Justia South Carolina Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Kevin Odems appealed the Court of Appeals' decision that affirmed his 2005 convictions for first degree burglary, grand larceny, criminal conspiracy, and malicious injury. The State's case against Petitioner consisted solely of circumstantial evidence. Petitioner argued on appeal the Supreme Court that the State failed to present substantial circumstantial evidence of his involvement in any of the crimes charged, and thus the circuit court should have directed a verdict on all four counts. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court agreed and reversed. View "South Carolina v. Odems" on Justia Law

This case returned to the South Carolina Supreme Court from the United States Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." The underlying action originally came to the Court on appeal of the trial court's denial of Appellant Century BMW's motion to compel arbitration. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to compel. Following that decision, Appellant filed a petition for rehearing, contending the Supreme Court's opinion was inconsistent with the federal Supreme Court's decision in "Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. Animalfeeds International Corp." which found that the federal Arbitration Act preempted South Carolina law. The South Carolina Court emphasized that its opinion was based on state law grounds, and admonished Appellant for "attempting to reframe the issues and miscast [the Court's] holding as disingenuous to the opinion and a holding [it] never made." Thereafter, Appellant petitioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The South Carolina Court's opinion was vacated by the federal Supreme Court and remanded for consideration in light of its decision in "AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion." Respondents Heather Herron and several others "individually and for the benefit of all car buyers who paid 'administrative fees'" argued that the matter of preemption was not preserved in the South Carolina proceedings. The South Carolina Court agreed and therefore adhered to its initial opinion. View "Herron v. Century BMW" on Justia Law

Appellant Willard Farr owned seven gaming machines seized from a Union business. The magistrate issued an order to destroy the machines, and Appellant timely sought a post-seizure hearing in an attempt to block their destruction. Following the hearing, the magistrate affirmed the order, and Appellant appealed to the circuit court. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented before the magistrate concerning the State's witness and her inability to identify which of the offending machines she played. Finding that Appellant misunderstood the burden of proof at the post-seizure hearing (which rested solely on the owner to show why the machines should not have been forfeited and destroyed), the Supreme Court affirmed the magistrate's and circuit court's decisions. View "Union County Sheriff's Office v. Henderson" on Justia Law

The property which was the subject of this appeal was owned by Appellant Peggy McMaster and located in the City of Columbia in the immediate vicinity of the University of South Carolina. Pursuant to the Ordinance, only one "family" may occupy a single dwelling unit. At the time this dispute arose, the property was occupied by four unrelated individuals—Appellant Gray McGurn and three other young women, all of whom were undergraduate students at the University of South Carolina. After receiving a neighborhood complaint, the City's Zoning Administrator conducted an investigation and determined the occupants violated the Ordinance. McMaster appealed the violation notice to the City's Board of Zoning Appeals arguing the Ordinance was not violated and in the alternative, the Ordinance was unconstitutional. Following a hearing, the Board affirmed the zoning violation. Appellants appealed the Board's decision to the circuit court. The circuit court found the Ordinance's definition of "family" did not violate the Due Process Clause of the South Carolina Constitution. Following its review, the Supreme Court found the Ordinance was a valid exercise of the City's broad police power and that there was a rational relationship between the City's decision to limit the number of unrelated individuals who may live together as a single housekeeping unit and the legitimate governmental interests of controlling the undesirable qualities associated with "mass student congestion." View "McMaster v. Columbia Board of Zoning" on Justia Law

