Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In August 2012, then-sixteen-year-old Appellant Stephen W. was charged with possession of marijuana. At the adjudicatory hearing, Appellant moved for a jury trial, claiming that he was entitled to a jury trial under the United States and South Carolina Constitutions. The family court denied Appellant's motion. The family court adjudicated Appellant delinquent and ordered that Appellant spend six consecutive weekends at the Department of Juvenile Justice, complete an alternative educational program, and continue with his prior probation for a period of time not to exceed his eighteenth birthday or until he obtained a G.E.D. Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. He argued that the family court erred in denying his motion for a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding. Because there was no constitutional right to a jury trial in a family court juvenile proceeding, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "In the Interest of Stephen W." on Justia Law

The Attorney General petitioned the Supreme Court to review two municipal courts' rulings addressing whether the Attorney General has the authority to prosecute criminal cases in magistrate and municipal courts. The first case involved Defendant Paul Gwinn who was charged with Criminal Domestic Violence (CDV). When the case was called for trial, Gwinn made a motion that the Attorney General could not prosecute the case because the municipal court was not a court of record, citing S.C. Const. art. V, sec. 24 (2009). The municipal court found that the Attorney General could prosecute the case. The second case involved the prosecution of Defendant Michael Long, also charged with CDV. Long moved to disqualify the Attorney General's office from prosecuting the case, arguing that the Attorney General is authorized to prosecute cases only in courts of record. The court granted the motion, ruling that the Attorney General did not have the authority to prosecute the case under art. V, sec. 24. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that art. V, sec. 24 does not prevent the Attorney General from prosecuting cases in summary courts. The Court therefore affirmed the trial court in Gwinn's case, and reversed the trial court in Long's case. View "South Carolina v. Gwinn" on Justia Law

In 2006, DLI Properties, LLC (DLI), hired Allen Tate, a real estate brokerage firm, and Faile, Allen Tate's licensee, to serve as its agents in connection with the sale of certain real property in Lancaster, South Carolina. Petitioners, using Sharon Davis of Davis Integrity Realty, Inc. as their broker, offered to purchase the property. Petitioners sued Respondents alleging fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA) based on DLI's acceptance of an offer on the property and Faile's representation that DLI would accept Petitioner's offer. Petitioners claimed Respondents made misrepresentations concerning the validity and effectiveness of their agreement to purchase the property. Petitioners asserted Respondents had a duty of care to communicate truthful information to Petitioners, and breached that duty by failing to disclose the ultimately successful offer, and the fact that DLI had not signed Petitioners' offer. Petitioners further alleged Respondents demonstrated a pattern of behavior sufficient to establish a SCUTPA violation. Petitioners appealed the circuit court's decision that granted summary judgment in favor of the Respondents. After careful consideration of the circumstances of the deal, the Supreme Court affirmed, noting that the appellate court erred only by not addressing the merits of Petitioners' appeal. On the merits, the Court affirmed the circuit court as modified. View "Woodson v. DLI Properties" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Department of Motor Vehicles suspended Petitioner Phillip Brown's driver's license following his arrest for driving under the influence (DUI). The Hearing Officer for the South Carolina Office of Motor Vehicles Hearings ("OMVH") rescinded the suspension on the ground that the arresting officer failed to present reliable evidence that the breathalyzer test was administered and the sample obtained in accordance with the provisions of section 56-5-2950. Specifically, the OMVH found that the required "simulator test" was not conducted prior to the actual test. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed and reinstated Petitioner's license suspension. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the ALC's order, finding Petitioner's failure to contemporaneously object to the arresting officer's testimony with respect to the functioning of the breathalyzer precluded the review of the issue on appeal. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's driver's license suspension. View "SCDMV v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue in this case centered on a workers' compensation lump-sum award to a claimant who passed away while an appeal of her award was pending. At issue before the Supreme Court was a Court of Appeals opinion that refused to reach Respondents-Petitioners' argument that the award abated upon the beneficiary's death; granted the entire lump-sum award to beneficiary's dependent grandsons; reversed the grant of interest on the award; and affirmed the reinstatement of a ten-percent penalty. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision with respect to the abatement issue and that court's holding that the ten-percent penalty should have been imposed in this case. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals decision requiring the entire lump-sum award be paid to the Grandsons, and reinstated the Estate's and Grandsons' settlement. The Court also reversed the Court of Appeals decision to remove the assessment of interest. The case was remanded for further proceedings on what sums were due pursuant to the Court's holding here. View "Hudson v. Lancaster Convalescent Center" on Justia Law

