Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Donald Anderson was walking in the vicinity of a drug raid when police officers located in the periphery of the search ordered him to the ground. Upon searching him, officers found crack cocaine, and Anderson was thereafter indicted for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. He moved to suppress the drugs, arguing the detention and subsequent pat-down were unlawful under the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied his motion to suppress and, following a bench trial, found Anderson guilty as charged. The court of appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, finding the police had both reasonable suspicion to detain him and reasonable belief he was armed and dangerous to justify the pat-down. The Supreme Court reversed. The South Carolina Supreme Court could not agree the evidence supported the conclusion that the officers had a particularized and objective basis to suspect illegal activity that would justify the detention. "We remain ever mindful of the difficult and often dangerous situations officers encounter daily and acknowledge that we give great deference to their experience and expertise. Here, however, the facts amount to no more than baseless conjecture that a person in a high crime area must be engaged in illicit activity. A person's proximity to criminal activity, without more, cannot establish reasonable suspicion to detain that individual. Taken to its logical conclusion, the erosion of an individual's Fourth Amendment right would necessarily accompany his or her misfortune of living in an area plagued by crime." View "South Carolina v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Donna Phillips was convicted of homicide by child abuse and sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment in the death of her 21-month-old grandson (Child). Phillips was alleged to have given the Child Tussionex, a prescription medication used to treat coughs and respiratory symptoms. Child was transported to the hospital after having been found in his bedroom, cold, not breathing and with no pulse. It was determined he was in opiate-induced cardiac arrest. After resuscitation, Child was taken by helicopter to a second hospital. Ultimately Child was pronounced brain dead and removed from life support; the cause of his death was documented as a hydrocodone overdose. Phillips held the prescription for Tussionex. The court of appeals affirmed Phillips conviction. Phillips argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred in affirming the denial of her motion for directed verdict because it considered the testimony offered by a co-defendant as well as Phillips' own testimony in its analysis. Although the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed the court of appeals erred in disregarding "South Carolina v. Hepburn," (753 S.E.2d 402 (2013)), the Court ultimately found the denial of Phillips' directed verdict motion was proper and affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The controversy in this case arose out of the South Carolina Department of Revenue's ("SCDOR") computation of Duke Energy's taxable income. Because Duke Energy did business in both North Carolina and South Carolina, it had apportion its income to determine its income tax liability in South Carolina. Duke Energy had a treasury department responsible for purchasing and selling securities. In 2002, Duke Energy filed amended corporate tax returns with the SCDOR for the income tax years of 1978 to 2001, seeking a total refund of $126,240,645 plus interest. In the amended returns, Duke Energy sought to include the principal recovered from the sale of short-term securities from 1978 to 1999 in the sales factor of the multi-factor apportionment formula. In its original returns, Duke Energy included only the interest or gain from those transactions. The SCDOR denied the refund request. Duke Energy appealed the decision to the SCDOR's Office of Appeals. The Office of Appeals denied Duke Energy's refund request, finding, inter alia, that including recovered principal in the apportionment formula: was contrary to the SCDOR's long-standing administrative policy, would lead to an absurd result, and would misrepresent the amount of business Duke Energy does in South Carolina. Duke Energy filed a contested case in the Administrative Law Court ("ALC"). The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The ALC found this was an issue of first impression in South Carolina, and adopted the reasoning of states that found including the principal recovered from the sale of short-term investments in an apportionment formula would lead to "absurd results" by greatly distorting the calculation, and by defeating the intent and purpose of the applicable statutes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, albeit on different grounds. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision affirming the administrative law judge's finding. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. View "Duke Energy v. SCDOR" on Justia Law

The underlying dispute in this case involved the repair of faulty windows and sliding glass doors in a condominium development, Shipyard Village Horizontal Property Regime (Shipyard Village), in Pawleys Island. Fifty co-owners of units in Buildings C & D of the development (Petitioners) appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the trial court's finding that the business judgment rule did not apply to the conduct of the Board of Directors of the Shipyard Village Council of Co-Owners, Inc., and the trial court's decision granting Petitioners partial summary judgment on the issue of breach of the Board's duty to investigate. Finding no reversible erro, the Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' decision. View "Fisher v. Shipyard Village" on Justia Law

Respondent Ashley Eugene Moore was convicted of trafficking in cocaine base and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. On appeal, Moore argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the admission of a large quantity of crack cocaine and a firearm, both of which were seized during a traffic stop. A majority of the court of appeals' panel reversed, finding that officers did not have reasonable suspicion to continue to detain Moore once the initial purpose of the traffic stop was concluded. State v. Moore, 404 S.C. 634, 746 S.E.2d 352 (Ct. App. 2013). We granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari. In light of the standard of review, we reverse the court of appeals and reinstate Moore's convictions and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Moore" on Justia Law

