Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose from the death of Martin Gasque after a 2010 University of South Carolina football game against the University of Alabama. Both Appellant Curtis Simms and the victim tailgated near the stadium during the football game, and both were intoxicated as they left the area. Appellant, wearing an Alabama jersey, left the tailgate with friends, riding as the front-seat passenger in a green truck driven by a friend. As they attempted to exit the tailgate parking lot, the victim, a South Carolina fan, was the front-seat passenger in a black truck driven by his friend, and was boisterously engaging South Carolina fans through his open window. The two trucks and passengers crossed paths when the black truck blocked the green truck from exiting the parking lot. Appellant exited the green truck and approached the black truck's passenger side, where the victim was sitting. Appellant punched the victim once while he was seated in the truck, and then hit the victim four or five more times as he exited the black truck. The victim was knocked unconscious, and fell into the roadway parallel to the truck on the white line comprising the edge of the lane of traffic. After the victim hit the ground, the victim's friend began pulling his truck forward to the right in order to move the truck onto the shoulder and out of the roadway. As he did so, he unknowingly began to slowly roll over the victim between his legs, then over his groin, his abdomen, his chest, and finally, his head. Appellant yelled at the black-truck-driver to stop, and banged on the truck with his fists, but this only caused the driver to accelerate. The victim died at the scene after suffering a life-threatening hinge fracture. Appellant was charged with both aggravated breach of the peach and involuntary manslaughter. The jury returned a verdict of not guilty on the involuntary manslaughter charge, but found Appellant guilty of aggravated breach of the peace. The trial court sentenced Appellant to ten years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years' imprisonment and three years' probation, but later reduced Appellant's sentence to ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of three years' imprisonment, plus three years' probation. Appellant argued on appeal of his conviction and sentence that: (1) the trial court erred in refusing to direct a verdict of acquittal with respect to the breach of the peace charge; (2) the trial court imposed an illegal sentence; and (2) the trial court erred in refusing to admit certain eyewitness testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Simms" on Justia Law

Respondent Richard Niles, Jr. was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. Respondent, his girlfriend and Ervin Moore met the victim, James Salter, in a store parking lot intending to purchase drugs. The evidence at trial focused on whether respondent was the aggressor in the encounter. On the facts entered into evidence at trial, the trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder and self-defense, but refused Niles's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence showed Niles was either guilty of murder or he was not guilty of any crime based on his claim of self-defense. The court of appeals reversed Niles's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, finding the evidence compelled a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The Supreme Court granted the State's for certiorari review to consider the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in determining Niles was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence at trial that Niles acted in the sudden heat of passion. The Supreme Court held that the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge, and reversed the court of appeals. View "South Carolina v. Niles" on Justia Law

Petitioner-respondent Roger Bruce was convicted of murder for the death of his girlfriend Laura Creel. Police performed a welfare check on the home Bruce and Creel shared. Bruce allowed the officers inside. Finding nothing, officers questioned Bruce, who told them Creel had left after the two argued. During the conversation, the officers noticed a cell phone and car keys on a table nearby. Bruce informed the officers they both belonged to Creel and an officer picked up the keys and went outside to the vehicle. The officer looked through the windows into the interior of the car and then attempted to open the trunk, but it would not open. He then asked Bruce which key opened the trunk and Bruce moved toward the officer as if to grab the keys. The officer pulled the keys back, and a second officer pressed the trunk release button. Inside the trunk, the officers discovered Creel's body. During the course of testimony regarding how the police found Creel's body in the trunk, Bruce objected "to the discovery of the body in this fashion" on the basis that there was no consent and no search warrant was obtained. When the trial court asked what basis Bruce had to object, he responded that it was on his property and the keys were in his house. The solicitor argued it was Creel's car and Bruce therefore had no expectation of privacy. He further claimed the officer who initially took the keys had testified the previous day that Bruce offered to open the trunk for them. Ultimately, the court denied the motion stating, "[i]t appears that this is inevitable discovery; but/for hitting the release button and opening the trunk according to the earlier testimony Mr. Bruce was gonna [sic] open the trunk for them, or at least was providing the keys to do so." Bruce was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment. On appeal, Bruce argued the trial court erred in denying the motion to suppress because Bruce never consented to the officers taking the keys from his home. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying Bruce's motion to suppress. View "South Carolina v. Bruce" on Justia Law

Charleston Auto Auction (Charleston Auto) is a wholesale auctioneer of automobiles. In 2008, an automobile dealer, A3 Auto Center (A3), sought to purchase three automobiles from other car dealerships (Sellers) and use Charleston Auto to facilitate the sale. Pursuant to a statutory requirement, A3 obtained a surety bond from CNA Surety. Charleston Auto located the three vehicles that A3 ultimately purchased. A3 paid Charleston Auto for the vehicles with three checks, which were eventually returned for insufficient funds. Charleston Auto sought reimbursement from its insurance carrier, petitioner Centennial Casualty Co. Petitioner paid Charleston Auto's claim and demanded reimbursement from CNA Surety pursuant to A3's surety bond. CNA Surety refused to pay, contending that the Dealer Bond Statute did not apply to the transaction as neither petitioner nor Charleston Auto was a "legal representative" who suffered a loss or damage. Petitioner then filed suit against CNA Surety, claiming that Charleston Auto was the "legal representative" of A3 and the Sellers and that Petitioner was subrogated to Charleston Auto's rights to seek damages under the Dealer Bond Statute. The trial court found that Petitioner was entitled to reimbursement under A3's surety bond, and CNA Surety appealed. The court of appeals reversed, finding that "[Charleston Auto] and [Petitioner] were not legal representatives of the Sellers" because Charleston Auto "did not stand in the shoes of the Sellers." Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari contending that the court of appeals ignored the "legal representative" designation in the bills of sale and misapplied the plain language of the Dealer Bond Statute. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded. View "Centennial Casualty v. Western Surety Co." on Justia Law

