Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent Matthew Jamison pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and was sentenced to twenty years in prison. He did not petition for a direct appeal. Respondent's first application for post-conviction relief (PCR) was denied. Respondent filed a second PCR application alleging newly discovered evidence. The PCR judge granted relief, and the court of appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR court erred in granting relief in respondent's second PCR application. Respondent's PCR testimony revealed that his decision to plead guilty rested on several considerations: the strength of the State's evidence against him, the relative weakness of his self-defense claim, and his counseled determination that it was to his advantage to plead guilty to the lesser charge of manslaughter in order to avoid going to trial on the indicted offense of murder. "Respondent is bound by his plea and conviction unless he can demonstrate the interest of justice requires that they be vacated. To grant relief under these circumstances would undermine the solemn nature of a guilty plea and the finality that generally attaches to a guilty plea." View "Jamison v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The State appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the convictions of respondent William Coaxum, Sr., who was found guilty of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. In 2007, two men robbed a Pizza Hut in North Charleston. The respondent, driver of the get-away vehicle, refused to pull over, and a high-speed pursuit ensued. Within two miles of the start of the chase, Respondent lost control of the vehicle and crashed into a fire hydrant. Respondent and his passenger attempted to flee on foot. The police caught and arrested respondent at the scene of the crash, and their search of his car and person revealed a sawed-off shotgun and over $1,000 in cash. Prior to Respondent's trial, the trial court conducted voir dire of the prospective jurors. Specifically, the court asked: "Are there any members of the jury panel related [by] blood or marriage, socially or casually connected with [Respondent], or that have any business dealings, any connection whatsoever?" None of the prospective jurors responded. At trial, after the State presented the first four of its eight witnesses, the judge received a note from the jury foreperson indicating that Juror #7 recognized one of respondent's family members sitting in the courtroom. The solicitor requested Juror #7 be removed from the jury, arguing that although Juror #7's initial nondisclosure during voir dire was unintentional, "these types of relationships . . . [,] ultimately she may not be able to put it out of her mind." After conducting a lengthy inquiry, the trial court found that the alleged connection between Juror #7 and Respondent would have been a material factor in the State's exercise of its peremptory challenges. The court did not view Juror #7's connection with Respondent and his family as a basis for a challenge for cause. However, the court ruled that the connection would have been a legitimate basis for the State's exercise of its peremptory strikes, and that the State would have struck Juror #7 had she disclosed the connection. Therefore, the trial court excused Juror #7 from the jury and replaced her with the alternate juror. The State then called its remaining witnesses, and the jury ultimately convicted Respondent of armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. The court of appeals reversed respondent's convictions and remanded the case for retrial, concluding that a trial court may not "automatically" remove a juror for an unintentional failure to disclose requested personal information during voir dire. Further, the court of appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court to have removed Juror #7 because, in essence, a trial court may remove a juror mid-trial only if the juror has intentionally failed to disclose. As there was no question the jury was impartial after Juror #7's removal, the Supreme Court concluded that was not entitled to a new trial. Accordingly, it reversed the court of appeals decision reversing Respondent's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Coaxum" on Justia Law