Appellants John Doe, Jane Doe 1, Jane Doe 2 and Jane Doe 3 separately sued Respondents the Bishop of Charleston and the Bishop of the Diocese of Charleston in his official capacity (respondents). The cases were consolidated, and respondents moved to dismiss on the pleadings. The trial court granted the motion. In 2007, respondents entered into a class action settlement agreement (the settlement) to settle the claims of "[a]ll individuals born on or before August 30, 1980 who, as minors, were sexually abused at any time by agents or employees of the Diocese of Charleston" as well as their spouses and parents, except those whose claims had been independently resolved. The settlement established a fund from which awards would be made to claimants who established their sexual abuse claims by arbitration. Appellants alleged they did not receive notice of the settlement. In 2009, after the claims and opt-out period provided for in the settlement had expired, they brought suit alleging claims of the type covered by the settlement. After careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the language of the settlement did not waive its res judicata effect as to future claimants, so that appellants were not entitled to treatment as class claimants; (2) however, dismissal on the pleadings was not warranted on the questions whether appellants were deprived of notice or adequate representation in the underlying class settlement and, if so, whether the statute of limitations was tolled on their claim of negligent supervision. If appellants could establish on remand that they were denied due process owing to lack of notice or because of inadequate representation in the class action proceedings, and that the statute of limitations was tolled, the Supreme Court held that they could proceed on their claims. View "Doe v. The Bishop of Charleston" on Justia Law

On February 14, 2013, the Attorney General received an ethics complaint, alleging possible violations of the Ethics Act by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Robert W. Harrell, Jr. The complaint was originally submitted by a private citizen to the House Legislative Ethics Committee. That same day, the Attorney General forwarded the complaint to South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED), and SLED carried out a 10-month criminal investigation into the matter. At the conclusion of the investigation, the Chief of SLED and the Attorney General petitioned the presiding judge of the state grand jury to impanel the state grand jury on January 13, 2014. Acting presiding judge of the state grand jury, the Honorable L. Casey Manning, subsequently impaneled the state grand jury. On February 24, 2014, the Speaker filed a motion to disqualify the Attorney General from participating in the grand jury investigation. On March 21, 2014, a hearing was held on the motion after which the court sua sponte raised the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. Another hearing was held, and the court found, as presiding judge of the state grand jury, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear any matter arising from the Ethics Act, and refused to reach the issue of disqualification. The court discharged the grand jury and ordered the Attorney General to cease his criminal investigation. The Attorney General appealed that order to the Supreme Court. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred in concluding that the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction over the original complaint. While the crime of public corruption could include violations of the Ethics Act, the state grand jury's jurisdiction is confined to the purposes set forth in the constitution and the state grand jury statute, as circumscribed by the impaneling order. While the Court reversed the circuit court's order, it "in no way suggest[ed] that it was error for the presiding judge to inquire whether the state grand jury was 'conducting investigative activity within its jurisdiction or proper investigative activity.'" The case was remanded for a decision on whether the Attorney General should have been disqualified from participating in the state grand jury proceedings. View "Harrell v. Attorney General of South Carolina" on Justia Law