W. H. Bundy, Jr. sought a determination of whether Bobby Brent Shirley established a prescriptive easement over a road on rural property owned by Bundy. The special referee found Shirley was entitled to the easement. The Court of Appeals reversed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the special referee's grant of a prescriptive easement to Shirley. It then modified the decision to the extent the Court held that a party claiming a prescriptive easement has the burden of proving all elements by clear and convincing evidence. View "Bundy v. Shirley" on Justia Law

Gregory Collins worked for West Expedited & Delivery Service, Incorporated, and was killed in an automobile collision while returning to South Carolina after making a delivery in Wisconsin for Seko Charlotte. West Expedited, as a subcontractor, contracted with Seko Charlotte to make an interstate delivery of parts. As a result of Collins' work-related death, Collins' dependents filed a workers' compensation claim against West Expedited, Seko Worldwide, Federal Insurance Company, Seko Charlotte, and Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company. A single commissioner of the Workers' Compensation Commission applied the three tests from "Voss v. Ramco, Inc.," (482 S.E.2d 582 (Ct. App. 1997)) and determined that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee at the time of his fatal accident pursuant to section 42-1-410 of the South Carolina Code. Additionally, Collins was determined to be a traveling employee. Therefore, Seko Charlotte, and its insurance company, Nationwide, were liable. Seko Charlotte and Nationwide appealed the order. The appeal was heard by the Appellate Panel of the Commission. Applying the four factors of the employee/independent contractor test, the Appellate Panel of the Commission concluded Collins was not an employee of Seko Charlotte on the return trip because West Expedited had "the exclusive right of control over [Collins]" after deliveries were made in Wisconsin. The Appellate Panel of the Commission therefore reversed the single commissioner. The Uninsured Employers Fund appealed to the Court of Appeals. The court found that the Commission committed an error of law when it applied the employee/independent contractor test instead of the statutory employee test. Applying the statutory employee test, the Court of Appeals concluded that Collins was Seko Charlotte's statutory employee, reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. The Supreme Court granted Seko Charlotte and Nationwide's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals. After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed the Commission's decision, and reinstated the single commissioner's order. View "Collins v. Seko Charlotte" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Odom appealed his conviction for criminal solicitation of a minor. Appellant's conviction stemmed from a series of internet chat sessions with an undercover Westminster, South Carolina, city police officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl. The internet chats took place May 4–6, 2006, in Oconee County, South Carolina. A jury found Appellant guilty of one count of criminal solicitation of a minor, based on the internet chats that occurred from May 4–5, 2006. Appellant was acquitted of the count involving a chat room conversation that allegedly occurred on May 6, 2006. The trial court sentenced Appellant to seven years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of five years' probation, along with conditions including registering as a sex offender. Appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the officer posing as a fourteen-year-old girl should have had a bond to act in his official capacity and therefore the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the law of bonding. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Odom" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ricky Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits. The single commissioner found the claim compensable. Respondent Charleston County School District sought review, and the matter was heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission. The Appellate Panel reversed, denying the claim. Petitioner filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel. He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his motion for rehearing. The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim. The court of appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because the notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim. The court of appeals held that motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a single commissioner's decision. After its review, the South Carolina Supreme Court held Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the decision denying the motion. The case was remanded to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal. View "Rhame v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

Petitioner Derrick McDonald and two codefendants were convicted of murder and first-degree burglary. The court of appeals affirmed, rejecting McDonald's argument that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated when the trial court admitted the redacted confession of one of his nontestifying codefendants. No defendant testified at trial. The jury found Defendants guilty of both charges. McDonald appealed, arguing that given the context, Cannon's written confession clearly implicated McDonald in the crimes. The court of appeals affirmed, "find[ing] that the neutral phrase 'another person' inserted into Cannon's statement avoided any [Confrontation Clause] violation." Cannon's confession was redacted using the phrase "another person." The Supreme Court found, after review of the trial court record, that even a casual reading of the confession made it apparent that the confession describes the actions of Cannon and two other male individuals. The Court rejected the State's invitation to find no Confrontation Clause violation based on the trial court's limiting instruction. Despite this finding, the Supreme Court concluded that in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court therefore affirmed the court of appeals as modified. View "South Carolina v. McDonald" on Justia Law

In a joint trial, petitioner Kenneth Workman and codefendant Oshawn Robinson were convicted of assault and battery, conspiracy, possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime, and armed robbery. After petitioner's direct appeal was dismissed pursuant to Anders, petitioner filed an application for post conviction relief (PCR), alleging trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to a coercive Allen charge and in failing to challenge the trial judge's ruling barring cross-examination of the State's witness, Timothy Wright, regarding the sentencing recommendation Wright received in exchange for testifying against petitioner and Robinson. The PCR judge denied petitioner's application for PCR, finding: (1) petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to the Allen charge, as the charge was not unduly coercive; and (2) petitioner was not prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to challenge the ruling barring cross-examination regarding Wright's sentence. After review, the Supreme Court found petitioner was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance in failing to object to an unconstitutionally coercive Allen charge; accordingly, the Court granted his petition for a writ of certiorari, dispensed with further briefing, reversed the PCR judge's denial of relief, and remanded for a new trial. View "Workman v. South Carolina" on Justia Law