Birth Mother was twenty-three years old when she learned that she was pregnant very late in the pregnancy. She received no prenatal care. She did not tell her parents she was pregnant, even though she lived with them. She gave birth alone after presenting to the emergency room when she went into labor with Baby Girl. Shortly after the birth, Birth Mother mentioned to hospital staff that she might be interested in placing Baby Girl for adoption. Other hospital workers were aware that Birth Mother was considering adoption, including the nurse midwife who delivered Baby Girl. The nurse midwife told Birth Mother that the nurse midwife's cousin, Adoptive Mother, was considering adoption, and gave her Adoptive Mother's telephone number. Birth Mother agreed to have Adoptive Mother adopt Baby Girl. Adoptive Mother's lawyer rented office space in an executive suite shared by other law firms, including the law firm where the attorney-witness worked. On the morning of the adoption, Adoptive Mother's lawyer asked the attorney-witness to act as a witness to the execution of the Consent. In addition, Adoptive Mother's lawyer asked a legal assistant from another law firm that also shared the office suite to be the second witness to the adoption. The legal assistant was present when Birth Mother signed the Consent, but did not see her initial the remainder of the document. She understood her role to be that of a witness to Birth Mother's signature. Adoptive Mother's lawyer notarized Birth Mother's signature. However, the attorney-witness did not enter the room until after Birth Mother signed the Consent, although she had the impression that Birth Mother had signed the Consent shortly before she entered the room. Neither witness was present for any discussions between Adoptive Mother's lawyer and Birth Mother regarding the Consent. The attorney-witness testified that she believed that Adoptive Mother's lawyer had explained the Consent to Birth Mother outside of her presence. Once the witnesses were in the room, Adoptive Mother's lawyer restated his prior conversation with Birth Mother in summary fashion. The witnesses signed the Consent, and the attorney-witness's law clerk notarized their signatures. The entire transaction lasted approximately ten minutes. Birth Mother left the office with Adoptive Mother's mother, who drove Birth Mother back to the local hotel where she had spent the previous night. Birth Mother spent time alone with Baby Girl there, and then relinquished Baby Girl to Adoptive Mother. However, Birth Mother explained that she "felt immediately that something was not right with the process." Five days later, Birth Mother sent a registered letter to Adoptive Mother's lawyer formally revoking her consent. The family court issued an order in a bifurcated hearing finding the Consent was invalid and requiring Baby Girl's immediate return to Birth Mother. In its order, the family court noted the only issue presented to the court was "whether the consent document was properly executed and, based on that ruling, whether Birth Mother's request for emergency transfer of legal and physical custody of the minor be granted." The court held that the relevant statutory provisions were clear and mandatory, such that strict compliance was required. Adoptive Mother appealed the court of appeals' decision affirming the family court order. Finding no error, the Supreme Court also affirmed. View "Brown v. Baby Girl Harper" on Justia Law

Desmond Sams was convicted of voluntary manslaughter after he strangled the victim, Jake Frazier, during an altercation. Sams appealed, arguing the circuit court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After review, the Supreme Court found Sams was not entitled to an instruction on involuntary manslaughter because, as found by the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, Sams' actions did not fall within the range of conduct constituting involuntary manslaughter. View "South Carolina v. Sams" on Justia Law

Petitioner Alberta Major fell and sustained an ankle injury while walking across an unpaved area of an intersection, which was owned and maintained by respondent City of Hartsville. Petitioner asserted her injury was a result of a rut in the ground created by vehicles frequently driving over the unpaved area. Petitioner brought suit against respondent alleging negligence, gross negligence, and willful and wanton conduct. Prior to trial, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment contending it was not liable under the South Carolina Torts Claims Act (SCTCA) because it was not on notice of any rut at the location where petitioner allegedly sustained her injury. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of respondent, finding respondent's knowledge of vehicles cutting the unpaved corner at the intersection did not create a continual condition and did not place respondent on constructive notice of the actual rut. The Court of Appeals affirmed, referring to the SCTCA and finding although petitioner presented evidence that respondent had notice of circumstances it knew would eventually lead to a rut, there was no evidence respondent had notice of the specific rut petitioner alleged caused her injury. The Court of Appeals further found there was no continual condition sufficient to establish constructive notice and impute liability to respondent. Based on the testimony presented at the summary judgment hearing, the Supreme Court found, however, that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether respondent should have been charged with constructive notice on the basis that the rut existed for such a period of time that respondent, in the use of reasonable care, should have discovered it. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the recurring nature of the defect created a continual condition giving rise to constructive notice. Therefore, the Court of Appeals' was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Major v. City of Hartsville" on Justia Law

Officers from the North Charleston South Carolina Police Department (NCPD),believed Petitioner Alfred Adams was a drug dealer. Acting without a warrant, officers placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on petitioner's vehicle. After monitoring petitioner's travel to Atlanta, Georgia, and upon his return to South Carolina, law enforcement stationed a drug canine unit on the interstate within the NCPD's jurisdiction, with instructions to conduct a traffic stop on petitioner's vehicle. An officer conducted the requested traffic stop and discovered cocaine in petitioner's possession, which resulted in his arrest. Petitioner moved to suppress the drugs, arguing that the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment. The trial court denied petitioner's motion, finding no constitutional violation. The court of appeals found the warrantless installation of the GPS device violated the Fourth Amendment but determined that the exclusionary rule did not apply because "Adams's traffic violations were intervening criminal acts sufficient to cure the taint arising from unlawfully installing the [GPS] device and monitoring the vehicle." Petitioner contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the court of appeals erred in finding that his traffic violations were intervening criminal acts that dissipated the taint from the unlawful search and concluding the facts did not warrant suppression. The Supreme Court agreed, reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Adams" on Justia Law