Petitioner All Things Possible, Inc. (ATP) sold an undeveloped lot to Respondents Michael and Marsha Moseley. The lot was burdened by an underground, surface-water drainage easement running diagonally across the entire length of the property, essentially cutting the lot in half. ATP, through its agents, was aware of the Moseleys' desire to build a home on the lot. According to the Moseleys, they "absolutely" relied upon the falsified plat in purchasing the lot, together with assurances from ATP related to the Moseleys' ability to build on the lot. As noted by the court of appeals, the Moseleys were induced to purchase the lot without obtaining an independent survey of the property. Conversely, the real estate contract contained standard provisions, including the right of the Moseleys to conduct a title examination and procure a survey of the lot. After purchasing the lot, the Moseleys learned of the easement and the resulting inability to build a home suited to their needs. The Moseleys sued ATP alleging multiple causes of action, including fraud. The matter was tried nonjury solely on the fraud claim. The trial court found that fraud had been established by clear and convincing evidence and awarded actual and punitive damages against ATP. The judgment against ATP was affirmed. On appeal, ATP argued that there was no clear and convincing evidence that it engaged in fraud. Furthermore, ATP argued that the alleged misrepresentation was discoverable in the chain of title, and therefore, the Moseleys' claim should have failed as a matter of law. The Supreme Court disagreed: "constructive notice is 'inapplicable especially 'where the very representations relied on induced the hearer to refrain [from] an examination of the records.'" The Court affirmed the appellate court's decision. View "Moseley v. All Things Possible" on Justia Law

Defendant Jose Lozada appealed the circuit court's order denying his petition for a declaratory judgment to be removed from the Sex Offender Registry. Defendant argued that the crime to which he pled guilty in Pennsylvania—unlawful restraint—was not a "similar offense" to the crime of kidnapping in South Carolina. He accordingly contended that he should not have been required to register as a sex offender for unlawful restraint pursuant to Section 23-3-430(A) of the South Carolina Code (2010). Upon review of the applicable legal authorities, the Supreme Court found that though "kidnapping" allowed for a greater punishment than "unlawful restraint," that fact did not prove that the offenses were not similar because kidnapping included significantly more culpable behavior. Based on the similarity in public policy behind both the Pennsylvania and South Carolina statutes and the fact that all the conduct proscribed under unlawful restraint was proscribed under the kidnapping statute, the Supreme Court found Defendant was properly required to register as a sex offender in South Carolina. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the circuit court's order. View "Lozada v. So Car. Law Enforcement Div." on Justia Law

Emerson Electric Company and its subsidiaries timely filed consolidated tax returns for South Carolina in fiscal years 1999 through 2002. The periods at issue in this appeal were tax years 1999, 2000, and 2001 (license tax years 2000, 2001, and 2002). In its initial returns, Emerson did not claim deductions for expenses related to its receipt of dividends from subsidiary corporations. Emerson later filed amended returns, claiming the deductions and seeking a refund. Emerson's claimed entitlement to the deductions on its South Carolina returns was the question before the Supreme Court. Emerson argued in the that section 12-6-2220(2), as applied, discriminated against non-resident taxpayers in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the record revealed Emerson availed itself of these same deductions numerous times against its taxable income in various other taxing jurisdictions. The Administrative Law Court properly found Emerson failed to carry its burden of proving that the application of section 12-6-2220 violated the Commerce Clause. The Department of Revenue properly disallowed Emerson's related expense deductions. Emerson's related expense deductions were properly allocated to the state of its principal place of business, Missouri. View "Emerson Electric v. So. Car. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Appellant Karen Cole, on behalf of her husband David, sued the Boy Scouts of America, Indian Waters Council Pack 48 after David was injured during a father-son softball game at a family camping trip. Respondent Jeff Wagner and his son were also on the camping trip and were playing on the opposite team from the Coles in the softball game. Apparently, some of the fathers were playing too aggressively in the minds of some participants and hitting the ball with full swings. One of the Scout leaders briefly interrupted the game and asked them to play more safely, fearing that they were putting the scouts in danger. During Wagner's next turn at bat, he hit a double. Another father came up to bat after him and hit the ball into the outfield, potentially allowing Wagner to score. As Wagner reached home plate, he collided with Cole, who had moved on top of the plate, thereby placing his body directly in the baseline. Wagner was running so fast that he was unable to stop or change directions in time to avoid Cole. Upon impact, Wagner flipped in the air and landed on a bat, breaking a rib. Cole suffered a closed head injury and was rendered semiconscious. He then began bleeding and went into convulsions. Cole had to be airlifted to Palmetto Richland Hospital where he spent two days in the intensive care unit. David Jr. witnessed the entire accident in fear that his father was going to die. Cole and his wife Karen, personally and as guardian ad litem for David Jr. brought this action against Wagner, the Boy Scouts of America, Indian Waters Council of the Boy Scouts of America, Pack 48, and Faith Presbyterian Church for personal injury, loss of consortium, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Wagner moved for summary judgment, contending he owed no duty to Cole because Cole assumed the risks incident to the sport of softball. The circuit court granted Wagner's motion. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court: "[e]ven assuming that Wagner's conduct could be characterized as reckless, it was not so reckless as to involve risks outside the scope of softball. ... Even within the context of a contact sport, players owe reciprocal duties to not intentionally injure each other. Cole [did] not allege that Wagner's conduct was intentional nor [did] he allege such recklessness as would fall outside the scope of the game of softball. Thus, Wagner's conduct fell within the duty of care he owed to Cole as a coparticipant in the game." View "Cole v. Boy Scouts of America" on Justia Law

