Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Deerfield Plantation Phase II B Property Homeowners Association appealed an Administrative Law Court's (ALC) decision affirming Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) decision to grant a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) General Permit for Storm Water Discharges from Large and Small Construction Activity and Coastal Zone Consistency Certification to Respondent Deertrack Golf, Inc. Deertrack Golf owns the real property that is the subject of this dispute, a non-operational golf course known as the Old South Golf Course. Bill Clark Homes entered into a contract with Deertrack Golf to purchase the Old South Course. Bill Clark Homes designed a residential subdivision to be constructed within the acreage known as Phase I of the Old South Course, and obtained approval from Horry County for a subdivision consisting of 278 lots and comprising approximately 85 acres. The Old South Course is adjacent to an existing residential development known as Deerfield Plantation Phase II B, and Appellant represents its residents, who oppose the residential redevelopment of the Old South Course. The redevelopment plan necessitated the construction of a new stormwater management system utilizing an existing drainage network of stormwater ponds on the Old South Course. The redevelopment required a jurisdictional determination from the Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) regarding whether any portion of proposed redevelopment acreage contained "waters of the United States" subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. In 2006, the Corps determined that the tract did not contain any federal waters subject to the Corps' jurisdiction. However, in 2010, upon Appellant's application, the Corps declared federal jurisdiction over .37 acres of the existing waters on the proposed 85-acre redevelopment tract. Appellant appealed the decision to the federal district court, arguing the Corps erred in failing to declare federal jurisdiction over the remaining waters found within the proposed redevelopment tract, and the district court granted summary judgment to the Corps. Appellant appealed the district court's decision to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed. During the pendency of the federal appeals, the South Carolina Court of Appeals variously stayed and held in abeyance the state appeal. However, in 2012, the court of appeals remanded the case "to the ALC to further remand the matter to DHEC for additional administrative action." The ALC remanded the case to DHEC. After DHEC took no additional administrative action, the court of appeals dismissed the appeal. After Respondents filed petitions for rehearing claiming the court of appeals misapprehended DHEC's reasons for taking no action on the Permit, the court of appeals reinstated the appeal. The South Carolina Supreme Court then certified the case for review, and affirmed (as modified) the ALC's decision upholding DHEC's issuance of the permit. Further, in light of the subsequent declaration of federal jurisdiction as to part of the acreage subject to the permit, the South Carolina Supreme Court remanded the case to DHEC for further administrative action. View "Deerfield Plantation v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Stokes-Craven Holding Corporation d/b/a Stokes-Craven Ford ("Stokes-Craven") appealed a circuit court order granting summary judgment in favor of Scott Robinson and his law firm, Johnson, McKenzie & Robinson, L.L.C., (collectively "Respondents") based on the expiration of the three-year statute of limitations. Stokes-Craven argued on appeal the court erred in applying the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in "Epstein v. Brown," (610 S.E.2d 816 (2005)), and holding that Stokes-Craven knew or should have known that it had a legal malpractice claim against its trial counsel and his law firm on the date of the adverse jury verdict rather than after the Supreme Court affirmed the verdict and issued the remittitur in "Austin v. Stokes-Craven Holding Corp.," (691 S.E.2d 135 (2010)). After review of this matter, the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled "Epstein," reversed the circuit court's order, and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Stokes-Craven Holding Corp. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

For more than a decade, the City of Columbia has been allocating substantial amounts of revenue generated from user fees for water and sewer services to its General Fund and for economic development purposes. Appellants filed this action contending the City's practices violated sections 6-1-330 and 6-21-440 of the South Carolina Code. The trial court granted the City summary judgment. Because there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the City's expenditures of water and sewer revenues were lawful, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether the funds transferred into the City's General Fund were properly considered "surplus revenues" under section 6-21-440 and could therefore be spent for unrelated purposes and whether the City's direct economic-development expenditures bore a sufficient nexus to its provision of water and sewer services such that they would be considered "related" expenditures under the terms of section 6-1-330(B) of the South Carolina Code. View "Azar v. City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Petitioner Antonio Scott was convicted of murder. He argued on appeal of that conviction that the appellate court erred in finding that the evidence did not support a jury instruction on involuntary manslaughter. The appellate court thus upheld the trial court's failure to charge involuntary manslaughter. After review and finding no error in the trial or appellate courts' judgments, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Scott" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shawn Reaves was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after the shooting death of Keshawn Applewhite. He argued on appeal that deficiencies in the police investigation (including the loss of potentially exculpatory evidence and the failure to ascertain the identity of a second shooter) deprived him of a fair trial, and delays occasioned by the State's faulty investigation deprived him of the right to a speedy trial. After review, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Reaves" on Justia Law

Michael Cunningham was terminated from his position as the county administrator for Anderson County. Cunningham brought this action alleging breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and violation of the Payment of Wages Act. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the County on all causes of action. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court on the breach of contract and Payment of Wages claims, but reversed and remanded the wrongful discharge claim. The County argued on appeal that the court of appeals erred by reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim because Cunningham has never argued he was a noncontractual, at-will employee. After review, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the portion of the court of appeals' opinion reversing and remanding that claim. View "Cunningham v. Anderson County" on Justia Law

