Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants, who are current and former certified educators employed by the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC) in the Palmetto Unified School District (PUSD), collectively appealed the Administrative Law Court's (ALC's) order that affirmed the State Employee Grievance Committee's decision denying their grievances regarding the SCDC's Reduction-in-Force (RIF) implemented in 2003. On appeal, Appellants contended the ALC erred in failing to enforce: (1) the plain language of the RIF policy; (2) the controlling legislation applicable to the PUSD and the RIF policy; (3) Appellants' constitutional rights with respect to employment; and (4) Appellants' rights as "covered employees" with respect to the RIF policy. Based on these alleged errors, Appellants asserted they were entitled to reinstatement to employment as well as back pay and benefits. Because the RIF was deemed "procedurally correct," the Supreme Court concluded the ALC correctly affirmed the Committee's decision regarding the inclusion of the PUSD in the RIF. However the Court concluded that the SCDC violated statutory law in precluding Appellants from exercising their priority right to recall as to the positions vacated by retirees. Because the "Retirement Opportunity" offered by the SCDC required a fifteen-day break in service before rehiring, the Court found that "window" constituted a vacancy for which Appellants should have been offered the opportunity for employment. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded this case to the Committee to determine the appropriate relief. View "Bell v. SCDC" on Justia Law

This case presented a "novel" question of whether a member of a limited liability company could be held personally liable for torts committed while acting in furtherance of the company's business. Carl R. Aten, Jr., and his wife are the only members of R. Design Construction Co., LLC. In this particular case, R. Design selected a lot in Beaufort, South Carolina, on which it planned to build a four-unit condominium project. When Aten could not secure the necessary financing, he approached Dennis Green about entering into a contract for R. Design to construct the building. Green ultimately formed 16 Jade Street, LLC for this purpose, and R. Design entered into an agreement with Jade Street for the construction of the condominium. One of the subcontractors selected by R. Design was Catterson & Sons Construction. Michael Catterson is the sole shareholder of Catterson & Sons, and he is a specialty subcontractor with a special license for framing in addition to holding his general contractor's license. As the general contractor, it was Aten's job to supervise the project. A couple months into construction, problems arose concerning the AAC block construction and the framing. Following a progress payment dispute, Catterson & Sons left the job site and did not return. In the ensuing months, Aten's relationship with Green deteriorated as Aten tarried in fixing the defects, and the construction eventually ground to a halt. R. Design subsequently left the project, never replacing Catterson & Sons nor adequately addressing the defects. The day after R. Design left the project, Kern-Coleman conducted another inspection of the property. This time, it identified thirty-four defects in addition to the original four, which had not yet been remedied, for a total of thirty-eight. Anchor Construction was retained as the new general contractor, and its own inspection revealed sixty defects in the original construction. After Anchor began working on the project, more defects surfaced. Jade Street subsequently sued R. Design, Aten, Catterson & Sons, and Catterson for negligence and breach of implied warranties. As to Aten personally, the circuit court concluded that despite the fact he was a member of an LLC, he was personally liable because he held a residential home builder's license. In particular, the court concluded the statutes pertaining to the license create civil liability for the licensee. The court imposed no liability against Catterson himself. The court ultimately awarded Jade Street damages for its claims. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the General Assembly did not intend the LLC act to shield a member from liability for his own torts. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's holding that Aten was personally liable for his negligence, and that Catterson was not personally liable for the acts of Catterson & Sons. View "16 Jade Street v. R. Design Construction" on Justia Law

Respondent Robert Bayly was issued a uniform traffic ticket for simple possession of marijuana. Prior to trial, Respondent paid the required fine and did not appear in court on the trial date. Respondent did not appeal his conviction but, instead, filed a post-conviction relief (PCR) application in which he alleged the magistrate court was without subject matter jurisdiction to convict him as no arrest warrant had been issued. The PCR judge granted the petition and vacated Respondent's conviction. The Supreme Court granted the State's petition for a writ of certiorari to review the PCR judge's order. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the PCR judge erred in relying on "Town of Honea Path v. Wright," (9 S.E.2d 924 (1940)), and reversed the PCR judge's order because it was controlled by an error of law. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Bayly v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

The South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED) conducted a sting operation on the Blue Moon Sports Bar, a private club operated by Petitioner Blue Moon of Newberry, Inc. After SLED's investigation, Respondent Department of Revenue concluded Blue Moon's guest policy violated Section 7-401.4(J) through (K) of the South Carolina Code of Regulations and revoked Blue Moon's liquor license. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) reinstated Blue Moon's license, and the court of appeals reversed. To test Blue Moon's compliance with these regulations, SLED conducted an operation wherein and agent went undercover and attempted to gain access to Blue Moon as a guest. The agent's first attempt was rebuffed by Blue Moon's bouncer when the agent admitted he was not a member of the organization. However, the bouncer directed the agent's attention to a sign which contained a telephone number and told him that he would be allowed to enter if he called that number. The agent called the number as directed, which was the telephone number for Blue Moon, and Steve Malone who is both a member and employee of Blue Moon, answered the call. It is undisputed that the agent did not know Malone or have any prior relationship with him whatsoever. However, Denise Polifrone, who is Blue Moon's owner and license holder, had given Malone authority to admit people who called as his guests. Approximately two to three minutes after he spoke with Malone and gave Malone his name, the agent returned, showed the bouncer his civilian identification and said he had called the number on the sign. The bouncer then let the agent enter the bar after he paid a small cover charge. Once inside, the agent ordered an alcoholic beverage, paid for it, and consumed a small portion of it. He subsequently called the SLED agent in charge of the operation. That agent arrived and issued Polifrone a citation for permitting someone who was not a bona fide member or guest to consume alcohol on-premises. As a result, the Department revoked Blue Moon's liquor license. Finding that Blue Moon complied with the plain language of Regulation Regulation 7-401.4(K), the Supreme Court denied the Department's request to revoke Blue Moon's license. View "SCDOR v. Blue Moon" on Justia Law

