Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Bruce Hill was convicted of two murders and first-degree burglary, arising from a home invasion and double homicide in Horry County in 2005. He received concurrent life sentences for the murders and a concurrent thirty-year sentence for the burglary. Prior to Appellant's trial, another individual, Richard Gagnon, was tried and convicted of these murders. During Gagnon's trial, the State maintained that there were two perpetrators involved, as there was blood at the scene that could not belong to either victim or to Gagnon. From blood droplets found at the crime scene, the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) developed a DNA profile. The profile did not match either of the victims or Gagnon's. Approximately four years after the murders, the Horry County Police Department (HCPD) was notified in a letter from SLED of a CODIS match for the unknown individual's blood found at the crime scene: Appellant's, who, at that time, was incarcerated in Tennessee (Appellant's DNA had been placed into the CODIS database by the Tennessee Department of Corrections). HCPD agents travelled to Tennessee for the purpose of obtaining a buccal swab on Appellant for further DNA comparison. However, the investigators who obtained this order subsequently left HCPD, and the evidence of the swab was lost. Arrest warrants were issued charging Appellant with burglary and murder. In 2010, Appellant requested the final deposition of the charges pending against him in South Carolina. The solicitor's office and the clerk of court acknowledged receipt of Appellant's request in September, 2010, which triggered the IAD 180-day clock to bring trial. Appellant arrived in South Carolina on October 21, 2010; On March 1, 2011, the last day of the 180-day Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act (IAD) limit, a hearing on the State's motion for a six-month continuance was held. Appellant opposed the continuance arguing that the State did not meet its burden for obtaining a continuance under the IAD. The circuit court disagreed with Appellant and ruled that there was good cause for granting the State's request. In addition to granting a continuance, the court ordered that a "Schmerber" hearing be conducted the next week. At the final pretrial hearing, the circuit court: (1) ruled that neither the State nor Appellant could make any reference to Gagnon's conviction, as it was irrelevant to the determination of Appellant's guilt; and (2) denied Appellant's motion to suppress any mention of Appellant being in the CODIS database. Appellant was ultimately convicted on all counts, and he appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Hill" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to two counts of indecent exposure and was sentenced to two consecutive three-year terms, with credit for 253 days already served. Appellant contended the trial court erred in denying his request for a full evidentiary hearing before the circuit court determined whether appellant's indecent exposure pleas should have been classified as sexually violent offenses for purposes of the Sexually Violent Predator Act (the SVP Act). Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court found no reversible error, and therefore affirmed the trial court. View "South Carolina v. Wessinger" on Justia Law

Appellant Donta Reid challenged the trial court's failure to suppress his confession, arguing it was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding the facts of this case fell within the purview of "Montejo v. Louisiana," (556 U.S. 778 (2009)). Furthermore contended the trial court erred in failing to grant a directed verdict of acquittal on the charges for possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime because the State failed to prove he actually or constructively possessed a firearm. The Supreme Court found those charges were properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Reid" on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Nation appealed a circuit court's decision to statutorily impose lifetime global positioning satellite (GPS) monitoring on him due to his prior guilty plea for a sex offense with a minor and subsequent probation violations. On appeal, Appellant brought various constitutional challenges to section 23-3-540 and contests the validity of five of our previous decisions involving the South Carolina Sex Offender Registry and statutory authorization of GPS monitoring of sex offenders. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Nation" on Justia Law

Lawrence Burgess was convicted of possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to three years in prison and ordered to pay a $25,000 fine. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Following the denial of his petition for rehearing, Burgess petitioned for a writ of certiorari to review the decision. The South Carolina Supreme Court granted the petition to review whether: (1) the multi-jurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement (which formed the purported basis of the arresting officer's authority to arrest Burgess outside of the officer's territorial jurisdiction) satisfied the statutory prerequisites to constitute a valid agreement; and (2) whether Burgess should have been permitted to cross-examine the arresting officer with his personnel records pursuant to Rule 608(c) of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence. Although the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed Burgess's conviction, it disagreed with the court's conclusion regarding the multijurisdictional drug-enforcement agreement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "South Carolina v. Burgess" on Justia Law

Appellant-wife Shirley Crossland contended on appeal to the Supreme Court that the court of appeals erred in reversing the family court's award of alimony, in modifying the equitable division of the marital estate, and in remanded an issue over attorney fees. With regard to the alimony issue, Wife argued the court of appeals erred in holding that, for the purposes of awarding alimony, income should be imputed to her based on her eligibility for social security retirement benefits she has not applied to receive. "Indeed, the family court may, but is not in all cases required to, consider eligibility for government benefits, and under the circumstances of this case, the family court did not commit reversible error. Thus the court of appeals erred in finding the family court was required to impute income to Wife based on social security benefits she is eligible to receive at age sixty-two. Although voluntary decreases in income may prompt a family court to consider a party's earning capacity instead of actual income, it is clear that 'the failure to reach earning capacity, by itself, does not automatically equate to voluntary underemployment such that income must be imputed.'" The Supreme Court agreed with Wife with regard to her remaining issues, reversed, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Crossland v. Crossland" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mildred H. Shatto sought workers' compensation benefits, claiming she was an employee of Respondent McLeod Regional Medical Center when she fell in an operating room and was injured. McLeod Regional opposed the claim on the basis of Shatto's purported status as an independent contractor. The Workers' Compensation Commission found that every factor of the common law employment analysis supported Shatto's contention of an employment relationship. The court of appeals reversed, finding that every factor of the common law employment analysis supported McLeod Regional's contention of an independent contractor relationship. The Supreme Court found disagreed with the appellate court's analysis and reversed its decision. View "Shatto v. McLeod Regional Medical Center" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court answered certified two questions from the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina. The case concerned supplemental health insurance policies, which differ from ordinary health insurance policies in both purpose and operation. The questions were: (1) whether the definition of "actual charges" contained within S.C. Code Ann. 38-71-242 be applied to insurance contracts executed prior to the statute's effective date; and (2) whether the South Carolina Department of Insurance could mandate the application of "actual charges" to policies already inexistence on the statute's effective dates by prohibiting an insurance company from paying claims absent the application of that definition. The South Carolina Supreme Court answered both questions "no." View "Kirven v. Central States" on Justia Law

The Standard Fire Insurance Company appealed a court of appeals' decision that reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in its favor, and finding respondents Thomas, Debra, and Christopher were entitled to stack underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage despite an exclusion in Standard Fire's policy purporting to limit an insured's ability to stack such coverage when the vehicles insured under the subject policy were not involved in the accident. After review of the trial and appellate court records, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Carter v. Standard Fire Insurance" on Justia Law

Appellant Ashley Hepburn appealed her conviction for homicide by child abuse. Sixteen-month-old Audrina Hepburn became unresponsive and was admitted to the hospital one evening in 2009. No one (including appellant) disputed the child died from child abuse. Only two people could have killed the child: appellant or her then-boyfriend, co-defendant Brandon Lewis. The jury found Appellant guilty of homicide by child abuse and Lewis guilty of aiding and abetting homicide by child abuse. The trial court sentenced Appellant to 45 years' imprisonment and Lewis to ten years' imprisonment suspended upon the service of seven years. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court erred in denying her mid-trial motion for directed verdict. After its review, the Supreme Court found the trial court should have granted appellant's motion, and directed a verdict of acquittal. View "South Carolina v. Hepburn" on Justia Law