Carolinian, LLC was a closely held, manager-managed South Carolina limited liability company owned and managed various hotel and rental properties in Horry County. In February 2010, Appellants Shaul and Meir Levy obtained a judgment against Bhupendra Patel (a member of Carolinian) in the amount of $2.5 million. Thereafter, the Levys obtained a charging order from the circuit court, which constituted a lien against Patel's distributional interest in Carolinian. Subsequently, the Levys filed a petition to foreclose the charging lien, and the foreclosure sale was held in April 2012. The Levys were the successful bidders, purchasing Patel's distributional interest. Following the foreclosure sale, Carolinian asserted it was entitled to purchase Patel's distributional interest from the Levys pursuant to Article 11 of the Operating Agreement. Carolinian contended that, since the Levys failed to obtain the consent required under Section 11.1 of the Operating Agreement, their distributional interest was deemed to have been offered to Carolinian, and Carolinian was entitled to purchase that interest under Section 11.2. The Levys objected to Carolinian's attempt to force them to sell their interest, arguing they were not subject to the terms of Article 11 of the Operating Agreement and, thus, were not required to seek consent. The Levys subsequently filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment that they were the lawful owners of Patel's distributional interest and that any right Carolinian had to compel the sale of the distributional interest terminated upon the foreclosure sale under the terms of Section 3.5 of the Operating Agreement. Following a hearing, the trial court found the foreclosure sale, which resulted in the transfer of Patel's distributional interest in Carolinian to the Levys, changed the Levys' status from that of mere judgment creditors to transferees of Patel's distributional interest. The trial court further found that, as transferees, the Levys became subject to the provisions of Article 11 of the Operating Agreement. Specifically, the trial court held that Carolinian could force the Levys to sell Patel's distributional interest pursuant to Sections 11.1 and 11.2 of the Operating Agreement. In their appeal, the Levys argued the circuit court committed an error of law in finding that, pursuant to Article 11 of the Operating Agreement, Carolinian could compel them to sell their interest. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed the trial court. View "Levy v. Carolinian, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals decision that affirmed the circuit court's suppression of respondent Philip Sawyer's breath test results and video in a prosecution for driving under the influence (DUI). Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that a videotape from the breath test site that lacked the audio portion of the reading of Miranda rights and the informed consent law did not satisfy the requirements of S.C. Code Ann. 56-5-2953(A)(2) (2006). View "South Carolina v. Sawyer" on Justia Law

Stephen Whigham was injured playing kickball during an event he organized for his employer, Jackson Dawson Communications. He filed a claim for workers' compensation. The commissioner denied the claim because she found the injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment, and that decision was affirmed by the full commission and the court of appeals. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, finding that under the facts of this case, Whigham was entitled to workers' compensation because he was impliedly required to attend the kickball game he organized, and therefore, his injury arose out of and in the course of his employment. View "Whigham v. Jackson Dawson Communications" on Justia Law

After the South Carolina Department of Revenue (DOR) failed to produce public documents requested by Appellant Edward D. Sloan, Jr., Sloan filed s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) action against DOR and its director, James Etter, seeking declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees and costs. After suit was filed, the DOR produced the requested information and asserted that Sloan's action was mooted and should have been dismissed. The trial court agreed with the DOR and dismissed the complaint, denying all relief. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs to Sloan. Despite the DOR's failure to comply with the requirements of FOIA, the Court held the trial court properly found that Sloan's request for a declaratory judgment was mooted when the DOR produced the requested information. Sloan contended, however, that the claim for declaratory relief remained viable. Here, the Court disagreed: "the information Sloan sought has been disclosed, [and] there [was] no continuing violation of FOIA upon which the trial court could have issued a declaratory judgment." As the prevailing party under these circumstances, the trial court erred in not awarding Sloan his reasonable attorney's fees and costs. View "Sloan v. SCDOR" on Justia Law