Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This negligence action arose out of a collision involving a train and an automobile at a railroad crossing. Petitioner Willie Stephens, as Guardian ad Litem for his minor granddaughter who suffered a traumatic brain injury while a passenger in her mother's vehicle, filed suit against CSX Transportation, Inc. and the South Carolina Department of Transportation ("SCDOT"). A jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, and Petitioner appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the trial judge did not err in admitting certain evidence, charging the jury, and in denying Petitioner's motions for a directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"). The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the rulings of the Court of Appeals regarding the denial of Petitioner's JNOV motion and the jury charge issues that it addressed. However, the Court found the Court of Appeals erred in restricting its analysis only to those jury charge issues related to the breach of CSX's and SCDOT's duty of reasonable care. Because portions of the judge's charge were erroneous and prejudiced Petitioner, the case was reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Stephens v. CSX Transportation" on Justia Law

Julie Freeman, individually and on behalf of over five-thousand similarly situated car buyers, filed a lawsuit against J.L.H. Investments, LP, a/k/a Hendrick Honda of Easley ("Hendrick"), seeking damages under the South Carolina Dealers Act on the ground that Hendrick "unfairly" and "arbitrarily" charged all of its customers "closing fees" that were not calculated to reimburse Hendrick for actual closing costs. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Freeman in the amount of $1,445,786.00 actual damages. In post-trial rulings, the trial judge: (1) denied Hendrick's motions to overturn or reduce the jury's verdict; (2) granted Freeman's motions to double the actual damages award and to award attorneys' fees and costs; and (3) denied Freeman's motion for prejudgment interest. The South Carolina Supreme Court certified this case from the Court of Appeals, and finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Freeman v. J.L.H. Investments" on Justia Law

This action arose out of the foreclosure of a lien for delinquent homeowner association fees. Todd Alexander did not appeal the foreclosure; however, he moved to vacate the resulting sale. Alexander's motion to vacate the sale was denied and Alexander appealed. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal, finding Alexander failed to comply with South Carolina Code section 18-9-170 to stay the sale and, therefore, the master-in-equity's issuance of the deed rendered the appeal moot. “Our jurisprudence establishes that, despite the master-in-equity's issuance of a deed, an appellate court may reach the merits of the appeal.” The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the issuance of a deed did not moot the appeal of a foreclosure sale and the appellate court here could reach the merits. View "Wachesaw Plantation v. Alexander" on Justia Law

In this familial dispute over property, it was uncontradicted that the decedent Kenneth Walker deeded to his sister, Catherine Brooks, approximately forty acres of property in two separate transfers before his death. The question was whether the property was deeded to Brooks freely, or subject to an equitable mortgage which would require her to return it to Decedent's estate. After review, the Supreme Court held that no equitable mortgage existed; accordingly, the Court remanded. View "Walker v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Lauren Proctor and Trans-Union National Title Insurance Company brought this action against Whitlark & Whitlark, Inc., d/b/a Rockaways Athletic Club ("Rockaways") and Pizza Man, Forrest Whitlark, Paul Whitlark, Charlie E. Bishop, and Brett Blanks (collectively "Defendants") seeking to recover money Proctor lost while gambling on video poker machines located at Rockaways and Pizza Man over the course of several years, including a time period following the South Carolina Legislature's ban of video poker in 2000. The circuit court granted Proctor's motion for partial summary judgment on her claim under the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act ("UTPA") as to the liability of Defendants. In so ruling, the court found the Legislature had abrogated the doctrine of in pari delicto with regard to losses sustained by illegal gambling for public policy reasons. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that the Legislature enacted specific gambling loss statutes as the exclusive remedy for a gambler seeking recovery of losses sustained by illegal gambling. By this opinion, the Court overruled its decisions that have implicitly authorized recovery beyond these statutes. As a result, the Court held that one engaged in illegal gambling could not recover under UTPA. However, based on the distinct facts of this case, the Court found that Proctor could pursue the portion of her UTPA claim for the losses she alleged that she sustained between 1999 and July 1, 2000, the day on which the ban on video poker became effective. View "Proctor v. Whitlark & Whitlark" on Justia Law

This case went before the South Carolina Supreme Court on cross-appeals from Whitney Moore (Wife) and Arthur Moore, III, (Husband) of an order of the family court valuing and dividing the parties' closely held business, Candelabra. After review, the Court affirmed the family court's inclusion of Wife's enterprise goodwill in the business as marital property. The valuation and equitable division award was modified, however, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Moore v. Moore" on Justia Law