Petitioner Frank Pedery argued the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's termination of Respondent Bonnie McKinney's alimony obligation to him and the family court's failure to award Pedery attorney's fees. In June 2009, McKinney sought a reduction or termination of her alimony obligation based on Pedery's continued cohabitation with his paramour, Cynthia Hamby, and a substantial change of circumstances. According to McKinney, a decrease in her income and deterioration of her health constituted the substantial change in circumstances. On August 26, 2011, the family court issued an order terminating McKinney's alimony obligation based on its finding that Pedery "continuously resided with [Hamby] for not only in excess of ninety days but on a continuous basis for an extended period of time . . . ." The court of appeals affirmed the family court's order. Pedery argues that McKinney failed to meet her burden of proof with regard to her argument that Pedery continuously cohabitated with Hamby for purposes of S.C. Code Ann. 20-3-130(B). After review, the Supreme Court agreed, "[w]e do not deny that the facts indicate that Pedery and Hamby's living situation is a permanent arrangement of a romantic nature. Rather, we focus on the specific requirement under the plain language of section 20-3-130(B). If the statute merely required the supported spouse to "reside with" his paramour, then termination of McKinney's alimony obligation would be proper. However, the statute mandates cohabitation for ninety consecutive days. The Court found that the testimony in the record concerning McKinney's changed income and health issues could support, at least, a reduction in McKinney's alimony obligation. Therefore the case was remanded the case for the family court to determine whether McKinney's alimony obligation should be reduced or terminated on the basis of a change in circumstances in her health and income. View "McKinney v. Pedery" on Justia Law

In 2008, respondent Brittany Johnson was arrested in Darlington County by United States Marshals for the shooting death of Monica Burroughs. At trial, the State sought to introduce a videotaped recording of the police's interrogation of respondent after she was arrested, and the court held a "Jackson v. Denno" hearing to assess the voluntariness of the statement. During cross-examination, the State sought to discredit Respondent's testimony by eliciting testimony that she was experienced with the criminal justice system and had been represented by counsel in the past in the juvenile justice system. In addition, respondent acknowledged that despite understanding her rights, she wished to waive them at that time, and further confirmed the recorded statement displayed her telling officers that she wished to waive her rights. Based on this testimony, the trial court determined that the confession was voluntarily given. The State subsequently introduced respondent's videotaped statement at trial over defense counsel's objection. The jury ultimately found respondent guilty of murder, and the trial court sentenced her to thirty years' imprisonment. Without discussion, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the conviction, finding the trial court erred in admitting respondent's statement to police. On appeal, the State argued the court of appeals: (1) applied an incorrect appellate standard of review in assessing the trial judge's factual findings; (2) erred in reversing the trial court's ruling where respondent was not being interrogated when she inquired about counsel and did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel; and (3) failed to consider if respondent was prejudiced by the admission of the evidence. Because the effect of the trial court's credibility finding was that respondent did not unequivocally invoke her right to counsel, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court's finding that respondent's statement was voluntary. View "South Carolina v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Appellant Columbia Venture, LLC, purchased approximately 4500 acres of land along the eastern bank of the Congaree River in Richland County, intending to develop the property. Columbia Venture knew at the time of the purchase that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was in the process of revising the area flood maps and designating most of the property as lying within a regulatory floodway. Pursuant to federal law, development is generally not permitted in a regulatory floodway. When Columbia Venture's efforts to remove the floodway designation were unsuccessful, Columbia Venture sued Richland County, alleging an unconstitutional taking. By consent, the case was referred to a special referee, who after numerous hearings and a multi-week trial dismissed the case and entered judgment for Richland County. The Special Referee concluded that Columbia Venture's investment-backed expectations were not reasonable in light of the inherent risk in floodplain development. Moreover, the Special Referee concluded that, on balance, the "Penn Central" factors preponderated against a taking and therefore that the County could not be responsible for any diminution in the property's value. Like the able Special Referee, the Supreme Court found Richland County's adoption of floodway development restrictions and the County's required utilization of FEMA flood data did not constitute a taking of any sort, and affirmed the Special Referee's decision. View "Columbia Venture v. Richland County" on Justia Law

In 2003, Kristy Orlowski, who was twenty-two years old and thirty-six weeks pregnant, was found unresponsive in her home by a family member. Less than twenty-four hours earlier, Orlowski had been seen by her prenatal care physician, Dr. Norman Taylor, to whom she complained of headaches, dizziness, nausea, and swelling of her hands and feet, all of which were symptoms of pre-eclampsia. Despite Orlowski's reported symptoms, Dr. Taylor failed to diagnose Orlowski's pre-eclampsia and sent her home from her doctor's visit without any special instructions or warnings. The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in which the court of appeals affirmed as modified the dismissal of this action, which was the second medical malpractice case filed by a conservator on behalf of Orlowski. The first medical malpractice action was filed in August 2006 against a different physician. When the trial of that action resulted in a defense verdict, Petitioner Gladys Sims filed this action on Orlowski's behalf seeking the same damages against different defendants, Respondents, Dr. Edward Creagh and Amisub of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center ("Piedmont"). Respondents moved for summary judgment, asserting Petitioner's claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Petitioner contended her suit was timely filed because the three-year medical malpractice statute of limitations in section 15-3-545 of the South Carolina Code was subject to the tolling provision for insanity in section 15-3-40. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the court of appeals properly construed section 15-3-545 in rejecting Petitioner's reliance on section 15-3-40 in arguing for an eight-year statute of limitations, and accordingly, affirmed. View "Sims v. Amisub of SC" on Justia Law