Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1997, Dr. Michael Hayes and Dr. Michael Taillon were working as emergency room physicians at Providence Hospital, presumably as independent contractors. Arthur Sharpe came to the Providence Hospital emergency room complaining of chest pain. Dr. Hayes and Dr. Taillon evaluated Sharpe and diagnosed him as suffering from reflux. Sharpe was discharged. Sharpe had actually suffered a heart attack, which was determined a few days later when he sought further medical care elsewhere. Because of the misdiagnosis, in 1999, Sharpe and his wife filed a medical malpractice and loss of consortium action against Providence Hospital and Dr. Hayes. The Sharpes did not name Dr. Taillon as a defendant. Providence Hospital settled with the Sharpes in 2004. In 2007, Providence Hospital filed this equitable indemnification action against Dr. Taillon and his medical malpractice insurer, The South Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association (collectively Respondents). Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground that the medical malpractice statute of repose barred Providence Hospital's claim and the circuit court granted the motion on that basis. Providence Hospital appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the medical malpractice statute of repose applied to Providence Hospital's indemnity claim. The Court concluded that Providence Hospital's indemnity action was indeed barred by the statute of repose, and as such affirmed the trial court. View "Columbia/CSA-HS Greater Columbia Healthcare System v. So. Carolina Medical Malpractice Liability Joint Underwriting Association" on Justia Law

Employee-petitioner Judy Barnes was employed as an administrative assistant at Charter 1 Realty. On the day of her injury, Barnes was asked to check the e-mail of one of the realtors before noon. Around 11:30 a.m., Barnes left her desk and walked toward the realtor's office. However, she stumbled, fell, and sustained serious injuries: a broken left femur, broken left humerus and a torn rotator cuff.Barnes subsequently filed a claim for workers' compensation. At the hearing, Barnes testified she was hurrying to the realtor's office to check her e-mail and that caused her to fall. Evidence was also introduced that her husband did not like the shoes she wore, and he had told her she needed to pick up her feet when she walked. The single commissioner and appellate panel found that her fall was idiopathic and therefore noncompensable. The court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the commissioner and appellate panel's findings, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Barnes v. Charter 1 Realty" on Justia Law

Claimant-petitioner Carolyn Nicholson, a supervisor in the investigations area of child protective services for the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS), was on her way to a meeting when her foot caught on the hall carpet and she fell. She received treatment for pain to her neck, left shoulder, and left side connected with her fall. Nicholson's claim for workers' compensation was denied by the single commissioner because she failed to prove a causal connection between her fall and employment. The commissioner held there was nothing specific to the floor at DSS which contributed to Nicholson's fall and that she could have fallen anywhere. The question this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioner was entitled to workers' compensation. "Despite how straightforward this issue appears to be," both the commissioner and the court of appeals found petitioner was not entitled to recover. The Supreme Court disagreed with both, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Nicholson v. SC Dept. of Social Services" on Justia Law

Appellant Charvus Nesbitt appealed a circuit court judgment finding that he entered a knowing and voluntary "Alford" plea to three of four charges listed in a negotiated plea agreement. On appeal, he argued that his plea agreement was a "package deal," and because his plea for one of the charges was invalid, please for the remaining charges were also invalid. The State conceded that the circuit court erred in failing to properly question and advise appellant of his rights with respect to the the charge appellant alleged was invalid. When the terms and obligations set forth in a plea agreement are not fulfilled, appellate courts may consider whether that failure constitutes harmless error. Here, Appellant received the forty-year sentence which he negotiated, and further received the benefit of having one of the charges against him essentially dropped, as his criminal record will only reflect three convictions and not four. Therefore, to the extent there was error, Appellant has suffered no prejudice. As such, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court. View "South Carolina v. Nesbitt" on Justia Law

In 2007, respondent Alonzo Hawes shot and killed his estranged wife in the presence of their children. Following a guilty plea to voluntary manslaughter, the trial court granted Hawes's section 16-25-90 motion for eligibility for early parole, which the court of appeals affirmed. The South Carolina Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision. Because the trial court failed to exercise discretion, which the Supreme Court concluded was likely the result of its reliance on a prior version of section 16-25-90, it vacated the court of appeals' opinion and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the correct version of the statute. View "South Carolina v. Hawes" on Justia Law

