Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charleston Auto Auction (Charleston Auto) is a wholesale auctioneer of automobiles. In 2008, an automobile dealer, A3 Auto Center (A3), sought to purchase three automobiles from other car dealerships (Sellers) and use Charleston Auto to facilitate the sale. Pursuant to a statutory requirement, A3 obtained a surety bond from CNA Surety. Charleston Auto located the three vehicles that A3 ultimately purchased. A3 paid Charleston Auto for the vehicles with three checks, which were eventually returned for insufficient funds. Charleston Auto sought reimbursement from its insurance carrier, petitioner Centennial Casualty Co. Petitioner paid Charleston Auto's claim and demanded reimbursement from CNA Surety pursuant to A3's surety bond. CNA Surety refused to pay, contending that the Dealer Bond Statute did not apply to the transaction as neither petitioner nor Charleston Auto was a "legal representative" who suffered a loss or damage. Petitioner then filed suit against CNA Surety, claiming that Charleston Auto was the "legal representative" of A3 and the Sellers and that Petitioner was subrogated to Charleston Auto's rights to seek damages under the Dealer Bond Statute. The trial court found that Petitioner was entitled to reimbursement under A3's surety bond, and CNA Surety appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding that "[Charleston Auto] and [Petitioner] were not legal representatives of the Sellers" because Charleston Auto "did not stand in the shoes of the Sellers." Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari contending that the court of appeals ignored the "legal representative" designation in the bills of sale and misapplied the plain language of the Dealer Bond Statute. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded. View "Centennial Casualty v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

W. H. Bundy, Jr. sought a determination of whether Bobby Brent Shirley established a prescriptive easement over a road on rural property owned by Bundy. The special referee found Shirley was entitled to the easement. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the special referee's grant of a prescriptive easement to Shirley. It then modified the decision to the extent the Court held that a party claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden of proving all elements by clear and convincing evidence. View "Bundy v. Shirley" on Justia Law

Gregory Collins worked for West Expedited & Delivery Service, Incorporated, and was killed in an automobile collision while returning to South Carolina after making a delivery in Wisconsin for Seko Charlotte. West Expedited, as a subcontractor, contracted with Seko Charlotte to make an interstate delivery of parts. As a result of Collins' work-related death, Collins' dependents filed a workers' compensation claim against West Expedited, Seko Worldwide, Federal Insurance Company, Seko Charlotte, and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. A single commissioner of the Workers' Compensation Commission applied the three tests from "Voss v. Ramco, Inc.," (482 S.E.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1997)) and determined that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee at the time of his fatal accident pursuant to section 42-1-410 of the South Carolina Code. Additionally, Collins was determined to be a traveling employee. Therefore, Seko Charlotte, and its insurance company, Nationwide, were liable. Seko Charlotte and Nationwide appealed the order. The appeal was heard by the Appellate Panel of the Commission. Applying the four factors of the employee/independent contractor test, the Appellate Panel of the Commission concluded Collins was not an employee of Seko Charlotte on the return trip because West Expedited had "the exclusive right of control over [Collins]" after deliveries were made in Wisconsin. The Appellate Panel of the Commission therefore reversed the single commissioner. The Uninsured Employers Fund appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court found that the Commission committed an error of law when it applied the employee/independent contractor test instead of the statutory employee test. Applying the statutory employee test, the Court of Appeals concluded that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee, reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. The Supreme Court granted Seko Charlotte and Nationwide's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. View "Collins v. Seko Charlotte" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Odom appealed his conviction for criminal solicitation of a minor. Appellant's conviction stemmed from a series of internet chat sessions with an undercover Westminster, South Carolina, city police officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. The internet chats took place May 4–6, 2006, in Oconee County, South Carolina. A jury found Appellant guilty of one count of criminal solicitation of a minor, based on the internet chats that occurred from May 4–5, 2006. Appellant was acquitted of the count involving a chat room conversation that allegedly occurred on May 6, 2006. The trial court sentenced Appellant to seven years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years' probation, along with conditions including registering as a sex offender. Appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl should have had a bond to act in his official capacity and therefore the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of bonding. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Odom" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick McDonald and two codefendants were convicted of murder and first-degree burglary. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting McDonald's argument that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted the redacted confession of one of his nontestifying codefendants. No defendant testified at trial. The jury found Defendants guilty of both charges. McDonald appealed, arguing that given the context, Cannon's written confession clearly implicated McDonald in the crimes. The court of appeals affirmed, "find[ing] that the neutral phrase 'another person' inserted into Cannon's statement avoided any [Confrontation Clause] violation." Cannon's confession was redacted using the phrase "another person." The Supreme Court found, after review of the trial court record, that even a casual reading of the confession made it apparent that the confession describes the actions of Cannon and two other male individuals. The Court rejected the State's invitation to find no Confrontation Clause violation based on the trial court's limiting instruction. Despite this finding, the Supreme Court concluded that in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals as modified. View "South Carolina v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, petitioner Kenneth Workman and codefendant Oshawn Robinson were convicted of assault and battery, conspiracy, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and armed robbery. After petitioner's direct appeal was dismissed pursuant to Anders, petitioner filed an application for post conviction relief (PCR), alleging trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a coercive Allen charge and in failing to challenge the trial judge's ruling barring cross-examination of the State's witness, Timothy Wright, regarding the sentencing recommendation Wright received in exchange for testifying against petitioner and Robinson. The PCR judge denied petitioner's application for PCR, finding: (1) petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the Allen charge, as the charge was not unduly coercive; and (2) petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge the ruling barring cross-examination regarding Wright's sentence. After review, the Supreme Court found petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance in failing to object to an unconstitutionally coercive Allen charge; accordingly, the Court granted his petition for a writ of certiorari, dispensed with further briefing, reversed the PCR judge's denial of relief, and remanded for a new trial. View "Workman v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the shooting death of James Salter (the victim) in a Best Buy parking lot in Myrtle Beach. It was undisputed that defendant Richard Niles, Jr., his fiancé, Mokeia Hammond, and Ervin Moore met the victim at the parking lot to purchase marijuana from him. Defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder and self-defense, but refused defendant's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence showed defendant was either guilty of murder or he was not guilty of any crime based on his claim of self-defense. The court of appeals reversed defendant's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, finding the evidence compelled a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the court of appeals found there was evidence of sufficient legal provocation based on defendant's testimony that he shot at the victim only after the victim began shooting first. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in determining defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence at trial that defendant acted in the sudden heat of passion. After review, the Supreme Court reversed: defendant's own testimony did not establish that he was overtaken by a sudden heat of passion such that he had an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. "Rather, Niles testified that he did not want to hurt the victim; that he shot with his eyes closed; that he was merely attempting to stop the victim from shooting; and that when he shot his gun, he was thinking of Hammond rather than of perpetrating violence upon the victim. In other words, there was nothing sudden about Niles's decision to shoot the victim. Thus, we hold that the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge." View "South Carolina v. Niles" on Justia Law

