Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State charged appellant "Kevin R." with possessing a weapon on school grounds. Prior to his adjudicatory hearing before a family court judge, Appellant moved for a jury trial on the grounds the federal and state Constitutions guaranteed him the right to a jury trial. The judge denied the motion and proceeded to hear Appellant's case in a bench trial. Ultimately, the judge adjudicated Appellant delinquent and deferred sentencing until an evaluation of Appellant was completed. The sentencing hearing was conducted before a second family court judge, who sentenced Appellant to an indeterminate period of time not to exceed his twenty- first birthday. The judge then suspended the sentence and placed Appellant on probation until his eighteenth birthday. On appeal, Appellant contended the family court judge erred in denying his motion for a jury trial. Recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court held a juvenile did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial in adjudication proceedings. However, the Court's decision in that case was not dispositive as it was presented with additional arguments raised by Appellant and the Amici Curiae. After consideration of these issues, the Court adhered to its decision in the earlier case, and affirmed the family court. View "In the Interest of Kevin R." on Justia Law

In this judicial disciplinary matter, respondent Former Abbeville County Magistrate George Ferguson and the Office of Disciplinary Counsel have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by Consent. Respondent was indicted on two counts of Misconduct in Office: the first indictment alleged respondent offered and gave Jane Doe #1 money and/or other benefits for the handling and disposition of legal matters involving Jane Doe #1 before him in his official capacity as Magistrate in return for sexual contact with her from 1996 to 2009; the second indictment alleged respondent offered and gave Jane Doe #2 money and/or other benefits for the handling and disposition of legal matters involving Jane Doe #2 before him in his official capacity as Magistrate in return for sexual contact with her from 2001 to 2011. In the Agreement, respondent admitted misconduct, consented to the imposition of a public reprimand and agreed never to seek nor accept a judicial office in South Carolina without the express written permission of the Supreme Court after written notice to ODC. The Supreme Court accepted the Agreement and publicly reprimanded respondent, the most severe sanction it was able to impose under these circumstances. View "In the Matter of Former Abbeville County Magistrate George T. Ferguson" on Justia Law

"The Record in this case is voluminous, and illustrates the complex and, at times, contentious nature of these proceedings. The circuit judge presided over numerous motion hearings and issued numerous orders over the course of this litigation." However, this appeal concerned a final order in which the circuit judge dismissed all of the cases and awarded fees and costs to Respondents as sanctions for Appellants' continued refusal to comply with his previous discovery rulings. In addition, Appellants appealed the judge's failure to disqualify himself at the outset of this litigation and late refusal to recuse himself. Appellants were limited partners in five separate limited partnerships and asserted legal claims in five separate actions against Respondents, their general partners. The limited partnerships were formed in the 1960s to construct and operate the properties at issue, affordable housing projects for low-income citizens in three counties. Respondents became general partners around 1975, and from that point forward, Appellants took no part in the management or business affairs of the complexes. In 1984, Respondents notified Appellants that they had contracted to sell the properties to Boston Financial Group (BFG). The terms of the sale called for a small amount to be paid upfront but the majority would be paid in 1999 in a "balloon" payment with accruing interest. However, BFG defaulted on the payment, and sold the properties without intervention from the partnerships. All of the claims stemmed from Respondents' roles in selling the properties and their actions in the aftermath of BFG's default. Appellants argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the circuit abused its discretion by dismissing these cases under the facts, particularly because" (1) less "draconian" punishments were available to the court; (2) Appellants agreed to receive a less harsh sanction and "took extraordinary steps to avoid dismissal"; (3) the judge consistently espoused Respondents' arguments as evidence constituting a factual basis to support his decisions; and (4) the judge deviated from South Carolina law to effect dismissal. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court in all respects: the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in the rulings it made, and Appellants failed to prove that they suffered any prejudice as a result of the judge's refusal to recuse himself in this case. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Davis v. Parkview Apartments" on Justia Law

