Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The plaintiffs in this case consist of four Charleston citizens' groups. Plaintiffs brought suit seeking an injunction against what they believed to be the unlawful use of a terminal by the Carnival Corporation's cruise ship, the "Fantasy." The Terminal is within the City's Old and Historic District which is listed on the National Register of Historic Places maintained by the United States Department of the Interior. Plaintiffs' complaint sought injunctive relief based on ten claims: seven based on City ordinances, a public nuisance claim, a private nuisance claim, and a claim based on the South Carolina Pollution Control Act. Following a hearing, the trial court commissioned a report which concluded: that as a matter of law, none of the ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal; the Pollution Control Act did not govern the Fantasy's discharges in South Carolina waters; but that the complaint made sufficient allegations to set forth both a private and a public nuisance cause of action. Plaintiffs and Defendants filed exceptions to the report. After considering the report and the exceptions, the Supreme Court dismissed the noise ordinance, sign ordinance, and Pollution Control Act claims, and withheld ruling on the motions to dismiss on the five zoning and two nuisance claims. After ordering briefing on the issues of standing, preemption, and whether the zoning ordinances applied to the Fantasy's use of the Terminal, the Supreme Court concluded Plaintiffs lacked standing. Accordingly, the Court granted Carnival's motions to dismiss. View "Carnival Corporation v. Historic Ansonborough Neighborhood" on Justia Law

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Jetter Pittman (Husband) and Gloria Pittman (Wife) were married in April 2000 and separated in March 2007. Wife petitioned for divorce on adultery grounds. Wife argued to the family court that Husband's land surveying business, Pittman Professional Land Surveying, Inc., was transmuted into marital property and was thus subject to equitable apportionment. Husband challenged the court of appeals' decision that affirmed the family court's finding of transmutation, which resulted in the inclusion of the land surveying business in the marital estate. Although the Supreme Court found the court of appeals erred in affirming the family court's reliance on the parties' premarital conduct in the transmutation analysis, it nevertheless affirmed based on the parties' conduct during the marriage. The Supreme Court found the evidence supported the finding that the parties intended the land surveying business to be the common property of the marriage. View "Pittman v. Pittman" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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Petitioner James Giles was convicted of first-degree burglary, strong arm robbery, and kidnapping. He was sentenced to thirty years', thirty years', and fifteen years' imprisonment, respectively, to be served concurrently. On appeal to the Supreme Court, he argued the appellate court erred in affirming his convictions and sentences on the basis that the trial court improperly sustained the solicitor's "Batson" motion. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "South Carolinav. Giles" on Justia Law

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White Oak Manor, Inc. owns and operates a nursing home in York. After sustaining injuries from the improper replacement of a feeding tube, a White Oak resident filed a lawsuit against the nursing home. White Oak ultimately settled the lawsuit without the involvement of its insurer, Lexington Insurance Company. White Oak subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action against Lexington to determine coverage for the malpractice claim. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the validity of a service-of-suit clause in an insurance policy in light of Section 15-9-270 of the South Carolina Code (2005) which provides for service of process on an insurer through the Director of the Department of Insurance. The circuit court upheld the service-of-suit clause and refused to relieve the insurer from default judgment. The court of appeals reversed, holding section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive method for serving an insurance company. In its review, the Supreme Court disagreed that section 15-9-270 provided the exclusive means of service on an insurer and held that insurance policy provisions creating alternative methods of service are valid and binding on insurers. Accordingly, the court of appeals' decision was reversed. View "White Oak Manor v. Lexington Insurance Company" on Justia Law

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Appellant Steven Barnes was convicted of kidnapping and murdering Samuel Sturrup, for which he received the death sentence. The judge sentenced appellant to death for the murder, but imposed no sentence for kidnapping. On appeal, appellant contended the trial court erred: (1) in permitting his attorney to call a defense psychiatrist to testify regarding his right to represent himself and in denying his "Faretta" request; (2) in limiting voir dire and in qualifying Juror #203; and (3) in refusing to dismiss the indictments because of the State's failure to comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) Act. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found the trial judge applied the incorrect competency standard in denying appellant's Faretta request. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Ervin C. Gamble challenged his conviction for heroin trafficking. The Supreme Court found that record in this case did not demonstrate that probable cause supported Petitioner's arrest. The officer's testimony describes Petitioner's arrival at a certain location, and Petitioner's subsequent arrest, but did not explain why these events triggered the search. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Gamble" on Justia Law

