Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Library Associates purchased a building located at 404 King Street (404 King) which was formerly the main branch of the Charleston County Public Library. Charleston City Council adopted Zoning Ordinance 2007-147, which rezoned the entire 404 King property. Respondents Historic Charleston Foundation and Preservation Society of Charleston then brought this action to challenge the ordinance's legality. The master invalidated the ordinance finding it was unlawful spot zoning. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed: "Zoning ordinances are presumed valid and the person attacking one bears the burden of showing the zoning decision is arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjust. In passing on the validity of a zoning ordinance, it is not within a court's prerogative to pass upon the wisdom or expediency of the municipality's decision. Respondents did not meet their heavy burden here." View "Historic Charleston v. City of Charleston" on Justia Law

After finding a card for flowers for another woman in her husband’s car, Petitioner Gail Jennings confronted him. Respondent M. Lee Jennings confessed he had fallen in love with someone else, and although he refused to divulge her name, he admitted the two had been corresponding via e-mail for some time. Gail confided this situation to her daughter-in-law, Petitioner Holly Broome. Broome had previously worked for Jennings and knew he maintained a personal Yahoo! e-mail account. She accessed his account by guessing the correct answers to his security questions and read the e-mails exchanged between Jennings and his paramour. Broome then printed out copies of the incriminating e-mails and gave them to Thomas Neal, Gail’s attorney in the divorce proceedings, and Brenda Cooke, a private investigator Gail hired. Broome was sued civilly for hacking Lee Jennings' Yahoo! e-mail account. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Broome on all claims, including violation of the federal Stored Communications Act (SCA). The court of appeals reversed, finding that the e-mails she obtained from hacking Jennings' account were in electronic storage and thus covered by the SCA. The Supreme Court disagreed and reversed. After opening them, Jennings left the single copies of his e-mails on the Yahoo! server and apparently did not download them or save another copy of them in any other location. The Court therefore declined to hold that retaining an opened e-mail constitutes "storing it for backup protection" under the Act. "We emphasize that although we reject the contention that Broome's actions [gave] rise to a claim under the SCA, this should in no way be read as condoning her behavior. Instead, we only hold that she is not liable under the SCA because the e-mails in question do not meet the definition of 'electronic storage' under the Act." View "Jennings v. Jennings" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of murder and possession of a weapon during a crime of violence and received concurrent sentences of life (murder) and five years (weapon). On appeal, he alleged the trial judge committed reversible error in charging the jury that they were acting "for the community" and that their verdict "will represent truth and justice for all parties that are involved." The Supreme Court agreed that these charges were erroneous, but because appellant did not properly preserve his issues for appeal, the Court affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Daniels" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jason Ervin Black appealed his convictions for criminal sexual conduct (CSC) with a minor in the first degree and committing a lewd act upon a minor. Petitioner contended on appeal that the trial court committed reversible error in allowing the State to impeach his defense witness with two manslaughter convictions that were more than ten years old because their introduction violated Rules 404 and 609 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence (SCRE), and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed. View "South Carolina v. Black" on Justia Law

Carolina Park Associates, LLC, lost its interest in a parcel of real property through foreclosure. At the foreclosure sale, an affiliate of one of Carolina Park Associates’ members purchased the property. Appellant Republic-Charleston, the managing member of Carolina Park Associates, contended that the circuit court erred when it dismissed claims seeking to impose a constructive trust in the property and when it cancelled a lis pendens filed by Appellants. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded Appellants failed to state a claim for which imposition of a constructive trust would have been an appropriate remedy because the facts alleged, even viewed in the light most favorable to them, did not present circumstances in which an equitable remedy was required or needed. Moreover, because dismissal of the claims seeking to impose a constructive trust on the Property was proper, cancellation of the lis pendens was proper. View "Carolina Park Associates v. Marino" on Justia Law

