Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Michael Goins pled guilty to a second possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine within the proximity of a school. He received a negotiated ten-year sentence for both convictions, to run concurrently.  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the circuit court's denial of post-conviction relief (PCR).  Petitioner argued the PCR court erred in failing to find plea counsel ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty when the drugs obtained were found pursuant to an illegal search.  Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed Petitioner's conviction. Although counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to properly advise Petitioner on the law regarding whether a motel owner can freely admit police into a rented room, Petitioner failed to prove this advice was his reason for electing not to go to trial and has thus failed to establish prejudice. View "Goins v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Respondent Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors, LLC brought an action against its landlord, Petitioner Laura Lewis, for negligent misrepresentation, unjust enrichment, and breach of contract.  Atlantic also sought a return of the security deposit it paid pursuant to its lease with Lewis.  The master-in-equity entered judgment in favor of Atlantic, and the court of appeals affirmed. The landlord appealed, arguing the appellate court erred in its return of the security deposit and in calculating its damages award. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the court of appeals erred in concluding the issue regarding the security deposit was preserved for review. Because the deposit issue was not preserved, the landlord was entitled to retain the deposit. Consequently, Atlantic's damages were reduced by $3500. The Court affirmed the appellate court as to the entry of judgment against the landlord for negligent misrepresentation and unjust enrichment. View "Atlantic Coast Builders and Contractors v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Appellant Jennifer Dykes appealed a circuit court's order that she be subject to satellite monitoring for the rest of her natural life pursuant to Section 23-3-540(C) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2010). She raised five constitutional challenges to this statute: (1) it violates her substantive due process rights; (2) violates her right to procedural due process; (3) violates the Ex Post Facto clause; (4) violates the Equal Protection Clause; and (5) violates her right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory imposition of lifetime satellite monitoring indeed violates Appellant's substantive due process rights and reversed the circuit court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "South Carolina v. Dykes" on Justia Law

Petitioner Zeb Eron Binnarr was convicted by a jury for failing to timely register as a sex offender. He appealed his conviction primarily on the ground that he did not receive actioal notice of a change of the law regarding sex offender registration. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction, and Petitioner again appealed. In view of the Supreme Court's decision in "South Carolina v. Latimore" (Op. 27102, Mar. 14, 2012), the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in declining to find that actual notice of the re-registration requirement was necessary to sustain a conviction. Because the State failed to provide any direct or substantial circumstantial evidence from which a jury could determine that Petitioner had actual notice of the change in the law, the Court found the trial judge erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. Accordingly, the Court reversed Petitioner's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Binnarr" on Justia Law

William Watson Eldridge III (Father) created two trusts for the ultimate benefit of his sons, William Watson Eldridge IV (Bill) and Thomas Hadley Eldridge (Tom). In 1973, Father formed a revocable trust (R-trust), for which he was the trustee. When Mother died in 1992, Father amended the R-trust to name Bill and Tom as co-successor trustees. In 1999, Father formed an irrevocable Qualified Personal Residence Trust (QPRT), for which he was trustee, and placed in it a Florida condominium (Florida condo) that he owned. Under the terms of the QPRT, Father could sell the Florida condo, but use of the proceeds was limited to the purchase of a replacement home to be placed in the trust, or the purchase of a separate annuity for the benefit of the trust. The trust document named Sons as co-successor trustees of the QPRT. The terms of the QPRT also provided that if Father died within eight years after its formation, the trust assets were to automatically transfer to the R-trust, of which Sons were beneficiaries. If Father was still living eight years after the formation of the QPRT, the trust assets were to be distributed equally among Sons. Father married Frances Eldridge (Wife) in 2001. Acting as trustee of the QPRT trust, Father sold the Florida condo and used the sales proceeds to buy a Hilton Head home. Instead of titling the Hilton Head home in the name of the QPRT trust, as required under the terms of the trust, he titled it in the name of the R-Trust. In 2003, Father transferred the Hilton Head home from the R-trust to himself and Wife, individually, as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. Father died in 2006, and under the right of survivorship, Wife's sole interest in the Hilton Head home became fully vested. Subsequently, she transferred title in the home to herself as trustee of the Frances Ulmer Eldridge Revocable Trust, of which Wife's children are the beneficiaries at her death. Bill and Tom, as trustees of the R-trust, filed suit against Wife and her trust, claiming that the Hilton Head home was held in either a constructive or a resulting trust for the benefit of the R-trust, and requesting the court to transfer the Hilton Head home to the R-Trust. After a bench trial, the master-in-equity issued judgment in favor of Wife. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the Sons did not have an adequate legal remedy to cure Father's breach of trust. The law of the case was that a resulting trust arose over the Hilton Head home for the benefit of the R-Trust. Because the Sons filed a claim against Wife and her trust just over a year after Father's death, the Court held that laches could not apply to bar the Sons' claim. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with direction that Respondents execute all documents necessary to re-transfer the Hilton Head home to the R-Trust. View "Eldridge v. Eldridge" on Justia Law