Kevin Tyrone Bennett was convicted of petit larceny, malicious injury to property, and second degree burglary. He was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for each offense, to be served concurrently. The court of appeals reversed his convictions, finding the trial court erred in denying Bennett's motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of guilt. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, and took the opportunity of its opinion here to more clearly articulate the standard governing whether the State has presented sufficient evidence to overcome a motion for directed verdict. View "South Carolina v. Bennett" on Justia Law

Respondents were former South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) agents who retired and were rehired by then SLED Chief Robert Stewart for a period of four years pursuant to a rehire program formulated by Chief Stewart. At the conclusion of Respondents' service under the rehire program, they filed suit against SLED and the State under various theories, all premised on the allegation that SLED deducted from their salaries the amount of the employer's contribution to the retirement system. The State was granted dismissal of the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP. On appeal, taking the allegations of the Complaint as true, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. On remand and following discovery, the trial court granted SLED summary judgment, which the court of appeals reversed. Having carefully reviewed the record, the Supreme Court found the trial court properly granted summary judgment to SLED, because the record made clear that Respondents were rehired at reduced salaries and the employer contributions to the retirement system were not deducted from those salaries, but were paid by SLED. As a result, the Court reversed the court of appeals and directed that judgment be entered for SLED. View "Grimsley v. SLED" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Clarence Kendall Cook for murder, unlawful possession of a pistol, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. After a jury trial, Cook was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Cook filed a post-conviction relief ("PCR") application, which was dismissed after a hearing. Following the dismissal of his PCR application, Cook petitioned for certiorari review, arguing that the trial court erred in charging the jury with the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence that he was acting in the sudden heat of passion. After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed and reversed Cook's voluntary manslaughter conviction. View "Cook v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the packaging and labeling of sodium bromate, a chemical which contributed to a fire that occurred in a plant owned by Engelhard Corporation in June 2004. At the time of the fire, Scott Lawing worked at Engelhard's Seneca plant as a maintenance mechanic. Engelhard produced a precious metal catalyst used in the automobile industry, and refined metals from recycled materials. In this products liability action, Trinity Manufacturing, Inc. and Matrix Outsourcing, LLC argued that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment to them on a strict liability cause of action. In their cross-appeal, Scott and Tammy Lawing asked the Supreme Court to reverse the court of appeals' decision affirming the trial court's decision to charge the jury on the "sophisticated user" defense. After review, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the court of appeals. The Court found the appellate court erred in setting forth its broad definition of "user," and affirmed as modified the court of appeals' decision on this issue. Furthermore, the Court concluded the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court's decision to charge the sophisticated user defense to the jury. The appellate court did not err, however, in reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to Trinity and Matrix on the Lawings' strict liability claim. The Supreme Court found that the evidence in this case did not support the sophisticated user defense, so the trial court erred in charging the defense to the jury. The case was remanded for a new trial on the Lawings' negligence and implied warranty of merchantability claims. View "Lawing v. Univar" on Justia Law

Diane and Otis Bass had three children: Brittany, Hanna, and Alex. All three children were special needs, but Hanna and Alex were also autistic. Otis worked outside the home, and Diane cared for the children. Due to their forms of autism and their other cognitive issues, both Hanna and Alex were prescribed Clonidine to help them sleep at night, in addition to other medications. A compounding pharmacy filled the Clonidine prescription. In April 2008, the prescription was inadvertently mixed at one thousand times the recommended concentration. Diane administered the wrongly compounded Clonidine to Hanna and later to Alex. Both children had serious reactions that required hospitalization. DSS received a report that two special needs children were in the hospital due to "possible poisoning by parents." The agency assigned an overall danger rating of "medium" to the case. A caseworker assigned to the case recommended the children be removed from the Bass home and placed with Diane's sister, Linda. Linda would later learn that the compounding pharmacy improperly filled the Clonidine prescription. Linda notified DSS, and the agency subsequently concluded that the medication was the cause of the children's hospitalization. This revelation led to the eventual return of the children to Diane and Otis. However, DSS continued to make announced and unannounced visits at the Bass home through the end of 2008 and refused to remove its finding that Diane and Otis "harmed their children" from the agency's file on Petitioners. Petitioners filed a lawsuit against DSS, the compounding pharmacy, and the pharmacist, alleging negligence and gross negligence, and seeking actual and punitive damages. After settling with the pharmacy and the pharmacist, Petitioners served DSS with an amended complaint alleging causes of action for gross negligence, defamation, and outrage, and sought actual damages. DSS moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of Petitioners' case, and again at the conclusion of all of the evidence. The trial judge denied both motions. At the conclusion of the evidence, Petitioners withdrew their defamation cause of action, and moved for a directed verdict regarding DSS's defenses of discretionary immunity and negligence of a third party. The trial judge granted Petitioners' motions for directed verdict as to those defenses. Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict for Petitioners, and awarded them $4 million in damages. DSS subsequently filed motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), for new trial absolute, and to reduce the verdict. The trial court issued an order denying DSS's post-trial motions. However, the trial court granted DSS's motion to reduce the verdict. The court of appeals reversed the jury's verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, finding the trial court did not err in its decision. View "Bass v. SCDSS" on Justia Law