Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants Robert Buchanan, Jr. and Adele Pope, formerly personal representatives for The Estate of James Brown and trustees of The James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust, appealed circuit court orders that: (1) approved a settlement agreement of pending litigation concerning the estate; and (2) removed Appellants from their fiduciary positions and appointed Russell L. Bauknight as personal representative and trustee. At the heart of this case is the estate of singer-entertainer James Brown, estimated to be worth between $5 million to $100 million. Brown devised all of his personal and household effects to six named adult children, with the remainder left to the James Brown 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Albert Dallas, Alfred Bradley, and David Cannon were named as the co-personal representatives of Brown's estate and as the co-trustees of the 2000 Irrevocable Trust. Brown's will and trust each contained a no-contest clause, which provided that any beneficiary who challenged the will or the 2000 Irrevocable Trust "shall forfeit his or her entire interest thereunder." Brown expressly disavowed any other potential beneficiaries. In 2001, Brown and Tommie Rae Hynie executed a prenuptial agreement whereby she waived any right to Brown's property or the receipt of alimony, including any claim for an interest in his estate. In 2004, Brown sought to annul the marriage, finding Tommie Rae was married to someone else. The couple had one child born prior to the prenuptial agreement or marriage. The parties dismissed their respective suits in a consent order late 2004, whereby Tommie Rae waived any claim of common law marriage. In 2007, five of the six adult children Brown named in his will and Tommie Rae, brought actions to set aside Brown's will and the 2000 Irrevocable Trust based on undue influence. They alleged Brown's estate should pass by the laws of intestate succession. Tommie Rae claimed that she was entitled to an elective share or an omitted spouse's share of Brown's estate and that her son, James B. (via a guardian ad litem), was entitled to a share of the estate as an omitted child. The probate court transferred these claims to the circuit court. Ultimately, the three original fiduciaries either resigned or were removed from their positions as personal representatives and trustees. A (New) Charitable Trust, similar to the existing Charitable Trust formed from the 2000 Irrevocable Trust, was to be created by the Attorney General (AG) with the advice and counsel of the parties. An Advisory Board was to be established, whose members would "serve at the pleasure of and on such terms as the [AG] shall decide." The number of members on the Advisory Board was to be determined by the AG, but would include a member selected by Tommie Rae and one selected by each of Brown's adult children, and the roles of all members of the board were expressly stated to "be solely advisory." A trust similar to the Brown Family Education Trust was to be established for the education of the grandchildren and their issue, to be funded with $2 million. The circuit court approved the compromise agreement and directed Appellants to execute the agreement. At the request of the settling parties, the circuit court appointed Bauknight to have full authority as the personal representative for Brown's estate and as trustee, and Appellants were removed from those positions. Appellants appealed these rulings as well as additional, related orders, and the Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's removal of Appellants from their fiduciary positions, but, in light of its decision invalidating the circuit court's approval of the compromise agreement, the Court directed the circuit court to appoint new, neutral fiduciaries to oversee these matters. View "In re: The Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

Respondent James Farmer operated a retail store in Florence County. In 2007, Petitioner Florence County Sheriff's Office executed a search warrant and seized the store's inventory, consisting of clothing, shoes, movie DVDs, and music CDs. Respondent was subsequently indicted in January 2008 for one count of trafficking in counterfeit goods and one count of illegal distribution of recordings. He pled guilty to illegally distributing not more than 25 audiotapes or more than 10 videos and the counterfeit goods indictment was dismissed. In early February 2008, respondent's attorney wrote a letter to petitioner seeking return of the allegedly counterfeit goods. In March 2008, counsel sent a second letter. Respondent sued petitioner on May 30, 2008, approximately nine months after the goods were seized and approximately four months after respondent pled guilty to piracy and the counterfeit goods charge was dismissed. The trial court dismissed respondent's suit, and he appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that respondent's remedy under these circumstances was found in South Carolina Code section 39-15-1195(H). Instead of exercising that option, he chose instead to bring this replevin action, a remedy specifically forbidden by section 39-15-1195(D). The circuit court erred in not dismissing respondent's suit, and the Court of Appeals compounded the error. The Court was informed that petitioner no longer had custody of the seized property, and it expressed its "disappointment" that the property was not safeguarded during the pendency of this matter. Since respondent's attorney acknowledged at oral argument that respondent could not establish that the seized goods were not counterfeit within the meaning of 39-15-1190, the Court did not address whether he would otherwise have a remedy against petitioner. The decision of the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the decision of the circuit court reversed. View "Farmer v. Florence County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

