Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Marie Borchers purchased the home at the heart of this controversy from Cammie Strawn. Cammie acquired the home, by deed, from her then-husband, Richard Strawn. Richard Strawn had previously given a mortgage to Regions Bank to secure a line of credit. At the time that the house was sold to Marie Borchers, there was an outstanding balance. On the day of closing, Marie Borchers' attorney had an employee deliver a payoff check and a mortgage satisfaction transmittal letter to Regions Bank. The check had the words "Payoff of first mortgage" typed on it. Regions Bank applied the check to the line of credit debt bringing its balance to zero; however, Regions Bank did not satisfy the mortgage. Instead, Regions Bank provided Richard Strawn with new checks on the line of credit even though the public record reflected that Richard Strawn had not owned the property for more than two years. Richard Strawn accrued new debt in excess of $72,000. Regions Bank attempted to collect Strawn's debt by foreclosing on the Borchers' home. The Borchers counterclaimed seeking to recover damages from Regions Bank pursuant to section 29-3-320 of the South Carolina Code based on the bank's failure to enter satisfaction of the mortgage within the three-month time period required by section 29-3-310. The trial court granted the Borchers' motion. Citing admissions from Regions Bank employees, the trial court concluded that based on "these admissions by the Bank it is clear that the closing day payoff should have been processed as a payoff instead of a paydown and that the bank should have had the mortgage satisfied of record." Additionally, the court specifically cited section 29-3-320 and its imposition of liability for mortgage lenders that do not satisfy mortgages within three months after payoff. Regions Bank appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Regions Bank v. Strawn" on Justia Law

Respondent AVX Corporation manufactured electronic parts at a plant in North Myrtle Beach. In 1980, respondent began using a chemical called trichloroethylene (TCE) as a degreaser to clean machine tools and parts. At some point, TCE escaped the plant and migrated beyond the boundaries of respondent's property, contaminating surrounding properties and groundwater. In December 1996, respondent entered into a consent order with the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), in which respondent admitted that it had violated certain state environmental statutes and regulations. DHEC required respondent to implement a plan to clean up the TCE. In 2007, environmental testing performed in a ten block section north of respondent's plant showed levels of TCE greater than considered safe. On November 27, 2007, a group of residents who own real property near respondent's plant filed suit alleging causes of action for trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability. The residents brought the suit both individually and as class representatives pursuant to Rule 23, SCRCP. The circuit court granted respondent's Rule 12(b)(6) motion and dismissed appellants' claims with prejudice. In dismissing appellants' trespass, negligence, and strict liability claims, the circuit court stated that such claims "cannot be maintained when there is no evidence that alleged contamination has physically impacted [appellants'] properties." Further, with respect to appellants' nuisance claim, the circuit court noted that a claimant must plead an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of his or her property in order to state a claim for nuisance. Therefore, the circuit court found that because their properties are not contaminated, appellants' allegations did not state a claim for nuisance. Appellants appealed. We affirm the circuit court's dismissal of both appellants' nuisance and strict liability claims because the complaint alleges actual contamination of the property in pleading both of these causes of action. Since each of these claims was pled only on behalf of the Subclass A plaintiffs and not on behalf of appellants, we uphold the circuit court's dismissal of these two causes of action pursuant to Rule 220(c), SCACR. As explained below, however, we find the complaint sufficiently pleads a negligence cause of action on behalf of appellants, and therefore reverse the dismissal of this claim. View "Chestnut v. AVX Corporation" on Justia Law

