Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Whitlee Jones was indicted for the murder of her boyfriend after she fatally stabbed him at the home they shared. In a pretrial motion, Jones asserted immunity from prosecution under the "Protection of Persons and Property Act." The circuit court judge granted the motion, finding Jones established by a preponderance of the evidence that she was entitled to immunity. The State appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in finding section 16-11-440(C) of the Act was inapplicable because the stabbing happened in Jones' house rather in "another place where [s]he ha[d] the right to be," or alternatively, Jones failed to establish she was acting in self-defense when she stabbed her boyfriend. Finding no error in the circuit court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Jones" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jacques Gibson was convicted of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm by a person under age 21. He sought the Supreme Court's review of his case when a trial court denied his application for post-conviction relief (PCR). These charges stemmed from a fight between two groups at a bar. Shortly after petitioner arrived to pick up his brother Adams, a dispute that began inside the bar spilled out into the parking lot and became a physical altercation between numerous members of each group. During the melee, several gunshots were heard, and the victim was killed by a single nine-millimeter shot to the back of his shoulder. There was evidence, including a statement petitioner gave to police, that petitioner retrieved his gun from his car, pointed his gun at another person he suspected was going to hit Adams, and subsequently fired his gun into the air three to four times as he drove away from the scene. When asked whether he believed he may have shot the victim, petitioner responded, "I think that I did, because I was doing some shooting, but I didn't just look at him and shoot him. . . . the gun could have dropped down because I was driving. I promise I don't remember seeing him and aiming." Trial counsel objected to the charge as a comment on the facts, but did not object to the trial judge's failure to use the permissive inference language approved in "Georgia v. Elmore." Petitioner contended in his PCR application that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the charge. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the PCR judge erred in finding there was evidence of malice other than the use of a deadly weapon. View "Gibson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Knight Systems, Inc., owned and operated by Buddy Knight, engaged primarily in the mortuary transport business until 2007. Knight Systems entered into an asset purchase agreement with Palmetto Mortuary Transport, Inc., a business owned by Donald and Ellen Lintal. Pursuant to the agreement, Knight Systems sold various tangible assets, goodwill, and customer accounts (including body removal service contracts with Richland County, Lexington County, and the University of South Carolina) to Palmetto in exchange for a purchase price of $590,000. The agreement also contained an exclusive sales provision that obligated Palmetto to purchase body bags at specified discounted prices from Knight Systems for ten years, and a non-compete clause. At issue in this case was a Richland County-issued request for proposal (RFP) seeking mortuary transport services from a provider for a period of five years. At that time, Palmetto still held the services contract with Richland County as a result of the Agreement. Palmetto timely submitted a response to the RFP. One day before responses to the RFP were due, Buddy accused Palmetto of breaching the agreement by buying infant body bags from other manufacturers in 2008. After this telephone conversation, Buddy consulted with his attorney and submitted a response to the RFP. After the RFP deadline passed, Buddy contacted an official at the Richland County Procurement Office, seeking a determination that Knight Systems be awarded the mortuary transport services contract because it was the only provider of odor-proof body bags required by the RFP. Although Palmetto asserted its response to the RFP contained the lowest price for services and had the highest total of points from the Richland County Procurement Office, Richland County awarded Knight Systems the mortuary transport services contract for a five-year term. Palmetto filed a complaint against Knight, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, and intentional interference with prospective contractual relations. A special referee ruled in favor of Palmetto, and Knight appealed. Knight argued the special referee erred in failing to find: (1) the geographic restriction in the parties' covenant not to compete was unreasonable and void; (2) the Covenant's territorial restriction was unsupported by independent and valuable consideration; (3) the Covenant was void as a matter of public policy; and (4) the Covenant became void after any breach by Palmetto. The Supreme Court found that the Covenant's 150-mile territorial restriction was unreasonable and unenforceable. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Palmetto Mortuary Transport v. Knight Systems, Inc." on Justia Law