In January 1994, Respondent purchased two parcels of property located on Folly Island, South Carolina: 806 East Cooper Avenue, and Tract D. These lots were previously a contiguous tract of high ground property in which the Tract D portion abutted the ocean, and the Cooper Avenue portion abutted the roadway. However, at some point prior to Respondent's property purchase, two man-made canals were constructed, after which Tract D became completely surrounded by coastal tidelands and waters. In 2009, Respondent filed a permit application with the Department of Health and Environmental Control requesting permission to construct a vehicular bridge from 806 East Cooper Avenue to Tract D. DHEC denied the application because Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) prohibited the agency from issuing a bridge construction permit to a "coastal island" less than two acres in size, and the parties agreed that if Tract D was a "coastal island," it did not meet the regulation's minimum size requirement. Respondent requested a contested case hearing before the ALC. At the hearing, the parties focused on whether Tract D met the definition of a "coastal island." Ultimately, the ALC found Tract D "geologically, geographically and by legal description, is on and within the boundaries of Folly Island," and it constituted a "coastal island" separate and apart from Folly Island. The ALC upheld DHEC's denial of Respondent's bridge permit application. Respondent appealed to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals reversed the ALC's decision. Specifically, the court of appeals found that because DHEC "failed to challenge" the ALC's finding that Tract D was part of Folly Island, that finding became the law of the case. The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals misapprehended the law of the case doctrine. Specifically, the court of appeals erred in applying the doctrine so as to bar the prevailing party below from raising an additional sustaining ground. Therefore, rather than find the argument procedurally barred, the court of appeals should have considered whether Tract D was a "coastal island" as defined in the regulations. Accordingly, the specific regulatory exemption for Folly Island controls over the more general regulatory definition of "coastal island." As a result, Tract D could not be considered a "coastal island," and the minimum acreage requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) does not bar Respondent's bridge construction permit application. In conjunction with Regulation 30-12(F) and the ALC's finding that "[t]he proposed bridge was the least environmentally damaging alternative for access to Tract D and, in fact, would have de minimus environmental impact," the Supreme Court found that DHEC and the ALC erred in denying Respondent's permit application. Therefore, the Court affirmed the result reached by the court of appeals, albeit through different reasoning. View "Dreher v. So. Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Control" on Justia Law

Petitioner LeAndra Lewis was injured by an errant bullet at Studio 54 Boom Boom Room while she was working as an exotic dancer. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether she was an employee of the Club and thus eligible for workers' compensation. After review of the facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the Club exercised control over the manner in which she performed her work and therefore concluded she was an employee. View "Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty" on Justia Law