Petitioner Larry Moore challenged the post-conviction relief (PCR) court's finding that he received effective assistance of counsel. Petitioner's trial counsel waived his right to a jury trial and opted instead for a bench trial as part of the defense strategy. Petitioner asserted that he did not wish to waive this right, and as a result, received ineffective assistance of counsel. The State asserted that Petitioner failed to establish counsel was ineffective in part because he did not recall "telling counsel that he wished to have a jury trial or asking counsel any questions about when a jury would be selected." "However, this argument exhibits a fundamental misunderstanding of what [the Supreme] Court's waiver jurisprudence commands." The validity of a waiver does not turn on his communication with counsel, but rather on the presence of a record supporting the validity of that waiver. The Court concluded that both the trial and PCR courts in this case conducted a deficient analysis of Petitioner's waiver. The waiver in this case case was not supported by a complete record, and PCR court erred in finding that Petitioner made a knowing and voluntary waiver. Accordingly, the Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Moore v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Appellant-Respondent George Tempel and Respondents-Appellants the State Election Commission and South Carolina Republican Party appealed a circuit court order concerning the candidacy of Respondent-Appellant Paul Thurmond for Senate District 41. Thurmond electronically filed a Statement of Economic Interests (SEI). Thirty minutes later, he filed his Statement of Intention of Candidacy (SIC) for the Republican Party primary for Senate District 41. However, he did not file a paper copy of his SEI along with his SIC as required by section 8-13-1356(B). All of the other Republican contenders for the Senate District 41 seat were decertified for failing to comply with section 8-13-1356(B). However, Thurmond's name remained on the ballot, and he received over 1,700 votes. He was subsequently declared the Republican candidate for the seat. The circuit court found Thurmond was not exempt from the filing requirement of section 8-131356(B) of the South Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. 8-13-1356(B) (Supp. 2011). Thus, Thurmond was disqualified as the Republican nominee for the District 41 seat. The judge ordered the Republican Party to conduct a special primary election pursuant to section 7-11-55. S.C. Code Ann. 7-11-55 (Supp. 2011). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Tempel v. So. Carolina Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

Frank Hutson was working as a crane operator for the State Ports Authority when he suffered an injury to his lower back and legs while attempting to remove a container from a ship. He was diagnosed with a disc bulge for which he was treated with steroid injections, physical therapy, and used a back brace. After reaching maximum medical improvement, he filed a Form 50 with the workers' compensation commission for continued benefits alleging permanent and total disability pursuant to Sections 42-9-10 and 42-9-30 South Carolina Code (1976 & Supp. 2011) or, alternatively, a wage loss under Section 42-9-20. He also asked to receive the award in lump sum. Although the Ports Authority and its insurance carrier, the State Accident Fund (collectively, Respondents), admitted the accident and the back injury, they disputed the claims to his legs and argued he should receive only permanent partial disability benefits. They also objected to Hutson's request that his benefits be paid in a lump sum. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether speculative testimony by the claimant concerning his possible future work as a restaurateur qualified as substantial evidence to establish he did not sustain a wage loss pursuant to Section 42-9-20 of the South Carolina Code (1976). The Court held it did not, and therefore reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hutson v. SC State Ports Authority" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Supreme Court certified the following question from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina: "In the case of a partial failure of title which is covered by an owner's title insurance policy, where the title defect cannot be removed, should the actual loss suffered by the insured as a result of that partial failure of title be measured by the diminution in value of the insured property as a result of the title defect as of the date of the purchase of the insured property, or as of the date of the discovery of the title defect?" The Court answered the question: consult the contract. "[W]here the insurance contract unambiguously identifies a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provides for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such date or method is controlling. Where, as here, the insurance contract does not unambiguously identify a date for measuring the diminution in value of the insured property or otherwise unambiguously provide for the method of valuation as a result of the title defect, such ambiguity requires a construction allowing for the measure of damages most favorable to the insured. . . .In sum, although [the Court acknowledged] the apparent inequity in [its] answer to the certified question, the resolution of this question [was] not a matter of equity. Rather, [the] Court [was] faced with the task of construing an insurance policy, and in the presence of an ambiguity [it was] constrained to interpret it most favorably to the insured." View "Whitlock v. Stewart Title" on Justia Law

Appellant Stacy Howard, an inmate incarcerated with the South Carolina Department of Corrections ("SCDC"), appealed the Administrative Law Court's ("ALC's") summary dismissal of his appeal from a prison disciplinary conviction. Appellant contended the SCDC's actions implicated a state-created liberty interest and, thus, the ALC erred in summarily dismissing his appeal pursuant to section 1-23-600(D) of the South Carolina Code. Additionally, Appellant challenged: (1) the enforcement of the policy that formed the basis for the disciplinary conviction; (2) the procedure employed to procure the conviction; and (3) the factual basis underlying the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed: because the plain language of section 1-23-600(D) would prohibit an ALC from hearing all inmate appeals involving the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits, the Court clarified that the ALC may not summarily dismiss an appeal solely on the basis that it involves the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits. Instead, the ALC must also consider whether the appeal implicates a state-created liberty or property interest. Furthermore, the Court found that the loss of the opportunity to earn sentence-related credits did not implicate a state-created liberty interest. The Court affirmed the ALC's dismissal of Appellant's appeal finding that Appellant failed to establish a legal basis on which to challenge the enforcement of the disciplinary policy underlying his conviction. View "Howard v. So. Carolina Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law