Susan Tappeiner was convicted by jury of second degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor. Tappeiner withdrew her direct appeal and filed an application for post-conviction relief (PCR), asserting, inter alia, that her trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to the State's improper remarks during closing arguments. Tappeiner argued her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the numerous instances in the State's closing argument in which the solicitor vouched for Victim's credibility by implying the police and rape crisis counselor believed Victim, and not Tappeiner. Tappeiner further contended trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object when the solicitor appealed to the jurors' emotions by asking them if they would want Tappeiner babysitting their own children and relatives. The PCR court denied relief, finding that although trial counsel was deficient in failing to object, Tappeiner was not prejudiced by the deficient performance. The Supreme Court found no evidence in the record to support the PCR court's conclusion that Tappeiner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failures to object during the State's closing arguments. "To the contrary, the solicitor's repeated vouching for Victim's credibility and her emotional plea to the jurors was incredibly prejudicial to Tappeiner because there was no other evidence beyond Victim's testimony of the events that allegedly occurred that August evening." The Court therefore reversed the PCR court's finding that trial counsel's failure to object during closing arguments was not prejudicial, and granted Tappeiner a new trial due to ineffective assistance of counsel. View "Tappeiner v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Melvin Stukes appealed his conviction for criminal sexual conduct (CSC) and first degree burglary, arguing the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's jury instruction that Victim's testimony need not be corroborated by additional evidence or testimony pursuant to Section 16-3-657 of the South Carolina Code (2003). After review, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that instructing the jury on this statute was an impermissible charge on the facts and therefore unconstitutional. The Court further overruled its precedent condoning this instruction. View "South Carolina v. Stukes" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jarvis Gibbs of kidnapping, entering a bank with the intent to steal, and using a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court sentenced Gibbs to an aggregate eighteen years' imprisonment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Gibbs subsequently filed an application for post-conviction relief ("PCR"). After a hearing, the PCR court dismissed his application with prejudice. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Gibbs' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR court's finding that trial counsel was not ineffective in failing to object to claims of witness intimidation. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gibbs v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2003, William Hueble purchased 220 acres of farming and hunting property in Greenwood County. At the time of closing, the seller informed Hueble that Respondent Eric Vaughn, a corporal for the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (DNR), had a personal deer stand on the property and had hunted there in the past. The seller indicated it would be a "good idea" to allow Vaughn continued access. Hueble declined the suggestion. During 2004, Hueble received a call from the seller informing him that Vaughn had recently been on the property and left four wheeler tracks. The seller again suggested that it would be in Hueble's "best interest" to allow Vaughn to hunt on the property, and provided Vaughn's phone number to Hueble. Hueble once again declined the suggestion and did not contact Vaughn. Hueble then acquired additional land and invested substantial sums of money to improve and maintain his property for hunting dove. More than one month prior to the opening day of dove season, Hueble believed the field was non-baited and in compliance with all regulations and guidelines. On opening day, Hueble's friends and family joined him for the first hunt of the season. Shortly into the hunt, Vaughn and other DNR officers entered Hueble's property unannounced. Vaughn and the DNR officers gathered the hunters together and began threatening them with fines and confiscation of property for baiting the dove field. Vaughn dug into Hueble's property with a knife blade to produce seeds and claimed that one seed constituted baiting a field. During this interaction, Hueble learned Vaughn was the DNR officer the seller had mentioned. Ultimately, Hueble was the only hunter charged by DNR with baiting the field. Hueble ultimately pled no contest to the baiting charge, believing this would resolve Vaughn's animosity. Hueble was accused of baiting at the start of turkey season too. Based on these encounters with Vaughn, Hueble believed that Vaughn had a "vendetta" against him and that Vaughn's supervisor was fully aware of the alleged threats he was making against Hueble. Because of these concerns, Hueble initiated a complaint with Vaughn's supervisor at DNR. However, the supervisor responded with allegations of Hueble's illegal activity based upon Vaughn's version of the events. Hueble filed a complaint against DNR and Vaughn. He obtained a Rule 68, SCRCP, judgment of $5,100 in his favor at the close of litigation. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether Hueble was a prevailing party within the meaning of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1988 (2006), and was therefore entitled to attorneys' fees. The Court held that he was, and reversed the lower courts' holdings to the contrary, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hueble v. SCDNR" on Justia Law

Donna Phillips was convicted of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment in the death of her grandson (Child). The court of appeals affirmed her conviction. On appeal, Phillips argued the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of her motion for directed verdict because it considered the testimony offered by a co-defendant as well as Phillips' own testimony in its analysis. Although the Supreme Court agreed the court of appeals erred in disregarding "South Carolina v. Hepburn," (753 S.E.2d 402 (2013)), it ultimately found the denial of Phillips' directed verdict motion was proper. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Believing the purchase of orthopaedic prosthetic devices and other implants were eligible for a sales tax exemption, CareAlliance Health Services (the Hospital) sought a refund from South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR). Following an audit, DOR denied the request as to orthopaedic prosthetic devices on the grounds they did not require a prescription to be sold and a prescription was not used in the purchase of the devices. The DOR also held other bone, muscle, and tissue implants were not exempt because they did not replace a missing part of the body, as required for the exemption. The Hospital filed for a contested case hearing. After discovery, both parties filed motions for summary judgment. Following a hearing on the motions, the ALC granted summary judgment in favor of the Hospital, finding orthopaedic prosthetic devices qualified for the exemption and other bone, muscle, and tissue implants replaced a missing part of the body. The DOR appealed, arguing the ALC erred in finding a prescription was required for the sale of an orthopaedic device between the Hospital and vendor because of federal regulations. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed: "The ALC's broad interpretation of the federal regulation is fundamentally at odds with the plain reading of the regulation and the strict construction afforded a tax exemption." Further, the Court reversed the ALC's finding that other bone, muscle and tissue implants replace a missing body part because it was not supported by substantial evidence in the record. The Court reversed the ALC and found the Hospital was not entitled to a tax exemption. View "CareAlliance Health Services v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

Appellant Ronald Legg was convicted of lewd act on a minor. He was sentenced to twelve years' imprisonment, ordered to be placed on the sex offender registry, and subjected to GPS monitoring. Appellant argued at trial and before the South Carolina Supreme Court that South Carolina Code Annotated section 17-23-175 (2014) (permitting a videotaped forensic interview of an alleged child abuse victim to be played before a jury) arbitrarily allowed an alleged victim to testify twice therefore violating his Due Process right to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial judge ruled the videotape at issue met the statutory requirement for admission, and that in his view, its admission was constitutional; therefore, the videotape was permitted to be played before the jury. Because the Supreme Court agreed that the statute was not facially unconstitutional on procedural Due Process grounds, it affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Legg" on Justia Law