Claimant Johnny Adger suffered an accidental injury to his left knee on while working as a police officer with the Manning Police Department. As a result, he was treated using various non-operative methods, including steroid injections. In January 2008, Claimant reached maximum medical improvement (MMI) and was assigned a 32% permanent impairment rating to his lower left extremity. However, in April 2008, Claimant returned to the doctor because he continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee. Ultimately, Claimant underwent knee replacement surgery. Claimant continued to experience swelling and pain in his left knee, and Claimant followed up with the orthopaedic center for several months after the surgery. At the time of his injury, Claimant suffered from preexisting diabetes, which Claimant's employer was aware of prior to the injury. Claimant experienced problems with his diabetes for years before the accident and required medication to control the condition. Claimant's diabetes was medically controlled around the time of the injury; however, Claimant's diabetes was uncontrolled on several occasions during the course of his knee treatment. The State Accident Fund appealed an order from the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission denying its request for reimbursement from the South Carolina Second Injury Fund for benefits paid to Claimant. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Commission denied Appellant's claim for reimbursement in full. Without mentioning medical payments, the Commission stated that "Claimant's preexisting diabetes did not create substantially greater liability for permanent disability nor did it result in substantially greater lost time from work." However, these facts fell under the compensation liability prong of the applicable statute. Furthermore, the Supreme Court found that the Commission ignored expert opinion that Claimant's injury most probably aggravated his diabetes and resulted in substantially greater medical costs than would have resulted from his work-related injury alone. The Second Industry Fund presented no evidence or expert opinion that contradicted the statement concerning medical costs. Therefore, based on the fact that the medical evidence supported the conclusion that the Claimant's work-related injury aggravated his diabetes and resulted in increased medical costs, the Court held that the State Accident Fund satisfied the requirements of section 42-9-400(a), and the Commission's decision to deny its claim for reimbursement of medical payments was clearly erroneous. View "State Accident Fund v. SC Second Injury Fund" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, Vicki Wilkinson appealed the circuit court's dismissal of her civil action with prejudice based on the motions filed by respondents East Cooper Community Hospital, Inc., Carolina Aesthetic Plastic Surgery Institute, P.A., and Dr. Thomas Hahm. Wilkinson argued on appeal that the court erred in finding: (1) the statute of limitations was not tolled because she failed to file an expert witness affidavit contemporaneously with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code; and (2) she failed to file her Complaint within the applicable statute of limitations given she did not contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with the Complaint or within forty-five days thereafter in accordance with section 15-36-100(C). This appeal implicated the Court of Appeals' decision in "Ranucci v. Crain," (723 S.E.2d 242 (Ct. App. 2012)) ("Ranucci I"). The Supreme Court reversed Ranucci I, holding that section 15-79-125(A) incorporatesdsection 15-36-100 in its entirety. Therefore, Wilkinson could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit with her NOI and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. However, because the analysis in Ranucci II was limited to the dismissal of the pre-litigation NOI, it was not dispositive since this case involved the next procedural step in medical malpractice litigation. Accordingly, the circuit court's order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Wilkinson v. East Cooper Community Hospital" on Justia Law

Shannon Ranucci appealed the circuit court's order dismissing her medical malpractice case for failing to contemporaneously file an expert witness affidavit with her Notice of Intent to File Suit ("NOI") pursuant to section 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code. Ranucci argued on appeal that the circuit court erred in finding the affidavit of her medical expert was not timely filed because section 15-79-125 incorporated section 15-36-100, which included a "safe harbor" provision that extends the time for filing the affidavit. The Court of Appeals, holding the pre-litigation filing requirement for a medical malpractice case found in section 15-79-125 incorporated only the parts of section 15-36-100 that related to the preparation and content of an expert's affidavit. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Court held that section 15-79-125(A) incorporated section 15-36-100 in its entirety. Thus, Ranucci could invoke section 15-36-100(C)(1), which extended the time for filing the expert witness affidavit and tolled the applicable statute of limitations. View "Ranucci v. Crain" on Justia Law