A circuit court found Appellant David Cannon in contempt of court for violating (1) an order mandating that Appellant give up all authority and cease all activities relating to the James Brown estate, the Brown trusts, and all Brown entities (which he violated by filing amended tax returns without authority); and (2) an order requiring Cannon to pay back money he had misappropriated from Brown's estate. The circuit court ordered Appellant to be incarcerated for six months for contempt. However, the circuit court stated Appellant could purge himself of the contempt "by the payment of the aforementioned [money, with a portion] to be applied towards the payment of attorneys' fees incurred by the various parties, and the payment of a fine." The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings; upholding all of the circuit court's findings regarding the contempt except for the amount awarded towards attorneys' fees and the imposition of the fine. The Court of Appeals found the circuit court abused its discretion as to attorneys' fees because it did not make the necessary factual findings to support the amount awarded, so it "reverse[d] and remand[ed] the issue of attorneys' fees to the circuit court for findings of fact as to the proper amount. On remand, the circuit court held a hearing for the sole purpose of making findings of fact regarding the proper amount of attorneys' fees to be awarded for reimbursing the parties for attorneys' time related to the issue of Appellant's contemptuous conduct, and held that Appellant should pay. Appellant appealed this order, arguing payment of fees was mooted by his serving his jail sentence. The case was transferred from the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, concluding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Appellant pay attorneys' fees. Further, the Court held that the issue of attorneys' fees was not mooted by Appellant serving his jail sentence. View "Ex parte: Cannon v. Estate of James Brown" on Justia Law

Willie James Fee died while in the care of Respondent AMISUB of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont). Petitioner Evelyn Grier, as the personal representative of his estate, subsequently brought this medical malpractice claim against Piedmont. The circuit court dismissed Petitioner's claim on the ground that the expert witness affidavit she was required to submit pursuant to Sections 15-36-100 and 15-79-125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) did not contain a competent opinion on proximate cause. Respondent appealed, arguing the court erred in finding these statutes require the affidavit contain such an opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed, reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Grier v. AMISUB" on Justia Law

Respondent Hook Point, LLC (Hook Point) was granted a preliminary injunction preventing Appellant Branch Banking and Trust Company (BB&T) from drawing on, and Defendant First Reliance Bank (First Reliance) from honoring, a $1.5 million letter of credit. BB&T appealed. In late 2007, Hook Point sought a loan from BB&T for the purpose of developing a subdivision on property Hook Point owned on Lake Murray called Panama Pointe. BB&T issued a commitment letter to Hook Point in September 2007 indicating that it would loan the company $5.1 million and establish a $2 million line of credit to enable Hook Point to develop the subdivision. Security for the loan included a first mortgage on the Panama Pointe property, personal guarantees of Hook Point’s four principals, and a $1.5 million standby letter of credit issued by First Reliance in favor of BB&T. On December 23, Hook Point filed suit alleging several causes of action against BB&T, including for fraudulent misrepresentation by which BB&T induced Hook Point to enter into a loan agreement. Hook Point admitted to being $70,000 in arrears on interest but argued that the terms of the agreement did not permit BB&T to draw the full amount of the letter of credit (LC) if that exceeded the amount of interest due. It also sought an ex parte temporary restraining order to prevent First Reliance from honoring a draft on the LC by BB&T, which the court granted. After a hearing, the court also granted a preliminary injunction against drafts on or honor of the LC beyond amounts of accrued interest, requiring extension of the LC for one year, and requiring Hook Point to post a $50,000 bond with the court. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's grant of the injunction: "[t]he standard under which a fraud in the transaction claim must be measured when deciding whether to enjoin honor of a letter of credit requires that the beneficiary have no colorable claim or basis in fact for asserting its rights under the letter of credit. In this case BB&T has, in [the Court's] view, not only a colorable claim but an undeniable basis in fact for asserting its rights under the letter of credit. Therefore, the circuit court erred when it granted the preliminary injunction." View "Hook Point v. Branch Banking" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a petition for a writ of certiorari to review the decision in "Fairchild v. South Carolina Department of Transportation," (385 S.C. 344, 683 S.E.2d 818 (Ct. App. 2009)). The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a new trial a negligence action arising from a motor vehicle accident. In relevant part, the Court of Appeals determined (1) Respondent Marilee Fairchild's claim for punitive damages should have been submitted to the jury; (2) the trial court should have charged the jury on the intervening negligence of a treating physician; and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant William Leslie Palmer's motion under Rule 35, SCRCP for an independent medical examination (IME) to be performed by Dr. James Ballenger. This action arose out of a motor vehicle that occurred on March 1, 2001 while several vehicles were traveling on Interstate 95. Just before the accident, an employee with the South Carolina Department of Transportation (SCDOT), was driving a dump truck with an attached trailer transporting a backhoe. The employee was traveling in the left lane of the southbound traffic (closest to the median) when he pulled in to a paved "cross-over" in the median so he could turn around and enter the northbound lanes of I-95. While he was stopped waiting for the northbound traffic to clear, the back of his trailer allegedly protruded into the left traffic lane on the southbound side. Several cars traveling south in the left lane directly behind the SCDOT truck, saw the trailer and simultaneously switched to the right lane. When those cars moved over, Fairchild, who was behind them driving a minivan, saw the trailer partially blocking the left lane where she was traveling. She "flashed" her brakes and then continued to brake while staying ahead of the vehicle behind her. Fairchild managed to avoid the trailer, but she was struck by a truck traveling behind her that was driven by William Leslie Palmer. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict in Fairchild's favor. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, which found reversible error in the trial court's failure to submit the issue of punitive damages to the jury and to charge the jury on the intervening negligence of a treating physician, and found the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Palmer's motion for an IME to be performed. View "Fairchild v. SCDOT" on Justia Law

Appellant East Cherry Grove Realty Co., LLC, appealed a jury verdict which found that South Carolina held title to certain disputed canals in North Myrtle Beach. The question was submitted to the jury on three theories: that two quitclaim deeds established title in the canals; that the canals had been dedicated to the public; and that the State held title to the canals in trust for the public. The jury returned a verdict for the State on all three theories. Appellant argued that the trial court erred when it denied Appellant’s motions for directed verdict on each theory. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the question of ownership under the quitclaim deeds was properly submitted to the jury and therefore affirmed the verdict. View "City of North Myrtle Beach v. East Cherry Grove Realty" on Justia Law