Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Georgia citizen George Skipper was involved in a motor vehicle accident with a logging truck that was driven by Harold Moors and owned by Specialty Logging, LLC. Specialty had a commercial automobile insurance policy with a $1,000,000 per occurrence limit, which was issued by ACE Property and Casualty Insurance Company (ACE). Following the accident, Skipper retained an attorney who wrote a demand letter to ACE offering to settle the case for the limits of the Policy. ACE retained two lawyers from Atlanta, Brantley Rowlen and Erin Coia, to represent Specialty and Moors. Specialty and Moors offered Skipper $50,000. Not satisfied with that offer, Skipper and his wife filed a lawsuit in the Allendale County Court of Common Pleas against Specialty and Moors. Unbeknownst to ACE or its attorneys, the Skippers entered into a settlement with Specialty and Moors, agreeing to execute a Confession of Judgment for $4,500,000, in which they admitted liability for the Skippers' injuries and losses. The Specialty Parties also agreed to pursue a legal malpractice claim against ACE and its attorneys Rowlen and Coia, and assigned the predominant interest in that claim to the Skippers.1 In exchange for the Specialty Parties' admission of liability, the Skippers agreed not to execute the judgment as long as the Specialty Parties cooperated in the legal malpractice litigation against Defendants. Armed with the assignment, the Skippers and Specialty Parties filed a legal malpractice action against the attorneys, also with the Allendale County court. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina. In federal court, ACE and its attorneys argued that the assignment of the malpractice claim was invalid and that the Skippers had no valid claims to assert. Because the question of whether a legal malpractice claim could be assigned between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was a novel question in South Carolina, the South Carolina Supreme Court accepted a certified question South Carolina law from the federal district court. After review, the South Carolina Court held that in South Carolina, the assignment of a legal malpractice claim between adversaries in litigation in which the alleged malpractice arose was prohibited. View "Skipper v. ACE Property" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rushan Counts was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, third offense. On appeal, he argued the circuit court judge erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence that was found at his residence after he opened his door in response to police officers knocking on the door. Petitioner claimed the use of the "knock and talk" investigative technique at his home violated his rights under the state and federal constitutions. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed Counts' conviction and sentence. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted Counts' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court found that the appellate court erred in failing to rule on Counts' argument regarding the heightened privacy protection afforded by the South Carolina Constitution. "For our state constitutional right to privacy to have any significance, we believe there must be some minimum evidentiary standard met before law enforcement conduct a warrantless search of a South Carolina citizen's home. Therefore, we hold that law enforcement must have reasonable suspicion of illegal activity before approaching the targeted residence and conducting the 'knock and talk' investigative technique." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, as modified. View "South Carolina v. Counts" on Justia Law

The State of South Carolina appealed the Court of Appeals' decision reversing respondent Christopher Broadnax's convictions for armed robbery and kidnapping, and remanding for a new trial. The State argued: (1) the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court on the issue of whether armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty or false statement;" and (2) the appellate court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's prior criminal record harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part. The Court disagreed with the State that armed robbery was a "crime of dishonesty," but agreed that the appeals court erred in refusing to find error in the admission of respondent's criminal record. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Broadnax" on Justia Law

Christopher Taft was found to be a sexually violent predator and was committed to the South Carolina Department of Mental Health. He now argues the trial court should have granted his motion for directed verdict because the State failed to present sufficient evidence under the Sexually Violent Predators Act (the SVP Act) that he was presently likely to reoffend if not confined. Accordingly, we find the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Taft had a current risk of reoffending which would allow a jury to conclude he was a sexually violent predator. View "In the Matter of the Care & Treatment of Christopher Taft" on Justia Law

A witness observed a vehicle being driven erratically on I-385 and ultimately wrecking. Police responded to the wreck and organized a search after learning from a witness that the driver had fled the scene. Officers were unable to locate the driver and cleared the scene. Several hours later, police responded to a call indicating an individual had been found walking down I-385. When police arrived, respondent was receiving medical care in an ambulance. The responding officer read respondent his Miranda rights and conducted a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test while respondent was in the ambulance. The officer initiated his audio recording device by a switch on his belt during the HGN test. After the HGN test, respondent did not go to the hospital, so the officer conducted a few more tests. Respondent failed both the HGN and ABC tests. The ABC test and the officer's admonitions while administering the HGN test were captured by audio recording. Neither test was captured by video recording. Respondent was arrested for DUI, and placed in a patrol vehicle. Facing the in-car camera towards respondent, the officer read respondent his Miranda rights again. Respondent sought dismissal of the DUI charge, alleging the videotape of his conduct at the scene failed to comply with the statutory videotaping requirements, because the statute governing the recording mandated inclusion of the individual being advised of his Miranda rights prior to the administration of field sobriety tests. The trial court denied respondent's motion to dismiss. The trial court recognized this incident was not a typical DUI stop because the officer's investigation began hours after respondent's wreck. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' opinion that found the trial court should have dismissed respondent's DUI charge because the videotape did not comply with the statutory requirements for videotaping respondent's conduct at the scene of his DUI arrest. After review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated respondent's conviction because the videotape satisfied the requirements of the applicable statute once videotaping became practicable. View "South Carolina v. Henkel" on Justia Law