The minor lived with Appellant and her mother for approximately six years from the time she was five years old until she was eleven. Appellant and the child had a close relationship, even as her mother's and Appellant's relationship ended. In November 2009, when she was eleven years old, the victim told her mother that Appellant had been sexually abusing her, including intercourse, since she was seven years old. There was no physical evidence of abuse, and Appellant denied the accusations. Appellant was convicted of first degree criminal sexual conduct with a minor, and received a life sentence without the possibility of parole (LWOP). On appeal, he challenged the constitutionality of S.C. Code Ann. 17-23-175 (2014) on Confrontation Clause grounds, and contended the trial court erred in qualifying one of the testifying witnesses as an expert in both forensic interviewing and child abuse assessment. Furthermore, Appellant alleged that witness' testimony impermissibly bolstered that of the minor. Upon review, the Supreme Court found the statute constitutional, but agreed with Appellant that the trial court erred in qualifying the witness as an expert, and in allowing bolstering testimony. Accordingly, the Court reversed Appellant's conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Amber Johnson filed suit against her closing attorney, Stanley Alexander, arguing he breached his duty of care by failing to discover the house Johnson purchased had been sold at a tax sale the previous year. The trial court granted partial summary judgment in favor of Johnson as to Alexander's liability. On appeal, the court of appeals held Alexander could not be held liable as a matter of law simply because the attorney he hired to perform the title work may have been negligent. Instead, the court determined the relevant inquiry was "whether Alexander acted with reasonable care in relying on [another attorney's] title search"; accordingly, it reversed and remanded. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals: even absent Alexander's admissions, the Court found it was error to equate delegation of a task with delegation of liability. The Court therefore agreed with Johnson that an attorney was liable for negligence in tasks he delegates absent some express limitation of his representation. Applying this standard to the facts, the Court found the grant of summary judgment was proper because there was no genuine issue of material fact as to liability. The case was remanded back to the trial court for a determination of damages. View "Johnson v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Petitioners Julia Gorman and Robert Palmer were tried jointly for the death of Gorman's seventeen month-old grandson. Palmer and Gorman, who lived together but were not married, were each convicted of homicide by child abuse, aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse, and unlawful conduct towards a child. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed both Palmer's and Gorman's aiding and abetting convictions, and a majority affirmed both petitioners' homicide and unlawful conduct convictions. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted both petitioners' and the State's petitions for writs of certiorari to review the directed verdict issues. Upon review of the arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' reversal of both aiding and abetting convictions, finding the State did not present enough evidence to support those convictions. With regard to the denial of Gorman's homicide and unlawful conduct directed verdict motions, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' affirmance of Palmer's convictions for homicide and unlawful conduct finding he was entitled to a directed verdict on both charges. View "South Carolina v. Palmer" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. During his testimony, respondent denied any involvement in the robbery. However, Respondent's counsel elicited testimony regarding respondent's prior convictions for armed robbery. The State likewise questioned respondent about his prior convictions. The jury found respondent guilty of armed robbery and four counts of kidnapping, and the trial judge sentenced respondent to a mandatory minimum sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole based on the prior armed robbery convictions. On appeal to the court of appeals, respondent argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred in admitting his prior armed robbery conviction for impeachment purposes. The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial. Specifically, the court of appeals found: (1) respondent's prior armed robbery convictions, without more, did not constitute crimes of dishonesty, and therefore, the trial court should have conducted a balancing test prior to admitting testimony regarding Respondent's prior armed robbery convictions; and (2) such error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in reversing the trial court because armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement" such that it is automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2), SCRE. The Court agreed, however, with the State's contention that the error in admitting the prior armed robbery convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court found other evidence implicating respondent in those crimes was overwhelming. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly the part-time Chief Magistrate of Newberry County, brought this action in the South Carolina Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to determine whether defendants Newberry County and Wayne Adams, County Administrator, had the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. In addition, the Court permitted the Senate President Pro Tempore to intervene in this action. Defendants and the Intervenor agreed with plaintiff that defendants did not have such authority, contending that all of defendants' actions have been done in compliance with the South Carolina Constitution and applicable statutes. After review, the Supreme Court agreed with all parties that defendants did not have the authority to abolish part-time magistrate positions in Newberry County. Rather, as permitted by code section 22-4-80(E), the part-time magisterial positions, including the one previously held by plaintiff, had been combined into one full-time magistrate position, and the Newberry County magistrates have been lawfully appointed pursuant to S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 26. While the Court declined plaintiff's invitation to expand the scope of this case to address issues of an alleged constitutional conflict between S.C. Const. art V, sec. 26 and art. V, sec. 4, and his related statutory claims, the Court reviewed all of plaintiff's arguments and found nothing of merit warranting the exercise of our authority to add necessary parties and address these additional arguments. View "Jayroe v. Newberry County" on Justia Law

Georgia citizen George Skipper was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a logging truck that was driven by Harold Moors and owned by Specialty Logging, LLC. Specialty had a commercial automobile insurance policy with a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit, which was issued by ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company (ACE). Following the accident, Skipper retained an attorney who wrote a demand letter to ACE offering to settle the case for the limits of the Policy. ACE retained two lawyers from Atlanta, Brantley Rowlen and Erin Coia, to represent Specialty and Moors. Specialty and Moors offered Skipper $50,000. Not satisfied with that offer, Skipper and his wife filed a lawsuit in the Allendale County Court of Common Pleas against Specialty and Moors. Unbeknownst to ACE or its attorneys, the Skippers entered into a settlement with Specialty and Moors, agreeing to execute a Confession of Judgment for $4,500,000, in which they admitted liability for the Skippers' injuries and losses. The Specialty Parties also agreed to pursue a legal malpractice claim against ACE and its attorneys Rowlen and Coia, and assigned the predominant interest in that claim to the Skippers.1 In exchange for the Specialty Parties' admission of liability, the Skippers agreed not to execute the judgment as long as the Specialty Parties cooperated in the legal malpractice litigation against Defendants. Armed with the assignment, the Skippers and Specialty Parties filed a legal malpractice action against the attorneys, also with the Allendale County court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In federal court, ACE and its attorneys argued that the assignment of the malpractice claim was invalid and that the Skippers had no valid claims to assert. Because the question of whether a legal malpractice claim could be assigned between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was a novel question in South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a certified question South Carolina law from the federal district court. After review, the South Carolina Court held that in South Carolina, the assignment of a legal malpractice claim between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was prohibited. View "Skipper v. ACE Property" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rushan Counts was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, third offense. On appeal, he argued the circuit court judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was found at his residence after he opened his door in response to police officers knocking on the door. Petitioner claimed the use of the "knock and talk" investigative technique at his home violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed Counts' conviction and sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Counts' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in failing to rule on Counts' argument regarding the heightened privacy protection afforded by the South Carolina Constitution. "For our state constitutional right to privacy to have any significance, we believe there must be some minimum evidentiary standard met before law enforcement conduct a warrantless search of a South Carolina citizen's home. Therefore, we hold that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before approaching the targeted residence and conducting the 'knock and talk' investigative technique." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, as modified. View "South Carolina v. Counts" on Justia Law

The State of South Carolina appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. The State argued: (1) the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court on the issue of whether armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement;" and (2) the appellate court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's prior criminal record harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court disagreed with the State that armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty," but agreed that the appeals court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's criminal record. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law