Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted defendant Brad Sigmon of two counts of murder and burglary in the first degree, and it subsequently sentenced him to death. His convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal. Upon review of his application for post-conviction relief (PCR), the Supreme Court found that defendant did not present evidence that he was afforded ineffective assistance of counsel. In light of this conclusion, it was not necessary for the Court to reach the second prong of prejudice in analyzing Defendant's entitlement to PCR. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the PCR court's dismissal of defendant's application for post-conviction relief. View "Sigmon v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Petitioner Steven Barnes was convicted of throwing urine on a jailor and received a fifteen-year sentence consecutive to the sentence he was then serving. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review an unpublished Court of Appeals' decision which affirmed the trial court's decision to have a twice deadlocked jury continue to deliberate in petitioner's case. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with petitioner that the trial court's decision violated the mandate of S.C. Code Ann. 14-7-1330 (1976) and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming his direct appeal. Accordingly, the Court reversed lower courts and remanded the case for a new trial. View "South Carolina v. Barnes" on Justia Law

Appellant Lawrence Brown challenged his conviction for grand larceny of two motor vehicles. On appeal, he argued: (1) whether the amendment to section 16-13-30 of the South Carolina Code should be applied retroactively to Appellant's case; and (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant's motion for a directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the amendment to the applicable statute in this case, 16-13-30, should not be applied retroactively: "Appellant's argument regarding the absence of a savings clause is merely an attempt to confuse the issues. . . Appellant clearly incurred liability for grand larceny at the time he committed the crime." Furthermore, the Court found that the stolen vehicles met the statutory monetary threshold for grand larceny. View "South Carolina v. Brown" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether former foster parents had standing to petition to adopt a child placed for adoption by the Department of Social Services (DSS) with a different family. Upon review of the trial court record in this case, the Supreme Court concluded that the former foster parents possessed neither statutory or constitutional standing, and therefore vacated the order that granted the parents' petition, and remanded custody of the child to DSS for adoptive placement. "[R]ecognizing that children develop rapidly, and that stability and attachment are important components in their growth and development, [the Court directed] DSS to consider [the] child's present best interests in placing her for adoption." View "Youngblood v. South Carolina Dep't of Soc. Svcs" on Justia Law

Petitioner Michael Crisp, Jr. worked for Employer SouthCo, Inc., seeding grass and performing odd construction jobs. In 2004, Petitioner and other workers were installing silt fencing to combat ground erosion. Petitioner held a pole while another worker operated the Bobcat. As Petitioner bent down to reach for a pole, the bucket of the Bobcat fell on Petitioner, covering him. Petitioner suffered injuries to his head and hands. At the emergency room, Petitioner was treated for abrasions and bruises to the back of the head and neck and a complex fracture in his right hand. There was no mention of a brain injury in Petitioner's hospital records. Nearly two years after his injury, Petitioner's doctor opined that Petitioner sustained physical brain injury as a result of his 2004 injury. Petitioner's eventual workers' compensation claim for the brain injury was denied, and he petitioned the Supreme Court for review of an appellate court's decision to reverse a circuit court's finding that he sustained a compensable brain injury. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further consideration of whether Petitioner sustained physical brain damage as contemplated under the Workers' Compensation Act which would entitle him to benefits for life. View "Crisp v. SouthCo." on Justia Law

Palmetto Hardwood, Inc. employed Petitioner Clifton Sparks as a saw operator. Petitioner suffered three work-related injuries during this employment, the first two of which injured Petitioner's lower back. In the third incident, Petitioner was required to remove a piece of metal from under a gang saw. In the process, the metal exploded and a three- to four-inch cubic piece struck him in the head. Petitioner subsequently sought workers' compensation for his injuries. Six doctors opined regarding whether Petitioner had suffered a physical brain injury. The Commission found that Petitioner had sustained a compensable injury to his head. It also found him to be totally and permanently disabled. The Commission ruled that Petitioner should receive only five hundred weeks of compensation as a result of his total and permanent disability and medical expenses causally related to the three compensable injuries. On appeal, the circuit court remanded to the Commission for it: (1) to explain whether the "physical brain injury" it found "border[ed] on the frivolous" was intended to be the same as or different from "physical brain damage" as used in section 42-9-10 (C); and (2) to reconcile the order's seemingly contradictory findings that Petitioner suffered a compensable injury to the head with its finding of no physical brain injury. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the Commission's order. Petitioner subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed in an unpublished opinion. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Petitioner argued that the Court of Appeals erred when it applied an improper definition of "physical brain damage" within the meaning of section 42-9-10(C). The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the circuit court. View "Sparks v. Palmetto Hardwood" on Justia Law

Appellant Stephen Christopher Stanko appealed his conviction and death sentence for murder and armed robbery. A grant jury indicted him for the death of Henry Turner in 2005. At trial, he relied on an insanity defense, specifically, that he suffered from central nervous system dysfunction, and at the time of the Victim's murder he did not understand "legal right from wrong." Appellant argued that the trial court erred by instructing the jury that it could infer malice from the use of a deadly weapon where Appellant presented an insanity defense. Though the Supreme Court agreed that the instruction was given in error, it was not reversible error entitling appellant to the relief he requested. Accordingly the Court affirmed appellant's conviction and sentence. View "South Carolina v. Stanko" on Justia Law