Respondent Steven Barnes' first capital conviction and sentence were reversed on appeal because he was denied his constitutional right to represent himself at trial. In that first case, the South Carolina Supreme Court declined to adopt the heightened competency standard for a defendant who seeks to represent himself which is permitted, but not required, by "Indiana v. Edwards," (554 U.S. 164 (2008)). Since the "Edwards" standard had been applied by the circuit judge in this case, the South Carolina Court held it was "constrained to reverse" respondent's conviction and sentence. The State planned to retry respondent, and indicated it would again seek the death penalty. Respondent sought the appointment of counsel to represent him in these new proceedings. At the appointment hearing, the State argued that in seeking representation for the retrial, respondent essentially conceded that his prior conviction was constitutionally obtained. The State contended that in light of this concession, respondent's original conviction and sentence should be reinstated and the Supreme Court should proceed to review the issues raised but not reached in the first appeal. The circuit court denied the State's request. The South Carolina Supreme Court, in review of this case, found that the State relied on appellate decisions that remanded the question of the defendant's waiver of his right to counsel to the trial court for reconsideration. "It is apparent to us that the State now regrets that in respondent's first appeal it chose to argue only that the trial court's adoption and application of the standard announced in Edwards, [. . .], was correct, rather than to ask in the alternative for a remand if the Court were not to adopt Edwards. The State did not seek this alternative relief, we decided the appeal on its merits, and properly returned the remittitur to the circuit court. Respondent is entitled to the new trial, with all its attendant constitutional rights, pursuant to our decision in his first appeal." View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

During her commute to work, H.M., the victim, frequently passed by a local grocery store and casually greeted the people loitering outside, many of whom lived in the area and often gathered there. Although the victim did not know any of these people beyond exchanging a passing greeting, she came to learn that one of the people with whom she exchanged pleasantries was nicknamed "Black." Black followed H.M. home one day, forcibly entered her apartment, beat and raped her, threatening to kill her if she told anyone of the incident. The victim ultimately did call police, and "Black" was revealed to be Respondent Daniel Jenkins. The nurse conducting the rape found semen on vaginal and rectal swabs taken from the victim, as well as on various clothing and bodily swabs. A forensic DNA analyst developed a DNA profile from the rape examination swabs, and compared that profile to Respondent's DNA profile. The DNA profiles matched. Respondent moved to suppress the DNA evidence, arguing that the affidavit did not establish probable cause. The trial court denied the motion to suppress. Ultimately, a jury convicted Respondent of CSC-First. Because of Respondent's two prior convictions for CSC-First and carjacking, both of which are "most serious offenses" under section 17-25-45(C)(1) of the South Carolina Code, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. After its review, the court of appeals held that the affidavit in support of the warrant did not establish probable cause because it contained only conclusory statements; failed to set forth the source of the facts contained therein; lacked any information allowing the Magistrate to make a credibility determination regarding the source of the information; and that the affidavit was defective because it did not contain any indication that the police had obtained DNA evidence from the rape examination, and thus it did not establish that Respondent's DNA would have been relevant to the investigation. The court of appeals concluded that admitting the DNA evidence was not harmless error because it bolstered the victim's credibility regarding two critical facts: that Respondent was her attacker, and that the sexual intercourse was not consensual. Despite reversing the trial court's admission of the DNA evidence, the court of appeals did not order a new trial, but instead remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing in response to the State's argument that Respondent's DNA would have been inevitably discovered regardless of the defective search warrant. The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals. Notwithstanding the DNA evidence, there was abundant, independent evidence in the record from which the jury could have found Respondent guilty. Accordingly, contrary to the court of appeals' assertion, the Court held that this case was not dependent on the credibility of the victim and Respondent, with the DNA evidence serving as the only physical evidence that Respondent committed the assault. View "South Carolina v. Jenkins" on Justia Law

