Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case stemmed from the shooting death of James Salter (the victim) in a Best Buy parking lot in Myrtle Beach. It was undisputed that defendant Richard Niles, Jr., his fiancé, Mokeia Hammond, and Ervin Moore met the victim at the parking lot to purchase marijuana from him. Defendant was convicted of murder, armed robbery, and possession of a weapon during the commission of a violent crime. The trial court instructed the jury on the law of murder and self-defense, but refused defendant's request to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter, reasoning that the evidence showed defendant was either guilty of murder or he was not guilty of any crime based on his claim of self-defense. The court of appeals reversed defendant's murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, finding the evidence compelled a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter. Specifically, the court of appeals found there was evidence of sufficient legal provocation based on defendant's testimony that he shot at the victim only after the victim began shooting first. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider the State's argument that the court of appeals erred in determining defendant was entitled to a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no evidence at trial that defendant acted in the sudden heat of passion. After review, the Supreme Court reversed: defendant's own testimony did not establish that he was overtaken by a sudden heat of passion such that he had an uncontrollable impulse to do violence. "Rather, Niles testified that he did not want to hurt the victim; that he shot with his eyes closed; that he was merely attempting to stop the victim from shooting; and that when he shot his gun, he was thinking of Hammond rather than of perpetrating violence upon the victim. In other words, there was nothing sudden about Niles's decision to shoot the victim. Thus, we hold that the evidence did not warrant a voluntary manslaughter charge." View "South Carolina v. Niles" on Justia Law

In January 1994, Respondent purchased two parcels of property located on Folly Island, South Carolina: 806 East Cooper Avenue, and Tract D. These lots were previously a contiguous tract of high ground property in which the Tract D portion abutted the ocean, and the Cooper Avenue portion abutted the roadway. However, at some point prior to Respondent's property purchase, two man-made canals were constructed, after which Tract D became completely surrounded by coastal tidelands and waters. In 2009, Respondent filed a permit application with the Department of Health and Environmental Control requesting permission to construct a vehicular bridge from 806 East Cooper Avenue to Tract D. DHEC denied the application because Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) prohibited the agency from issuing a bridge construction permit to a "coastal island" less than two acres in size, and the parties agreed that if Tract D was a "coastal island," it did not meet the regulation's minimum size requirement. Respondent requested a contested case hearing before the ALC. At the hearing, the parties focused on whether Tract D met the definition of a "coastal island." Ultimately, the ALC found Tract D "geologically, geographically and by legal description, is on and within the boundaries of Folly Island," and it constituted a "coastal island" separate and apart from Folly Island. The ALC upheld DHEC's denial of Respondent's bridge permit application. Respondent appealed to the court of appeals, and the court of appeals reversed the ALC's decision. Specifically, the court of appeals found that because DHEC "failed to challenge" the ALC's finding that Tract D was part of Folly Island, that finding became the law of the case. The Supreme Court concluded that the court of appeals misapprehended the law of the case doctrine. Specifically, the court of appeals erred in applying the doctrine so as to bar the prevailing party below from raising an additional sustaining ground. Therefore, rather than find the argument procedurally barred, the court of appeals should have considered whether Tract D was a "coastal island" as defined in the regulations. Accordingly, the specific regulatory exemption for Folly Island controls over the more general regulatory definition of "coastal island." As a result, Tract D could not be considered a "coastal island," and the minimum acreage requirement found in Regulation 30-12(N)(2)(c) does not bar Respondent's bridge construction permit application. In conjunction with Regulation 30-12(F) and the ALC's finding that "[t]he proposed bridge was the least environmentally damaging alternative for access to Tract D and, in fact, would have de minimus environmental impact," the Supreme Court found that DHEC and the ALC erred in denying Respondent's permit application. Therefore, the Court affirmed the result reached by the court of appeals, albeit through different reasoning. View "Dreher v. So. Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Control" on Justia Law

