Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Marcus Hyman appealed the denial of his request for post-conviction relief (PCR) on the ground that his counsel was ineffective. In June 2007, a grand jury indicted Petitioner for a third offense of distributing of cocaine, and distributing cocaine within the proximity of a school or park.  He pleaded guilty to these charges, and after a colloquy with the plea judge, he relinquished various constitutional rights, including his right to a jury trial. The plea judge sentenced Petitioner to the mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment for the distribution charge and ten years for the proximity charge, to run concurrently.  No direct appeal was taken. However, Petitioner subsequently filed an application for PCR. Defense counsel had entered plea negotiations with the solicitor that ultimately resulted in the solicitor agreeing to reduce the distribution charge to a second offense, in exchange for Petitioner's agreement to serve five years in prison. This offer was conditioned on Petitioner's agreement not to view a videotape recording of the drug transaction that formed the basis of the charges against him. The solicitor sought to protect the identity of a confidential informant who would have been revealed to Petitioner if Petitioner watched the tape. At the evidentiary hearing, Petitioner testified he repeatedly told defense counsel that he wanted to watch the videotape, and stated that his personal review of the videotape was critical to whether he planned to accept the offer because he wanted to discern whether the videotape depicted his involvement in the drug transaction. Defense counsel testified that Petitioner stated he wanted her to watch the videotape. Consequently, defense counsel testified she watched the videotape that the videotape "clearly" depicted Petitioner engaged in a drug transaction. Defense counsel relayed these impressions to Petitioner while the five-year offer was still on the table. Petitioner testified he recognized himself as the subject of photographs made from the tapes, but testified that the images did not show him engaged in a drug transaction. Petitioner still refused to accept the solicitor's offer. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of Petitioner's request for PCR. View "Hyman v. South Carolina" on Justia Law

Kristi McLeod (Mother) and Robert Starnes (Father) divorced in 1993. Mother received custody of their two minor children, and Father was required to pay child support. Despite rather sizable increases in Father's income, Mother never sought modification of his child support obligation. In August 2006, the parties' older child, Collin, reached the age of majority and enrolled as a college student. Father wholly supported his son's to attend college, and agreed to repay all of Collin's student loans upon graduation. Father took it upon himself to unilaterally decrease his weekly child support to which Mother later acquiesced in consideration of Father's assurances that he would support the son while he was in college.  However, Father did not uphold his end of the bargain, nor did he regularly pay a percentage of his bonus as promised. Mother filed suit in March 2007 seeking an award of college expenses, an increase in child support for the couple's other child, plus attorney's fees and costs.  Father counterclaimed, asking that the court terminate: (1) his child support for the eldest son because he had attained the age of majority and graduated from high school; (2) his support for the younger child upon graduation from high school; (3) and the requirement that he pay a percentage of his annual bonus as child support.  He also denied that he should be required to pay any college expenses for his oldest son.  A temporary order was filed in June 2007 that set child support for the younger child, ordered Father to contribute towards college expenses, and left intact the thirty-five percent of Father's annual bonus payable as support. The court dismissed Mother's claim for college expenses on the ground that it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution. Less than two years ago, the Supreme Court decided "Webb v. Sowell,"(692 S.E.2d 543 (2010)), which held that ordering a non-custodial parent to pay college expenses violated equal protection. The Court granted permission in this case to argue against that precedent so that the Court could revisit its holding in "Webb."  In his holding in this case, the Court concluded that "Webb" was wrongly decided and remanded this case for reconsideration in light of the law as it existed prior to "Webb." View "McLeod v. Starnes" on Justia Law

This issue in this case centered on proposed renovations to the overcrowded Chapin High School, which required filling in a portion of a stream on its property.  District 5 of Lexington and Richland Counties received a water quality certification (WQC) from the Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC), authorizing the project and allowing the District to fill the approved portion of the stream.  The Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirmed the certification, and Appellant Kim Murphy appealed, arguing the ALC erred in determining that the vicinity of the project included the area surrounding the proposed fill, failied to find that the project would damage the surrounding ecosystem, and found no feasible alternatives to the proposed project. She also alleged DHEC impermissibly abdicated its decision-making authority to the District.  Upon review, the Supreme Court found no error in the ALC's analysis or in DHEC's evaluation of the project and accordingly affirmed those decisions. View "Murphy v. SCDHEC" on Justia Law

Appellant John Sterling, Jr. was charged with three criminal offenses: securities fraud, making false or misleading statements to the State Securities Commission, and criminal conspiracy. He was convicted of securities fraud, acquitted of making a false or misleading statement and conspiracy, and received a five-year sentence.  Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing the trial judge abused his discretion in permitting testimony from investors, in denying appellant's directed verdict motion, and that the trial court committed reversible error in charging the jury. Charges against Appellant stemmed from a business venture related to the retail mortgage lending industry. After a merger between two companies, Appellant ceased being an employee of one of the acquired companies, but remained on the Board of Directors of the newly formed entity. The new entity had financial trouble from the onset, and began moving debts and assets among the surviving entities to hide its financial difficulties. Appellant's defense was predicated in large part on the fact that the financial maneuvers that took place were approved by outside auditors. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found no error and affirmed Appellant's conviction. View "South Carolina v. Sterling" on Justia Law

Susan Chisholm (Wife) appealed the court of appeals' reversal of the family court's grant of attorney's fees. She argued that the court of appeals incorrectly held the family court erred by solely considering beneficial results in determining the award because the court of appeals had remanded that issue for that very reason. Moreover, Wife contended that the record contains sufficient evidence to support the family court's award. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed the appellate court's holding. View "Chisholm v. Chisholm" on Justia Law

