condemnation claim. Finding that the Court of Appeals erred in its analysis of the takings claim, the South Carolina Supreme Court simply held that damage to the property during the police department’s hostage rescue effort did not constitute a taking as contemplated by the State Constitution. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision as modified. View "Carolina Convenience Stores v. City of Spartanburg" on Justia Law

The underlying matter to this appeal stemmed from Emmitt Scully's departure from Allegro, Inc., a professional employer organization (PEO), in order to form a competing PEO, Synergetic, Inc., along with former Allegro employees, including Yvonne Yarborough. Allegro brought this suit against petitioners Scully, Yarborough, Synergetic, and George Corbin (a former client of Allegro who also performed some accounting services for the company). The jury returned a verdict in favor of Allegro on all claims and awarded it $1.76 million in actual damages and $250,000 in punitive damages. Petitioners moved for, inter alia, judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on all causes of action, which the trial court denied. The court of appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. In its review of the case, the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed only whether the claims for civil conspiracy, breach of contract, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act should have been included in the remand. The Supreme Court found those causes of action should never have been submitted to the jury and therefore held the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of JNOV as to those claims. View "Allegro, Inc. v. Scully" on Justia Law