From 2002 through 2004, George Harper and his law firm at that time, Jackson Lewis, represented EnerSys Delaware, Inc. in a variety of employment and labor law matters. Harper served as EnerSys' attorney of record in at least five employment-related lawsuits during this time. The relationship between Jackson Lewis and EnerSys deteriorated in 2004 when EnerSys brought a malpractice claim against the firm based on some labor-related legal advice that it claimed resulted in fraudulent testimony. In 2011, EnerSys filed this suit against a former EnerSys employee, Tammy Hopkins, alleging six causes of action including breach of contract based on violations of the confidentiality agreement and various computer use policies and agreements, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. When EnerSys learned that Hopkins had retained Harper to represent her, it moved to have him disqualified pursuant to Rule 1.9(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Harper's previous assistance in developing EnerSys' litigation strategy was insufficient grounds upon which to disqualify him due to the dissimilarities of his previous representations and the current suit. EnerSys then filed this appeal. This case presented the question of whether the denial of a motion to disqualify an attorney was immediately appealable. The Supreme Court held it was not and dismissed the case as interlocutory. View "EnerSys Delaware v. Hopkins" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were married for thirty years. Following the onset of serious health problems (for both), they separated. A family court judge was tasked with identifying and dividing the marital estate upon dissolution of the marriage. The issue before the Supreme Court in this matter centered on whether trust distributions could be considered marital property. The Court ruled that they can in limited circumstances. Further, the Court affirmed the family court's division of the marital estate, but reversed the inclusion of one tract of timber. The Court also reversed the reservation of alimony to the wife and modified that portion of the order that required the husband to pay the wife's attorney's fees and costs. View "Wilburn v. Wilburn" on Justia Law

The United States District Court certified the following question to the South Carolina Supreme Court: "Does the 'dual persona' doctrine allow an injured employee to bring an action in tort against his employer as a successor in interest who, through a corporate merger, received all liabilities of a predecessor corporation that never employed the injured person but allegedly performed the negligent acts that later caused the employee's injuries, or is such action barred by the exclusivity provision of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act?" The decedent-employee of Walterboro Veneer, Inc. died resulting from a fall into a vat of heated milling solution while trying to access a leak to repair. the defendant-employers removed the case to federal court and subsequently moved to dismiss the case brought by the employee's estate, arguing that they were immune from suit under the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Each defendant sought dismissal based on the Act's exclusivity provision. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that South Carolina recognizes the "dual persona" doctrine: "under South Carolina law, whether the dual persona doctrine applies in a particular case turns on whether the duty claimed to have been breached is distinct from those duties owed by virtue of the employer's persona as such. In this case, that determination lies with the federal court." View "Mendenall v. Anderson Hardwood Floors" on Justia Law

Appellant Raymondeze Rivera directly appealed his death sentence to the Supreme Court. Although Appellant raised multiple challenges, the Court was "constrained to reverse and grant a new trial based on one - the trial court's error in refusing to allow Appellant to testify during the guilt phase of his trial." View "South Carolina v. Rivera" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned the question of when tax liability for property is determined. Appellant Hampton Friends of the Arts challenged the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) finding that real property it acquired in March 2008 was subject to 2008 property taxes because the property was subject to taxes on December 31, 2007. Appellant contended that, as a non-profit corporation, it was entitled to a property tax exemption for the 2008 tax year. The Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the ALC: "pursuant to settled law, the 2008 tax status of the Hampton County property was determined on December 31, 2007. Because the property was subject to property taxes as of December 31, 2007, the property is subject to 2008 property taxes." View "Hampton Friends v. So. Carolina Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner John Curtis McCoy appealed the summary dismissal of his second post-conviction relief (PCR) application on the grounds it was successive, untimely, and failed to prove a newly discovered evidence claim. Further, Petitioner alleged recently discovered juror misconduct in his petition. As to the timeliness issue, the Supreme Court concluded the PCR judge misconstrued section 17-2745(A) in finding Petitioner was required to file his claim within one year after his trial, rather than one year after the remittitur was sent from his direct appeal. Furthermore, the Court found a genuine issue of fact existed as to whether Petitioner's claim was successive under section 17-27-90. The Court reversed and remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing. In addition, the Court took the opportunity in this opinion to clarify the proper legal standard for claims involving juror misconduct. View "McCoy v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Defendant Miama Kromah was convicted of: (1) infliction of great bodily injury upon a child; and (2) unlawful neglect of a child. She appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in permitting two of the State's witnesses to testify about actions they took after hearsay conversations they had with the three-year-old victim who did not testify at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the issue was not preserved for review. The Supreme Court granted Defendant's petition for a writ of certiorari. Upon review, the Court concluded that Defendant's issue on appeal was preserved. The Court addressed it in this opinion "in the interest of judicial economy." On the merits, Defendant did not show an abuse of discretion in the trial court's admission of certain testimony or forensic evidence. Consequently, the Court upheld the Court of Appeals' decision in result. View "South Carolina v. Kromah" on Justia Law

Shenandoah Life Insurance Company brought an action to void an insurance policy it issued on the life of Lorenzo Smallwood. The circuit court granted partial summary judgment to Shenandoah, and narrowed the issue for trial to whether Lorenzo intended to defraud the insurance company when he did not disclose information related to his medical history on the insurance application. At trial, the court granted Shenandoah's motion for a directed verdict. Lakeisha Smallwood appealed the directed verdict. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that a jury could reasonably conclude that Shenandoah failed to meet its burden of proving Lorenzo made the misrepresentations with the requisite fraudulent intent. The Court reversed and remanded the case for trial. View "Shenandoah Life v. Smallwood" on Justia Law