Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Lawton Limehouse, Sr. ("Father") and Lawton Limehouse, Jr. ("Son") each sued attorney Paul Hulsey, and his law practice (collectively, "Hulsey") for defamation arising out of statements Hulsey made about L&L Services, LLC ("L&L"), a staffing agency they owned. Local newspapers published articles concerning housing raids performed on homes rented by L&L and fines assessed for overcrowding, inadequate heating and plumbing, and running illegal boarding houses. Hulsey filed a class action lawsuit in federal court on behalf of former employees of L&L, alleging violations of the RICO Act and other state and federal laws. One article quoted Hulsey as stating that L&L engaged in a "classic racketeering scheme . . . just like Tony Soprano." Neither Father nor Son was mentioned by name in the article. The case was moved to federal court based on the RICO claim; the federal court remanded the case back to the state court on the ground it lacked federal question jurisdiction over the issues presented. After the remand, the state court clerk of court entered a default against Hulsey. Following a damages hearing, a jury awarded Father $2.39 million in actual damages and $5 million in punitive damages. While the appeal in Father's case was pending, a damages hearing was held for Son's case. A jury awarded Son $1 million in actual damages and $2.6 million in punitive damages. Hulsey appealed both judgments. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court found that the state court proceedings were void as the lack of a certified remand order precluded the state court from resuming jurisdiction over the cases. The cases were remanded back to the circuit court to start over from the procedural point at which the state court received a certified remand order from the federal court. View "Limehouse v. Hulsey" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was one of first impression centering on the foreclosure on a member of a limited liability company's (LLC) interest under the South Carolina Uniform Limited Liability Company Act. Kriti Ripley, LLC and Emerald Investments, LLC formed Ashley River Properties II, LLC for the purpose of developing a parcel of property. Emerald made in-kind contributions for its share in Ashley River II, and Kriti contributed cash. Immediately, Emerald and its sole member, Stuart Longman, diverted and misappropriated those funds. Upon learning of Emerald and Longman's wrongdoing, Kriti and Ashley River II obtained a judgment against Emerald and Longman, and Emerald was stripped of its voting rights in and management of Ashley River II. Since then, Emerald and Longman refused to pay any amount towards the judgment and instead have engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation. Kriti and Ashley River II obtained a charging order against Emerald's interest and later moved to foreclose on that interest. The circuit court denied the motion for foreclosure. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court erred in denying the motion to foreclose, finding that it failed to consider the likelihood of satisfaction of the judgment through distributions. The Court remanded the case for foreclosure and the sale of Emerald's interest in Ashley River II. View "Kriti Ripley, LLC v. Emerald Investments" on Justia Law

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Employee-claimant Cathy Bone filed a workman's compensation claim for a work-related injury. The employer, U.S. Food Service, and its carrier Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America disputed the claim. The single commissioner and an Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission issued orders denying the claim. Under the procedure then in place, Bone appealed to the circuit court, which concluded the injury was compensable and remanded the matter to the Commission for further proceedings. The employer appealed the circuit court's order, and the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal on the basis the order was not a "final judgment" and thus not immediately appealable because further proceedings were ordered before the administrative agency. The Supreme Court granted Petitioners' petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The high court subsequently granted a petition for rehearing filed by the employer, and it additionally granted the following two motions: (1) Bone's motion to argue against precedent, and (2) the motion of the South Carolina Defense Trial Attorneys' Association to accept its Amicus Curiae Brief in support of Petitioners. After considering the record in this matter, as well as the briefs and arguments, the Court adhered to its original decision to affirm. View "Bone v. U.S. Food Service" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Robert Taylor appealed the post-conviction relief court's denial of relief on the grounds that he did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel though his plea counsel failed to advise him of the consequences of a guilty plea. He also argued that counsel failed to fully investigate one of the charges prior to his plea. Finding that Petitioner did not demonstrate he was prejudiced by his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Taylor v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