This products liability action arose following the death of Benjamin Riley, who was killed in a motor vehicle accident involving a negligently designed door-latch system in his 1998 Ford F-150 pickup truck. Petitioner Laura Riley, as the Personal Representative of the Estate, filed suit against Respondent Ford Motor Company and the at-fault driver, Andrew Marshall Carter, II. Carter settled with the Estate for $25,000, with $20,000 allocated to the survival claim and $5,000 allocated to the wrongful death claim. Petitioner and Ford proceeded to trial on the wrongful death claim. The jury returned a verdict for Petitioner in the amount of $300,000. The trial court granted a nisi additur of $600,000, bringing the judgment to $900,000. Ford appealed. The court of appeals upheld the finding of liability but reversed the trial court as to nisi additur, as well as the allocation and setoff of settlement proceeds. On appeal, Petitioner argued the court of appeals departed from well-established law concerning nisi additur and that the court of appeals erred in modifying the negotiated, court-approved settlement allocation and in finding Ford was entitled to offset the amount of $20,000. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and reinstated the judgment of the trial court. View "Riley v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Deerfield Plantation Phase II B Property Homeowners Association appealed an Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision affirming Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) decision to grant a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Storm Water Discharges from Large and Small Construction Activity and Coastal Zone Consistency Certification to Respondent Deertrack Golf, Inc. Deertrack Golf owns the real property that is the subject of this dispute, a non-operational golf course known as the Old South Golf Course. Bill Clark Homes entered into a contract with Deertrack Golf to purchase the Old South Course. Bill Clark Homes designed a residential subdivision to be constructed within the acreage known as Phase I of the Old South Course, and obtained approval from Horry County for a subdivision consisting of 278 lots and comprising approximately 85 acres. The Old South Course is adjacent to an existing residential development known as Deerfield Plantation Phase II B, and Appellant represents its residents, who oppose the residential redevelopment of the Old South Course. The redevelopment plan necessitated the construction of a new stormwater management system utilizing an existing drainage network of stormwater ponds on the Old South Course. The redevelopment required a jurisdictional determination from the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) regarding whether any portion of proposed redevelopment acreage contained "waters of the United States" subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. In 2006, the Corps determined that the tract did not contain any federal waters subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. However, in 2010, upon Appellant's application, the Corps declared federal jurisdiction over .37 acres of the existing waters on the proposed 85-acre redevelopment tract. Appellant appealed the decision to the federal district court, arguing the Corps erred in failing to declare federal jurisdiction over the remaining waters found within the proposed redevelopment tract, and the district court granted summary judgment to the Corps. Appellant appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed. During the pendency of the federal appeals, the South Carolina Court of Appeals variously stayed and held in abeyance the state appeal. However, in 2012, the court of appeals remanded the case "to the ALC to further remand the matter to DHEC for additional administrative action." The ALC remanded the case to DHEC. After DHEC took no additional administrative action, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. After Respondents filed petitions for rehearing claiming the court of appeals misapprehended DHEC's reasons for taking no action on the Permit, the court of appeals reinstated the appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court then certified the case for review, and affirmed (as modified) the ALC's decision upholding DHEC's issuance of the permit. Further, in light of the subsequent declaration of federal jurisdiction as to part of the acreage subject to the permit, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to DHEC for further administrative action. View "Deerfield Plantation v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Stokes-Craven Holding Corporation d/b/a Stokes-Craven Ford ("Stokes-Craven") appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Scott Robinson and his law firm, Johnson, McKenzie & Robinson, L.L.C., (collectively "Respondents") based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Stokes-Craven argued on appeal the court erred in applying the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in "Epstein v. Brown," (610 S.E.2d 816 (2005)), and holding that Stokes-Craven knew or should have known that it had a legal malpractice claim against its trial counsel and his law firm on the date of the adverse jury verdict rather than after the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and issued the remittitur in "Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.," (691 S.E.2d 135 (2010)). After review of this matter, the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled "Epstein," reversed the circuit court's order, and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

For more than a decade, the City of Columbia has been allocating substantial amounts of revenue generated from user fees for water and sewer services to its General Fund and for economic development purposes. Appellants filed this action contending the City's practices violated sections 6-1-330 and 6-21-440 of the South Carolina Code. The trial court granted the City summary judgment. Because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the City's expenditures of water and sewer revenues were lawful, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the funds transferred into the City's General Fund were properly considered "surplus revenues" under section 6-21-440 and could therefore be spent for unrelated purposes and whether the City's direct economic-development expenditures bore a sufficient nexus to its provision of water and sewer services such that they would be considered "related" expenditures under the terms of section 6-1-330(B) of the South Carolina Code. View "Azar v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law