Petitioner LeAndra Lewis was injured by an errant bullet at Studio 54 Boom Boom Room while she was working as an exotic dancer. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether she was an employee of the Club and thus eligible for workers' compensation. After review of the facts entered in the trial court record, the Supreme Court found the Club exercised control over the manner in which she performed her work and therefore concluded she was an employee. View "Lewis v. L.B. Dynasty" on Justia Law

Appellant Jeffrey Allen, on behalf of his daughter, appealed the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order affirming the Appeals Committee of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board Employee Insurance Program's (EIP Appeals Committee) decision to deny Appellant's insurance claim for his daughter's diabetes educational training session. Blue Cross's Appeals Review Committee upheld the denial of benefits on the basis that diabetes educational training was excluded under the State Health Plan, and that section 38-71-46 of the South Carolina Code, did not apply to the State Health Plan. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the ALC's decision that section 38-71­46 of the South Carolina Code did not apply to this matter. The EIP was mandated to promptly determine and pay the benefits that were due for Appellant's daughter under the State Health Plan. View "Allen v. SC Public Employee Benefit Authority" on Justia Law

Respondent David DeCarlis was the sole member of respondent Buncombe Professional Park, L.L.C., which owned an undeveloped parcel of land. In 2007, DeCarlis, as Buncombe's representative, executed a note and mortgage with Independence National Bank. At the same time, DeCarlis executed a personal guaranty. As part of this transaction, Bank satisfied the existing first mortgage at closing. Buncombe stopped paying on the mortgage. As Bank prepared to foreclose, it learned in 2010 that DeCarlis held what had been, prior to Bank's satisfaction of the original first mortgage, a second mortgage on the property executed and properly recorded in 2006. The same attorney represented both Bank and Buncombe at the 2007 mortgage closing, and had actual notice of DeCarlis' 2006 mortgage at the time of the 2007 closing since he had conducted the title search. The attorney testified at the hearing in this matter that he erroneously neglected to have DeCarlis execute a satisfaction, release, or subordination of his 2006 mortgage at the 2007 closing in order to effectuate the parties' agreement that Bank was to have a first mortgage. Since no such document was executed, DeCarlis' 2006 second mortgage became the first lien, with priority over Bank's 2007 mortgage. The Bank then foreclosed on Buncombe and DeCarlis. In a post-trial order following the parties' Rule 59 motions, the master found Bank was equitably subrogated to the original first mortgage which Bank had satisfied as part of the 2007 closing, thus giving Bank's 2007 mortgage priority over the 2006 DeCarlis mortgage on a second ground. Buncombe and DeCarlis appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in finding that the Bank had notice of the 2006 second mortgage by virtue of its agent's actual knowledge of that lien. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the master's judgment. View "Independence National Bank v. Buncombe Professional Park" on Justia Law

Appellant Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals (Janssen) manufactured the antipsychotic drug Risperdal. The Attorney General of South Carolina believed that Janssen had violated the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (SCUTPA) by engaging in unfair methods of competition by willfully failing to disclose known risks and side effects associated with Risperdal. In 2007, the State and Janssen entered into a tolling agreement concerning the statute of limitations. The State filed its Complaint on April 23, 2007: the first claim arose from the content of the written material furnished by Janssen since 1994 with each Risperdal prescription (the "labeling claim"); the second claim centered on alleged false information contained in a November 2003 Janssen-generated letter sent to the South Carolina community of prescribing physicians (the "Dear Doctor Letter"). Because both claims arose more than three years prior to January 24, 2007, Janssen pled the statute of limitations as a bar to the Complaint. The matter proceeded to trial. A jury rendered a liability verdict against Janssen on both claims. The trial court rejected Janssen's defenses, including the statute of limitations, finding that both claims were timely. Janssen appealed. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the liability judgment on the labeling claim but modify the judgment to limit the imposition of civil penalties to a period of three years from the date of the tolling agreement, which was coextensive with the three-year statute of limitations, subject to an additional three months by virtue of the time period between the January 24, 2007, tolling agreement and the filing of the Complaint on April 23, 2007. The Court affirmed the liability judgment on the doctor letter claim, but remitted the amount of penalties associated with that claim. View "South Carolina v. Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals" on Justia Law