Appellant Andrew Lee Harrison contended on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to find that the penalty portion of section 56-5-1210 violated the Eighth Amendment. In 2009, appellant was traveling along the highway in the same direction as victim Gary Tims and Daniel Gantt. The victim and Gantt were both riding motorcycles. Gantt rode approximately one "bike length" behind the Victim. Appellant entered the highway, but instead of utilizing the right lane, pulled his vehicle into the left lane. The victim lost temporary control of his motorcycle and shifted to the right lane to avoid appellant's vehicle. However, Appellant simultaneously switched to the right lane and the victim struck the rear of appellant's truck. The victim's motorcycle "flipped over" and landed in the highway. Appellant did not stop, but continued driving. Gantt followed appellant until appellant pulled over approximately one-half mile from the accident. Gantt informed appellant that the victim was "laying [sic] down in the highway," and that Gantt did not know whether the victim was "dead or alive." Appellant inspected the damage to the truck and stated that he did not possess a valid driver's license, because his driver's license had been suspended. Appellant agreed to return to the scene of the accident. However, once Gantt departed to return to the scene, appellant travelled in the opposite direction. He was ultimately charged with driving under suspension and leaving the scene with death, a violation of section 56-5-1210. The trial court sentenced Appellant to twenty years' imprisonment for leaving the scene with death, and a concurrent sentence of six months' imprisonment for driving under suspension. "When the proportionality principle jurisprudence is applied to section 56-51210 it is not evident that its repugnance to the constitution is clear beyond a reasonable doubt." The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's conclusion that section 56-5-1210 of the South Carolina Code was constitutional. View "South Carolina v. Harrison" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the scope of an arbitration clause under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). Respondent Christopher Landers served as Appellant Atlantic Bank & Trust's executive vice president pursuant to an employment contract. The contract contained a broad arbitration provision. Respondent alleged five causes of action, namely that he was constructively terminated from his employment as a result of Appellant Neal Arnold's tortious conduct towards him. Appellants moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the employment contract. The trial court found that only Respondent's breach of contract claim was subject to the arbitration provision, while his other four causes of action comprised of several tort and corporate claims were not within the scope of the arbitration clause. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "Landers' pleadings provide a clear nexus between his claims and the employment contract sufficient to establish a significant relationship to the employment agreement. We find the claims are within the scope of the agreement's broad arbitration provision." The Court reversed the trial court's order and held that all of Respondent's causes of action must be arbitrated. View "Landers v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case arose from an administrative law court's (ALC) decision authorizing Respondent Kiawah Development Partners to construct a bulkhead and revetment on Captain Sam's Spit (the Spit) on Kiawah Island. In 1999, the Office of Coastal Resource Management (OCRM) established a baseline and building set back line twenty feet landward based on information that the Spit had accreted, and had not been subject to any significant, measurable erosion between 1959 and 1999. The movement of the baseline prompted Respondent to consider development of the Spit. On February 29, 2008, Respondent submitted an application to DHEC for a permit to construct a combination bulkhead and revetment in the area. On December 18, 2008, DHEC issued a conditional permit approving the construction of the erosion control structure for a distance of 270 feet. DHEC refused the permit request for a remaining 2,513 feet based on its concerns regarding cumulative negative impacts, including interference with natural inlet formation and possible adverse effects on wintering piping plovers. DHEC also determined that the project was contrary to the policies set forth in the Coastal Zone Management Program (CZMP). Respondent requested a final review conference by the DHEC Board, but the Board declined to hold a review conference. Respondent then requested a contested case hearing before the ALC, and challenged the denial of the construction of a bulkhead and revetment along the remaining 2,513 feet. The Coastal Conservation League (CCL) opposed the construction of any bulkhead or revetment on the Spit, and also requested a contested case hearing challenging the decision to authorize the 270 foot structure, but supporting denial of the remainder. The cases were consolidated. The ALC granted Respondent's permit to construct the bulkhead and revetment, subject to certain conditions reducing and altering its size. DHEC and CCL (collectively, Appellants) appealed the ALC's order. The Supreme Court reversed the ALC and remanded the issue in a decision published in late 2011. The Court subsequently granted Respondent's petition for rehearing, and accepted an amicus brief from the Savannah River Maritime Commission (the SRMC). The Court then withdrew its initial opinion, and issue this opinion, affirmed the decision of the ALC. "The essence of Appellants' argument is rooted in dissatisfaction with the verbiage and structure of the ALC's order, and not in actual errors of law or the absence of substantial evidence. The ALC acted within the permissible scope of its authority in modifying the existing permit to include a structure no larger than that requested by Respondent or initially reviewed by DHEC. On appeal of a contested case, we must affirm the ALC if the findings are supported by substantial evidence." View "Kiawah Development v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law