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In 2001, Petitioner James Miller pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child under sixteen, and criminal domestic violence of a high and aggravated nature. He was sentenced for the lewd act to fifteen years in prison, suspended upon ten years of service and five years' probation. Petitioner was also to undergo counseling and have no contact with children while on probation. Probation began in 2005; however Petitioner was not immediately released, but referred for review as to whether he should be deemed a sexually violent predator (SVP) and subjected to civil commitment. The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was the question of whether Petitioner's probation for a criminal offense should have been tolled during his civil commitment as a SVP. The lower courts affirmed the tolling, but the Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Miller" on Justia Law

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Petitioners' properties were in danger of foreclosure. Prior to any foreclosure action, Petitioners obtained loan modifications from their respective lenders to extend their loans' maturity dates and receive additional time to pay. Petitioners were unable to keep up with payments under the modification, and sought to prevent foreclosure arguing that the lenders engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by modifying the loans without an attorney. The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that modifying the loans without attorneys was not the unauthorized practice of law. View "Crawford v. Central Mortgage" on Justia Law

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Appellant John Rainey sued the Honorable Nikki Haley, Goveror of South Carolina, seeking a declaration that the Governor violated the State Ethics Act when she was a member of the House of Representatives. The circuit court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, finding the House Ethics Committee had exclusive jurisdiction to hear ethics complaints against its members. The Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Rainey v. Haley" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Edward Sloan and the South Carolina Public Interest Foundation filed suit in the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction for a determination of whether the South Carolina Transportation Infrastructure Bank was constitutional. Plaintiffs alleged the Bank violated both the dual office holding and the separation of powers prohibitions of the South Carolina Constitution. Finding the statute at issue here (11-43-140, So. Car. Code (2011)) was constitutional, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Bank. View "SC Public Interest Foundation v. SC Transportation Infrastructure Bank" on Justia Law

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Suits were filed in Alabama and South Carolina in this divorce case. In 2007, the husband filed for divorce in Alabama, alleging he was a resident of Alabama, and his wife was a resident of South Carolina. Wife accepted service of the complaint, but approximately one month later, sued in South Carolina effectively responding point for point to the husband's Alabama case. After the wife's attempts to serve her husband failed, she was permitted to serve her husband by publication in Alabama. The husband never responded to her pleading. An Alabama attorney filed a limited notice of appearance on the wife's behalf in Alabama, challenging jurisdiction and moving the court to dismiss the husband's complaint. The Alabama court denied the wife's motion and set the matter for trial. Meanwhile, in South Carolina, the court awarded the wife alimony and divided the marital property. The South Carolina court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and subject matter jurisdiction over the division of property, noting the husband's Alabama attorney sought to have the South Carolina action dismissed, but was not admitted pro hac vice in South Carolina, and therefore did not respond to husband's motion. A hearing was held in Alabama; wife's counsel had withdrawn and was not replaced. The Alabama court found it had jurisdiction over the parties and their property, declared the South Carolina judgment null and void, and divided the parties' marital property. With his Alabama judgment, the husband filed a Rule 60(b) motion in South Carolina to have wife's judgment vacated. Upon review, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded: the Alabama court's grant of divorce should be given full faith and credit; the wife was not entitled to bring her South Carolina action for division of property or attorney's fees; by making a limited appearance in Alabama, wife was bound by Alabama law, and abandoned her opportunity to contest personal jurisdiction there. Since Alabama would have given its order res judicata effect, it was entitled to full faith and credit. Therefore, the husband's Rule 60(b) motion the South Carolina orders should have been granted. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Ware v. Ware" on Justia Law

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The issue before the Supreme Court centered on the grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondent Action Concrete Contractors, Inc. in a mechanic's lien foreclosure action. Owners Elvira Chappelear, Craig Chappelear, Premier Southern Homes, LLC, Henry G. Beal, Jr. and First Citizens Bank and Trust Co., Inc. argued on appeal there were material issues of fact and that the grant of summary judgment was inappropriate. The Supreme Court disagreed after its review of the trial court record and affirmed. View "Action Concrete v. Chappelear" on Justia Law