Appellant Benjamin P. Green appealed his convictions for criminal solicitation of a minor and attempted criminal sexual conduct ("CSC") with a minor in the second-degree. In challenging his convictions, Appellant contended the trial judge erred in: (1) denying his motion to dismiss the charge of criminal solicitation of a minor on the ground the statute is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague; (2) denying his motions to dismiss and for a directed verdict on the charge of attempted CSC with a minor in the second-degree; (3) admitting certain photographs; and (4) denying his request for a jury charge on attempted assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature ("ABHAN"). Finding no merit to Appellant's issues on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "South Carolina v. Green" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Appellant Robert Whitesides was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of the crime of trafficking in marijuana. On appeal, he contended that the trial court erroneously convicted him without finding that a nexus existed between his possession of firearms and his drug trafficking. While the Supreme Court agreed that a nexus between the possession of the firearm and the underlying violent crime must be established, the Court found that the trial judge made a factual finding that such a nexus existed in this case and that the finding was supported by evidence in the record. View "South Carolina v. Whitesides" on Justia Law

Appellant Creola Young appealed an order of the circuit court which upheld the Charleston County School Board's (Board) decision not to renew her employment contract, on the ground that the Board violated her procedural due process rights. Appellant taught fifth grade at E.B. Ellington Elementary School in Charleston County for six years. During Appellant's tenure there, she received multiple warnings and feedback about inappropriate conduct and poor judgment with students, and her failure to provide instruction in a satisfactory manner. In 2009, the Associate Superintendent of the Charleston County School District (District) recommended the Board not renew Appellant's teaching contract. Appellant made a timely request for a hearing before the Board concerning the recommendation. The Board delegated the hearing function to a three-member committee comprised of Board members. The Committee reported a quorum of the Board during a special telephone executive session. Appellant was not present at that meeting. At the end of the executive session, the Board reconvened in open session and voted to accept the committee's recommendation not to renew Appellant's contract by a vote of four to three. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the review undertaken by the Board of Appellant's non-renewal hearing was insufficient to satisfy due process requirements. The Court reversed the circuit court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Young v. Charleston County School District" on Justia Law

In 1969, the State sued Appellant Yelsen Land Company alleging that the State owned "all tidelands, submerged lands, and waters" adjacent to Morris Island.  Appellant answered and claimed it owned all the tidelands, submerged lands, and marshes adjacent to Morris Island. Appellant also counterclaimed for trespass on those lands by the Corps of Engineers in the form of spoilage dredged from Charleston Harbor, the digging of a ditch, and the erection of a dike. In the first appeal, the Supreme Court held that the legal questions of title to the land should be tried to a jury and that the trial judge erred in denying the State a jury trial. The jury returned a general verdict for the State, having been charged that title to tidelands, submerged lands, and all land below the high water mark on navigable streams were presumptively the State's unless the entity claiming title can show a specific grant from the sovereign that included the words "to the low water mark."  It was also charged that it was to determine title to marshlands and to return damages for appellant if it found the State had trespassed on marshland owned by appellant or if it found a taking. Following the jury verdict, Appellant moved for a judgment non obstante verdicto and a new trial, both of which the trial judge denied in a written order. In 2007, Appellant brought this suit against the State contending that the dredging spoils placed in the tidelands had created new highlands, and that as the adjacent highland owner, it was the owner of the newly “accreted” highlands as well.  The State Ports Authority (SPA) sought to intervene, but in lieu of intervention, Appellant was permitted to amend its complaint to add the SPA. A Master granted the State and the SPA summary judgment, and Appellant appealed.  The Supreme Court affirmed, finding res judicata applied to bar Appellant's attempt to relitigate title to the property. View "Yelsen Land Company v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

In 2004, Petitioner Reginald Latimore pled guilty to committing a lewd act on a child. He was released from prison in 2005, and was required to register as a sex offender by the Sex Offender Registry Act. In 2006, the General Assembly revised the sex offender registry statute to require offenders to re-register twice a year, once in their birth month and again six months later. Petitioner did not re-register before September 2006, when he was originally informed he must re-register, nor did he re-register in December 2006, as required by the amended statute. Petitioner was charged under the amended act with failing to register in December 2006. At trial, the State relied on both the forms Petitioner had executed in August 2005 requiring he register and upon the testimony of the sex offender registry coordinator that Petitioner had no contact with the office during 2006. After the State rested, Petitioner moved for a directed verdict on due process grounds because he had not received actual notice of the change in the registration statute. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner testified that he called the sex offender registry coordinator in February 2006 to obtain approval to move into a new house, and he was under the belief that this phone call satisfied his re-registration requirement. At the close of the defense case, Petitioner renewed his directed verdict motion, which was again denied. The court of appeals affirmed Petitioner's sentence. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider Petitioner's argument that the court of appeals erred in affirming the circuit court's denial of Petitioner's directed verdict motion, and after review, affirmed that decision as modified. View "South Carolina v. Latimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner Oseil Gomez Narciso appealed his conviction for trafficking cocaine, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress drug evidence seized by police during a routine traffic stop. Following his conviction, Petitioner signed a Consent Order Granting Belated Direct Appeal and waived his right to raise any other post-conviction relief allegations. Petitioner requested the Supreme Court remand his case to determine whether that waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's order denying Petitioner's motion to suppress, and remanded the case for a determination as to whether Petitioner's waiver was entered into knowingly and voluntarily. View "Narciso v. South Carolina" on Justia Law