John Weik was convicted of murdering his former girlfriend following an argument over the couple's child. He confessed to the shooting and cooperated with law enforcement. There was never any dispute regarding guilt. During the sentencing phase, the State proceeded on two aggravating circumstances: burglary and torture. Regarding Weik's mental status, the defense relied on three mental health experts, who all of whom testified that Weik suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, including auditory and visual hallucinations, suicidal ideations, and paranoid delusions. The defense, however, failed to present readily available evidence concerning Weik's chaotic upbringing and dysfunctional family. It was the absence of the social history mitigation evidence that compelled the South Carolina Supreme Court, "under controlling United States Supreme Court precedents, to grant Weik a new sentencing hearing." View "Weik v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In approximately twenty years PCS Nitrogen, Inc. contributed to environmental contamination by manufacturing fertilizer and disturbing contaminated soil during various demolition activities. In 2003, Ashley II of Charleston, Inc. purchased 27.62 acres of the PCS's property. Since that time, Ashley II has incurred substantial costs in remediating the environmental contamination. In July 2008, Ashley II filed a complaint against PCS seeking a declaration of joint and several liability under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) due to costs of the environmental cleanup at the Site. Additionally, PCS asserted a third-party indemnification claim against the site's previous owner based on the indemnity provision in a 1966 purchase agreement, seeking indemnification for attorney's fees, costs, and litigation expenses incurred in establishing that the predecessor contributed to the contamination. The South Carolina Supreme Court anwered the following certified question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "Does the rule that a contract of indemnity will not be construed to indemnify the indemnitee against losses resulting from its own negligent acts, unless such intention is expressed in clear and unequivocal terms, apply when the indemnitee seeks contractual indemnification for costs and expenses resulting in part from its own strict liability acts? " In the context of the underlying claim in federal court, the South Carolina Court answered the question, "no." View "Ashley II v. PCS Nitrogen" on Justia Law

For about forty years, 100 and 200 children residing in the Mitford Community of Fairfield County have been attending Chester County School District (CCSD) schools in the Great Falls area of Chester County. The CCSD schools are closer to the Mitford Community than are any Fairfield County School District (FCSD) schools. The Mitford students have been attending CCSD schools at no cost to the students or their families. Mitford students' attendance at CCSD schools began as a result of a Federal 1970 desegregation order, which required the all African-American Mitford Elementary School be closed, and its students be given the choice of attending CCSD's Great Falls schools. The General Assembly passed Act No. 1236, consolidating the Mitford Community into CCSD. This Act was repealed the following year based on an agreement between FCSD and CCSD respecting the Mitford Community's students' enrollment in CCSD's schools. Under this agreement, FCSD paid CCSD $25,000 per year for educational expenses. This agreement ended in the 2009-10 school year when no agreement was reached for that year or thereafter. In light of the school districts' failure to reach an agreement for payment to CCSD for the cost of educating Mitford Community's students in CCSD's schools and FCSD's refusal to continue negotiations, the General Assembly passed Act No. 294 of 2010 in order to provide for a uniform arrangement between FCSD and CCSD. Pursuant to section 59-63-485(C), CCSD has invoiced the Fairfield County Treasurer for the expenses of educating the Mitford children for the past three school years. FCSD filed suit against the Respondents seeking a declaratory judgment that Act No. 294 was unconstitutional. CCSD, the State, and FCSD filed cross motions for summary judgment as to the constitutionality of Act No. 294. The circuit court issued an order denying FCSD's motion and granting CCSD and the State's motions for summary judgment, holding that Act No. 294 was constitutional special legislation, and FCSD appealed. In a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, the Board of Trustees for the FCSD appealed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State, CCSD, the Fairfield County Treasurer, and the State Department of Education. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Board of Trustees for the Fairfield County School District v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In early 2006, Deputy Chris Farrell responded to a domestic call at the home of defendant James Ramsey's estranged wife (Wife). Farrell interviewed both parties and noticed a bruise on Wife's hand, which she indicated was the result of Ramsey attempting to grab a phone from her. Based on his observations, Deputy Farrell issued Ramsey a uniform traffic ticket for criminal domestic violence (CDV). Ramsey moved to dismiss the charges for lack of jurisdiction. He argued that because the CDV was not committed in the presence of the officer, Deputy Farrell could not issue him a uniform traffic ticket under section 56-7-15(A), and absent a valid uniform traffic ticket, the magistrate lacked authority to hear the case. The magistrate agreed and dismissed the charges. The circuit court affirmed the dismissal on the alternative basis that only offenses listed under Section 56-710 of the South Carolina Code (2006), amended by 56-7-10 (Supp. 2013), allowed for prosecution solely based on a uniform traffic ticket and at the time the alleged crime was committed, CDV was not listed in section 56-7-10. Therefore, the circuit court concluded the magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear the CDV charge until an arrest warrant was issued. The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal. Although the court disagreed with the circuit court's conclusion that CDV could never be prosecuted in magistrate court absent an arrest warrant, it found that pursuant to section 56-7-15, an officer could only issue a uniform traffic ticket for CDV if the crime was committed in his presence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' opinion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Ramsey" on Justia Law