Lawrence and Evelyn Morrow filed a lawsuit against THI of South Carolina at Magnolia Place at Spartanburg, LLC (Magnolia Place) alleging personal injuries to Lawrence as a resident. The Morrows alleged that due to Magnolia Place's negligence, Lawrence sustained an injury while being assisted in the shower and was required to undergo surgery to remove a penile implant. They also alleged the nursing home failed to properly monitor Lawrence's diabetes or properly care for his pressure wounds. The Morrows also brought suit against Fundamental Long-Term Care Holdings, LLC, Fundamental Clinical Consulting, LLC, Fundamental Administrative Services, LLC, THI of Baltimore, Inc., THI of South Carolina, Inc., and THI Holdings, LLC (collectively, Fundamental Entities). The Morrows alleged the Fundamental Entities were vicariously liable for the negligence of Magnolia Place, and furthermore were directly responsible for Lawrence's injuries by way of their conscious disregard for his health in underfunding Magnolia Place, which led to issues with staffing, training, and nutrition. The Fundamental Entities thereafter filed a motion to bifurcate the trial pursuant to Rule 42(b), SCRCP between the nursing home negligence claims and the corporate negligence claims, and further, to stay discovery related to the corporate negligence claims. The Fundamental Entities argued bifurcation was proper because the issues of nursing home negligence and corporate negligence were distinct, and the Morrows could only move forward on the corporate negligence claims if they were first successful against Magnolia Place. As an extension, the Fundamental Entities argued bifurcation of the trial would simplify the issues, save significant judicial resources, and cut costs related to discovery. The trial court granted the motion, finding that without first proving negligence against the nursing home the Morrows' claims for corporate negligence could not proceed. Accordingly, the trial court ordered that discovery and a trial on the nursing home negligence claims could go forward, and only if the Morrows were successful, a new jury could hear the corporate negligence claims in a later proceeding. The court of appeals dismissed as interlocutory an appeal which severed a number of defendants from this lawsuit, ostensibly under the label of "bifurcation." The Morrows appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial court's order went "far beyond our common understanding of bifurcation," thereby affecting a substantial right of the petitioners. View "Morrow v. Fundamental Long-Term Care" on Justia Law

In exchange for the State's promise not to seek the death penalty on three charges of murder, Anthony Sanders consented to a bench trial and waived his right to any appellate, post-conviction, or habeas corpus review. He was convicted of three counts of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. His subsequent application for post-conviction relief (PCR) was dismissed based on the agreement. Sanders argued the PCR court erred in failing to allow him to present evidence that his waiver was entered into upon the advice of constitutionally ineffective trial counsel. The Supreme Court agreed, and remanded back to the PCR court for an evidentiary hearing. View "Sanders v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court in this case was a circuit court's order upholding the validity of an ordinance amending respondent City of North Augusta's 1996 Tax Increment Financing District (TIF) ordinance, and a finding that the Mayor and City Council did not violate the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) between January to September 2013. In 1996, respondents adopted an ordinance creating a Redevelopment Plan to revitalize the City's riverfront and the adjacent areas. In 2013, City Council adopted an ordinance amending the Redevelopment Plan to allow the City to proceed with "Project Jackson," a development project of riverfront property for commercial activities ("minor league baseball stadium, a convention center, parking decks, a YMCA, a 200 room hotel, and assorted commercial buildings"). The ordinance both extended the duration of the Redevelopment Plan and the associated TIF Bonds, and increased the amount of the estimated Bond Issuance to finance the Plan. Appellant Stephen Donahue contended that the City did not comply with the statutory requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 31-6-80(F) (Supp. 2014). Appellant contends the final clause of 31-6-80(F)(2) required respondents to redetermine that the property affected by the amended ordinance met the criteria set forth in 31-6-80(A)(7) (Supp. 2014). He argued the City was required to hear evidence and then state their 31-6-80(A)(7) findings in Ord. No. 2013-19. Appellant subsequently made a FOIA request with regard to the the City's discussions of the ordinance amending the TIF Bonds. Appellant contends that the circuit court erred in finding that between January and September 2013 respondents complied with the FOIA's requirement that "the specific purpose of the executive session" be announced in open session. The circuit court held an announcement that the purpose of the executive session was the discussion of a "proposed contractual matter" satisfied the specific purpose requirement. The Supreme Court agree with the trial court that the ordinance at issue on appeal here was valid, but the Court agreed with appellant that the FOIA was violated. View "Donohue v. City of North Augusta" on Justia Law