Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Antonio Scott was convicted of murder. He argued on appeal of that conviction that the appellate court erred in finding that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate court thus upheld the trial court's failure to charge involuntary manslaughter. After review and finding no error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Scott" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shawn Reaves was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after the shooting death of Keshawn Applewhite. He argued on appeal that deficiencies in the police investigation (including the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence and the failure to ascertain the identity of a second shooter) deprived him of a fair trial, and delays occasioned by the State's faulty investigation deprived him of the right to a speedy trial. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Reaves" on Justia Law

Michael Cunningham was terminated from his position as the county administrator for Anderson County. Cunningham brought this action alleging breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and violation of the Payment of Wages Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all causes of action. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on the breach of contract and Payment of Wages claims, but reversed and remanded the wrongful discharge claim. The County argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim because Cunningham has never argued he was a noncontractual, at-will employee. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion reversing and remanding that claim. View "Cunningham v. Anderson County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Frank Pedery argued the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's termination of Respondent Bonnie McKinney's alimony obligation to him and the family court's failure to award Pedery attorney's fees. In June 2009, McKinney sought a reduction or termination of her alimony obligation based on Pedery's continued cohabitation with his paramour, Cynthia Hamby, and a substantial change of circumstances. According to McKinney, a decrease in her income and deterioration of her health constituted the substantial change in circumstances. On August 26, 2011, the family court issued an order terminating McKinney's alimony obligation based on its finding that Pedery "continuously resided with [Hamby] for not only in excess of ninety days but on a continuous basis for an extended period of time . . . ." The court of appeals affirmed the family court's order. Pedery argues that McKinney failed to meet her burden of proof with regard to her argument that Pedery continuously cohabitated with Hamby for purposes of S.C. Code Ann. 20-3-130(B). After review, the Supreme Court agreed, "[w]e do not deny that the facts indicate that Pedery and Hamby's living situation is a permanent arrangement of a romantic nature. Rather, we focus on the specific requirement under the plain language of section 20-3-130(B). If the statute merely required the supported spouse to "reside with" his paramour, then termination of McKinney's alimony obligation would be proper. However, the statute mandates cohabitation for ninety consecutive days. The Court found that the testimony in the record concerning McKinney's changed income and health issues could support, at least, a reduction in McKinney's alimony obligation. Therefore the case was remanded the case for the family court to determine whether McKinney's alimony obligation should be reduced or terminated on the basis of a change in circumstances in her health and income. View "McKinney v. Pedery" on Justia Law

In 2008, respondent Brittany Johnson was arrested in Darlington County by United States Marshals for the shooting death of Monica Burroughs. At trial, the State sought to introduce a videotaped recording of the police's interrogation of respondent after she was arrested, and the court held a "Jackson v. Denno" hearing to assess the voluntariness of the statement. During cross-examination, the State sought to discredit Respondent's testimony by eliciting testimony that she was experienced with the criminal justice system and had been represented by counsel in the past in the juvenile justice system. In addition, respondent acknowledged that despite understanding her rights, she wished to waive them at that time, and further confirmed the recorded statement displayed her telling officers that she wished to waive her rights. Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntarily given. The State subsequently introduced respondent's videotaped statement at trial over defense counsel's objection. The jury ultimately found respondent guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years' imprisonment. Without discussion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the conviction, finding the trial court erred in admitting respondent's statement to police. On appeal, the State argued the court of appeals: (1) applied an incorrect appellate standard of review in assessing the trial judge's factual findings; (2) erred in reversing the trial court's ruling where respondent was not being interrogated when she inquired about counsel and did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel; and (3) failed to consider if respondent was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Because the effect of the trial court's credibility finding was that respondent did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent's statement was voluntary. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased approximately 4500 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, intending to develop the property. Columbia Venture knew at the time of the purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as lying within a regulatory floodway. Pursuant to federal law, development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway. When Columbia Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking. By consent, the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County. The Special Referee concluded that Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light of the inherent risk in floodplain development. Moreover, the Special Referee concluded that, on balance, the "Penn Central" factors preponderated against a taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in the property's value. Like the able Special Referee, the Supreme Court found Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data did not constitute a taking of any sort, and affirmed the Special Referee's decision. View "Columbia Venture v. Richland County" on Justia Law

In 2003, Kristy Orlowski, who was twenty-two years old and thirty-six weeks pregnant, was found unresponsive in her home by a family member. Less than twenty-four hours earlier, Orlowski had been seen by her prenatal care physician, Dr. Norman Taylor, to whom she complained of headaches, dizziness, nausea, and swelling of her hands and feet, all of which were symptoms of pre-eclampsia. Despite Orlowski's reported symptoms, Dr. Taylor failed to diagnose Orlowski's pre-eclampsia and sent her home from her doctor's visit without any special instructions or warnings. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in which the court of appeals affirmed as modified the dismissal of this action, which was the second medical malpractice case filed by a conservator on behalf of Orlowski. The first medical malpractice action was filed in August 2006 against a different physician. When the trial of that action resulted in a defense verdict, Petitioner Gladys Sims filed this action on Orlowski's behalf seeking the same damages against different defendants, Respondents, Dr. Edward Creagh and Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center ("Piedmont"). Respondents moved for summary judgment, asserting Petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner contended her suit was timely filed because the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations in section 15-3-545 of the South Carolina Code was subject to the tolling provision for insanity in section 15-3-40. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the court of appeals properly construed section 15-3-545 in rejecting Petitioner's reliance on section 15-3-40 in arguing for an eight-year statute of limitations, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Sims v. Amisub of SC" on Justia Law