Petitioners Beaufort County and several officials from county boards of elections and registration sought a declaration from the Supreme Court in its original jurisdiction that the General Assembly has neither authorized the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012, nor mandated that Petitioners bear the financial burden of conducting the primary. The South Carolina Republican Party scheduled a Presidential Preference Primary for January 21, 2012. In the 2011-2012 Appropriations Act, the General Assembly provided that filing fees received from candidates to run in primary elections may be used by the State Election Commission to conduct the 2012 Presidential Preference Primary elections. In addition, the State Election Commission is authorized to use funds originally appropriated for ballot security to conduct the Presidential Preference Primary elections and the statewide primaries and runoffs. Petitioners contended the General Assembly did not authorize the State Election Commission or the County Election Commissions to conduct a Presidential Preference Primary in 2012 or any election cycle thereafter. In addition, Petitioners argued the amount set forth in the Appropriations Act were insufficient to cover the actual costs to the counties of conducting the 2012 primary. Because the Court was "firmly persuaded" that the General Assembly, through passage of Provisos 79.6 and 79.12 for fiscal year 2011-2012, intended to suspend the temporal limitation in S.C. Code Ann. 17-11-20(B)(2) (Supp. 2010), the Court entered judgment for Respondents the State Election Commission. View "Beaufort County v. SC Election Commission" on Justia Law

Appellant Alexander Michau appealed a ruling by the Appellate Panel of the South Carolina Workers' Compensation Commission (Commission) denying his claim for repetitive trauma injuries to his shoulders. Specifically, Appellant challenged the Commission's interpretation and application of section 42-1-172 of the South Carolina Code. Prior to his injury in 2008, Appellant did not report any work-related problems with his arms to his employer, although he sought outside treatment. The Commission denied Appellant's claim on the grounds that "the greater weight of the medical evidence reflects [Appellant's] upper extremity and shoulder problems are related to pre-existing osteoarthritis and/or rheumatoid arthritis and not caused or aggravated by his employment with Georgetown County." Appellant disputed the admissibility of the Commission's expert doctor's report under South Carolina Code section 42-1-172 because it was not stated "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty." Appellant argued that without this evidence, the remaining competent evidence would support his claim of sustaining a compensable repetitive trauma injury. The Supreme Court concluded after a review of the Commission's record that the doctor was not Appellant's treating doctor, and his employer sought a medical "opinion" to decide the compensability of Appellant's claim. In this instance, the Court concluded that the doctor's testimony was indeed an "opinion" within the meaning of the Code, and therefore inadmissible against Appellant in adjudicating his claim. The Court reversed the Commission's decision to admit the doctor's medical opinion and remanded the case to determine whether the remaining competent evidence supported Appellant's claim of injury. View "Michau v. Georgetown County" on Justia Law