Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner James Giles was convicted of first-degree burglary, strong arm robbery, and kidnapping. He was sentenced to thirty years', thirty years', and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the appellate court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences on the basis that the trial court improperly sustained the solicitor's "Batson" motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolinav. Giles" on Justia Law

White Oak Manor, Inc. owns and operates a nursing home in York. After sustaining injuries from the improper replacement of a feeding tube, a White Oak resident filed a lawsuit against the nursing home. White Oak ultimately settled the lawsuit without the involvement of its insurer, Lexington Insurance Company. White Oak subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against Lexington to determine coverage for the malpractice claim. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the validity of a service-of-suit clause in an insurance policy in light of Section 15-9-270 of the South Carolina Code (2005) which provides for service of process on an insurer through the Director of the Department of Insurance. The circuit court upheld the service-of-suit clause and refused to relieve the insurer from default judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive method for serving an insurance company. In its review, the Supreme Court disagreed that section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive means of service on an insurer and held that insurance policy provisions creating alternative methods of service are valid and binding on insurers. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision was reversed. View "White Oak Manor v. Lexington Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Barnes was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Samuel Sturrup, for which he received the death sentence. The judge sentenced appellant to death for the murder, but imposed no sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, appellant contended the trial court erred: (1) in permitting his attorney to call a defense psychiatrist to testify regarding his right to represent himself and in denying his "Faretta" request; (2) in limiting voir dire and in qualifying Juror #203; and (3) in refusing to dismiss the indictments because of the State's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) Act. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the trial judge applied the incorrect competency standard in denying appellant's Faretta request. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Ervin C. Gamble challenged his conviction for heroin trafficking. The Supreme Court found that record in this case did not demonstrate that probable cause supported Petitioner's arrest. The officer's testimony describes Petitioner's arrival at a certain location, and Petitioner's subsequent arrest, but did not explain why these events triggered the search. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Gamble" on Justia Law

A twelve-year-old Child was sexually assaulted and murdered. The Child's father, Billy Wayne Cope was convicted of murder, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), criminal conspiracy, and unlawful conduct towards a child. The court of appeals affirmed Cope's convictions. Cope raised four issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's refusal to admit certain evidence; (2) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's excluding certain evidence; (3) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to allow Cope's false-confessions expert to specifically discuss factually similar cases; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Cope's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of criminal conspiracy. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed Cope's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Cope" on Justia Law

Kenneth Poch and Kevin Key were temporary workers contracted through Personnel Resources of Georgia, Inc. and Carolina Staffing, Inc. d/b/a Job Place of Conway, to work for Bayshore Concrete Products/South Carolina, Inc. to clean up a concrete casting worksite and dismantle equipment used to produce concrete forms. As a result of a tragic, work-related accident, Poch was killed and Key was injured. Poch's estate and Key received workers' compensation benefits through Job Place. Subsequently, Key and his wife and the estate of Poch filed suit against Bayshore SC and its parent company, Bayshore Concrete Products Corporation. The circuit court granted the company's motion to dismiss the actions on the ground that workers' compensation was Petitioners' exclusive remedy and, therefore, the company was immune from liability in a tort action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. Though the Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, it found the court incorrectly analyzed Petitioners' arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "Poch v. Bayshore Concrete" on Justia Law

Appellant Justin B. challenged the active electronic monitoring requirements of section 23-3-540 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant argued that because he was a juvenile, the imposition of lifetime monitoring under the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court found that electronic monitoring was not a punishment, and rejected Appellant's claim. However, the Court concluded Appellant must be granted periodic judicial review to determine the necessity of continued monitoring. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

This action involved competing claims to the retirement benefits of the late Thomas Sullivan, a former National Football League (NFL) running back for the Philadelphia Eagles. Thomas married Lavona Hill in Maryland in 1979. They separated in 1983, but never divorced. In 1986, Thomas purported to marry Barbara Sullivan in South Carolina. Sullivan was unaware of Thomas' prior marriage to Hill. In 1991, Thomas submitted pension forms to the NFL indicating Sullivan was his current spouse. Thomas died in 2002. Thereafter, Sullivan filed a claim with the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan (the Plan), which provided benefits to a player's surviving spouse, defining the term as "a [p]layer's lawful spouse, as recognized under applicable state law." In November 2002, the Plan began paying Sullivan monthly benefits. Four years later, Hill contacted the Plan to request benefits. Following an investigation, the Plan suspended payments to Sullivan pending a court order identifying Thomas's surviving spouse. After Hill failed to obtain that order, the Plan resumed payments to Sullivan. In 2009, Hill filed this action against the Plan in Pennsylvania state court, claiming entitlement to Thomas's retirement benefits. The Plan promptly removed the case to federal district court and filed an interpleader counterclaim, joining Sullivan as a party. The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the South Carolina Supreme Court over whether South Carolina law recognized the "putative spouse" or "putative marriage" doctrine. The Supreme Court answered the certified question "no." View "Hill v. Bell" on Justia Law

Carl Aten, Jr. appealed the circuit court's order finding him personally liable for torts he committed as a member of a limited liability company (LLC). Although this case presented a novel question of whether the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (LLC Act) shields an LLC member from personal liability from his own torts, the Supreme Court declined to opine on that issue, and found that Aten committed no actionable tort. Therefore the Court reversed the portion of the circuit court's order which imposed personal liability upon Aten. View "16 Jade Street v. R. Design Construction" on Justia Law

Appellant Greg Issac appealed a trial court ruling that denied his request for a hearing to determine whether he was immune from prosecution under the Protection of Persons and Property Act. Appellant was indicted for murder, first degree burglary, attempted armed robbery and criminal conspiracy. Appellant contended that he was not afforded a hearing on his immunity issue. The trial court determined the Act did not apply to this case as a matter of law, specifically, that the intent of the Act was not to protect intruders and afford immunity to them or those who might enter the dwelling of another to commit a criminal act. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that the trial court's order was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed Appellant's appeal. View "South Carolina v. Isaac" on Justia Law