Appellant Graham Law Firm (Graham) appealed a trial court's order granting respondents' motion to set aside default judgment on the grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction based upon inadequate service of process.  In 2007 Graham filed suit against Respondents MKKM, Inc., and Mohamed Makawi, individually and doing business as International House of Pancakes, seeking payment for professional services.  Graham served both complaints on Makawi, who is MKKM's president and registered agent for service of process, by certified mail, return receipt requested, restricted delivery, at the IHOP location in Florence, South Carolina. Neither Makawi nor MKKM filed an answer to the complaint, and Graham's motions for entry of default and default judgment were granted.  Graham served a copy of the order granting default judgment by certified mail on Makawi and Makawi as registered agent of MKKM, and the return receipt was signed by Makawi.  In March 2009, counsel for respondents contacted Graham to request information about the judgment. After reconsideration, the trial court issued an order granting respondents' motion for relief from judgment. Graham appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that Graham was not given sufficient opportunity for discovery and cross-examination of witnesses on the matter of authorization to accept service of process. The Court therefore reversed the trial court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Graham Law Firm v. Makawi" on Justia Law

Appellants Phillip Grimsley and Roger Mowers were retired and later rehired employees of the South Carolina Law Enforcement Division (SLED). As employees, they were members of the Police Officers Retirement System. As part of the rehire process, SLED required Appellants to sign a form which provided that they would take a pay cut in the amount it would cost SLED to pay "the employer portion" of retirement. According to their suit, Appellants claimed that provision was contrary to state law, which assigned the responsibility for the employer portion of the retirement to the employer. On behalf of themselves and others similarly situated, Appellants brought suit against SLED and the State, seeking a declaratory judgment and asserting causes of action for a violation of S.C. Code Ann. section 9-11-90 and for unlawful takings. The trial court dismissed the complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the South Carolina Retirement Contribution Procedures Act (Retirement Act), which Appellants challenged on appeal to the Supreme Court. Appellants additionally appealed the trial court's alternative ruling dismissing their unlawful takings claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with Appellants and found the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint: "Appellants have asserted a cognizable property interest rooted in state law sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss. In so finding, [the Court] also [held] the trial court erred in dismissing Appellants' unlawful takings claim." View "Grimsley v. So. Carolina Law Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal before the Supreme Court was whether Respondent South Carolina Department of Health and Human Services and its agent, the South Carolina Department of Disabilities and Special Needs (DDSN), "properly ceased Mental Retardation/Related Disability services to" Appellant Jane Doe, a twenty-eight-year-old woman with undeniable cognitive and adaptive deficits. Based on a legal standard that the "onset of Mental Retardation must be before the age of eighteen (18) years according to accepted psychological doctrine[,]" the Hearing Officer concluded Doe was not mentally retarded. The Administrative Law Court (ALC) affirmed this legal determination, as well as the Hearing Officer's factual findings. Because the decision of the Hearing Officer and ALC was controlled by an error of law, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case: "DDSN could have promulgated regulations incorporating […] additional criteria as part of the definition of mental retardation. But no such steps were taken. Rather, South Carolina adopted a broad definition of mental retardation […] using language that parallels the SSI definition, and in Regulation 88-210, DDSN interpreted that definition in a manner consistent with the SSA. DDSN's interpretation of section 44-20-30 in its policy guidelines directly conflicts with Regulation 88-210 and should be disregarded." View "Doe v. South Carolina Dept. Health Human Svcs." on Justia Law

Appellant State Law Enforcement Division (SLED) appealed the circuit court order relieving Respondent Jeremy Lane Edwards from registering as a sex offender registration. In 1998, Respondent pled guilty to two counts of being a "Peeping Tom." Respondent served a probationary sentence including one hundred hours of community service. In 2004, Respondent received a pardon from the South Carolina Department of Probation, Parole, and Pardon Services (SCDPPPS). In 2009, Respondent filed petitions requesting that the circuit court issue an order mandating that he was no longer required to register as a sex offender. The Attorney General opposed the petition, and asserted that Respondent's pardon did not relieve him from the requirement that he register as a sex offender. The Attorney General argued that the amendments to the applicable statute were remedial and procedural in nature, and thus applied retroactively to Respondent's case. The circuit court disagreed, and ruled that the 2004 pardon relieved Respondent from the registration requirements of the statute, and that the 2005 and 2008 amendments did not apply retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that Respondent's 2004 pardon relieved him of all consequences of his conviction. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order relieving Respondent of his duty to report. View "In the Matter of the Care and Treatment of Jeremy Lane Edwards" on Justia Law

Appellant Jerry Inman pled guilty to murder, first-degree burglary, first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and kidnapping of a Clemson University student. The judge sentenced Appellant to death for murder and two consecutive thirty-year sentences for first-degree burglary and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. On appeal, Appellant challenged the judge's acceptance of his guilty plea because he maintained it was conditional and that he was entitled to be sentenced by a jury despite his plea of guilty. Furthermore, Appellant contended the trial court erred in (1) refusing to recuse the Solicitor's Office from any further involvement in the case; (2) declining defense counsel's request to question the Solicitor on the issue of prosecutorial misconduct; and (3) declining to grant a mistrial despite a finding of prosecutorial misconduct. Finding that Appellant entered a valid guilty plea that was not conditioned on the preservation or outcome of the jury sentencing issue, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. Moreover, even if Appellant properly preserved this issue, the Court concluded Appellant abandoned it on appeal. As to the propriety of the sentencing proceedings, the Court concluded the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Appellant's requests to recuse the Solicitor's office as advocates and to question members of the office. Although Court found the Solicitor committed prosecutorial misconduct in his treatment of Appellant's expert witness, the Court concluded that Appellant was not sufficiently prejudiced to warrant the grant of a mistrial. View "South Carolina v. Inman" on Justia Law