Respondent and his wife (collectively, the Larmands) owned a branch of "Pop-A-Lock," a national locksmith franchise company. Ryan Lochbaum worked at the Larmands' branch of Pop-A-Lock for several years until he was fired. The Larmands became suspicious that he and one of their current employees, Mike Taylor, were conspiring to defraud Pop-A-Lock by masquerading as a locksmith; after the customer paid Lochbaum for "Pop-A-Lock's" services, Taylor and Lochbaum would split the money between themselves, and Taylor would inform the Larmands that the customer had cancelled the call. To confirm their suspicions, the Larmands "mystery shopped" Taylor. Respondent's brother-in-law, Leo Lemire, posed as the customer. Neither Lochbaum nor Taylor answered the mystery shopper's call. Lochbaum and three of his neighbors (Mark Whittington, Devin Fivecoat, and Ron Lee) were socializing outside Lochbaum's house at the time of the call. Respondent approached the group, and subsequently got into an argument with Lochbaum. One minute into the exchange, Respondent broke eye contact with Lochbaum and saw Lemire approaching quickly and pointing a handgun at Lochbaum. Lochbaum seized the gun and began to struggle with Lemire. Respondent placed Lochbaum in a chokehold and attempted to pull him away from Lemire. A grand jury would indict Respondent and Lemire for lynching, conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. At trial, Respondent moved for failed to provide any testimony that the attack on Lochbaum was premeditated, or that Respondent and Lemire jointly planned the attack. Rather, Respondent asserted he was merely speaking with Lochbaum when Lemire appeared, and he only reacted to Lochbaum's "affirmative action" of "jump[ing] on [] Lemire" to grab the gun. The trial court denied Respondent's motion, and the jury later convicted Respondent and Lemire of second-degree lynching, criminal conspiracy, and pointing and presenting a firearm. The court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision on the directed verdict. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. "Although Respondent presented plausible explanations for each of these facts," and "[g]iven the deferential standard of review, we find the State presented sufficient circumstantial evidence of premeditation and a common plan or scheme such that the trial judge properly denied Respondent's motion for a directed verdict." Accordingly, the court of appeals erred in reversing Respondent's convictions, and the Supreme Court reversed that court's decision. View "South Carolina v. Larmand" on Justia Law

In October 2011, respondent Cody Gordon was stopped at a license and registration checkpoint by a South Carolina Highway Patrol Officer. The officer administered several field sobriety tests. The test at issue in this case was the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus (HGN) test. The dashboard camera on the officer's patrol car recorded the entire incident, including all field sobriety tests, with continuous recording. The stop occurred at night, so the lighting was not perfect, but the officer had Gordon stand in the light of his patrol car's headlights and further illuminated Gordon by shining a flashlight directly on his face. The State appealed the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the circuit court's interpretation of section 56-5-2953 of the South Carolina Code. The appellate court found that the statute required officers to record the head of the motorist when administering the HGN field sobriety test and that respondent's head was not sufficiently visible. The State contended that a plain reading of the statute made no mention of the motorist's "head." Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' conclusion that the statute required that the motorist's head be recorded in the video; however, the Court vacated the mandate to remand to the magistrate court for further consideration. The Court reinstated respondent's conviction as it found that the officer complied with the statute in recording Gordon's HGN test. View "South Carolina v. Gordon" on Justia Law

Latoya Brown purchased a Mazda 6 from Dick Smith Nissan, Inc. through the dealer's salesman, Robert Hiller. The purchase was contingent on acquiring third-party financing. Due to continuing and unresolved issues with financing, Brown returned the vehicle to Dick Smith. The car was later repossessed and sold by Sovereign Bank with a deficiency against Brown. Brown filed a complaint against Dick Smith and Old Republic Surety Company, the surety on Dick Smith's licensing bond, alleging violations of the South Carolina Dealers Act. The trial judge, in a bench trial, found in favor of Brown and awarded damages plus interest as well as attorney's fees and costs. Dick Smith and Old Republic appealed and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that any misconceptions that Brown had about her financing were caused by Sovereign Bank, not Dick Smith. Despite evidence in the record to support the trial judge's findings of fact, the Court of Appeals ignored those findings and substituted its own. By doing so, the Court of Appeals exceeded its standard of review. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the trial judge's decision. View "Brown v. Dick Smith Nissan" on Justia Law