This case arose out of plaintiff Ferguson Fire's efforts to obtain payment for materials it supplied to defendant Preferred Fire Protection, LLC for defendant Immedion's data center. In 2007, Immedion, a telecommunications company, hired Rescom, L.L.C. to be the general contractor for improvements planned for its data center on property Immedion leased in Greenville. Rescom, in turn, hired Preferred Fire, a fire sprinkler company, as a subcontractor. In addition, Immedion directly hired Preferred Fire under a separate contract to install a special "pre-action" fire suppression system1 in its data center. To complete this work, Preferred Fire purchased materials from Ferguson Fire. Ferguson Fire began delivering materials to Preferred Fire in August, 2007, and the deliveries continued through October. In September, while its deliveries were in progress, Ferguson Fire sent a "Notice of Furnishing Labor and Materials" to Immedion advising it in relevant part that it had been employed by Preferred Fire to deliver labor, services, or materials with an estimated value of $15,000.00 to Immedion's premises. The Notice of Furnishing advised that it was being given as "a routine procedure to comply with certain state requirements that may exist," and that it was not a lien, nor any reflection on Preferred Fire's credit standing. Immedion paid Preferred approximately half of the contract price for installation of the system before receiving Ferguson Fire's Notice of Furnishing. After receiving the Notice, Immedion issued two additional checks to Preferred Fire for the unpaid balance of the contract price. Immedion paid everything it owed to Rescom, and it also paid its contractor Preferred Fire in full under the separate contract for the fire suppression system. However, Preferred Fire never paid Ferguson Fire for the materials it furnished. Ferguson brought a mechanic's lien foreclosure action against Immedion and Preferred Fire. Ferguson Fire contended (and the Supreme Court agreed) that the Court of Appeals erred in adding requirements to S.C Code Ann. 29-5-40 (2007) (governing a notice of furnishing) that were not in the statute itself and in concluding Ferguson Fire did not establish an effective lien upon which a foreclosure action could be premised. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ferguson Fire v. Preferred Fire" on Justia Law

Appellant Bruce Hill was convicted of two murders and first-degree burglary, arising from a home invasion and double homicide in Horry County in 2005. He received concurrent life sentences for the murders and a concurrent thirty-year sentence for the burglary. Prior to Appellant's trial, another individual, Richard Gagnon, was tried and convicted of these murders. During Gagnon's trial, the State maintained that there were two perpetrators involved, as there was blood at the scene that could not belong to either victim or to Gagnon. From blood droplets found at the crime scene, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) developed a DNA profile. The profile did not match either of the victims or Gagnon's. Approximately four years after the murders, the Horry County Police Department (HCPD) was notified in a letter from SLED of a CODIS match for the unknown individual's blood found at the crime scene: Appellant's, who, at that time, was incarcerated in Tennessee (Appellant's DNA had been placed into the CODIS database by the Tennessee Department of Corrections). HCPD agents travelled to Tennessee for the purpose of obtaining a buccal swab on Appellant for further DNA comparison. However, the investigators who obtained this order subsequently left HCPD, and the evidence of the swab was lost. Arrest warrants were issued charging Appellant with burglary and murder. In 2010, Appellant requested the final deposition of the charges pending against him in South Carolina. The solicitor's office and the clerk of court acknowledged receipt of Appellant's request in September, 2010, which triggered the IAD 180-day clock to bring trial. Appellant arrived in South Carolina on October 21, 2010; On March 1, 2011, the last day of the 180-day Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) limit, a hearing on the State's motion for a six-month continuance was held. Appellant opposed the continuance arguing that the State did not meet its burden for obtaining a continuance under the IAD. The circuit court disagreed with Appellant and ruled that there was good cause for granting the State's request. In addition to granting a continuance, the court ordered that a "Schmerber" hearing be conducted the next week. At the final pretrial hearing, the circuit court: (1) ruled that neither the State nor Appellant could make any reference to Gagnon's conviction, as it was irrelevant to the determination of Appellant's guilt; and (2) denied Appellant's motion to suppress any mention of Appellant being in the CODIS database. Appellant was ultimately convicted on all counts, and he appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Hill" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to two counts of indecent exposure and was sentenced to two consecutive three-year terms, with credit for 253 days already served. Appellant contended the trial court erred in denying his request for a full evidentiary hearing before the circuit court determined whether appellant's indecent exposure pleas should have been classified as sexually violent offenses for purposes of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the SVP Act). Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court. View "South Carolina v. Wessinger" on Justia Law