Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

"Appellant and the Respondents are neighbors who obviously do not get along." Appellant Ursula Pallares brought suit alleging five claims against two of her neighbors, respondents Sharon Seinar and Lisa Maseng. Pallares claimed respondents had "mounted a campaign to harass and humiliate" her and to "drive her from her home." Pallares outlined four areas of conduct by one or both Respondents involving: (1) code violations; (2) nuisance animals; (3) a petition for a mental evaluation; and (4) requests for restraining orders, which Pallares averred gave rise to civil tort liability. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy. Pallares appealed, and the Supreme Court certified the case for review. Based on careful consideration of the facts in record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's grant of partial summary judgment to Respondents on Pallares's claim for malicious prosecution. However, the Court reversed the grant of summary judgment on Pallares's claim for abuse of process. View "Pallares v. Seinar" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this appeal centered on a court of appeals' decision to reverse the administrative law court's (ALC) final order, which reversed and denied the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's (DHEC) issuance of a permit to respondent MRR Highway, 92, LLC for a commercial construction, demolition waste and land-clearing debris (C&D) landfill (the Landfill). Upon review of the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in reversing the ALC, so it reversed and reinstated the ALC's final order. View "Engaging & Guarding Laurens County's Environment v. South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control" on Justia Law

Brian Hover, son of decedent Margaret Dever Hover Gurnham and the Personal Representative of her Estate, appealed the circuit court's order confirming the probate court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Beach First National Bank to enforce a deficiency judgment against the Estate. Hover argued the Bank's claim (which arose following a foreclosure action) was untimely and, thus, barred by section 62-3-8031 of the South Carolina Probate Code (Probate Code). Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed that the Bank's claim was barred because it was presented outside the time limits of the applicable statute. View "Beach First National Bank v. Estate of Gurnham" on Justia Law

Appellant Quashon Middleton was convicted on two counts of attempted murder and one count of possession of a weapon while committing a violent crime. Appellant pulled alongside his victims' stopped car one day in 2010 on his moped. He fired 5-7 times into the car, but none struck the car's occupants. But for the driver's hitting appellant as he sped away, the driver and passenger would have been killed. On appeal, appellant argued the trial judge erred in refusing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of assault and battery in the first degree, and this error required reversal. The Supreme Court agreed the trial court's failing to include the lesser-included charge was made in error, however, the Court concluded this error was harmless. View "South Carolina v. Middleton" on Justia Law

In 2005, Winyah Bay Holdings, LLC held an event aimed at selling marsh-front lots located in South Island Plantation, an affluent, unbuilt housing development. Winyah conducted the sale by lottery, and geared the event toward on-the-spot sales. Winyah had Wachovia Bank and two unrelated realty and marketing companies (the Realtors) set up booths to promote financing the lot sales. Respondents alleged that Winyah, the Realtors, and Wachovia further enticed potential buyers by promising that "day docks, roads, infrastructure, pool [sic], marsh walks, and other amenities would be in place within 18 months of the lottery." Respondents William and Judith Blackburn claimed these promises got them to participate in the lottery. Over six months later, Respondent William Blackburn delivered a promissory note to Wachovia in the amount of $463,967 to finance the purchase of one of the lots. The note was secured by a mortgage and unconditional personal guaranties executed by Tammy Winner, Watson Felder, and Respondents. Sometime in 2008, Respondents failed to make payments on the note. Wachovia then filed a foreclosure action. Respondents answered, asserting counterclaims against Wachovia, cross-claims against the South Island Plantation Association, Incorporated (the HOA), and a third-party complaint against the Seller and the Realtors. At issue here were the counterclaims against Wachovia, which included claims for negligent misrepresentation, promissory estoppel, breach of contract/breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud/fraud in the inducement, breach of contract/negligence, breach of contract, civil conspiracy, illegality of contract, and violations of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act (the SCUTPA). Wachovia appealed the court of appeals' decision to reverse the circuit court's determination that Respondents' counterclaims were within the scope of a jury trial waiver in the property sales documents. The Supreme Court affirmed the portion of the appellate courts' judgment finding that the waivers were executed knowingly and voluntarily; however, the Court reversed the portion finding that the outrageous and unforeseeable torts exception to arbitration applies in the jury trial waiver context, and found instead that Respondents waived their right to a jury trial on all of their counterclaims. View "Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn" on Justia Law

Petitioner Clarence Robinson appealed his conviction for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime. He claimed the trial court erred in finding the police had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop and search the vehicle in which he was riding as a passenger. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed petitioner's convictions. View "Robinson v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

When the Respondent City of Myrtle Beach transferred $302,545 of accommodations tax (A-Tax) funds into the City's general fund and bypassed the Act's provisions, Appellant Tourism Expenditure Review Committee (TERC) invoked its authority under section 6-4-35(B) and certified those expenditures as "noncomplian[t] to the State Treasurer." The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reversed TERC's noncompliance certification. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the ALC's acceptance of the City's characterization of the funds as "general funds" was error, because the City's internal documents unmistakably revealed that it "decided to sweep accommodations tax funds to the General Fund to cover tourism related public services." View "City of Myrtle Beach v. Tourism Expenditure Review Committee" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the admission of appellant Davontay Henson's codefendant's redacted confession during a joint trial violated appellant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the admission of the redacted confession indeed violated the Confrontation Clause because the jury could infer from the face of the confession that it referred to and incriminated Henson. View "South Carolina v. Henson" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case consist of four Charleston citizens' groups. Plaintiffs brought suit seeking an injunction against what they believed to be the unlawful use of a terminal by the Carnival Corporation's cruise ship, the "Fantasy." The Terminal is within the City's Old and Historic District which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places maintained by the United States Department of the Interior. Plaintiffs' complaint sought injunctive relief based on ten claims: seven based on City ordinances, a public nuisance claim, a private nuisance claim, and a claim based on the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court commissioned a report which concluded: that as a matter of law, none of the ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal; the Pollution Control Act did not govern the Fantasy's discharges in South Carolina waters; but that the complaint made sufficient allegations to set forth both a private and a public nuisance cause of action. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed exceptions to the report. After considering the report and the exceptions, the Supreme Court dismissed the noise ordinance, sign ordinance, and Pollution Control Act claims, and withheld ruling on the motions to dismiss on the five zoning and two nuisance claims. After ordering briefing on the issues of standing, preemption, and whether the zoning ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiffs lacked standing. Accordingly, the Court granted Carnival's motions to dismiss. View "Carnival Corporation v. Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood" on Justia Law

Jetter Pittman (Husband) and Gloria Pittman (Wife) were married in April 2000 and separated in March 2007. Wife petitioned for divorce on adultery grounds. Wife argued to the family court that Husband's land surveying business, Pittman Professional Land Surveying, Inc., was transmuted into marital property and was thus subject to equitable apportionment. Husband challenged the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the family court's finding of transmutation, which resulted in the inclusion of the land surveying business in the marital estate. Although the Supreme Court found the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's reliance on the parties' premarital conduct in the transmutation analysis, it nevertheless affirmed based on the parties' conduct during the marriage. The Supreme Court found the evidence supported the finding that the parties intended the land surveying business to be the common property of the marriage. View "Pittman v. Pittman" on Justia Law