North American Rescue Products, Inc. (NARP) brought a declaratory judgment action to determine whether P. J. Richardson had the right to purchase 7.5% of NARP's stock at a discount despite the fact that he had been terminated, the agreement to which purported to end the parties' relationship. A jury's verdict allowed Richardson to purchase the stock, but both parties appealed. The Supreme Court granted review of the appellate court's decision affirming the jury's verdict. After that review, the Supreme Court concluded the termination agreement unambiguously ended any right Richardson had to purchase the stock. The appellate court was reversed and the case remanded for entry of judgment in favor of NARP. View "North American Rescue Products v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Both CarMax Auto Superstores West Coast, Inc., and the South Carolina Department of Revenue (appealed the court of appeals' decision, reversing and remanding a decision of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholding the Department's use of an alternative apportionment formula to calculate CarMax West's income tax for tax years 2002-2007. When a party seeks to deviate from a statutory formula, the proponent of the alternate formula bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) the statutory formula does not fairly represent the taxpayer's business activity in South Carolina and (2) its alternative accounting method is reasonable. The Supreme Court affirmed (as modified), and declined to remand at both parties' request. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals' finding that the ALC erred in placing the burden of proof on CarMax West. Furthermore, while there was substantial evidence in the record to support the ALC's finding that the Department's alternative accounting method was reasonable, the Department failed to prove the threshold issue that the statutory formula did not fairly represent CarMax West's business activity within South Carolina. View "Carmax Auto v. South Carolina Dept. of Rev." on Justia Law

Respondent Bryant Kinloch was charged with trafficking cocaine, trafficking heroin, and possession with intent to distribute heroin within proximity of a park after law enforcement obtained a search warrant and discovered cocaine and heroin at a Charleston residence. Before trial, Kinloch moved to suppress the drugs, arguing: (1) the search warrant affidavit was not sufficient to establish probable cause to search the residence; (2) the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply; and (3) even if the affidavit were sufficient, law enforcement intentionally omitted exculpatory information, which, if included, would defeat probable cause. The trial judge suppressed the drugs, finding the search warrant affidavit was insufficient to establish probable cause. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The State appealed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's suppression ruling as the magistrate had a substantial basis for reaching his probable cause determination. View "South Carolina v. Kinloch" on Justia Law

After prevailing in a condemnation action, petitioners-landowners moved for an award of attorneys' fees pursuant to section 28-2-510(B)(1) of the Eminent Domain Procedure Act. Contrary to petitioners' view, the circuit court determined attorneys' fees should be awarded based on an hourly rate via a lodestar calculation rather than the contingency fee agreement between Petitioners and their attorney. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court interpreted section 28-2-510 and concluded the General Assembly intended for attorneys' fees to be awarded based on a constellation of factors. Specifically, section 28-2-510(B)(1) mandated that in order for a prevailing landowner to recover reasonable attorneys' fees he or she must submit an application for fees "necessarily incurred." Therefore, by implication, the General Assembly precluded a landowner from recovering attorneys' fees based solely on a contingency fee agreement without regards for section 28-2-510. The Court explained that even though the contingency fee agreement is not the sole element in the calculation, it is still a significant component as it may be used to explain the basis for the fee charged by the landowner's counsel. "Our decision should not be construed as somehow condemning or eliminating an attorney's use of a contingency fee agreement. To the contrary, we recognize that the use of these agreements is a legitimate and well-established practice for attorneys throughout our state. This practice may still be pursued. Yet, it is with the caveat that the terms of the agreement are not controlling. Rather, they constitute one factor in a constellation of factors for the court's consideration in determining an award of reasonable litigation expenses to a prevailing landowner under section 28-2-510(B)(1). The court may, in fact, conclude that the contingency fee agreement yields a reasonable fee. However, the court is not bound by the terms of the agreement. " For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals misapplied case law precedent. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court failed to conduct the correct statutory analysis, and remanded this matter to the circuit court. Petitioners' counsel was instructed to submit an itemized statement in compliance with section 28-2-510(B)(1) as counsel's original affidavit failed to identify the "fee charged" and the actual number of hours expended. View "South Carolina Dept. of Trans. v. Revels" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the South Carolina Supreme Court's review centered on the correct application of those statutes and regulations pertinent to an invaluable (environmentally, economically, and socially) stretch of tidelands located on the edge of a spit of land along the South Carolina coast. A landowner and real estate developer sought a permit to construct a bulkhead and revetment stretching over 2,700 feet in length and 40 feet in width over the State's tidelands, thereby permanently altering 111,320 square feet or over 2.5 acres of pristine tidelands. The landowner sought to halt ongoing erosion along that stretch of tidelands in order to facilitate a residential development on the adjacent highland area. The Department of Health and Environmental Control denied the majority of the requested permit and granted a small portion to protect an existing county park. An administrative law court (ALC) disagreed and found a permit should be granted for the entire structure, and this appeal followed. The Supreme Court concluded the ALC committed several errors of law and therefore, it reversed and remanded for further consideration. View "Kiawah Development v. South Carolina Dept. of Health & Env. Ctrl." on Justia Law