Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband Michael Buist and Wife Katie Buist married in 1999 and had one child. In 2007, Wife filed for divorce, seeking, inter alia, attorneys' fees and costs. In 2009, the family court granted the couple a divorce on the grounds that they had lived separate and apart for one year. In November 2009, the family court conducted a final hearing, receiving testimony from Husband, Wife, their witnesses, and a guardian ad litem (GAL) regarding contested issues of division of marital assets, child custody and visitation, and child support. At the hearing, Wife's attorney submitted a fee affidavit requesting approximately $15,000 in attorneys' fees. Husband's attorney did not object to the affidavit, but submitted his own fee affidavit regarding his earlier motion for a rule to show cause. In the final divorce decree, the family court ordered Husband to pay $8,000 towards Wife's attorneys' fees and costs within 180 days. The court also ordered Husband and Wife to each pay half of the $2,768.90 owed to the GAL within 180 days. Finally, the family court ordered Wife to pay Husband's attorney $3,050 in regards to Husband's motion for a rule to show cause. Husband appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the family court erred in failing to apply the factors set forth in "Glasscock v. Glasscock" or "E.D.M. v. T.A.M" prior to awarding attorneys' fees to Wife. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, finding that because Husband was not sufficiently specific in his objection to the family court's final divorce decree, he waived any objection that the family court did not adequately apply the Glasscock or E.D.M. factors. View "Buist v. Buist" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, including eight South Carolina school districts, claimed that the State has failed to meet the constitutional obligation that there be a system of free public schools that affords each student the opportunity to receive a minimally adequate education. The trial court held that the State's failure to address the effects of pervasive poverty on students within the plaintiffs' school districts prevented those students from receiving the required opportunity. The trial court performed a "thorough and cogent examination" of the issues of this case. While the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's conclusion regarding the adverse effects of poverty, the Record demonstrated that there were myriad other issues, under the State's control, working to prevent students within these districts from receiving the constitutionally required opportunity. Thus, the Court found in favor of the plaintiffs, and affirmed as modified. View "Abbeville County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Fifteen inmates who were sentenced to life without parole as juveniles petitioned the South Carolina Supreme Court for resentencing in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in "Miller v. Alabama," (132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012)). The Court held that their sentences violated the Eighth Amendment under Miller and the petitioners and those similarly situated were entitled to resentencing. View "Aiken v. Byars" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jomar Robinson appealed the court of appeals' decision to affirm his convictions for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute (PWID), PWID within one-half mile of a public park, unlawful carrying of a pistol, possession of marijuana, and resisting arrest. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed (as modified). View "South Carolina v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Respondent Kimberly Legette was employed by Appellant Nucor Corporation from 1998, through 2010. Nucor terminated Legette's employment after she failed a random on-site drug test in violation of Nucor's drug policy. Although Legette obtained an independent drug test, which tested negative for drugs, she was fired from her job at Nucor based on the two positive drug test results. Legette subsequently applied for unemployment benefits. Nucor requested that Legette be denied unemployment benefits, contending she was statutorily ineligible to receive them because she was fired for violating Nucor's drug policy by testing positive for drugs. This direct appeal from the Administrative Law Court (ALC) presented for the Supreme Court's review a threshold procedural challenge to appealability, and substantively, to the awarding of unemployment benefits to an employee terminated for failing a drug test administered by a laboratory that was not properly certified. Because this appeal arose from a final resolution of all issues, the Court found the matter is appealable. The Court affirmed the ALC. View "Nucor v. SCDEW" on Justia Law