Mark Baker was convicted of four counts of committing a lewd act upon a minor. In October 2004, Victim Two, Baker's youngest niece, informed her mother that "Uncle Mark was messing with" her older sister, Victim One. At that time, Victim Two denied that Baker had molested her. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Baker petitioned the Supreme Court for review. The Court granted certiorari to analyze whether: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to quash the indictments, which alleged the offenses occurred over a six-year time frame; and (2) qualifying a witness as an expert in forensic interviewing. After review, the Court reversed Baker's convictions because the Court found the indictments were unconstitutionally overbroad. View "South Carolina v. Baker" on Justia Law

Appellant George Chavis was convicted of multiple crimes involving unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, Appellant's step-daughter. The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review concerned the qualification and testimony of two child abuse assessment experts. Finding no reversible error as to the trial court's actions with regard to the experts, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Chavis" on Justia Law

The federal district court certified a question of South Carolina law to the South Carolina Supreme Court. Behrooz Taghivand was the manager of a Rite Aid store in a high crime area of North Charleston. While on duty, Taghivand observed a patron acting strangely and milling around the store with no apparent purpose. The patron stopped briefly in the section directly in front of the cashier, selected a few items, and made a purchase. After the patron checked out, the cashier told Taghivand that when the patron entered the store, he was carrying a bag that appeared to be empty but now had items in it. Taghivand instructed the cashier to call the police. An officer arrived at the scene and gathered together the items the patron claimed he purchased from the store, and Taghivand confirmed these as belonging to the patron. The officer also searched the patron's bag, and found it contained only dirty clothes. Taghivand was terminated effective that day, and was informed the incident was the reason for his termination. As a result, Taghivand filed this action against Rite Aid Corporation, Eckerd Corporation d/b/a Rite Aid, and Steve Smith in federal court for wrongful termination; the defendants moved to dismiss. After finding that South Carolina law was not clear on the issue raised by the motion to dismiss, the federal district court certified this question: under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine in South Carolina, does an at-will employee have a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where: (1) the employee, a store manager, reasonably suspects that criminal activity, specifically, shoplifting, has occurred on the employer's premises; (2) the employee, acting in good faith, reports the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement; and (3) the employee is terminated in retaliation for reporting the suspected criminal activity to law enforcement? After review, the South Carolina Supreme Court answered the certified question: no. View "Taghivand v. Rite Aid" on Justia Law

BADD, L.L.C. purchased three warehouse units in Myrtle Beach. To finance the transaction, BADD executed two promissory notes. A personal guaranty was also executed by William McKown, who was a member of BADD. After BADD defaulted, the Bank brought this foreclosure action and included McKown as a party based on his status as a guarantor. In McKown's amended answer and counterclaim, he demanded a jury trial because the Bank sought a money judgment for the breach of a guaranty arrangement. McKown further sought an accounting and a determination that the guaranty agreement was unconscionable. McKown then asserted two counterclaims: (1) civil conspiracy and (2) breach of contract, both based on an alleged conspiracy between the Bank and William Rempher. Finally, McKown asserted third-party claims against Rempher. The Bank moved for an order of reference. The circuit granted the motion, referring the matter in its entirety to the master-in-equity. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding McKown was entitled to a jury trial because the Bank's claim on the guaranty agreement was a separate and distinct legal claim. The Bank appealed, challenging the Court of Appeals' finding that McKown was entitled to a jury trial. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that McKown was not entitled to a jury trial solely because the Bank exercised its statutory right to join him as a party in the event of a deficiency judgment. Furthermore, the Court held McKown was not entitled to a jury trial based on his counterclaims, which, while legal, were permissive. McKown waived his right to a jury trial by asserting permissive counterclaims in an equitable action. View "Carolina First Bank v. BADD, L.L.C." on Justia Law