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A twelve-year-old Child was sexually assaulted and murdered. The Child's father, Billy Wayne Cope was convicted of murder, two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC), criminal conspiracy, and unlawful conduct towards a child. The court of appeals affirmed Cope's convictions. Cope raised four issues on appeal to the Supreme Court: (1) whether the court of appeals erred in upholding the trial court's refusal to admit certain evidence; (2) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's excluding certain evidence; (3) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's refusal to allow Cope's false-confessions expert to specifically discuss factually similar cases; and (4) whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the trial court's denial of Cope's motion for a directed verdict on the charge of criminal conspiracy. Finding no reversible error by the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed Cope's convictions. View "South Carolina v. Cope" on Justia Law

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Kenneth Poch and Kevin Key were temporary workers contracted through Personnel Resources of Georgia, Inc. and Carolina Staffing, Inc. d/b/a Job Place of Conway, to work for Bayshore Concrete Products/South Carolina, Inc. to clean up a concrete casting worksite and dismantle equipment used to produce concrete forms. As a result of a tragic, work-related accident, Poch was killed and Key was injured. Poch's estate and Key received workers' compensation benefits through Job Place. Subsequently, Key and his wife and the estate of Poch filed suit against Bayshore SC and its parent company, Bayshore Concrete Products Corporation. The circuit court granted the company's motion to dismiss the actions on the ground that workers' compensation was Petitioners' exclusive remedy and, therefore, the company was immune from liability in a tort action. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's order. Though the Supreme Court agreed with the result reached by the Court of Appeals, it found the court incorrectly analyzed Petitioners' arguments. Accordingly, the Court affirmed as modified. View "Poch v. Bayshore Concrete" on Justia Law

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Appellant Justin B. challenged the active electronic monitoring requirements of section 23-3-540 of the South Carolina Code. Appellant argued that because he was a juvenile, the imposition of lifetime monitoring under the statute constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the federal and state constitutions. The Supreme Court found that electronic monitoring was not a punishment, and rejected Appellant's claim. However, the Court concluded Appellant must be granted periodic judicial review to determine the necessity of continued monitoring. View "In the Interest of Justin B." on Justia Law

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This action involved competing claims to the retirement benefits of the late Thomas Sullivan, a former National Football League (NFL) running back for the Philadelphia Eagles. Thomas married Lavona Hill in Maryland in 1979. They separated in 1983, but never divorced. In 1986, Thomas purported to marry Barbara Sullivan in South Carolina. Sullivan was unaware of Thomas' prior marriage to Hill. In 1991, Thomas submitted pension forms to the NFL indicating Sullivan was his current spouse. Thomas died in 2002. Thereafter, Sullivan filed a claim with the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle NFL Player Retirement Plan (the Plan), which provided benefits to a player's surviving spouse, defining the term as "a [p]layer's lawful spouse, as recognized under applicable state law." In November 2002, the Plan began paying Sullivan monthly benefits. Four years later, Hill contacted the Plan to request benefits. Following an investigation, the Plan suspended payments to Sullivan pending a court order identifying Thomas's surviving spouse. After Hill failed to obtain that order, the Plan resumed payments to Sullivan. In 2009, Hill filed this action against the Plan in Pennsylvania state court, claiming entitlement to Thomas's retirement benefits. The Plan promptly removed the case to federal district court and filed an interpleader counterclaim, joining Sullivan as a party. The United States Third Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question to the South Carolina Supreme Court over whether South Carolina law recognized the "putative spouse" or "putative marriage" doctrine. The Supreme Court answered the certified question "no." View "Hill v. Bell" on Justia Law