In 1993, Way pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a minor. The victim was Way's 13-year-old niece, who was spending the night with Way (who was then about 28 years old) and his wife. Way was sentenced to ten years in prison, suspended upon the service of eighteen months in prison and five years of probation. In 1995, while on probation, Way pled guilty to contributing to the delinquency of a minor. In that matter, Way allowed two girls who were runaways, one 13 and one 15, to spend the night at his home without notifying the police. While still on probation in 1997, Way pled guilty to committing a lewd act upon a minor. The victim was a 13-year-old girl, who reported that Way met her at a boat dock in 1995 and gave her marijuana, then had sexual intercourse with her. Way was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for this offense. In 2007, prior to his release from prison, Way was referred to the multidisciplinary team, which determined there was probable cause to believe Way met the statutory definition of a sexually violent predator (SVP). The circuit court concluded probable cause existed and ordered a mental evaluation of Way. At the conclusion of the evidence, the jury found Way met the definition of an SVP, and the circuit court ordered him to be civilly committed for long-term control, care and treatment. Way appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. In his appeal, Way challenged the propriety of both the State's cross-examination of Way and its invocation of the missing witness rule in closing argument. The Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine Way about his retention of his non-testifying expert witness. Furthermore, the Court concluded the circuit court erred in allowing the State to assert that the jury could infer the missing witness' testimony would have been adverse to Way's case. Despite these errors, the Court concluded (as did the Court of Appeals) that these errors could not have reasonably affected the outcome of Way's case. The Court of Appeals was affirmed (as modified). View "In the Matter of Vincent Neal Way" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court granted certiorari in this post-conviction relief (PCR) action to review the Court of Appeals' decision, which remanded for a determination of the lawfulness of Antonio Bordeaux's sentence. Bordeaux's plea agreement was capped at a sentence of twenty-five years. He pled guilty to two counts of armed robbery and two counts of burglary. He was sentenced to twenty-four years' imprisonment on the armed robbery charges, and to twenty-five years' imprisonment, suspended upon the service of twenty years with three years' probation on the burglary counts. Bordeaux's plea proceeding was conducted simultaneously with that of a co-defendant, Wesley Washington. Washington had been indicted on two counts of first degree burglary, but pleaded guilty to two counts of second degree burglary. The transcript reflected that the plea colloquy with the trial judge alternated between Bordeaux and Washington. During Bordeaux's plea colloquy, he acknowledged on at least seven occasions that he was pleading guilty to two counts of first degree burglary. At sentencing, Bordeaux was again reminded, and acknowledged, that he was being sentenced pursuant to his plea negotiations for two counts of first degree burglary, each of which carried a minimum fifteen-year sentence, and a maximum of life imprisonment. The State argued the Court of Appeals erred because the unambiguous plea colloquy and imposition of sentence control over the ambiguous written sentence. To this point, the Supreme Court agreed: it was clear Bordeaux pleaded guilty to first degree burglary, was sentenced within the legal limits for that crime, and in consonance with his negotiated plea agreement. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Bordeaux v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Roger Brock was passenger in a vehicle driven by Brian Mason, which was involved in an accident with a logging truck, driven by Ryan Stevens. At the time of the accident, Stevens was insured through the owner of the logging truck, Malachi Sanders' policy issued by Aequicap Insurance Company. Brock sustained severe injuries as a result of the wreck and filed suit. Soon after the litigation began, Brock settled his claim against Stevens and Sanders with Aequicap for $185,000 for the release of all claims. Shortly after the settlement was reached but before Brock received any payment, Aequicap was declared insolvent. Because Aequicap was an insurer licensed to do business in the State of South Carolina and the insured was a resident of South Carolina, the claim was referred to South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association (Guaranty). As a result, Brock made demand on Guaranty for payment of the full settlement amount of $185,000. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on the construction and application of the South Carolina Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association Act (the Act), S.C. Code Ann. Secs. 38-31-10 to -170 (2002 and Supp. 2013), and specifically the exhaustion/non-duplication provision in section 38-31-100(1). Guaranty and Brock moved for summary judgment on the issue whether Guaranty may offset payments from solvent insurance carriers against Brock's settlement under section 38-31-100. The circuit court found section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and granted partial summary judgment to both parties, holding that Guaranty may offset some but not all of the benefits received by Brock from solvent insurance carriers. The Supreme Court disagreed that section 38-31-100 was ambiguous and hold that the unambiguous language of section 38-31-100 provides that Guaranty may offset all payments from all solvent insurers made to Brock as a result of this wreck. View "SC Property v. Brock" on Justia Law

Appellant Erika Fabian brought this action for legal malpractice and breach of contract by a third-party beneficiary, alleging respondents attorney Ross M. Lindsay, III and his law firm Lindsay & Lindsay made a drafting error in preparing a trust instrument for her late uncle and, as a result, she was effectively disinherited. Appellant appealed the circuit court order dismissing her action under Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP for failing to state a claim and contended South Carolina should recognize a cause of action, in tort and in contract, by a third-party beneficiary of a will or estate planning document against a lawyer whose drafting error defeats or diminishes the client's intent. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Fabian v. Lindsay" on Justia Law

Appellants the South Carolina Energy Users Committee (the SCEUC) and the Sierra Club appealed orders of the Public Service Commission that approved Respondent South Carolina Electric & Gas's (SCE&G) application for updated capital cost and construction schedules, pursuant to the Base Load Review Act, (the BLRA). The issues this case presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether the Commission applied the correct section of the BLRA, and whether the Commission had to also consider the prudence of project completion at the update stage. Finding no reversible error in the Commission's orders, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "SC Energy Users Committee v. SCE&G" on Justia Law